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Summary 
It is widely agreed that the current industrial zones (IZs) in Egypt are not sustainable and face 
insurmountable environmental problems. This research is guided by an argument considering that the 
problem is in the founding process of the current IZs and, hence, future industrial development in 
Egypt is prone to the same destiny, if it is going to follow the current process, that lacks theorisation. 
This research, therefore, stemmed out of a concern to understand the process which gives shape to 
these IZs, and the factors which govern this process. This is the first crucial step, this research has 
contributed to, towards sustainability of the future industrial development. The importance of taking 
this step increased after the 25th of January Revolution that has put Egypt on the way towards 
democracy and progress after an authoritarian era of governing under which the country had been 
deteriorating.   
Out of this concern, the research theoretically investigated the current position of the Egyptian 
industry from industrial ecology (IE) and governance for sustainable development (SD) perspective. 
Further, a pilot study was conducted, making use of a preliminary conceptual framework for 
sustainable IZs which the research developed from literature on IE and governance for SD. While the 
investigation fell short of providing a full understanding of the process, it was found that Egypt has 
recently made some legal and institutional arrangements to incorporate sustainability. However, the 
debate on the seriousness and effectiveness of these arrangements had been quite contradictory. It was 
also found that the whole founding process of IZs is complex and controlled by the government, 
where the planning phase is the best to allow for participation of partners, as highly called for by the 
international debate on IE. The importance of the role of planning in guiding the implementation of IE 
in communities is also internationally highlighted. Therefore, the research set out to, through 
empirical investigation, understand realities of only the current planning process and its governing 
factors.  
To help do that, this research constructed an in-depth conceptual framework of the planning process 
through which IE could be normatively implemented. The framework guided the empirical qualitative 
study which depended on a multi-stage, multi-method approach with a case study design in its core. 
Three case studies, representing the Industrial Developer Program, the most recent program expected 
to influence the future industrial development and the most advanced case to adopt sympathetic 
approaches to IE and SD concepts, were chosen. Semi-structured interviews with involved key 
partners and experts, primary and secondary documentary data sources, and observations were 
utilised.  
The official and actual planning processes, synthesized in this research, are found to be unsustainable. 
Despite the partial involvement, doubted in its purposes, of industrial developers in the process, the 
IZs planning is conducted through a top down process that suffers from centrality and government 
monopoly of  decision-making in most of the steps. This top down process has been strengthened by 
diminishing the role of regional level, that is supposed to connect the national level to the local one 
back and forth to empower the participatory planning approach. Regarding the factors influencing the 
current process, it is found that the authoritarian nature of the previous regime has deeply/negatively 
influenced the context, shaping the planning process. Authoritarianism has created a set of other 
factors that has flawed the context making it chaotic and disabling for the implementation of SD/IE. 
The research concludes by reflecting on the international debate on IE, presenting, thereafter, a new 
list of barriers to IE implementation. 
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Chapter 1 
1 
 
1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
“Cities are processes, not products” (Abu-Lughod, 1987, p.172). In this research, 
unsustainable Egyptian industrial zones (IZs) are looked at as processes through which the 
built environment of these IZs is founded. This research argues that the problem is in the 
process rather than the product, the ‘how come’ not the ‘know how’. Therefore, the questions 
that have been posed by this research are; what is the process through which the Egyptian IZs 
are planned, is it sustainable, and how and why has it been shaped? Answering these 
questions is seen in this research as the first significant step towards modifying the path of 
industrial development in Egypt towards applying sustainable development (SD) and 
industrial ecology (IE) principles. To answer these questions, this research empirically 
examines the extent to which the framework governing the planning process of IZs, involving 
different players, role of each one, and relationships among them, is ready to enable 
sustainability and IE. The planning process is specifically chosen after a critical theoretical 
investigation of IE and governance for SD that internationally spots a gap between the 
concept of IE and its implementation on one hand, and, more importantly, the need for the 
role of planning in guiding the implementation of IE in communities on the other. Also, the 
selection depended locally on initial results of a pilot study, conducted by this research, to 
investigate different phases of the IZs founding process. The study highlighted the 
importance of the planning phase in allowing a better possibility, compared to other phases, 
for applying participatory approaches. This in total emphasized the significance of examining 
the planning process through which IZs are planned in Egypt.   
This chapter first outlines the background of the governing system in Egypt, the urban and 
industrial movement and its future plan, and the current status of Egyptian IZs. It, then, 
comes up with preconceptions to build up the research argument and focus. Secondly, it 
outlines the argument adopted in this research dealing with IZs as a process, and, hence, 
presents the initial focus of the research, namely; what the process through which Egyptian 
IZs are founded is, whether it is sustainable and applying IE, and how and why this process 
has been shaped. Thirdly, the chapter briefly shows how the research focus on the planning 
process evolved. It also poses the research questions, justifies asking them, and briefly 
summarizes the methodology followed to conduct the empirical study. Finally, this chapter 
outlines the thesis structure.  
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1.2. Background and preconceptions 
1.2.1. Governing system in Egypt 
Egypt has been controlled for many years by an authoritarian regime1. This regime, according 
to the Democracy Index 2010, was ranked 138th among worldwide countries and 12th among 
Arab countries in the list of the most authoritarian regimes (EIU, 2010). It anchored on its 
security arm working on securing and insuring its interests and those of its followers. 
Therefore, the State was controlled by a group that was very connected to the ruling class 
where violations on civil liberties, absence of an independent judiciary, and suppression of 
opponents and criticism of the government, were all characteristics of this regime 
(BikyaMasr, 2010). It was also characterized by centralization of power and absence of the 
true role of the State apparatus where the individual will overwhelmed the social and 
objective requirements (Elbeshry, 2011). Scientific research was ignored (Almasalla, 2009) 
causing organized chaos (Ac-55) reflecting strongly and negatively on all aspects of life in 
Egypt (Elbeshry, 2011).   
While the majority of Egyptians dealt negatively, a category of Egyptians remained coherent 
fighting images of repression, forgery, and corruption despite the harassment and persecution. 
They have been working for a long time to overcome this situation. The last of their trials and 
the strongest was the protest on the 25th of January 2011. The accumulation of internal anger, 
from the characteristics mentioned above, helped develop these protests to be wrapped and 
embraced by the vast majority of the Egyptian people. This led to the popular overwhelming 
revolution that has started toppling the regime in order to begin a new era in Egypt. That is a 
new era of the dominance of the people, activating people’s participation in governing the 
country (Al-Turkey, 2011, Kamel, 2011, Lau, 2011).  
Though there has been a revolution, by default many governing structures and processes 
remain in place or are, at least, not yet replaced in total. Indeed, there are always continuities 
as well as ruptures; therefore, understanding the processes before Jan 2011 is important for a 
better future. 
1.2.2. The current situation of the Egyptian industrial zones 
Egypt faces great threats to sustainability that could broadly harm the society economically 
and environmentally. The governing system and the lack of institutional and legislative 
reform are the most deficiencies that Egypt faces causing deterioration of the environmental 
                                                          
1
 ‘Authoritarian regimes’: regimes which do not apply political pluralism or fair and free elections. They violate 
civil liberties, control media, repress criticism and opposition of the government and lack independent judiciary 
(EIU, 2010). 
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capacity (Esty et al., 2003). The current status of IZs in Egypt is an example for this 
deterioration. It is widely agreed that the existing industrial zones (IZs) in Egypt are not 
sustainable (Shalaby, 2003b, Badr, 2008, Khalifa, 2006, Zahran, 2000, Baligh, 2006) for 
many reasons. Some of them could be briefly stated as follows (Shalaby, 2003b): 
• Several planning schemes of many industrial zones in Egypt, like Badr and Sadat shown 
in next points, have been dramatically altered during implementation where land uses 
have been allocated in a chaotic distribution causing many environmental calamities. 
• The adhesion between IZs and residential areas is common in many cases. For example, 
see Figure (1-1) for Badr city map including its IZ in dark blue. This contradicts 
environmental legislations in terms of keeping a protected unoccupied area (with at least 
5km radius) surrounding the mass of IZs. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Badr city 
Source: (Shalaby, 2003b) 
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• Respecting only the northern direction of wind in allocation of IZs without caring about 
its relationship with residential areas during seasonal changes of wind. Hence, residential 
areas are subjected to polluted winds during many intermittent periods along the year. 
Figure (1-2) shows the case of the residential areas of Sadat City polluted by the eastern 
northern wind from its IZs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Residential Area Industrial Area 
Figure 1-2: Pattern of polluting winds from industrial zone, 
Sadat City 
(Shalaby, 2003b) 
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• There is a dramatic decline in the percentage of total areas of green spaces inside IZs. The 
maximum percentage is around 7% of the total area of an IZ. Figure (1-3) shows the case 
of Sadat city: 0% in both original plan and current situation, and 7% in the new plan. This 
percentage is very low compared to cases from other countries where the average 
percentage is around 40% (see Figure (1-4)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
New Plan  Current Situation        Original Plan 
Figure 1-4: Percentage of green areas in Sadat City 
(Shalaby, 2003b) 
Average  Iwaki  Yamaguchi  Pan Wol Laem Chabang 
 
Figure 1-4: Percentage of green areas in international cases 
(Shalaby, 2003b) 
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• Infrastructure, utilities networks and wastes disposal locations suffer from many 
problems, see Figure (1-5), such as: 
o Same network for sanitary and industrial sewage.   
o Lack of treatment stations for sanitary and industrial sewage in many cases.  
o Lack of secured disposal dump/burial for solid wastes.  
o Lack of secured disposal dump/burial for hazardous wastes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• In respect to wasting water resources, all IZs water networks are served by drinking water 
for all uses that do not need the same degree of pureness (irrigation, water for human 
uses, industrial processing water and pure water for fine and medical industries); see 
Figure (1-6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1-6: Model of current water supply network in many Egyptian cases 
(Shalaby, 2003b) 
The 
Figure 1-5: Model of current sewage network in many Egyptian cases 
(Shalaby, 2003b) 
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1.2.3. Urban and industry evolution 
Industrial movement has strongly progressed after the Revolution of 1952. The priority has 
been given to heavy industries such as: Chemicals, Spinning and Textiles, Metals especially 
Steel and Iron Industries in Helwan. These industries have been regionally concentrated in 
the urban area of The Nile Valley in Upper Egypt, Delta, Alexandria and Greater Cairo (see 
Figure (1-7)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the late 1970s, the Egyptian government has launched its program of founding new cities 
in its vast unoccupied desert. The number of these cities is currently 17 and is expected to rise 
up to 61. Egypt has recently set out to prepare a new national urban development map to 
accommodate double the current population for the year 2050. Within this intended national 
urban plan, industry is one of the main proposed economic bases (Madbouly, 2011). The 
same meaning was confirmed through, Dr. Sami Amer, a member of the multidisciplinary 
team assigned by the General Organisation of Physical Planning to develop the national urban 
development map. He clearly indicated that competitive projects of industry and commerce 
are going to be among the leading economic bases for the new proposed national urban plan 
(Elsaadawi, 2011). To relive the urban development implications on the environment, the 
Locations of Minerals’ Mines 
Industrial Centres 
Figure 1-7: Distribution of industrial centres in Egypt, 1998 
Source: (GOPP, 1998) 
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Egyptian government has recently made institutional arrangements in favour of 
environmental protection, and announced taking steps to incorporate SD and good 
governance, see Chapter 2, Section (2.3.4). 
1.2.4. Preconceptions 
From the above mentioned background, some preconceptions could emerge. These are as 
follows: 
• ‘Chaos’ could be the best word to describe the work system of the State after long 
years in which Egypt had been governed by an authoritarian regime. Industrial 
development system in Egypt is not an exception. However, hopes for change and 
improvement have highly increased. The 25th of January Revolution has opened the 
way to the realization of the Egyptians’ dreams of a modern and democratic State that 
is governed by the people, and is respecting science and considering it the way 
towards a better country. Though there has been a revolution, by default, many 
governance structures and processes remain in place or are at least not yet replaced in 
total. There are always continuities as well as ruptures; therefore understanding the 
processes before Jan 2011 is important. The industrial development processes come 
on top of such sectors for its importance in increasing the national income. In this 
context, analyzing and understanding how processes of industrial systems work and 
what are the factors shaping them, is a necessary step in order to improve the 
functionality of these systems. 
• Existing Egyptian IZs suffer from insurmountable problems and they are not 
sustainable. Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that the process through which these 
IZs have been founded is not sustainable. Yet, Egypt has recently embarked upon 
preparing an ambitious national urban plan for the year 2050, with industry as one of 
its proposed economic bases. If the current IZs founding process is going to control 
the future development of IZs, these future industrial developments are prone to the 
same destiny of lacking sustainability. 
• Though it is possible to speculate very plausibly that the previous regime was chaotic 
in parts, was not committed to sustainability, has deeply influenced all frameworks of 
the State in a negative way, there is a need to know precisely how this chaos and 
unsustainability were embedded in processes, if they are to be changed and improved. 
However, doing so is not easy. Understanding processes within authoritarian regimes 
Chapter 1 
9 
 
is very difficult because there is, by definition, a lack of transparency and democratic 
accountability, see Chapter (4), Section (4.5) for details. 
1.3. Research argument  
Literature on planning for industrial development in Egypt mainly focuses on IZs as products. 
Some literature investigates different urban and environmental problems that IZs physically 
face, see for example Shalaby (2003b), or the environmental dimension affecting urban 
development, see for example Badr (2008). Some other literature is interested in urban 
planning of IZs or specifying environmental or urban considerations to improve urban 
planning of IZs and new cities, see for example Effat (2001), Khalifa (2006) and Shalaby 
(2003b). Some literature also searches the environmental assessment for cities and different 
types of projects, see for example (Zahran, 2000, Baligh, 2006). Literature searching the 
processes of industrial development and IZs is lacking. IZs in Egypt are mainly looked at as 
mere products that need to be improved rather than processes that need to be understood and, 
then, redirected towards better products. This research stems out of a concern of how a 
product can be improved without understanding the process which gives shape to it, and the 
factors which govern this process. The importance of this concern increases when dealing 
with an entity that is produced through a complex socio-political process containing 
continuous interaction of human groups and institutions that is manifested in the social, 
economic, cultural, and indeed, urban life (Shalaby, 2003a).  The urban built environment in 
general and specifically IZs, are produced by such complex processes. Indeed, considers that 
“[c]ities are processes, not products” (Abu-Lughod, 1987, p.172).   
In light of this, this research argues that in order to make the future Egyptian IZs sustainable, 
they have to be looked at as processes not products.  
1.4. Research initial focus 
In light of the preconceptions stated earlier and the research argument dealing with IZs as 
complex socio-political processes, this research has reviewed available literature on 
governance for sustainable development to spot a gap. 
Governance for SD: international discourse 
Jordan (2008), in his review paper, finds that the step beyond grand theories and typologies of 
governance, towards undertaking detailed empirical testing to measure the shift from 
government to governance, is needed. These efforts  need to be focused on governance in a 
more dynamic and interactive manner in order to know what forms of governing lead to what 
Chapter 1 
10 
 
sorts of outcomes (Jordan, 2008). Accordingly, there is a local need for an empirical test to 
measure the extent to which the industrial system in Egypt is moving towards governance for 
SD. The effort in this regard should be directed to study the governing form in Egypt and 
whether it has the potential of producing sustainable IZs.  
Governance for SD in Egypt: 
Review of literature about Egypt to cover the previous stated issue finds that the debate on 
whether the industrial system in Egypt is moving towards governance for SD is quite 
contradictory, discussed in Chapter (2), Section (2.3). On one hand, the governmental rhetoric 
argues that Egypt has planned for sustainability and has achieved a good level, in this regard, 
in industry generally, and regarding the environmental considerations specifically (Mobarak, 
2001, EEAA and Danida-ESP-CEM, 2005, EEAA, 2005, EEAA, 2001). From such rhetoric, 
it could be concluded that the Egyptian Government has a good understanding of concepts 
and principles of governance for SD. Furthermore, the concepts/ideas included in the 
Government publications could theoretically form together a base for a conceptual framework 
for founding sustainable IZs. The question that poses itself is: to what extent are these ideas 
and concepts actually practiced in Egypt? On the other, the literature available to answer this 
question, up to the year 2005, state that the position of Egypt, being an authoritarian state, is 
still away from governance for SD (Hamza, 2005), (Esty et al., 2003), (ESCWA, 2003),  Al-
Deen and El-Kholy (2001) and UNEP (2003). A new SD strategy, which has the ability to 
improve this condition, has become a necessity (ESCWA, 2003). In response to this, the 
Egyptian government has recently made some institutional arrangements in favour of 
environmental protection, and has announced taking steps to incorporate SD and good 
governance, see Chapter (2), Section (2.3.4). Given that the country has been controlled by an 
authoritarian regime that was defied on the 25th of January 2011, it is therefore doubtful that 
the announced steps towards governance for SD are serious and effective. 
Building the initial focus of the research: 
To conclude, Egypt has recently embarked upon preparing an ambitious national urban plan 
for the period up to the year 2050, with industry as one of its proposed economic bases. Yet, 
it is widely agreed that the existing industrial zones (IZs) in Egypt are not sustainable. 
Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that the process through which these IZs have been 
founded is not sustainable. Future industrial developments are prone to the same destiny, if 
the current process is going to control the future development of IZs. In this regard, and in 
line with the international discourse on governance for SD, Egypt has recently taken some 
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steps to apply a governance system that could achieve SD. Yet, the existence of an 
authoritarian state where an inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy has grown causing 
deterioration of the country, led to a revolution on the 25th of January 2011 that has started 
bringing down the previous regime. It is, therefore, doubtful that the steps announced by the 
previous regime towards governance for SD are serious and effective. Given the lack of 
theorization on the founding process of the current IZs, the attempt to understand such a 
process, its governing factors, and the extent to which these factors have effectively 
influenced it towards sustainability constitutes the initial focus of this research.  
1.4.1. Research focus and questions  
The initial focus of looking at the founding process as a whole has been then narrowed down 
to a more specific point focusing on the planning process. Following is the justification of 
doing so. In this research, a preliminary comprehensive conceptual framework for founding 
sustainable IZs has been constructed from the literature reviewed on governance for SD, IE 
and sustainable management of IZs, see Chapter (2), Section (2.4.1) for details. This 
framework has been initially used in a pilot study to investigate the local context, and collect 
available data and literature. The pilot study has come up with some initial results, most 
important of which is that the whole process of founding IZs in Egypt seems to be complex2 
and controlled by the government. In this process, the planning phase stands as the best 
phase, among others, in allowing the intervention of partners other than the government, see 
Chapter (2), Section (2.4.1). It was also found that, according to the limitations of time and 
money, it will be hard to conduct an in-depth research into the comprehensive and complex 
process of founding IZs.  
From an international perspective, an updated literature review on IE finds that IE lacks a 
grand theory/background/design (Agarwal and Strachan, 2006) or a comprehensive 
theoretical framework (Boons et al., 2011) and is subjected to ambiguity (Gibbs and Deutz, 
2005). IE is still in its early stages facing many barriers (McManus and Gibbs, 2008) which 
make a gulf between the idea and its implementation (McManus and Gibbs, 2008, Gibbs and 
Deutz, 2007).  This requires more social research regarding the role of planning in guiding 
the implementation of industrial ecology (Gibbs and Deutz, 2007, Vermeulen, 2007, Welford, 
2004). One of the main reasons behind this gulf is that the developing process of IE faces a 
real obstacle in terms of achieving real cooperation between partners regarding waste 
interchanging. For that reason, many authors argue that planning has a key role in 
                                                          
2
 Especially for such type of research conducted by one researcher with time and money limitations. 
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encouraging new synergies and interchanging behaviour between partners towards advancing 
the implementation of IE in our societies (Roberts, 2004, Tudor et al., 2007, Elabras Veiga 
and Magrini, 2009). From this point of view, the role of planning emerges to guide the 
implementation of IE.  
In light of the foregoing, this research attempts to understand the planning process of 
Egyptian IZs and its governing factors, and examine the degree to which this process 
represents an enabling context for sustainability and IE. Hence, this research attempts to 
answer the following questions:  
1. Does the Egyptian government have an operational planning framework that could 
lead to sustainable industrial zones? 
a. What is the official framework of the process under which the industrial zones 
in Egypt should be planned? 
b. What is the actual process through which the industrial zones are planned? 
c. Consequently, to what extent is the current planning process sustainable and 
applying industrial ecology? 
2. What are the factors that influence/shape the current process through which the 
industrial zones are planned? 
1.4.2. Significance of the research 
As indicated earlier, a scholarly attempt to understand the IZs planning process and the 
factors shaping it in Egypt had not been made prior to this research.  Such an attempt, 
however, seems crucial if industrial development in Egypt is to be directed towards 
sustainability. Also, such an attempt is importantly needed especially after the Egyptian 
context has started to head towards democracy and become more ready to apply scientific 
research after the 25th of January Revolution. 
Further, Chapter (2) has spotted a gap in the contribution of  the Arab countries, one of which 
is Egypt, to the international discourse on environmental sustainability processes (Esty et al., 
2003). Similarly, it was also concluded in Chapter (2), derived from Jordan (2008), that there 
is an utmost need to undertake detailed empirical testing to measure the shift from 
government to governance,  and  know what forms of governing lead to what sorts of 
outcomes. In addition, directing the research to focus on planning, as this research does, is 
internationally needed in guiding the implementation of industrial ecology (Gibbs and Deutz, 
2007, Vermeulen, 2007). It is also needed, according to McManus and Gibbs (2008), to know 
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how decisions are taken regarding industrial development, in reference to acceptance of IE 
and barriers to its implementation from the perspective of various decision-makers. In this 
regard, this research, stands as a contribution to the international discourse as it conducts an 
empirical testing to identify what sort of a planning process leads to the current industrial 
zones in Egypt. It also shows how planning decisions have been made, and the extent to 
which IE is accepted therein and the different barriers facing its implementation.  
 It is hoped that this research could potentially help the international discourse on developing 
more advanced theories on the implementation of IE. 
1.5. Research Methodology 
1.5.1. Case study and research sample 
To answer the research questions, the research strategy depends mainly on a case study 
design. A case study design is considered to be appropriate as case studies can be especially 
useful in explanatory studies of social processes (Yin, 2009). The process of choosing a 
sample is selective and consists of two main steps. The first was to examine different types of 
IZs in Egypt to choose the suitable types for addressing the research questions of this study. 
The criteria used in this step were: the tendency to adopt sympathetic approaches to SD and 
IE, and the potential impact on future development of IZs in Egypt. Out of this step, the 
Industrial Developer Program (IDP) is chosen as the case study. The second step is concerned 
with choosing a representative sample of the chosen case study, the IDP. The criteria used in 
this step were: passing the planning stage and covering different phases of the IDP. Resulting 
from applying such criteria are the following three IPs:    
a. “AL Tagamouat Industrial Park, a fully serviced and integrated industrial park” (Al 
Tagamouat IP), 10th of Ramadan City. 
b. “CPC Egypt, the one stop shop towards building the future” (CPC), 6th of October 
City. 
c. The third IP (IP3)3 
(More details, and justification, are provided in Section (4.3). 
1.5.2. Research methods 
To answer the research questions, the study sought data mainly on two broad issues; the 
process through which IZs in Egypt are planned and whether sustainable, and the factors 
                                                          
3
 The researcher is not able to tell any details that could lead to identify this IP as requested by its executive 
director.  
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which shape this process. The study is qualitative and depended on a multi-stage, multi-
method approach to collect the data needed as follows: 
• To answer the first research question, part a, about the official version of the planning 
process of the IZs, documentary evidences from primary sources were used.  The focus 
was on the establishing laws/decrees of the concerned bodies describing those bodies, 
their roles, and the institutional setup controlling the relationship among them. To identify 
how these legal resources are comprehended by those applying them, it was essential to 
interview a group of governmental top officials. This was also important to fill the gaps in 
the legal documents regarding the details of the process. As approaching governmental 
employees is likely to result in skewed data, it was important to triangulate their 
contribution from academic consultants of those governmental bodies along with 
collecting available data from secondary resources.  
• To answer the first research question, part b and c about the actual planning process of 
IZs and its sustainability status, a case study design was used. To identify the whole 
actual process with its details from different angles; the study depended mainly on 
interviewing different partners involved in a chosen sample of the IPs. To triangulate the 
data expected to be skewed from officials, interviews with consultants of the concerned 
governmental bodies were conducted. To verify the data gained and fill its gaps, 
collecting documentary data, conducting informal discussions with a group of 
professionals, and performing field observations were helpful in this concern.  
• To answer the second question about the shaping factors of the actual planning process, 
building upon the preconceptions that inescapably came out from the case studies, the 
study sought data from a group of key-experts with a broader knowledge on the planning 
process of IZs. The main objective from interviewing those experts was to identify the 
problems of the planning process and to understand why it takes its current shape. Given 
the fact that the researcher interviewed a satisfactory number of experts from different 
backgrounds and collected abundant secondary data, triangulating the data collected was 
possible. 
To conclude, the study applied different methods to acquire different sets of data that 
satisfactorily offered answers to the research questions. Furthermore, this multiple methods 
approach helped triangulating the collected data. 
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1.6. Research structure 
This thesis is constructed in 8 chapters, see Figure (1-8): 
Chapter (1) outlines the background to Egypt’s governing system, the current status of the 
Egyptian IZs, and the urban and industrial movement and its future plan. It also presents the 
argument dealing with IZs as process, and, thus, presents the initial focus of the research 
which is: what the process through which Egyptian IZs are founded is, whether it is 
sustainable and applying IE, and how and why this process has been formed. It then briefly 
shows how the research focus on the planning process evolved, poses the research questions, 
justifies asking them, and briefly summarizes the methodology followed to conduct the 
empirical study. Chapter one lastly outlines the thesis structure.  
Chapter (2) contextualizes the Egyptian case study by briefly discussing the planning 
approaches and models, and Egypt’s situation from them. It then deals with the theoretical 
background extrapolating the Egyptian industry and its position from sustainability and 
governance for SD, as well as the recent institutional/legal developments towards governance 
for SD. It then asks about the extent to which these developments influenced the founding 
process of Egyptian IZs. Further, Chapter (2) shows how the initial comprehensive 
conceptual framework of founding IZs was constructed to investigate the Egyptian context 
and update the relevant literature. It then shows how the pilot study was conducted and how 
the initial outcomes were used with the literature review on IE to narrow down the initial 
focus of research: the founding process, to the main focus of research: the planning process of 
IZs. Thus, the chapter ends with the redefinition of the research questions.   
Chapter (3) presents the conceptual framework of the process through which planning for IE 
could be normatively developed. At first, it justifies the need for such framework to initially 
help in collecting/organizing the data needed to answer the research questions. It then 
addresses the overarching concepts that normatively have to govern the formation of the 
enabling context for the implementation of IE, and the planning process. It also outlines the 
setup of the context in relation to its different components such as education and research, 
institutional and regulatory frameworks, networking, and funding. Furthermore, it lays down 
the planning process nationally, regionally and locally. Chapter (3) lastly uses the materials 
reviewed in the previous three sections to logically build on them towards the construction of 
the framework as a 'whole' in the concluding section.  
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Figure 1-8: Research structure 
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Chapter (4) discusses how the study, needed to answer the research questions, is carried out. 
It discusses the research strategy and explains how and why the case studies were chosen. It 
also justifies how the needed data is derived from primary and secondary resources, and the 
research methods are utilised therein. It then discusses the settings in which the field study 
was carried out. Finally, it shows how ethics are considerably respected, and how the data 
was analysed and reported, along with addressing the instruments used.  
Chapter (5) answers the first part and partially the third one of the first research question. It 
synthesizes the official framework of the State through concluding phases and steps that are 
supposed to be officially followed, as well as main official roles and relationships among the 
relevant bodies in Egypt concerned with the planning process of IZs. It, then, concludes the 
most important characteristics and problems of the State official framework for the planning 
process of IZs.     
Chapter (6) answers the second and third part of the first research question and gives 
preconceptions for the second one. It discusses in details the process through which three 
industrial parks are planned, and the developers’ thoughts on the process they followed as 
well as the problems they faced during the process. It then synthesizes the actual framework 
of the process through which the IPs are planned and gives a discussion that challenges this 
actual framework to the official one. At the end, it concludes a group of preconceptions 
regarding the governing factors shaping the process.    
Chapter (7) answers the second research question. It discusses the factors shaping the process 
through which the IZs are planned. It is divided into six sections addressing: autocratic 
governance and centrality, chaos of the regulatory framework, marginalizing science, 
corrupting the society and marginalizing its will and role, corruption and lack of 
transparency, and conflicts and lacking coordination. At last it concludes and summarizes 
how and why the environmental role and its tools were weakened and marginalized. 
Chapter (8) first synthesizes all together the answers for the research questions that have 
been extensively discussed in the previous three chapters. It provides a simplified construct of 
the current actual framework of the process through which the Egyptian IZs are planned, and, 
more importantly, highlights its governing factors. Secondly, it shows the research's 
contribution to knowledge and reflections of the Egyptian case on the international discourse. 
It finally gives recommendations and avenues for future research. 
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2. CHAPTER TWO: INDUSTRY AND GOVERNANCE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE EGYPTIAN CASE 
2.1. Introduction 
Egypt has recently embarked upon preparing an ambitious national urban plan for the period 
up to the year 2050, with industry as one of its proposed economic bases. Yet, it is widely 
agreed that the existing industrial zones (IZs) in Egypt are not sustainable (Shalaby, 2003). 
Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that the process through which these IZs have been 
founded is not sustainable.  Future industrial developments are prone to the same destiny, if 
the current process is going to control the future development of IZs. In this regard, and in 
line with the international discourse on governance for sustainable development (SD), Egypt 
has recently taken some steps to apply a governance system that achieves SD. Yet, the 
persistence of an authoritarian state where an inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy has grown 
causing deterioration of the country, led to a revolution on the 25th of January 2011 that has 
brought down the previous regime. It is therefore doubtful that the steps announced by the 
previous regime towards governance for SD are serious and effective. Given that theorizing 
on the process through which the current IZs have been founded is lacking, theorizing on 
such process and its governing factors, and examining the extent to which these steps have 
effectively influenced it towards sustainability is the initial focus of this research.   
This chapter, first, contextualizes the Egyptian case study. It starts with a brief discussion of 
planning approaches and models, and Egypt’s situation in relation to them. It then provides 
an overview of the political, economic and industrial structure of the country. The chapter 
then discusses governance for SD. It highlights the gap in the international debate on 
governance for SD then discusses Egyptian industrial development, whether it is sustainable 
and its position in relation to governance for SD in detail. In addition, this chapter illustrates 
the most important legal/institutional arrangements and developments made by Egypt to get 
closer to governance for SD. Finally, the chapter presents a pilot study that the researcher 
conducted to narrow down the initial focus of research towards the main focus of research. 
The pilot study made use of a preliminary comprehensive conceptual framework for founding 
sustainable IZs that the researcher constructed to help investigate the local context and collect 
available data and literature. The pilot study came up with some initial results that were used 
with conclusions from the literature reviewed to narrow down the research focus from the 
founding process to the planning process of IZs. Hence, this chapter presents the initial 
comprehensive conceptual framework of founding IZs, and, then, describes the pilot study 
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steps and the initial outcomes, concluding with the redefinition of the main research 
questions.   
2.2. Egyptian planning approaches 
This section aims to theoretically understand the planning approaches accepted and adopted 
in Egypt. To do so, this section, at first, briefly addresses the evolution of planning 
approaches and models in general as a necessary background to understand the Egyptian 
situation. It then discusses the Egyptian situation from this evolution concluding with the 
most well known and applied approaches and models especially in planning new urban 
communities (including the case studies of this research). By doing so, this section gives an 
important background to understand the prevailing planning thought through which the 
planning process of the current industrial zones has been formulated. It also contextualizes 
the thinking related to governance for sustainable development and industrial ecology 
planning process, as well as the ideas discussed later in this chapter and the one after.   
2.2.1. Evolution of planning approaches and models internationally: 
Spatial planning thought has developed remarkably since the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The evolution of this thought can be divided into four stages. First, the stage before 
the sixties during which comprehensive thought controlled planning focusing only on the 
spatial dimension and with the dependence on the government as the only player. This was 
followed by the sixties stage witnessing the beginning of the concept of public participation. 
Then, there was the stage of the late sixties and early seventies which has seen the deep 
involvement of society in the planning process. Finally the eighties stage with the emergence 
of strategic thinking in dealing with planning and the integration of the various dimensions of 
development; economically, socially and environmentally. The following subsections address 
these different stages. 
2.2.1.1. Pre-sixties 
Since the beginning of the century until the late fifties comprehensive thought controlled 
planning depending on the governments’ role in addressing the consequences  of the first and 
second world wars’ destruction (Friedmann, 1987). Therefore, this thought has been 
interested in the spatial dimension of development (Healey et al., 1982) through setting urban 
plans to connect city parts to each other. These plans relied on social and economic 
predictions set for long periods of time (Cresswell, 1984). This thought has been adopted by a 
set of traditional planning approaches that consider only the spatial dimension in planning 
where the planning process is controlled by the State planning institutions. In these 
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approaches, a comprehensive solution to all problems is provided along with assuming 
complete control of all inputs and outputs of urbanism (Ahmed, 2007). These approaches 
could be summarized as follows: 
• Physical Planning Approach: it is the gateway affecting planning applications since the 
beginning of the century until the late fifties (Greed, 1999). Planning is considered as a 
process exploiting resources (which are rare in most cases) to improve the physical 
environment (built environment) (urban structure - roads - network infrastructure etc.). 
Despite the scarcity of resources, the expected outcomes of planning must be substantial 
(Healey et al., 1982). 
• Rational planning approach: considers planning as a process that needs for its completion 
the availability of all information, facts, theories and ideas about the problems requiring 
solutions. This is in order to generate a large number of comprehensive alternatives and 
evaluating them in light of the criteria related to the objectives. The comprehensive 
rational planning approach is often associated with planning activities related to the 
governmental public sector (Ahmed, 2007). 
• Finally, the most famous of these approaches is the top-down planning approach adopting 
the State’s full control of the planning process through its planning institutions that have 
the upper hand in decision-making to achieve the supreme goals and policies of the State 
(Greed, 1999). 
As for the planning models adopting these approaches they are: 
1- Central Planning Paradigm: this model was put by Person in 1934 (Friedmann, 1987). 
It adopts the institutional thought of planning demonstrating the comprehensive role 
played by State planning institutions in the planning process. It considers that these 
institutions in coordination with each other are able to produce successful and 
effective planning. This model is applied in communities where planning institutions 
of the State have the sole decision-making authority and control of the planning 
process. A society in which this approach is applied is; one where its members lack 
the understanding of the importance of participation in decision-making (Ahmed, 
2007). 
2- Rational comprehensive planning model: this model dominated the theories of urban 
planning in the fifties and early sixties (Breheny et al., 1985). It seeks to provide 
comprehensive solutions known as master plans. These are plans that determine the 
future land uses distribution in the targeted urban space (Greed, 1999). The planning 
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process within this model seems to be a multifaceted process where it involves several 
concurrent trends that are considered at the same time (urban, social, economic, 
available resources and environmental dimensions). The planning process is 
theoretically a dynamic process (Levy, 1988). However, in reality, the comprehensive 
planning product, a master plan, is a rigid product making a picture of the future 
difficult to change as it depends on calculations of predictions of social and economic 
conditions for time periods of up to 25 years. Thus, this model is to be followed when 
the planning context is a semi-constant context characterized by slow change. This 
context may not be available in practice due to the correlation between urbanism and 
society characterized by complexity and rapid change (Abu-Lughod, 1987). Moreover 
it is related to the existence of some kind of centrality, where because of its 
comprehensiveness its application requires an organizational structure involving all 
relevant bodies and organizations of the State (Ahmed, 2007). This model follows a 
series of procedural steps as follows: clarification and goal setting, systematic 
analysis, logical generation of rational alternatives, systematic evaluation for these 
alternatives, and monitoring performance (Healey et al., 1982). 
2.2.1.2. Sixties 
Planning thought started to change gradually by the late fifties and sixties through criticizing 
physical planning theory. A new thought that adopts a view that as long as planning is for 
people so it must come  from the people and their needs in parallel with the physical design 
of cities, has emerged (Greed, 1999). Planning has also become more interested in identifying 
the potential of sites and working on optimizing and taking advantage of them. This is carried 
out along with a focus on social issues and promoting economic development without 
harming the surrounding environment (Hughes, 1984). Therefore, the sixties witnessed the 
emergence of the principle of public participation in the planning process (Greed, 1999). 
Consequently, a set of approaches that interacted with this thought emerged as follows: 
• Choice Planning Approach: it was concerned with the procedure followed to achieve the 
technical product (plans) more than its interest with the product itself, to ensure the 
integration of the people’s needs in planning. Therefore, it focused on how to identify 
different views of the community members and their needs through a set of choices and 
planning perceptions. These are reconciled with each other to choose the closest view to 
the community needs as much as possible (Breheny et al., 1985). As for the methods that 
fall under this approach, they are:  
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1. Advocacy Planning Model: it appeared in the sixties, promoted by Paul Davidoff. 
This was in an attempt to compensate for the inability of the traditional 
comprehensive approaches to consider the needs and interests of the poor in planning. 
So, he tended to consider the community as an entity where powers and authority are 
to be distributed without the control of one group on the society as a whole. Through 
this understanding he considered that planning must take into account the desires and 
needs of all segments of society. Advocacy planning relies on the presence of a 
planning perception or alternative for each group of people to achieve their objectives 
and address their problems through the provision of alternative satisfactory solutions 
to them. This is followed by reconciling different scenarios and alternatives for all 
groups to reach an urban plan taking into account the public interest (Ahmed, 2007). 
2. The emergence of Advocacy Planning was accompanied by Etzioni's writings on 
interwoven planning. It presents a combination of the authority’s views and society’s 
categories. As Etzioni mentioned, such planning takes place in societies which can 
express their goals and views. Accordingly, the consensual planning model emerged. 
In this model all categories of society contribute along with interest groups and 
planners in the formulation of the planning objectives.  Planning, considering these 
objectives, is to be developed and its implementation is to be controlled, by the higher 
State levels (Friedmann, 1987). Therefore this model is considered as a transit point 
between the State’s full control of the planning process, what happened in the first 
period of the twentieth century, and between what is proclaimed in the second half of 
the twentieth century through the need to include the community and its needs in the 
planning process (Ahmed, 2007). 
• One of the most famous planning approaches expressing urban planning thought in this 
period is the Incremental Planning Approach. It promotes the idea of society’s 
involvement in the planning process and makes it achievable. This is because developing 
comprehensive planning solutions is performed by planning institutions where citizens are 
not able to understand or participate in them realistically. This approach focuses on 
solving some urgent problems of the current situation without changing the urban 
framework involving these problems (Friedmann, 1987), making it easier for citizens' 
participation in decision-making about them. The planning models falling under this 
approach are: 
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1- Incremental Planning Model (1963) evolved by Charles Lindblom, in an attempt 
to address the criticisms made against the comprehensive model (Friedmann, 
1987). The criticism made of the comprehensive planning model, by Herbert 
Simon and others based on two important elements: the difficulty of dealing with 
the tremendous amount of information required by the comprehensive planning 
model, as well as the difficulty of drafting a large number of comprehensive 
alternatives including solutions to all problems or a faithful reflection of the 
reality. One of the most important criticisms made against the incremental 
planning model is that it provides partial solutions to the problems in the form of 
projects that cannot be aggregated together into a plan or a collective vision 
(Ahmed, 2007). Therefore, the incremental model deals with urban problems by 
providing gradual solutions to them according to the priorities of those problems 
to the society being planned for (Friedmann, 1987). This model can be applied in 
rapidly changing planning contexts that fit the cumulative steps method in 
decision-making which is a characteristic of incremental planning. It requires the 
existence of a decentralized system in decisions making that enables actors make 
their decisions without referring to central authorities. It is also preferred when 
there are limited time and resources available for the study (Ahmed, 2007). 
2- Mixed scanning planning model (1968) developed by Etzioni as a solution or 
compromise between the comprehensive and incremental planning models. It is 
applied through the division of decision making into two levels: a higher level 
involving decision-making regarding integrated planning visions for long periods 
of time and the lower level, where decisions related to detailed areas (Levy, 1988). 
It can be applied in changing planning contexts, where through this model detailed 
plans for smaller areas are progressively placed (depending on their vulnerability 
to changes in the society or depending on the emergence of a certain problem in 
those areas). It can also make adjustments quickly and easily on the plans of those 
small areas and what results from the modification of the action plan at the level 
of the larger domains. This model depends on the presence of the central system 
for coordination (Ahmed, 2007). 
2.2.1.3. Late sixties and early seventies: 
It was realized that the previously discussed models were not effective in involving the public 
and considering their needs and interests in the planning process. Planners began, by the late 
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1960s and early 1970s, to seek new approaches that instead of considering public 
participation as a complementary method to the normal traditional planning process, 
suggested that effective participation has to be a central goal. The public was encouraged to 
have an active role in setting up the policy process. Planners, therefore, acted as managers 
who distribute information and as feedback sources.  
Accordingly, the radical planning approach emerged in application of this thought (Lane, 
2005). Also the bottom-up planning approach appeared which considered planning as an 
activity starting from the society that does not require to be managed by the State alone. It 
may start from the society and be managed by either society or in partnership between the 
State and the society (Ahmed, 2007). The following planning models are an expression of 
these approaches: 
1- Participatory Planning Model (1969): it emerged through several scholars; two of the 
best known of whom are Lichfield and Travis. It is based on the idea of partial or total 
embedding of the society in the planning process and specifically in policy-
formulation and decision-making. Thus, solutions resulting from this model are not 
decisions taken from the upper levels of the State. However, they reflect the desired 
conditions by the society as well as its needs and interests. This is due to these 
solutions being deduced by the members of the society in collaboration with the 
planning teams (Ahmed, 2007). 
2- The idea of involving societies in the planning process was followed by the need for a 
curriculum to teach the members of society how to participate in planning and how to 
express their views and needs. Therefore, the Social Learning Planning Model 
emerged from many, among them Dunn and Schon. This model aims at training the 
community members to change from not participating in the planning process to 
effective positive participation (Healey et al., 1982). The application of this model 
requires a kind of change in the State planning institutions to guide and direct the 
members of society on how to identify their goals and express them. This model is 
followed in societies that are in the process of transition from central to decentralized 
decision-making. Therefore, the State becomes aware of the importance of preparing 
members of society to actively participate in the planning process. All of this is in 
light of the availability of community financial resources for requirements of the 
social learning model from tools and teaching aids (Ahmed, 2007). 
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2.2.1.4. Eighties onwards: 
In 1982 the Strategic Planning Model appeared in an attempt to avoid the disadvantages of 
the previous approaches and ideas, as a compromise between their models and in particular 
between the comprehensive and incremental ones, and also for more activation of the concept 
of public participation. Although the roots of this model date back to the twenties of the last 
century, it was not used in urban planning until the early eighties. It puts forward a future 
vision for urban communities through analysing the relationship with the external 
environment, and exploiting resources of these communities’ sites along with involving the 
public in taking decisions in the planning process. Accordingly, appropriate strategies to 
reach that vision (long-range strategies) are then developed. The next step is to prepare urban 
plans, followed by action programs. These are not long-range plans, but rather incremental 
ones to measure reactions of the economic, social and urban systems to gradually develop the 
vision and thus adjust next stage plans based on extrapolations of such reactions. Therefore, 
this model is characterized by being holistic in developing strategic issues and forming the 
future vision (which is reflected on the formulation of strategies) on one hand. On the other, it 
is characterized by interim decision-making to achieve this vision. This model is considered 
as the most appropriate model dealing with changing planning contexts, because of its 
reliance on the provision of interim planning solutions fitting the change in those contexts. It 
can also be applied in central and decentralized communities, but better results arise when 
applied in decentralized contexts, where incremental goals in each stage are more easily 
applied without being restricted to the routine imposed by central system in decision-making 
(Ahmed, 2007). 
2.2.2. The planning approaches: the Egyptian situation1 
After presenting thoughts, approaches and models of planning in general from a global 
perspective, this section deals with the application of urban planning models used in Egypt in 
planning new urban communities (where the case studies of this research locate), their 
extensions, or updating their plans. This section also addresses the circumstances 
accompanying the application in each of these models. Those models are the comprehensive, 
central, strategic and incremental planning models. 
2.2.2.1. Comprehensive Planning model: 
The Comprehensive Planning Model is the most popular model. Moreover, until recently it 
was the only model applied in planning new urban communities in Egypt or their extensions 
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 (Ahmed, 2007) is the main reference for this sub-section unless stating other references.  
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as well as in updating their plans. Regarding the appropriateness of this model to the 
circumstances surrounding the planning process, it was noted that it was inadequate to some 
objectives’ levels being applied in Egypt, causing a waste of time and resources. This is 
because this model puts overarching objectives and then tries to achieve them through the 
planning process in order to provide comprehensive solutions. Whereas planning new urban 
communities, updating their plans and planning their extensions cannot be considered 
altogether by putting comprehensive objectives and solutions as in the Egyptian case. For 
example, planning new urban communities starts with developing general objectives that 
reflect the targeted situation for urban communities. However, it is difficult to resolve a 
comprehensive solution to achieve all such objectives at once as it will become illogical and 
difficult to achieve. This is what actually happened in the vast majority of constructed 
communities where they encountered great difficulties in the implementation of their plans or 
in reaching the targeted population. They were developed to accommodate a range of 
between 500 thousand to one million in population while the numbers settled is much lower 
(Shalaby, 2003). The importance of such general objectives is to guide planners preparing for 
the future vision in drawing the picture of the relationship between the new urban community 
and the surrounding urban communities and how to exploit the city resources to achieve its 
objectives in the long run. Upon dealing with the urban expansions of new cities, or when 
updating their plans, it is necessary to develop benchmarks/intermediate objectives. It is also 
important to gather information gives a general picture of the relationship of the new entity 
with its surrounding area and the target of this expansion or updating. Therefore, the use of 
the comprehensive planning model therein is a kind of wasting of resources and effort in 
gathering information about the community as a whole and in formulating planning solutions 
for it. Thus it does not require the development of comprehensive goals and solutions, but 
rather needs incremental targets easily accessed for the development of a real effective and 
urgent development. 
As for degree of change of the planning context and its fitness with the model; the theoretical 
case for applying the comprehensive planning model is in semi-fixed planning contexts as 
previously noted. And where the planning environment in Egypt is characterized by being 
changing and it can even be described as rapidly-changing in some cases, so the application 
of the comprehensive planning model in Egypt was not suitable for such planning context. 
This is due to the difficulty of applying the comprehensive planning model thought for its 
dependence on the socio-economic studies results (difficult to be stable for long periods of 
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time), which are usually built on specific numerical equations for long periods of time 
reaching up to twenty-five years. Then results are translated into housing, activities and 
services programs. Therefore, land use plan (the general plan) is difficult to implement due to 
the difficulty of achieving economic and social indicators found in this plan. This is because 
the Egyptian context is actually erratic due to change of time, decision-makers and planners 
as well as social and economic data. This is what makes the technical product of the 
comprehensive planning model; the master plan, is a static product, unable to keep up with 
the changes occurring in the planning context. Later on, it becomes different to the reality on 
the ground. 
Regarding participation of the concerned parties: it was found that the State remains the party 
in control of the planning process in Egypt in line with what mentioned before that this model 
is theoretically linked to the State control and the centralized decision-making. The State in 
this concern was adopting the Central Planning Model discussed in the next section. 
2.2.2.2. Central Planning Model: 
The Central Planning Model was found by Person in 1934 (Friedmann, 1987) to be in 
control2 in managing participation of concerned parties and their roles in the planning 
process. In this model, the central authority was determined in planning new urban 
communities, by itself or through contracting consultancy offices. This is to control the 
planning work and technical product of the planning process achieving the government 
objectives in line with the high Sate policies. Regarding the adequacy of this model to the 
planning context, it was found that; at the goals level the model has been used with all 
holistic goals levels as well as the incremental goals emphasizing the State control. Regarding 
the degree of change in the planning context, as in the comprehensive planning case, 
inadequacy of the central planning model was observed. Whereas it is theoretically possible 
to apply the central planning model in traditional semi-fixed contexts, it is noted that the 
planning context in Egypt is erratic but with the availability of multiple groups ready and 
even having the desire to participate. Thus, the application of this model in Egypt was not 
suitable for the planning context. Intervention of the central authority in the specialists’ work 
was also noted in site selection and preparation of the comprehensive plans of new urban 
communities. Therefore, local planning (new city plan) becomes just plans controlled by the 
general State policy rather than being plans resulting from the potential and requirements of 
                                                          
2
 With the exception of only one case which is the attempt to apply the social learning planning method/model 
in case of planning Eltagamoe Elawal to activate the role of the society members in the planning process. 
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the planned region of each of these urban communities. Neither is it resulting from 
development potentials of sites of the urban communities. Furthermore, central planning 
results in insufficiency in the development plans due to blocking the views of specialists by 
the central authority. In addition, centrality and the State control of decision-making 
eliminate participation of citizens in development and in taking fateful decisions. 
2.2.2.3. Strategic Planning and Incremental models  
Strategic and incremental planning models have been used respectively in one case which is; 
the new Heliopolis city, a business sector-owned city. This has been a good start to use 
models that are commensurate with the nature of the planning context in Egypt characterized 
by continuous change (Ahmed, 2007). This is considered as the only case for the use of 
models outside the central and comprehensive planning frameworks before issuing the 
Unified Building Code recently in 2008. This law involved obliging the State bodies with 
carrying out strategic planning for the Egyptian cities and villages (Mubarak, 2008b). Since 
then the State has swept in making strategic plans for the Egyptian villages and cities whether 
existing or new ones applying the strategic planning model accompanied by public 
participation in planning decision-making (Ac-G-11)3. However, the conditions associating 
the application represented in; the State control and centralized decision-making have 
prevented the effective application of this model or the public participation principle. The 
implementation has been characterized by procedural steps without effective achievement of 
the targeted job or benefit from the strategic planning model or planning by participation. 
This is in addition to the legislative and procedural flaws that accompanied the 
implementation and failed planning projects of cities and villages (De-G-37, En-25)  4 . 
To conclude, Egypt until now experiences the application of planning thoughts, approaches 
and models of the sixties era. The nature of the ruling regime in Egypt is based on centrality 
in decision-making and State control of the planning process created a context where 
adopting the comprehensive and central planning models was regarded as being appropriate 
to the nature of thought and desires of the successive governments in Egypt. This is done to 
ensure the governments’ control over the planning process as is the case in the other areas of 
the State. This context also had a strong influence on the delayed adoption of strategic 
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  An indication for an interview/ee, it may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
4
 Chapters from the fifth to the seventh deal with this subject in detail. 
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planning approaches and public participation until 2008 despite their knowledge to the world 
since the sixties to the eighties of the last century. In addition to the delay in application, this 
context has deprived the application of its meaning and limited it to procedural forms 
preventing any tangible benefit from its implementation. 
The empirical part of this research examines in detail the impact of the State regime on the 
planning process and in particular the planning of industrial zones in Egypt. Furthermore, 
because of the clear influence of the regime on the planning process, the next sections of this 
chapter address the literature discussing governance for sustainable development. This is 
from a global perspective first and then locally in Egypt searching for gaps in both 
perspectives that this research can work to contribute for filling. It is also in order to identify 
lessons that can be used in analyzing and then understanding the process through which 
industrial zones in Egypt are planned.  
2.3. Industrial development in Egypt: the relationship with SD and good 
governance  
This section, seeks to contextualize the Egyptian case study, and provides a brief overview of 
the political, economic and industrial structures of the country. It then discusses governance 
for SD internationally, at first, then in the Egyptian case. It discusses the industrial 
development policies and foundations showing that the Government acceptably understands 
SD. This section then reviews available literature to examine the practice of this 
understanding, concluding the faraway position of Egypt from the application of SD and GG. 
It then addresses different recent arrangements and steps that Egypt has made targeting 
effective application of sustainability.   
2.3.1. Industry in Egypt  
2.3.1.1. Politics, economy and industrial structures in Egypt: background 
The modern era in Egypt started by Mohammad Ali taking over to rule in the year 1805, 
where he sought to build a strong state based on organized modern industry to make Egypt 
self-sufficient. The industry at his time has significantly evolved whereby a major industrial 
base was established including textile, sugar, extraction of oils, chemicals, rice mills 
industries and military industry (SIS, 2011a). Through Mohammad Ali’s attempt to break 
away from the Ottoman Empire, foreign countries and notably Britain intervened and 
threatened Mohammad Ali. Accordingly, the Treaty of London in 1840 was imposed giving 
him the hereditary rule of Egypt but as a part of the Ottoman Empire properties. Since that 
time, foreign financial and political control of Egypt made it a colony without the need of 
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military battles. Egypt then in 1882 has been occupied by Britain (SIS, 2011b). Despite all of 
this, the Egyptians attempts to establish an industrial base continued. Banque Misr founded in 
1920 with Egyptian capital has led a campaign for the advancement of the Egyptian industry. 
The bank succeeded in establishing an industrial base including a series of big companies and 
factories (SIS, 2011a).  
With the continued occupation, the general atmosphere in Egypt deteriorated and peaked with 
Arab defeat in the War of Palestine 1948, paving the conditions for the 23rd of July 1952 
revolution (SIS, 2011b). Accordingly, the monarchy was ended and the republic was 
proclaimed leading to the independence and evacuation of British colonialism from Egypt in 
1956. Egypt in this period tended to ally with the Soviet Union and apply the socialist 
economy. The most important features of this period was the national comprehensive 
planning, discussed in the previous section (LAS and AU, 2011). Thus, Egypt faced a new 
wave of industrialization based mainly on governmental efforts where this period saw the 
emergence of numerous strong national industries aiming at achieving self-sufficiency and 
building a strong industrial base (Mobarak, 2001). This was based mainly on heavy industries 
such as iron and steel, mining, petroleum and chemical industries in addition to spinning and 
textiles and food industries (SIS, 2011a). 
Egypt then entered many wars where the concept of a war economy dominated. The economy 
suffered from a problem of financing the State plan and policies that were serving the 
liberation of the Egyptian territory. This had a negative impact on the industrial sector. This 
period ended by Egypt’s victory in October war 1973 which paved the way to the peace 
treaty in 1979 and the evacuation of the Israeli occupation of Sinai. On the peace road, a new 
phase in the industrial development has started and the slogan of “Made in Egypt” has 
become a national objective (SIS, 2011a). Egypt has witnessed the application of the 
‘economic openness’ and the start to involve the private sector in development (Mobarak, 
2001). After ex-President Mubarak had come to power in 1982, Egypt returned to the 
comprehensive national planning while maintaining the policy of economic openness and 
encouraging investment. This period was marked by the attention to the implementation of 
infrastructure and scheduling debt. There was also an interest in a transition to a market 
economy and the application of privatization while maintaining the State role in 
macroeconomic management to ensure price stability, justice in distribution and antitrust 
rules (LAS and AU, 2011).  
Chapter 2 
31 
 
Since 1990 until now, Egypt is officially (according to the governmental rhetoric) in the 
reform stage. According to the Government, the reform is a shift to market mechanisms and 
the adoption of policies to address cash and structural deficiencies, the implementation of 
privatization programs, and liberating the public sector (SIS, 2011a).  This period witnessed  
governmental rhetoric on advancing the Egyptian industry to move from manufacturing phase 
for the replacement of imports to the phase of manufacturing for export (LAS and AU, 2011). 
Accordingly, The Egyptian Government, by the beginning of the 21st century, has linked 
industry with the external and internal trade under one ministry to undertake tasks of 
improving the Egyptian economy and raising competitiveness of the Egyptian product. It was 
also tasked with updating Egyptian industry and increasing exports to join effectively the 
global economy. Furthermore, the new ministry sought to improve the investment atmosphere 
institutionally and legislatively to encourage private sector to participate in economic 
development (SIS, 2011a). For the application of these policies, the year 2007 witnessed the 
introduction of the 2007/2012 five year plan aiming at achieving an annual growth rate of 8% 
and reduction of the inflation rate to 5% by the end of the plan (LAS and AU, 2011). The 
plan in the sector of industry depended mainly on a project, known as 1000 factories project5 
(SIS, 2011a), and the initiation of the Industrial Developer Program that involves the private 
sector as a partner in developing industrial zones for the first time (discussed in detail in 
Chapter (6)).  
There are a wide range of political and economic debates on the seriousness and credibility of 
the performance of successive governments specially during the last 5 years after the 
complete association between money and power in ruling the country. This resulted in 
increasing of poverty of the poor class at the expense of the middle one. The previous regime 
was characterized with monopoly, corruption, election fraud crudely at all levels and the 
repression of opponents. All of this led to the revolution of January 25, 20116, discussed in 
Section (1.2.1). 
2.3.1.2. Properties, supporting factors and importance of industry: 
Industry in Egypt is based on seven industries constituting more than 80% of industrial 
establishments. Engineering, electronic and electric industries ranked first with 30% of the 
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 It is proved in Chapter (6 and 7) that the Government used this project for propaganda purposes without real 
implementation as announced. 
6
 Egypt entered after this revolution in a provisional reign synchronized with the time of writing these lines and 
expected to last until end of 2013 according to the announced timetable. Therefore, as the research is expected to 
be completed early in 2012, it is hard to expect the views of the incoming regime especially economically, 
environmentally and the impacts of this on the development of the Egyptian industrial zones. 
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total industrial production. Food, beverages and tobacco industries came next with 23% 
followed by chemical industries with 15% and spinning, textile, clothes and leather industries 
around 10%. These four sectors are important sectors in the Egyptian economy in 
contribution to the overall industrial production and their ability to absorb labour and wage 
level. In 2005 these sectors possessed about 78% of the industrial production and 58% of the 
total industrial investments with approximately 79% of total employees (IDA, 2011b). As 
regarding geographical distribution of industrial enterprises, see Figure (1-7), it is found that 
89% of the industrial production is concentrated in Cairo and northern regions while the 
remainder, about 11%, is concentrated in Upper Egypt. This led the Egyptian government to 
recently give more attention to Upper Egypt. Industrialization in Egypt depends on natural 
resources and labour. It also relies on the use of technology, although most of it is imported 
(Mobarak, 2001) but this has helped the Egyptian industry to enter the areas of hi-tech and 
software industries and micro-electronics industries (IDA, 2011b). 
Egypt has many factors supporting the development of industry. Egypt lies on the crossroad 
of the ancient continents, bordered by two seas, overseeing two gulfs and on its land runs the 
Suez Canal (IDA, 2011e). Labour is cheap and abundant (IDA, 2011d). There is a large 
diversity in resources ranging from agriculture production and livestock, a wealth of 
important minerals and quarry products, and petrol and natural gas. Though having 55.5 
billion cubic meters yearly from the Nile River, in addition to rains and ground water, water 
resources are considered somewhat limited as compared to increasing demand and needs. 
Means of transportation are available including a network of highways, airports and harbours 
(IDA, 2011a). There is a diversity of energy sources from electricity, petrol (oil), natural gas 
to renewable sources such as solar and wind energies (Mobarak, 2001). According to the 
governmental rhetoric, Egypt also seeks to improve the investment atmosphere by 
simplifying procedures, offering incentives to investors, holding international trade 
agreements that allowing Egypt to enter new markets (IDA, 2011c). The Government provide 
technical/training support services beside the system of specialized international exhibitions 
(NDP, 2009). 
With the growing population in Egypt, the importance of industry increases due to many 
factors, on top of which come creating jobs and raising living standards of citizens. Industry 
is considered as the cornerstone of economic development (Mobarak, 2001). That is why it 
occupies a leading position in the Egyptian economy and comes in the forefront of economic 
sectors in terms of its contribution to the GDP (about 17.5% in 2005 to 2006). The 
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contribution of the industrial sector in the GDP was by 275.3 billion pounds of which the 
private sector contributed by 81.3% while the public sector contributed the remaining 18.7% 
(SIS, 2011a). 
To conclude, the difficult political life in the modern era in Egypt due to occupation, wars 
and corrupt regimes over the past two centuries did not qualify or help Egypt to achieve a 
substantial and continuous development in programs directed to the creation of a stable and 
modern industrial base7, despite multiple promotion waves. The Industrial development in 
this context has passed through different stages starting from social economy till the 
transformation to the free market economy where privatization programs took place. This 
difficult life has affected the administration system and the successive governments in Egypt 
especially during the last three decades. This governing system has been led to focusing on 
the economic element in successive plans regardless of any other considerations. The existing 
industrial base therefore, has been formed mostly from polluting industries that are 
concentrated in the populated areas causing harm to people and the environment (Hamza, 
2005). However, industry is very important for Egypt to increase the production and raise the 
living standards of the Egyptian people. Reforming the governing system to adopt 
sustainability principles in industrial development is crucial. The next section, therefore, 
discusses governance for SD: first, the international discourse and, second, the debate on 
whether industrial development in Egypt approaches sustainability.  
2.3.2. Governance for SD: the international discourse8 
This section addresses briefly the meanings of ‘governance’ and ‘sustainable development’ 
(SD) to assess the cumulative knowledge they built through and the attempts that have been 
made to build empirical and/or theoretical bridges between the two terms. This section then 
synthesizes a conclusion from revision of both terms identifying the gaps in knowledge 
regarding them.   
  
                                                          
7
 In support, UNEP, (2003) reads: “Data released in 2003 indicate that economic growth in the [Arab] region 
was affected by war and instability and is lagging behind the world average.” P.1. 
8 In late 2007, Andrew Jordan reviewed a wide range of literature  published over the last decade or so on 
'sustainable development' and 'governance' in a paper entitled: “The governance of sustainable development: 
taking stock and looking forwards” (Jordan, 2008). The purpose is to explore the meanings of these two terms 
and to assess the cumulative knowledge built through the attempts that have been made to form empirical and/or 
theoretical bridges between the two terms. In late 2009, he revisited his paper to examine any changes that could 
contribute to the international debate on this regard (Jordan, 2009). This section depends mainly on these papers 
unless stating other references. 
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2.3.2.1. The debate on and  meanings of the terms 
1. Sustainable Development  
The UN Brundtland Commission has presented a definition which has become the most 
quoted definition of SD that meets “the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs” (UN, 1987). SD is still a set of guiding and, in 
practice, highly contradictory concept than a precisely defined scheme. However, most 
scholars now accept that SD would fall down if it was defined precisely and defining SD is 
not even possible. SD with its two contradictory themes and the creative tension between 
different social and ecological contexts, is what has given SD its staying power. Therefore, 
the need for governance systems that resolve such conflicts reaching coordinated policies is 
crucial (Jordan, 2008).  
2. Governance 
Governance differs from governing or government. Governing refers to social activities 
which make effort to guide or manage societies. On the other hand, governance describes the 
emerging patterns from the governing activities of social, political and administrative actors.  
From another side, while government focuses on institutions and actions of the state, 
governance involves nongovernmental organisation/actors into all societal 
steering/management. The debate about governance and what achievements the term reached 
is still a mess. While Jordan (2008) considers that some agenda like the UN Agenda 21 barely 
constructed a precise blueprint, others say that governance lacks the consensus on which 
group of phenomena can be grouped under the term. Therefore, the debate continues to find 
this consensus and address how to govern for SD (Jordan, 2008).  
3. Governance for Sustainable Development 
It could be from the foregoing that the debate on both terms is a mess where the two terms are 
highly ambiguous terms which if dealt with in a loose way, may slow up rather than make a 
cumulative research. The relationship between governance and SD in this context can be 
approached from three disciplinary perspectives. The first is concerned with building a 
theory; namely ‘governance as theory’, for different purposes. For some authors like 
Biermann (2006) and Richards and Smith (2002), governance is a ‘descriptive label’ and will 
forever remain like this. Others have sought to use it in a more theoretical approach to 
illustrate some of the empirical patterns of governance. Flinders (2002), as an example, has 
sought to advance a ‘governance theory, to raise issues of control, coordination, 
accountability and political power. Jordan (2008) states that exponents of ‘governance as 
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theory’ are relatively modest in their claims and Young (2005), in support, mentioned that 
there is not and never will be a grand `theory of governance' (Jordan, 2008).  
The second is `governance as an empirical phenomenon' that describes what has been done to 
put SD into action. The literature here remained in the area of discursive ‘smoke’ but with 
small empirical ‘fire’. In this context, the majority of countries, through their national 
environment ministries, are still elaborating the first SD strategy over a decade after Rio. 
After, adopting new environmental policy instruments increased massively, but too little is 
known about their performance to make definitive judgments about their effectiveness 
(Jordan, 2008). 
The third is `governance as a normative prescription' that illustrates what should possibly be 
done to apply SD. In this context, ‘good governance’ is one of the most well-known 
constructions9 which strongly associated with the work of development organisations such as 
the World Bank. Governance therein is associated with an efficient public service, an 
independent judiciary, a publicly accountable system for collecting and allocating funds, a 
respect for law, order, and human rights (Jordan, 2008).  
Finally, the vast majority of contributions in such a debate are either empirical or normative, 
or some combination of the two with a limited dialogue between them. Very few attempts 
have been made to produce a dedicated ‘theory of sustainable development governance’ 
(Jordan, 2008).  
2.3.2.2. What efforts is required and in which direction? 
Scholars, like Kooiman (2003), and Van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004), mentioned 
that there is certainly a need to move beyond grand theories and typologies of governance, 
and to undertake more detailed empirical testing better to measure the extent to which we are 
in fact witnessing a shift from government to governance. Analysts, according to Jordan 
(2008), need to go beyond this and conduct work that explores the relationship between 
governance and sustainable development in a more dynamic/interactive manner and to 
explore the causal relationship between governance intervention and real outcomes on the 
ground. In this context, there is a need, according to Bache and Flinders (2004) and van 
Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004), to know what forms of governing lead to what sorts of 
outcomes, whilst ensuring that they remain legitimate and publicly accountable. In addition, 
Jordan (2008) states that there is a danger that research on governance and/for SD ends up 
                                                          
9
 OECD is one of the most important prescriptions among the international efforts which can policy makers 
have a look no further than to its checklist produced in 2002. 
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being a rather technical exercise in counting and cataloguing different governing instruments 
or, normatively, trying to recognize the exact governing tool for the job (Jordan, 2008). 
To conclude, although the international debate about governance and/for sustainable 
development has run and run, it is a mess where the two terms are highly ambiguous terms. 
The available literature in this context is mainly either normative or empirical whilst the 
dialogue between the two is limited. The step beyond grand theories and typologies of 
governance towards undertaking detailed empirical testing to measure the shift from 
government to governance is needed. These efforts are needed to be focused on governance 
in a more dynamic and interactive manner in order to know what forms of governing lead to 
what sorts of outcomes. It is also important while doing so to ensure that the forms remain 
legitimate and publicly accountable.  
Reflecting from the international need regarding governance for SD on the Egyptian case, it 
could be concluded that there is a need for an empirical test to measure the extent to which 
the industrial system in Egypt is moving towards governance for SD. The effort in this regard 
should be directed to study the governing form in Egypt and whether it has the potential of 
producing sustainable IZs. Doing so will not only contribute to the local debate but also to the 
international one by filling the gap from the developing countries’ side. The question posed 
here is to what extent does Egypt practice governance for SD in general and in the industrial 
system specifically? 
2.3.3. Governance for sustainable development: the Egyptian case 
2.3.3.1. Industrial Development: Policies and Foundations  
According to the governmental rhetoric, the Government through its successive plans and 
strategies targeted a number of themes where the following come on top (MOP, 2002): 
1. Improve the quality life of the Egyptian citizens, especially in terms of income and 
education. 
2. The development of the institutional structure towards GG especially public 
participation, deepening democracy, improving the mechanisms of control, 
accountability, and transparency, and reform of the legislation base. 
3. The development of the production base, natural and economic resources, with 
emphasis on the rational use of water, energy, and development of alternative 
resources for them. 
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In light of these major themes, industrial development in Egypt is characterized by two main 
trends. The first is the creation of new industries capable of competition in terms of 
technology. The second is the expansion and renovation of existing industries aiming at 
increasing their productivity (Mobarak, 2001). In this context, the Government announced 
that its strategy was anchored on a package of policies as follows: 
• To continue providing the necessary circumstances for improving the investment 
atmosphere to encourage Egyptian, Arab and foreign capital investment in industrial 
activities (Mobarak, 2001, MOP, 2002). 
• To improve productivity and quality standards of goods through: 
 strengthening the institutional and regulatory setup to ease the burden of the 
production process, 
 using standard specifications of industry (MOP, 2002), 
 paying attention to non-traditional areas of industrial production such as “cleaner 
production”      10, 
 establishing new industrial zones in line with the recent international scientific 
approaches (MOP, 2002), 
 adopting new technologies and learning to international experiences, 
 mobilizing and inviting Egyptian experts abroad to share their knowledge with local 
counterparts, 
 continuous and specialised training for industry workers at all levels (Mobarak, 2001), 
and 
 establishing applied scientific research units in production sites in collaboration with 
academic and scientific institutions, specialised centres and the Academy of Scientific 
Research to raise the level of production processes through scientific and modern 
technological applications (Mobarak, 2001, MOP, 2002). 
• To pay attention to exporting through the expansion of export-oriented and basic 
industries, and the study of the needs of foreign markets for new goods (Mobarak, 2001). 
This was confirmed by Engineer Rasheed Mohamed Rasheed, ex-minister of trade and 
industry, highlighting the importance of the national plan efforts to double the exports due 
                                                          
10
 The term ‘cleaner Production’ was first coined in September 1990, by the UN Environment Program. The 
formal UNEP definition of ‘cleaner production’ says that: “Cleaner Production is the continuous application of 
an integrated, preventive strategy to processes, products and services to increase efficiency and reduce risks to 
humans and the environment.” (Eionet, 2009). 
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to its important implications on community development and economic growth, as well as 
the importance of creating the appropriate circumstances to achieve that (NDP, 2009). 
The plan includes protection of Egyptian industry from unfair competition caused by 
subsidies granted by some countries for certain products or policies of dumping in 
markets. This could be achieved through the expansion of integrated industrial complexes 
as well as expanding the provision of technical and administrative assistance, and 
marketing assistance for small and medium-sized projects (Mobarak, 2001, MOP, 2002). 
• To redistribute production and industrial activities according to priorities in order to 
achieve balanced growth geographically on the national level (Mobarak, 2001, MOP, 
2002) with particular attention to the expansion of industrial development in Upper Egypt 
and also accelerating the extension of utilities and gas to current IZs (NDP, 2009). Add to 
this the promotion of small and medium-sized industries and their spread in all provinces 
as well as supporting their role as sources for final products, feeders or supplements of 
large scale industries (Mobarak, 2001). 
• To develop and update databases, (MOP, 2002) particularly with regard to the 
geographical distribution of the potential existing manufacturing and design capabilities 
as well as architectural design offices data, their development and involvement in the 
process of making the first model; and provide the necessary funding for this process 
from national development budgets (Mobarak, 2001). 
• To draw basic rules and criteria to evaluate the policies through periodic measurements of 
sustainable growth rate in terms of productivity, profitability, development, innovation 
and provision of new job opportunities (Mobarak, 2001). 
• To pay attention to respecting the principles of SD in industry. Therefore the Egyptian 
government strategy regarding SD in industry is focused on directing investments to new 
areas and granting incentives and comparative advantages to remote areas (MOP, 2002). 
This strategy depends on the following themes: 
 any new project must be subject to environmental impact assessment prior to final 
approval, 
 all polluting activities have to be transferred from residential areas to other more 
appropriate locations,  
 IZs for new investments have to be created in all provinces, 
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 energy consumption using new energy saving production techniques have to be 
rationalised with the emphasis on the introduction of new and renewable energy11, 
 pollution prevention measures have to be used such as clean technologies, cleaner 
production programs and periodic maintenance to minimize waste,  
 quality production technologies have to be adopted through applying the ISO 9000 
series and ecosystem 14000 series whenever possible (Mobarak, 2001), and 
 cooperation between industry and scientific research centres, universities, programs 
and international organizations have to be enabled (MOP, 2002) in the field of 
environment and SD (Mobarak, 2001).  
2.3.3.2. Sustainable development arrangements for founding IZs in Egypt up to 2005 
Since the 1990s, the Egyptian government has made some institutional arrangements in 
favour of environmental protection, the most important of which are: 
• Establishing Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) and its executive arm 
the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA). the tasks of which are (EEAA, 
2011): 
 Preparing national plans for environmental protection, and emergency plans for 
natural disasters. 
 Implementing pilot projects. 
 Formulating principles and procedures of environmental impact assessment. 
 Drafting environmental laws, regulations, standards and safe pollution rates. 
 Supervising the Environmental Protection and Development Fund. 
• Raising awareness and preparing environmental capacity building programs (EEAA, 
2011). 
• Setting up the environmental law No. 4/1994 to organize the environmental bodies 
responsibilities and to enforce the balance between development and environment. This 
law requires new projects to environmentally assess its impacts by doing an 
environmental impact assessment study (EIA) (Mobarak, 2001). 
• The State through its environmental bodies has prepared a number of environmental 
national plans and strategies12 since the beginning of the last decade that show that the 
                                                          
11
 Prime minister decree no. 1560 issued in 2004 for the composition of the Board of Directors of the agency of 
the development of new and renewable energy use 12 September 2004. This reflects the State 's attention to new 
and renewable energy and establishing a formal body for the development of its uses. 
12
 Most important publications of them are as follows:  
 The National Environmental Action Plan of Egypt 2002/17 (EEAA, 2001). 
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Egyptian government has good understandings of SD (EEAA, 2001, EEAA and Danida-
ESP-CEM, 2005, EEAA, 2005, EEAA et al., 2006, EEAA et al., 2005). 
• Forming an inter-ministerial council to encourage institutional coordination, and 
establishing environmental units in some line-ministries (like the Ministry for Industry) to 
achieve and maintain inter-sectoral coordination (ESCWA, 2003). 
• Initiating the Program of Eco-friendly Industrial Cities (Shalaby, 2003), targeting the 
cleaner production in the factories of these cities (Rasheed, 2010c, Mobarak, 2001). 
It could be noted from this section and the one before, indicating the State policies/procedures 
regarding industrial development and SD arrangements as well as concepts adopted in its 
publications, that the Government in Egypt has a good understanding of SD and GG concepts 
and principles. It could also be concluded that the concepts/ideas included in the 
Government’s publications could theoretically together form a base for a conceptual 
framework for founding sustainable IZs. The question that poses itself now is: to what extent 
was this framework actually practiced in Egypt? The next section discusses the actual 
practice of governance for SD in Egypt until 2005 answering this question.  
2.3.3.3. Governance for sustainable development in Egypt: literature on the actual 
practice updated until 200513  
This section discusses governance for sustainable development in Egypt and synthesizes 
Egypt’s situation in the practice of governance for sustainable development. It was found that 
most publication efforts in this regard were done by regional and international organizations 
like the League of Arab States (LAS), and the United Nations (UN) and its regional 
organizations like Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) (see for 
example: Hamza (2005), ESCWA (2003), and UNEP (2003)). The remaining literature was 
mainly prepared for the UN forums held in the preparation for the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) (see for example: Al-Deen and El-Kholy (2001)), or were 
academic literature that discussed and built upon the previously mentioned literature of 
international/regional organizations (see for example: (Esty et al., 2003)). In support, Esty et 
al. (2003) stated that their analysis depended greatly on the 2002 Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI) and the data collected for it. The dominance of international and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 The National Strategy for Environmental Communication (NSEC) (EEAA and Danida-ESP-CEM, 
2005). 
 The National Strategy for Cleaner Production in Egyptian Industry (EEAA, 2005). 
 The Environmental Responsible Guide (EEAA et al., 2006). 
 The Industrial Areas Management Guideline (EEAA et al., 2005). 
13
 This year is chosen only because there appear to be little literature available for the period after 2005 on 
governance for SD in Egypt. 
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regional organizations literature over the other sources is due to the fact that governments are 
committed not only to protect the environment but also to disseminate the environmental data 
to those organizations when they ask for. However, other sources, even like the World Bank, 
mentioned that they faced many constrains when collecting environmental data in Egypt 
(World-Bank, 2002). Therefore, the literatures available to the researcher mainly discuss the 
state of the Arab or the Middle East region containing Egypt. While studying the 
commonalties in the region, the literature from time to time shows differences between 
different countries of the region. The literature therefore, gives a generic picture of the 
Egyptian situation.  It is worth mentioning here that a gap has been spotted regarding the 
contribution by the Arab countries to the international discourse on environmental 
sustainability processes (Esty et al., 2003). 
This section reviews the most comprehensive literature available and briefly synthesizes 
relevant parts on Egypt. It then concludes with thoughts on Egypt’s situation in the practice 
of governance for SD. 
A. Introduction 
The Arab countries, one of which is Egypt, face great threats to sustainability that could 
broadly harm the society economically and environmentally. Such threats are related to water 
scarcity, climatic change, high rates of pollution and unbalanced population growth in 
systems that lack institutional reform (Esty et al., 2003). Despite the commitment that Egypt 
has performed towards environment, as shown previously, the bodies established to manage 
SD process remain, to a great extent, insufficient. While these environmental institutions have 
taken steps to protect the environment, an important gap remains with regard to the ability of 
such bodies and the institutional setup to manage effectively SD process (ESCWA, 2003, Al-
Deen and El-Kholy, 2001). This has been widely noticed from the environmental degradation 
caused by urbanization in general and from industrial development particularly. It depends on 
a rapid pattern of industrialization that causes increased pollution by the use of improper 
waste treatment depending on the end of pipe pattern14 (Hamza, 2005, Al-Deen and El-
Kholy, 2001). Regarding the reasons for this behaviour, they are: the systems of governance 
and the environmental capacity (Esty et al., 2003). In such a way of governing, a top down 
governmental administration process is in control (Hamza, 2005). It adopts a culture of 
                                                          
14
 In support, UNEP (2003) states: “In spite of the noticeable increase of awareness and interest in changing 
towards more sustainable forms of industrial production, the rates of release of emissions, liquid effluents and 
solid (including hazardous) wastes remain a major challenge for the rapidly growing industrial sector in the 
Arab region.” P.2. 
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environmental management that depends on a sector-based approach that controls the 
institutional setup (ESCWA, 2003). Environmental degradation is exacerbated because the 
regulatory setup to protect the environment is inadequate (Hamza, 2005).   
In light of this introduction outlining governance for SD in Egypt, the next sections discuss 
how governance for SD is understood by the State and how this understanding has affected 
the institutional and regulatory setup of the State.  
B. Governance for sustainable development as understood by the State   
Egypt’s understandings of governance for SD have passed through three phases: (a) support 
for sanitary engineering and public health (1920s-1960s), (b) the shift from public health to 
environmental management (1970s-1980s), and (c) the gradual move from environmental 
management towards sustainable development (1980s-till present) (ESCWA, 2003). In such a 
move, environmental institutions lack appropriate authorities to address all issues of SD. 
Despite the multi-sectoral perspective of SD, SD is still considered an environmental matter. 
In other words, a culture of environmental management dominates the institutional setup that 
adopts a sector-based approach (ESCWA, 2003, Al-Deen and El-Kholy, 2001, UNEP, 2003), 
causing the inadequacy of the arrangements and instruments to apply integrated and 
participatory SD (ESCWA, 2003). This is partly due to financial limitations due to the erratic 
economic growth that results in inadequate budgets for environmental protection and 
incorporating SD into the State framework (Hamza, 2005). It is also due to the lack of desire 
of environmental bodies to extend the mandate for SD to other bodies to avoid their role to be 
marginalized (ESCWA, 2003, Al-Deen and El-Kholy, 2001).  
C. Governance for sustainable development: the institutional and regulatory setup 
of the State   
The institutional setup in Egypt is the most important obstacle standing against the practice of 
governance for SD. In such a setup, environmental institutions tend to be politically weak 
with limited roles as advisors or coordinators and with steady mandate despite the widening 
of the SD paradigm. This could be a result of the recent restructuring power politics, limited 
budgets and overlap between bodies jurisdictions (ESCWA, 2003). Behind these factors is 
the nature of the authoritarian regime (Esty et al., 2003), that was in control of the country 
with the following traits: dictatorship, centralized governing system, top-down political 
culture and limited public accountability, and resistance to institutional change (ESCWA, 
2003). While the policy platform supports the establishment of an effective system of 
governance, SD therefore, under such regime, could not be achieved due to the absence of 
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operational mechanisms. In details, the institutional setup lacks operational mechanisms and 
instruments for planning, implementing, budgeting and finance, monitoring, reporting, 
assessment and enforcement, and public participation (ESCWA, 2003, Al-Deen and El-
Kholy, 2001). With more focus on planning for industry, it does not prompt sustainability 
concepts and principles. Planning also lacks the mechanisms for strategic planning for waste 
minimization and integration of cleaner production in industrial processes (Hamza, 2005, Al-
Deen and El-Kholy, 2001). 
In relation to the regulatory setup; it lacks economic incentives and appropriate 
environmental regulations and standards. Pollution loads and assimilative capacity of the 
environment are not considered, for example, when setting regulations of the pollution 
prevention as well as emission standards. Additionally, there are difficulties in enforcing the 
current environmental regulations and monitoring emissions.  Environmental awareness and 
commitment of decision-makers towards SD is still low (Hamza, 2005). 
After all, the local institutions that make basic governance for environmental sustainability 
possible are lacking in Egypt. Therefore, there is no base for Egypt to deal with incorporating 
sustainability within the current institutional and regulatory setup (Esty et al., 2003). Yet, the 
main challenge ahead for Egypt is to develop an appropriate setup that can adopt a 
governance system for SD while being culturally sensitive to the country (ESCWA, 2003). 
 To conclude, Egypt suffers from environmental degradation due to erratic economic growth 
with rapid industrialization adopting a planning trend that does not prompt sustainability 
concepts and principles. This happened due to the lack of environmental awareness and 
commitment of decision-makers towards SD and GG. Despite the formal commitment that 
Egypt made to improve environmental governance, an SD platform remained politically weak 
and insufficient due to the nature of the authoritarian regime was in control. Dictatorship, 
centralized governance, top-down political culture and resistance to institutional change 
resulted in a culture of environmental management which controlled the institutional setup. It 
adopted a sector-based approach lacking operational mechanisms that could incorporate SD 
into the work system of the State. Furthermore, the regulatory setup lacks the appropriate 
environmental incentives and regulations, and even suffers from difficulties in enforcing 
current environmental regulations, (see (Hamza, 2005), (Esty et al., 2003), (ESCWA, 2003) 
Al-Deen and El-Kholy (2001) and UNEP (2003)) 
The inability of the institutional and regulatory setup to manage effectively SD process means 
that an important challenge for Egypt is to develop an appropriate setup that can adopt a 
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governance system for SD while being culturally sensitive to the country. In light of this, 
Egypt has recently made some institutional and regulatory arrangements towards improving 
the governance system for SD. The following section presents these arrangements.  
2.3.4. Recent arrangements towards governance for sustainable development: from 
2005 onwards 
This section discusses recent developments and arrangements in the regulatory and 
institutional frameworks that the State made towards achieving a governance system for SD. 
In particular, these arrangements could be categorized under three sections: incorporating 
sustainability into development, incorporating public participation into planning, and 
reformation of the administrative framework.  
2.3.4.1. Incorporating sustainability into development 
Recently, Government talk about sustainability and incorporating it into various development 
branches, especially sustainable urban development and planning has increased. The most 
recent law passed in this regard is the Unified Building Law No. 119 of 2008, where the term 
sustainable urban development is defined therein as: 
Managing urban development process through the optimized exploitation of 
natural resources available to meet the needs of the present generation without 
compromising the opportunities of future generations. (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 
2) 
The Law also obligates those working on the preparation of strategic planning to apply SD 
therein. This is mentioned clearly through the law definition of strategic planning as follows: 
It is the schema defining the future vision for urban development and may be at 
the level of national, regional, governorate, city or village. It describes the goals, 
policies and economic and social development plans as well as the built 
environment plans for applying SD. It also identifies future needs for 
urbanization, different land uses, programs, priorities, implementation 
mechanisms and funding sources at the schematic level. (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 
2) 
The same Law also confirmed its respect to sustainable urban development by describing it as 
a base and assigning the GOPP15 responsible of its application, stipulating in its fifth Article: 
The GOPP is the State's entity in charge of laying down the general policy for 
planning and sustainable urban development, preparing the plans and programs 
for this development at national, regional and urban levels. It is in charge of 
reviewing and approving the urban schemes at the local level in the framework of 
national, regional and local goals, policies for planning and sustainable urban 
development. (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 5) 
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 General Organization of Physical Planning. 
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From another side, the Environmental Law No. 4/1994 was amended by the Law No. 9/2009 
that included a series of amendments containing in depth and clearer definitions of 
environmental concepts16. It also created a fund for environmental protection (EPF)17 and 
gave more powers to the EEAA18 to govern protecting the natural environment, and reducing 
pollution and depletion of natural resources, leading to SD (Mubarak, 1994, Mubarak, 2009).  
In addition to the foregoing, the State has taken a number of important steps aimed at 
incorporating sustainability into development, on top of which  is establishing the National 
Commission for SD (NCSD) by the Prime Ministerial decree No. 47 of 2006. The NCSD is 
to be headed by State Minister of the MSEA and membership of all ministries and agencies 
concerned with development issues in Egypt (Nazeif, 2006). In this regard, Eng. Majed 
George, State Minister of the MSEA illustrated that this decree was issued to authorize the 
NCSD to prepare policies, plans, methodologies and legislative reforms required to lay the 
foundations of SD in Egypt (George, 2010). 
International conventions connecting Egypt to the international community are considered to 
be one of the important steps taken towards SD realisation. This was confirmed by Eng. 
Maged George giving an example of the agreement between MSEA and the UN Environment 
Program to prepare a plan for sustainable consumption and production for the Cairo 
Governorate. According to him, this agreement accomplished in 2008 was to be the first step 
of preparing a national plan for the sustainable consumption and production within the 
national SD strategy (George, 2010). 
At the level of concepts and attitudes of officials of the ministries involved in SD, the 
frequency of statements showing understanding and incorporation of SD has increased. These 
are made by a number of ministries but the research focuses basically on MSEA and Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (MTI). Many statements from both ministries show their understanding 
                                                          
16
 Law no. 9/2009 involves a better understanding for the environmental definitions which is in harmony with 
the development of the new international ideas and approaches in this concern. Especially the serious 
development in the environmental pollution definitions where it included harming natural habitats and 
biological diversity. In addition, the law did not limit itself with what was decided in the old one in caring just 
about pollution levels but added to that, respecting the kinds of carrying capacity of pollution in several points 
of the law (Mubarak, 1994, Mubarak, 2009). 
17
 The legal personality has been given to EPF. A board of directors has been established with the presidency of 
the MSEA’s Minister and with the EEAA’s president as a deputy president. Representatives from the relevant 
ministries to facilitate the sectoral cooperation. NGOs are represented in the board of directors. Also, experts, if 
needed, must be entitled to join the board of directors (Mubarak, 2009, Article 15). 
18
 Particularly regarding the EIAs, in the commitment of all parties and individuals to submit the study, as well 
as making it available to the EEAA to request modifications on the study or completion of incomplete data 
(Mubarak, 2009, Article 19 and 20). Most important is the authority granted by law for the EEAA to intervene 
as it deems appropriate towards the offender if he/she does not respond within two months to rectify the 
environmental violation (Mubarak, 2009, Article 22) 
Chapter 2 
46 
 
and quest for SD19. Beginning with the MSEA, during his speech at the sixth international 
conference on sustainable production and consumption of Africa entitled "Towards eco-
friendly economic development in Africa"20, Eng. Maged George confirmed that the 
sustainable consumption and production is an engine of SD in all productive and service 
sectors, saying: 
This in fact is aimed at the use of eco-friendly materials, technologies and tools to 
produce non-harmful components to the environment, as well as rationalizing the 
consumption of natural resources and products achieving thereafter the highest 
rates to maximize the available natural resources, and reduce generated waste 
amounts with their pressure on and damage to the environment. The Conference 
aims at supporting green economic development initiatives in Africa and 
spreading environmentally friendly use of clean technology. (George, 2010, 
Para.7)  
Adding to the above, he also stressed the importance of establishing an institutional structure 
for SD in all ministries with the preparation of sectoral action plans for all institutions to help 
achieve SD, saying: 
What has been achieved from national accomplishments of applying SD whether 
on the planning or executive side calls us over the next period to focus on 
establishing a national institutional structure of SD within all the ministries and 
bodies concerned with building capacity and providing the necessary tools to 
achieve the required work.... It also requires the preparation of the national 
strategy for SD, finalizing the set up of SD indicators and the preparation of 
sectoral and geographical action plans for all institutions at all levels. This is to 
work together towards achieving SD and increasing public awareness of the 
concept, importance and value of SD. (George, 2010, Para.6) 
The understanding of the importance of SD and the call for its incorporation have been 
expressed by the ex-Minister of MTI. Eng. Rasheed Mohamed Rasheed said at the opening of 
the conference on the Egyptian version of the seventh annual competitiveness report entitled 
"Green Egypt: a vision for the future": 
The conditions affecting the world today; water, energy and natural resources 
shortages make it necessary to reconsider the practice of better use of resources to 
help rationalize consumption. This entails dealing with a different performance at 
the level of individuals, companies and the Government to achieve maximum 
benefit for society and future generations.... Green Egypt can be the real portal to 
better handling of our resources and all problems such as pollution and wastes of 
all kinds which, if treated properly, can provide employment opportunities and 
big earnings. (Rasheed 2010b, Para.1)  
                                                          
19
 The examples of statements of the two ministers stated afterwards are just sample from a multiple and large 
number of the ministers’ statements in this regard. It is also important to mention here that evaluation of 
seriousness of such kind of statement is discussed in details in Chapters (6 and 7). 
20
 Held on 14/06/2010 for the first time in Cairo with the participation of more than 40 African and Arab 
countries and organized by the Centre for Cleaner Production Technology following the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in cooperation with the United Nations Industrial Development Program. 
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The Ex-Minister of trade and industry also declared, at the end of the seventh Conference21 of 
Industry Ministers of Euro-Mediterranean Conference, approving the Egyptian initiative 
concerned with meeting the challenges imposed by the global financial crisis on sustainable 
industrial development opportunities. This emphasized the need to exploit natural resources 
and provide the right atmosphere for continued funding of industry , as well as establishing 
joint ventures between Euro-Mediterranean countries in the areas of optimizing the use of 
renewable energy , cooperation in human resources development, and establishing a network 
of cleaner production centres in the Mediterranean region (Rasheed, 2010a). 
In practice, Eng. Rasheed confirmed that the MTI began a new policy committed to industry 
and its relationship with the environment through which a balance between environmental 
considerations and developmental needs could be reached. He explained that the MTI is 
working in collaboration with the MSEA and other ministries to help manufacturers comply 
with environmental standards and regulations, and convert their establishments into eco-
friendly plants. To implement this plan, The Cleaner Production Technology Centre started to 
encourage 900 factories in sectors of chemical industries, cement, iron, food industry, 
agricultural, and other sectors to implement cleaner production methods (Rasheed, 2010c).  
2.3.4.2. Incorporating public participation into planning 
Considering that the unified Building Law No. 119/2008 is the regulator of the urban 
planning affairs, the law and its executive regulations have emphasized public participation 
and its importance in determining needs and priorities for urban development and proposing 
the necessary projects and its implementation (Mubarak, 2008b, Mubarak, 2008a). Articles 9 
and 11 mention this concept while Article 11 stipulates participation in detail as follows: 
Public administrations for planning and urban development specify, according to 
the guidebooks of urban schemes prepared by the GOPP with the participation of 
competent local units, local people's assemblies, competent executive bodies and 
representatives of civil society, the needs and priorities of urban development at 
the local level within the framework of objectives and regional and local policies, 
proposing the necessary projects, and the action plans for achieving them. 
(Mubarak, 2008b, Article 11)         . 
In a question to Ac-G-1122, a consultant of the GOPP, on the extent to which development 
partners are involved in the planning process, he confirmed the previous article, saying: "of 
course this is true, all development partners' opinions must be taken into consideration and 
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 Held in Nice, France, headed by Rasheed Mohamed Rasheed, Minister of Trade and Industry in Egypt, and 
Mr. Luc Chatel, French Minister of State for Industry. 
22
 An indication for an informal discussions made with a group of industrial officials during a pilot study, see 
Chapter (4) for full details on the research methodology. The code contains the following abbreviations that 
mean: In = Industrial, G = Governmental position, and Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
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they must participate with documentation of this process” (Ac-G-11). In support, Article 12 
(Mubarak, 2008b), dealing with the strategic plan that should be presented to citizens for their 
comments therein, reads:  
The General Directorates of Planning and Urban Development within local units 
offer the master plan drafts and receive comments from citizens, relevant 
agencies and local people's councils. The Executive Regulations of this law 
illustrate the rules and procedures of this offer and stakeholders’ feedback on it. 
(Mubarak, 2008b, Article 12) 
This has been confirmed by Eng. In-G-06, Head of the Central Administration of IZs  in the 
IDA23, giving an example on planning and accrediting sites of IZs by governors, saying:   
Through the process he [the Governor] conducts to prepare the strategic scheme. 
He listens to the local council and takes the opinion of the relevant bodies to this 
subject. We then approve the concept that: yes we can establish an IZ here. The 
Supreme Council for Urban Planning (SCPUD) approves the project. Hence, an 
IZ in a governorate is now accredited. (In-G-06) 
2.3.4.3. Reforming the institutional setup: overcoming bureaucracy and improving 
investment atmosphere  
The Government has lately been working to reform the institutional setup, overcome the 
bureaucracy and improve the investment atmosphere to attract investments, increase work 
opportunities and improve the quality of life for the Egyptian citizens. This is in addition to 
governmental actions24 the purpose of which is to reform administrative bodies and improve 
the investment atmosphere, examples of these actions include: converting the GAM25 to the 
IDA, establishing the FSEEDIZ26, the SCPUD27 and the NCPSLU28, and issuance of unified 
laws for various activities that unify the rules and terms, and disengage the overlap and 
conflict between the various laws regarding a particular activity such as the Unified Building 
Law. In addition to these actions, this section presents the most recent actions made or 
sponsored by the Government in favour of overcoming bureaucracy and improving the 
investment atmosphere.  
Booz-Allen and Guillotine contracts 
Government has made contracts with a number of global advisory bodies specialized in 
management with a view of analyzing the existing institutional setup, identifying its problems 
and then formulating the necessary steps for administrative reform to overcome bureaucracy 
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 Industrial Development Authority 
24
 Addressed in details in Appendix (VI) detailing the different governmental bodies involved in the process 
through which the Egyptian IZs are planned and related laws and regulation.   
25
 General Authority of Manufacturing. 
26
 Fund for Supporting the Establishment, Extending public utilities and Development of IZs. 
27
 Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development. 
28
 National Centre for Planning the State Lands Uses. 
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and improve the investment atmosphere. Perhaps the most significant of these engagements is 
the so-called Guillotine Contract (In-G-58) and the contract with the consultancy office 
Booz-Allen that worked on the so-called One Window Policy (In-G-41). It (the One Window 
Policy) is supposed to help improve and facilitate licensing procedures for industrial projects. 
After the investor was dealing with 18 various ministries and bodies, according to In-G-58, 
he/she would deal only with a single window in the IDA. Accordingly, the timeline for 
issuing licenses has been reduced from several months as confirmed by In-G-58 to a 
maximum of two weeks as also stated by the ministerial decree (Rasheed, 2008a). 
In an interpretation of the nature of licensing procedures of this new policy and after the 
issuance of the Unified Building Law No. 119/2009, In-G-58, Assistant Executive Director of 
the FSEEDIZ, explained that investors, at first, shall ask for a land booking application form 
for an industrial project. This form must be filled and supplemented with the necessary papers 
and official documents. No later than two weeks, the examination committee of the IDA shall 
study this form and give an initial approval on the project, also give the investor a formal 
letter to receive the land from the competent administration authority, and then the licensing 
process starts (In-G-58, Rasheed, 2008a). Drawings of the project shall be prepared by a 
planner who has been contracted by an investor. This planner is responsible alone for the 
validity of his/her drawings and its harmony with the planning and design codes therein. 
Therefore, the competent administrative authority shall ensure the fulfilment of drawings 
without reviewing the technicality of these drawings (Mubarak, 2008b). 
In addition to the One Window Policy, the contract with Guillotine came up with the 
cancellation of 80 ministerial decrees, contrary to the basic industry law, and a number of 
resolutions and other laws (In-G-41, Rasheed, 2008a). This is in addition to the 
disengagement between different resolutions and laws related to specifying industrial 
activities and their classification, and the endorsement of  the Industry Law No. 21/1958 as 
the only reference in this concern (Rasheed, 2008a).  
 In-G-58 criticizes the above mentioned attempts blaming the choice of the team members of 
the Egyptian officials accompanying the international consultants. It was based on loyalty 
rather than efficiency and thus such a team works as a barrier against the effective transfer of 
experience, thoughts and ideas from top to bottom. Therefore, he sees that there will not be 
the desired benefit from hiring these foreign bodies (In-G-58). 
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In Chapter (6), the previous mentioned attempts will be examined, especially the licensing 
and approval procedures through the analysis of the case studies, and, therefore, whether the 
law is applied or not will be determined. 
Egyptian initiative to reform the business atmosphere "Errada”29: 
Errada is an Egyptian governmental initiative designed to support the State’s efforts to build a 
system of revision and amendment of the legislative instruments related to the business 
atmosphere. It depends on partnership between Egyptian public and private institutions to 
improve competitiveness and efficiency of the Egyptian economy and create more jobs. The 
initiative has been launched in February 2008 by the ex-Minister of trade and industry, decree 
No. 1089/2008 (Rasheed, 2008b), and operates under the umbrella of the Ministerial Group 
of Production30 that is managed by the Minister of MTI. Errada seeks to contribute to the 
implementation of the reform plan adopted by the State since 2004 by reviewing the 
legislative tools in the business atmosphere and making recommendations aimed at 
improving the investment atmosphere and by contributing to solving the following problems 
(Errada, 2011a): 
• The large number and complexity of legislative instruments. 
• The lack of a clear statement of legislative instruments in force. 
• The absence of a system identifying cancelled decisions. 
• Overlap between agencies responsible for issuing regulations. 
• Inconsistency of decisions release cycle  in all ministries. 
• The lack of a specific mechanism to study the economic impact of new resolutions. 
Errada is based on four major objectives (Errada, 2011a): 
• Identifying existing legislative tools concerning the business atmosphere through 
comprehensive inventory. 
• Simplifying legislative instruments that were captured by an organized review in 
consultation with the business community through the Advisory Council of Business. 
• Allowing all legislative tools to all people through an electronic record. 
• Seeking to assess the economic impact of legislative instruments based on the analysis 
of different alternatives for establishing governance principles. 
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  “Errada” in Arabic means “Will” in English  
30
 The Group consists of the ministers of finance and investment, military production, agriculture, health, 
population, transport and tourism in addition to minister of trade and industry as a rapporteur of the group. Its 
main objectives are: increase work opportunities, increase investment in all sectors of production in particular 
industrial sector (Ahram, 2006). 
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In this context, Helmy Abouleish, Chairman of the Egyptian National Council for 
Competitiveness, through the proceedings of the conference issuing the seventh version of the 
Egyptian Competitiveness Report entitled " Green Egypt”, stressed the importance of Errada 
and the aim from it, saying: 
... Errada has started the process of streamlining and rationalizing the legislative 
tools. It also took the initiative to organize the dialogue between institutions of 
public and private sector. The objective of this initiative was represented in 
building an Egyptian efficient system to manage the procedures and regulations 
concerning public and private institutions. This system is based on transparency 
and justice aiming at stimulating and creating a competitive economy. (Rasheed, 
2010b)  
Eleven ministries have joined the initiative in the first stage: investment, housing, oil, trade 
and industry, management development, community development, agriculture, tourism, 
health, finance, and transportation. Errada central unit together with the ministerial units set 
up the procedural manual of accounting which has become a general framework for 
inventory. Hence, ministerial units accounted more than 34,000 legislative tools that affect 
economic and business atmosphere in Egypt and then edited them to the electronic database 
of Errada in preparation for reviewing them. During the period from March 2009 until July 
2010, the initiative reviewed about ten thousand legislative instruments representing about 
32% of those that have been accounted. Based on the audit, about three thousand 
recommendations were released leading to the cancellation and the integration of about 1400 
legislative instruments that have been implemented in accordance with resolutions issued by 
five ministries (Errada, 2011b). 
Private sector initiatives supported and encouraged by the Egyptian Government 
Egyptian National Council for Competitiveness (ENCC):  
The Egyptian National Council for competitiveness was established in February 2004 by the 
efforts of a number of Egyptian business leaders and academics. That was after their 
participation in the annual campus of World Economic Forum (WEF) and by the support of 
Eng. Rasheed Mohamed Rasheed Ex-Minister of trade and industry. Also, the Arab Council 
for Businesses of WEF, the Egyptian Association of Young Businessmen and the 
International Economic Forum of Egypt have contributed in the establishing of the ENCC. It 
is meant to be a forum for dialogue among economists, private businesses sector 
representatives, decision-makers and representatives of the civil society institutions. It stands 
as an instrument for influencing both government policies and business atmosphere as well as 
public opinion in Egypt with a view to contributing to a better quality of life for all citizens.  
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This can be achieved through doing its role effectively and efficiently in raising awareness 
about the concept of competitiveness and proposing policies promoting and supporting efforts 
to improve the status of Egypt competitiveness globally. Therefore, NECC is considered to be 
the first Egyptian non-governmental organization dealing predominantly with 
competitiveness. The most important work and achievements of the NECC is its 
contribution31 to the process of legislative reform through Errada by playing a coordinator 
role between Errada and the private sector during the audit process which began on 1st of 
January 2009. The NECC also monitors and consults the business sector continuously and 
regularly in issuing laws and legislations. NECC uses a legislative impact assessment (RIA)32 
during the two previous works (ENCC, 2011). 
To conclude, it is now clear that since 2005, the Egyptian Government has made and 
announced steps to reform the governing system to incorporate sustainable development. The 
issue which poses itself now is: to what extent these steps have considerably changed the 
process through which industrial zones are founded in Egypt. More importantly, there is an 
utmost need to study the factors which control the impact of these steps.  Therefore, the 
following questions could be initially raised: 
• What is the current process through which industrial zones are founded in Egypt, and 
to what extent have the recent arrangements taken by the Government considerably 
changed this process?  
• What are the factors which help shape the process through which industrial zones are 
founded in Egypt? 
Answers to these questions are necessary in order to provide an evidence base for effective 
interventions to bring about more sustainable industrial development.  
2.4. Narrowing down the research focus 
Understanding the founding process of the current IZs and its governing factors, and 
examining the extent to which the recent steps made by Egypt to incorporate sustainability 
have effectively influenced it, is the initial focus of this research. This initial focus has been 
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 The Egyptian National Council for Competitiveness contributes in the process of legislative reform through 
one of its initiatives known as the Business Advisory Council 
32
 The legislative impact assessment study aims at improving the quality of legislation where the provided 
legislations are assessed in terms of an objective study based on information and actual facts in a context of 
clear policies. This requires analysis and measurement of economic and social impacts - affecting certain areas 
which are identified in advance - resulting from the application of the proposed legislation. Analysis of the 
proposed legislation allows conducting an assessment and comparison of options for the various parties 
concerned, which include the authors of the legislation and the representatives of the business community 
((National Council for Competitiveness)) 
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narrowed down after constructing a preliminary comprehensive conceptual framework for 
founding sustainable IZs from available literature on good governance and SD. This 
framework has been used in a pilot study to investigate the local context and collect the 
available data and literature to help the researcher identify a contextual researchable issue. 
The pilot study came out with some initial results that helped narrow down the research focus 
from the founding process to the planning process of IZs. This section therefore, discusses the 
methodology used in the pilot study and concludes the findings of the pilot study. It 
ultimately poses the questions which this research attempts to answer. 
2.4.1. Pilot study methodology and results 
Given that there is a gap in the practice of sustainability, and that a grand theory of 
governance for sustainable development is extremely doubtful, a grounded theory approach is 
proposed in this research for the investigation of the Egyptian case. Hence, it was essential to 
develop, from the available literature, a comprehensive conceptual framework for founding 
sustainable IZs that could be used to initially collect and structure data on the founding 
process of Egyptian IZs. 
To construct this framework, the normative and empirical literatures, like Geng and Yi 
(2005), Hollander (2005), Lowe (2001), OECD (2002), Qi (2005), Sterr (2005), Sundermann-
Rosenow (2005), AMCG (2008), and Solutions (2008), were analyzed for overarching 
governing understandings, ideas and components through which sustainable IZs could 
potentially be brought to reality. This framework was designed as a best practice model 
which contains a combination between polices and instruments that need to be applied in 
different stages of the process of founding industrial zones. Constructing this framework was 
only to be used as a catalyst that could initially help in collecting relevant data from the local 
Egyptian context. To investigate the local context and to collect and update the data needed, a 
pilot study was conducted that included the following: 
• Conducting a number of informal interviews with decision makers from the industrial 
sector and relevant bodies. 
• Attending an international conference in Egypt focusing on the development of new 
urban communities, to get information about the recent ideas/directions/approaches in 
the academic and practical environment. 
• Collecting documentary data related to the legal and institutional framework in Egypt 
as well as resources that could help understand the extent to which sustainability is 
understood in relevant ministries. 
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• Increasing the base of knowledge about stakeholders and public sector views on 
sustainability, industry and the governmental attitude towards sustainable 
development. This base has been gained from the Egyptian media. 
By analyzing the data collected from the previous resources, some initial results have come 
out as follows: 
• The Egyptian Government strongly endeavours to reform the legal and institutional 
framework to develop the industrial sector to attract investments to provide more 
work opportunities. However, there is a large contradiction between the governmental 
rhetoric and the opponents’ critique about the governmental role towards applying the 
following: 
o Strengthening the role of major groups in participatory and deliberative 
decision-making. 
o Transparency, openness and disclosure, 
o The process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, 
and 
o The respect of law, order and independent judiciary. 
• The governmental industrial bodies, which have the power, by law, by the political 
agenda and by practice, to leading the process of founding industrial zones in Egypt, 
lack an understanding of sustainability. Yet, the governmental environmental bodies 
which are responsible, by law, for applying sustainability have enough understandings 
of sustainability and industrial ecology but are with no power to intervene to improve 
the process. 
• The IZs founding process is complicated where the decision making stage is so much 
controlled by the central government where other partners are marginalized. The 
planning stage represents the best area for partners in general and planners 
specifically to participate aiming at reaching sustainability. In this stage, experts and 
planners’ ways of handling sustainability seem to be in the orbit of sanitary 
engineering and environmental management. They are to some extent  away from the 
environmental sustainable dimensions.  
In relation to narrowing down the research focus, as the Government dominates the decision 
making stage without the involvement of other stakeholders, and the planning stage 
represents an opportunity for public and technical participation, this research focuses on the 
planning process of IZs. What increases the importance of the planning stage is that it, 
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theoretically, directs the following stages from implementing to operating, monitoring and 
follow up. Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that a failure to apply sustainability in this 
stage should result in sustainability being lacking in the following stages while the contrary is 
not true. In addition, it was found that, according to the limitations of time and money, it will 
be hard to conduct in depth research into the comprehensive and complex process of 
founding IZs. 
Consequently, the researcher has updated literature on sustainable industrial zones in general 
and on the planning for industrial ecology specifically. The following section shows a 
discussion on this review and its conclusions.   
2.4.2. Industrial Ecology33 as an operational approach to sustainable development 
The early literature was very optimistic about what industrial ecology could provide. 
However, many scholars have agreed that industrial ecology (IE), the “science of 
sustainability” (Gibbs and Deutz (2005), p.453)34 which mimic the nature environment, 
represents accurately one of the paths that could provide real solutions of how the concept of 
sustainable development can be made operational in an economically feasible way (Erkman, 
1997). Eco-industrial parks (EIPs) are the IE emerging operational models that are being 
spread worldwide which can reconcile the three dimensions of sustainability: social, 
economic and environmental (see Erkman (1997), Elabras Veiga and Magrini (2009), 
Polyakov et al. (2008), Singh et al. (2007), Cervantes (2007), Geng and Hengxin (2009), and 
Kim (2007)). Adopting this concept, the literature considers industrial symbiosis (IS) as the 
primary concern of industrial ecology (see Roberts (2004), Gibbs and Deutz (2005), Erkman 
(1997), Tudor et al. (2007), Singh et al. (2007), Geng et al. (2009), Cervantes (2007), 
Liwarska-Bizukojc et al. (2009) and Kim (2007)). The case of Kalundborg make it more than 
a smart idea. It confirms the facts that IS can be practical and economically viable (Erkman, 
1997). In the same area, the co-location and incorporation of firms that can reprocess wastes 
of other activities is critical to the success of the IE (Roberts, 2004). Gibbs and Deutz (2005) 
warned that defining IE or EIPs is facing the same risk of ambiguity as for SD. The 
expectations of this ambiguity increases due to the fact that IE till now “lacks a more of a 
comprehensive theoretical framework” (Boons et al., 2011)35 or a grand theory/background or 
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 The ideas on IE are explored in greater detail in the following chapter. 
34
 As mentioned by Allenby, 1999,p.40 in IEEE through Gibbs and Deutz 2005. 
35
 Very recently, at the time of writing up this thesis, Boons et al. (2011) suggested a theoretical framework for 
industrial symbiosis (IS). They stated that their paper fills the gap of the absence of such a conceptual 
framework but only regarding IS. Their framework has a very specific focus on IS and does not cover 
comprehensively industrial ecology and governance for SD contrary to the conceptual framework constructed in 
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grand design (Agarwal and Strachan, 2006). The reason is that the field is still in its early 
stages where the gap is substantial between the concept and its implementation (McManus 
and Gibbs, 2008, Gibbs and Deutz, 2007). However, McManus and Gibbs (2008) noted that 
there is a need for the research to be continued looking for overcoming the barriers for its 
implementation from the perspective of various decision-makers, and recognizing how 
current industrial decisions are being made and the level of knowledge/acceptance of 
industrial ecology. 
Gibbs and Deutz (2007) and Vermeulen (2007) mentioned that many authors, like Welford 
(2004), in the last decades, see a role for social sciences in guiding the implementation of IE. 
Hence, they have called for more input from other relevant scientific fields, where planning is 
one of the stated fields. In addition, linking the IE to these fields is a challenging job 
(Vermeulen, 2007).  
Welford (2004) sees that the science and engineering approaches to IE have largely advanced 
beyond the social science ones. Furthermore, comprehension of processes and concepts of 
social theories is lacking. Therefore, there is an utmost need to show that IE can work in our 
communities where this is a demanding focus of the research still somewhat underdeveloped 
(Gibbs and Deutz, 2007). In a response, many authors argue that planning has a key role in 
applying IE. In this context: 
o Roberts (2004) and a significant volume of literature (See Tudor et al. (2007) and 
Elabras Veiga and Magrini (2009)), noticed that planning is essential in encouraging 
new synergies and interchanging behaviour by locating activities in EIPs  in clusters. 
The more strong the clustering, the greater are the expectations for synergies and for 
the implementation of IE. 
o Gibbs and Deutz (2005) confirmed that EIP projects must be planned for a long term 
vision and to allow a gradual (incremental) approach, and each phase needs to be 
financially viable. This may be more viable than a purely park-based approach. They 
also contend that an EIP must be “a community of, and not just co-located, 
businesses” (Gibbs and Deutz, 2005, p.463). It is this networking that will encourage 
materials interchange in the long term. In this community, it is helpful for planners 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Chapter (3) of this research. Furthermore, Boons et al. (2011) also stated that their conceptual framework 
“specifies basic relationships between variables. Further research is required to define variables more precisely, 
and establish in more detail the relationships among them” p.910. The conceptual framework constructed in this 
research on one hand, and the theorization on the actual process of founding industrial zones on the other 
attempt to fill the current gap in knowledge indicated, and, hence, stand as the novel contribution of this 
research.  
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and policy makers to understand the importance of individual champions to the 
development of EIPs. The development of social relationships is necessary  for 
founding an EIP not just on technical basis but also as a community (Hewes and 
Lyons, 2008).  
o Tudor et al. (2007) believes that EIPs have in general tended to arise naturally not 
through deliberate planning. However, they declared that various writers have asked 
for a more centralized planning process at different levels to overcome market failures 
concerning synergies. The writers contend that an overall framework to regulate EIPs 
and reduce any limitations is essential.  
o Zhao, et al. (2008) stated that there are limitations not only in applying IS but also in 
the comprehensive evaluation. Some EIPs plans have failed to establish sustainability 
targets, indicators and benchmarks, maintenance and monitoring plans in detail. 
Therefore, many innovative planning strategies were simply adopted as decorative 
practices.  Zhao, et al. (2008), therefore, sees that simulation and evaluation methods 
are important to measure quantitatively the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
scenarios adopted within the eco-industrial system plan. 
o Fernundez and Ruiz (2009) called for planning that defines and incorporates 
subsystems and the important aspects of SD. 
To conclude, IE is considered as an important tool for operationalzing sustainable 
development. The primary pillar of this concept is IS where the co-location and integration of 
firms can reprocess wastes of other industries. IE lacks a grand theory and is subjected to 
ambiguity. IE is still in its early stages, facing many barriers which make a gulf between the 
idea and its implementation which requires more social research regarding the role of 
planning in guiding the implementation of industrial ecology. One of the main reasons behind 
this gap is that, in the developing process, partners don’t understand their roles in the process 
and are unaware of the importance of relationships between each other in advancing the 
implementation of industrial ecology in our societies. Hence, there is a need to continue the 
social research seeking practical ways to overcome the current barriers.  
From this point of view, the role of planning emerges to guide the implementation of IE. 
Planning is essential at many levels in applying IS, using clustering as one of its tools.  It is 
essential that planning, to reach the goal, has to be long term allowing for a gradual approach, 
and each phase needs to be financially viable. Planning also has to be oriented to using the 
existing social relationships.  
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Accordingly, to specify in more detail the focus of the research; it looks at the processes 
where different constellations between the public and private actors contribute to the planning 
of industrial zones, and to understand these processes and the governing factors. Then it is to 
examine the degree to which the processes cooperate with sustainability and industrial 
ecology. 
2.5. Discussion and redefinition of the research question 
As discussed in Chapter (1), Egypt has recently set out to prepare a new national urban 
development map to accommodate double the current population for the year 2050. Within 
this intended national urban plan, industry is one of the main proposed economic bases. Yet, 
it is widely argued that existing industrial development in Egypt is not sustainable. It was also 
found that theorising upon the current process of founding IZs in Egypt is lacking. 
Environmental conditions are expected to get worse, if the proposed IZs are going to follow 
the footsteps of the existing ones. It was concluded from local literature, the most recent of 
which was published before 2005, in line with the international debate, that there is a need for 
an empirical testing to measure the extent to which the industrial system in Egypt is moving 
towards governance for SD and how and why the process has produced unsustainable IZs. 
The main challenge for Egypt has been to develop an appropriate setup/framework that can 
adopt a governance system for SD that is culturally sensitive to the country. Therefore, Egypt, 
after 2005, has taken some enhancing steps to achieve a governance system for SD that could 
improve the industrial development process. Yet, these steps have not yet been practically 
examined and there is no literature that theorized on its effects on the sustainability 
framework of Egypt in general and on the founding process of the IZs in specific. The 
question which poses itself now is: to what extent have these steps considerably changed the 
process through which industrial zones are founded in Egypt. In line with IE lacking a grand 
theory and a huge gap between the idea and its practice, the role for planning emerged from 
the international discourse to guide the implementation of IE. The whole process of founding 
IZs in Egypt seems to be complex and controlled by the government. In this process, the 
planning phase represents a greater opportunities than other phases in allowing the 
intervention of other partners. For these reasons, in addition to the research limitations, the 
research focus has been narrowed down from the founding process to the planning process. 
To specify in more detail the focus of the research in line with the international discourse on 
IE, the research will be looking at the processes where different partners, public and private 
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actors, are involved. It will then theorize for the processes and its governing factors, and then 
examine the degree to which the processes cooperate with sustainability and IE. 
In light of the foregoing, the research questions are redefined as follows:  
1. Does the Egyptian government have an operational planning framework that could lead 
to sustainable industrial zones? 
a. What is the official framework of the process under which the industrial zones 
should be planned? 
b. What is the actual process through which the industrial zones are planned? 
c. Consequently, to what extent is the current process sustainable and applying 
industrial ecology? 
2. What are the factors that influence/shape the current process through which the industrial 
zones are planned? 
Answers to these questions are necessary in order to provide an evidence base for effective 
interventions to bring about more sustainable industrial development. To answer these 
questions, the following chapter discusses the significant need for an in-depth conceptual 
framework for the planning process of EIPs. This framework is rather a catalyst that could 
initially help in collecting data relevant from the local Egyptian context. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY: THE CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK OF THE PLANNING PROCESS 
3.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the problem of the international discourse about industrial 
ecology (IE) and eco industrial parks (EIPs). It was widely contended that the field is still in 
its early stages where the gap is substantial between the concept and its implementation. 
More importantly, IE lacks a comprehensive framework and is subjected to the same risk of 
ambiguity as for sustainable development (SD). A significant role for planning emerged from 
the international discourse to guide the implementation of IE. The previous chapter therefore 
redefined the research questions asking about the process through which the IZs are planned 
in Egypt and the extent to which this process is sustainable as well as its governing factors. 
To answer these questions, the need for an in-depth conceptual framework significantly came 
out as a catalyst that could initially help in organizing and collecting the data relevant from 
the local Egyptian context. This chapter therefore attempts to construct this conceptual 
framework of the process through which EIPs could be normatively developed. This 
framework is seen in this chapter as a first step to investigate the current process of planning 
IZs in Egypt, and developing it, when needed1.  
The chapter is organized in four sections. The first presents the overarching concepts that 
normatively have to govern the formation of the enabling context for the implementation of 
IE, and the planning process. The second outlines the set up of the context in relation to its 
different components such as education and research, institutional and regulatory 
frameworks, networking, and funding. The third lays down the planning process through 
which EIPs could be likely developed. Materials reviewed in these three sections take the 
shape of consecutive points which logically build on each other towards the construct of the 
framework, which is, then, synthesised as a 'whole' in the fourth concluding section.  
                                                          
1
 It is worth mentioning here that this chapter uses a normative style in formulating the conceptual framework. 
The main purpose of this framework is to help organizing data collection and that is why it is found that using 
the normative style is easier to follow in looking for relevant data from the Egyptian context than using the 
descriptive style. Another important reason for using such style is to use the research findings, synthesized in 
Chapter (8), concentrating on the Egyptian realities to reflect on the concepts of this framework. This aims at 
contributing to the international discourse by constructing a new list of barriers to the implementation of IE form 
understandings of the planning process of the Egyptian IZs and the factors governing its shape. Furthermore, in 
a future research, the potential comparison between the ideas presented by this conceptual framework and the 
investigated realities of the Egyptian process could enrich local scholarly as well as societal debates on how to 
develop the current process towards IE. As a first step on this breathtaking challenge, Chapter (8) ends with 
recommendations that could potentially help develop the current process. 
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3.2. Methodology and significance of the framework 
To construct this framework, this chapter analyses normative and empirical literature 
available in the field of IE, governance and SD, looking for overarching governing concepts, 
contextual settings, and planning processes through which IE could potentially be brought to 
reality. A synthesis of these ideas/components into a coherent framework constitutes a part of 
the contribution of this research.  
The importance of this framework emerges from being a catalyst to help evaluate the ability 
of the current process in Egypt to produce sustainable industrial development. That is utterly 
needed now, as Egypt is currently planning for an outstanding urban-industrial growth to 
accommodate double its population up to 2050. This chapter does not present this framework 
as a recipe that is placeless or timeless. Being a collection of mosaics, this framework is 
evidently inapplicable to any context. As indicated in Chapter (2), a grand theory of 
governance for SD or of IE is lacking. This highlights the importance of constructing this 
framework to be used to initially help in collecting and organizing data relevant from the 
local Egyptian context. These data are then to be analysed inductively towards an 
understanding of the current process of planning IZs, its shaping factors, and the obstacles it 
faces. Further, the ideas presented by this framework could enrich local scholarly as well as 
societal debates on how to develop the current process towards IE. 
3.3. Industrial ecology: the conceptual framework of the planning process 
3.3.1. Overarching concepts 
This section presents two groups of concepts that normatively govern the formation of the 
enabling context for the implementation of IE and the emerging planning process. The first 
group, see Figure (3-1),  generally addresses the nature of both, SD, governance and IE on 
one hand (mainly concluded from the previous chapter), and the local context on the other; 
and consequently hints to some principles/ideas that have to be considered in setting the 
context and the planning process to bring about best possible results. The second group, see 
Figure (3-4), identifies the gist of IE along with its major characteristics which have to inform 
and contribute to the formation of the planning process. 
3.3.1.1. General concepts 
 SD, governance (Jordan, 2008), and IE (Gibbs and Deutz, 2007, McManus and Gibbs, 
2008, Agarwal and Strachan, 2006), are all ambiguous terms. Intensive scholarly and 
societal debates are needed to contextually define these terms (Jordan, 2008, McManus 
and Gibbs, 2008).  
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Figure 3-1: General concepts 
 
 
 SD is fundamentally a normative idea and achieving it is a complex issue (Jordan, 2008) 
that is handled in a continuously changing context. Therefore, policies, plans and 
regulations have to be regularly updated (Geng and Yi, 2005). 
 SD principles related to its three pillars, society, economy and the environment, conflict 
sharply with one another, and hence require systems of governance that resolve conflicts 
and reach coordinated policies (Jordan, 2008).    
 Governance mode has to be cognizant to its context (Jordan, 2008). Compared with 
developed nations, developing nations face different environmental, economic and social 
constraints, and, therefore, have to adopt a different approach to implement IE (Geng and 
Yi, 2005). 
 Communities do not accept change which can make the implementation of IE a 
challenging task since it involves change. Gaining community support for applying IE is 
important. This requires governments and developers to embark upon a process to 
educate and encourage communities to learn about and support investment that would 
uphold IE concepts. A community learning/participatory approach to the development of 
EIPs will avoid much unfriendliness by local communities (Roberts, 2004). Figure (3-2) 
shows the concepts of gaining community support for IE in detail2 
                                                          
2
 Each of the figures similar to this one shows one of the IE concepts then the main action to be done to adopt it 
what also could be used to measure the application of the mentioned concept. It then addresses the prerequisites 
to the application of the concept on both macro and detailed levels of planning. It is important here to mention 
that the prerequisites are discussed and referenced in variant places in this chapter according to their 
appropriateness to other concepts and settings.  
IE 
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 Significant factors constraining IE are societal attitudes towards waste, and value systems 
of business, government and communities regarding treatment methods. Therefore, 
changing value systems regarding waste and IE, and maintaining interest and creating 
positive attitudes to mechanical or biotechnologies are indeed crucial concepts (Roberts, 
2004). Figure (3-2) shows the concepts of changing the values system regarding IE and 
wastes in detail. 
 
 IE is not a system that is merely applicable inside the boundaries of an EIP (Geng and Yi, 
2005), but a culture that the community has to adopt. SD should not continue to be 
understood as a mere environmental matter (ESCWA, 2003). IE is, therefore, an 
interdisciplinary field of studying industrial systems in concert with nature and society 
(Geng and Yi, 2005). To apply IE, therefore, a long-term, incremental, multidisciplinary, 
integrated, and coordinated planning approach has to be adopted by the government 
(Geng and Yi, 2005, Gibbs and Deutz, 2005, Roberts, 2004). The outcome of such an 
approach has to be flexible and subject to regular scrutiny and potential change (ESCWA, 
2003). Figure (3-3) shows the IE planning approach in detail.  
 
      Figure 3-2: Societal change for IE 
Concept Main action/measure Prerequisites 
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 For a regulatory/legal setup to be favourable, effective and realistic, it has to be not only 
context-specific, but also case-specific. A shift from a regulation-based to incentive-based 
approach, or from a prescriptive to proscriptive code of law, is a necessity. At present, the 
literature reviewed is in favour of a setup which tells people what not to do (as opposed to 
telling them what to exactly do), and encourages them to achieve good results rather than 
follow certain steps or abide by insensitive generalised regulations (Roberts, 2004, 
Shalaby, 2010). 
3.3.1.2. Industrial ecology concepts 
The primary concern of IE is industrial symbiosis (IS)/cycle closing (Boons et al., 2011). The 
co-location and integration of firms which can use or reprocess the waste of other industries 
in the same locality is critical to the success of IE (Roberts, 2004, Gibbs and Deutz, 2005, 
Tudor et al., 2007, Erkman, 1997, Geng et al., 2009, Singh et al., 2007, Cervantes, 2007, 
Liwarska-Bizukojc et al., 2009, Kim, 2007). Closed industrial system (Shalaby, 2003), 
industrial ecosystem (Geng and Yi, 2005), industrial round put system, and circular economy 
(Sterr, 2005) are different terms used to express the gist of IE to imply ideas of lowering the 
      Figure 3-3: IE planning approach 
Concept Main action/measure Prerequisites 
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ecological footprint (Shalaby, 2003), mimicking nature, optimizing the use of energy and 
resources (Geng and Yi, 2005), and meeting the challenge of resource depletion (Sterr, 2005). 
 
Figure 3-4: Industrial ecology concepts 
 
 
 In this regard, waste must no longer be seen as something that is harmful, but as a 
potential resource (Erkman, 1997, Elabras Veiga and Magrini, 2009).   
 IE works best where there is a strong agglomeration or clustering of establishments that 
have the capacity to utilise waste as a resource in production. The more intense the 
agglomeration, the greater are the prospects for innovation and synergies (Roberts, 2004, 
Tudor et al., 2007, Erkman, 1997, Elabras Veiga and Magrini, 2009). This intensity 
implies not only variety, but also redundancy, of the agglomerated establishments. In 
support, reporting on Chertow (2007), Boons et al. (2011) state when defining IS: 
[E]ngaging traditionally separate industries in a collective approach to 
competitive advantage involving physical exchange of materials, energy, water, 
and by-products. The keys to industrial symbiosis are collaboration and the 
synergistic possibilities offered by geographic proximity. p.905. 
According to Sterr (2005), the principle of redundancy has proven to be one of the vital 
success factors of the natural role model. In other words, for closing the loop in an 
industrial setting, the number of establishments within an industrial context should not 
only extend into various branches and input-output systems in order to increase the 
probability that a fitting partner is among them, it should also provide several species of 
the same kind. Figure (3-5) shows the concept of industrial symbiosis in detail. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
66 
 
 
 EIPs have to provide such an opportunity of variety and redundancy (Sterr, 2005). An EIP 
is a piece of a contiguous fenced property owned and managed as a unit for a community 
of sharing, integrated industrial and business enterprises (Geng and Yi, 2005, Shalaby, 
2003). EIPs encourage mixed land uses, and co-location of manufacturers and service 
providers; and facilitate cogeneration, waste and resource sharing and waste reprocessing 
(Roberts, 2004). A shift from activity-based to performance-based appraisal is, therefore, 
crucial in the co-allocation process of uses/firms. A performance-based appraisal would 
permit a business to be located not due to the nature of its activity, but according to its 
performance and the external benefits it could create (Roberts, 2004). Figure (3-6) shows 
the concept of mixed industry in detail.  
 However, if EIPs fail short of achieving full industrial symbiosis, industrial regions are 
powerful counterparts. In fact, the adoption of IE principles on the regional level is 
argued by some to be more viable than on a purely park-based level (Gibbs and Deutz, 
2005, Sterr, 2005). The increased diversity of actors and activities of the regional level, 
according to Korhonen and Snäkin (2005), “enhances connectance and opens up new 
possibilities for cooperation” (Boons et al., 2011, p.906) . Lyons (2007) sees that closing 
the loop is controlled by an economic logic for the companies involved. Therefore, there 
Figure 3-5: Industrial symbiosis 
Concept Main action/measure Prerequisites 
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is no preferable level at which the loop should be closed. Determining the level3, though, 
will differ from a context to another (Boons et al., 2011). 
 
3.3.2. Setting the context 
Costa et al. (2010) argue that applying IE/IS requires a specific context, ‘the enabling 
context’, that should consider different knowledge, socio-cultural and socio-political 
structures, spatial, and temporal sittings (Boons et al., 2011). In light of this as well as the 
above-mentioned concepts, this section shows how to make the context normatively ready to 
incorporate and implement IE. It sets the societal will central to any real shift towards the 
application of IE. It highlights the role that education and the media, capacity building and 
science have to play to raise people awareness on SD/IE issues, advance planning and 
management skills of industrial systems, and develop research on new technologies and 
theories of SD. In addition, it shows that institutions have to be restructured, regulatory 
frameworks have to be more effective and realistic, sustainability-oriented networking has to 
be established/strengthened among different stakeholders/factories, and funds have to be 
secured to facilitate governance processes for SD.  
Yet, this contextual restructuring, collected from available regional and international 
literature, is not proposed as a way through which IE could be achieved in Egypt. Indeed, the 
                                                          
3 Sterr (2005) finds that the market size of the industrial region of Rhine-Neckar, Germany with its roughly 2 
million inhabitants is large enough to economically guarantee self sustaining recycling processes within its 
systemic borders, and generalizes that almost any kind of waste that can be recycled within Germany can also be 
recycled within the systemic borders of an industrial region like that of Rhine-Neckar. 
Figure 3-6: Mixed industry 
Concept Main action/measure Prerequisites 
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effective setup is a case-specific contextual one which builds on existing institutional and 
regulatory frameworks. In addition, embedded in the attempt to bring about an effective 
setup, change has to be gradual, coordinated and responsive to contemporary societal 
characteristics.  
3.3.2.1. Societal Will 
Society has to have the will to bring about SD. The political will (Gibbs and Deutz, 2007) is 
part of this, but what really matters is the collective will of all societal groups. Seeking 
substance not appearance is a key issue in this regard (Geng and Yi, 2005). 
3.3.2.2. Media and Education 
Media and education have a significant role to play in making the society willing and 
mobilised to bring about/accept SD, see Figure (3-7), through: 
 Informing the public of the SD objectives and practices. 
 Placing greater emphasis on the responsibility and role of individuals, communities and 
the private sector in supporting progress towards SD/IE (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Affirming the inter-connectedness of development, environmental issues, and health 
through everyday coverage (ESCWA, 2003).  
 Disseminating cleaner production strategies (Geng and Yi, 2005) and best sustainable 
practices. 
 Exposing environmental violations, following up on enforcement of environmental laws, 
and even rating manufacturers and producers according to their environmental 
performance (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Forming stronger connections with other civil society sectors, including NGOs, and 
academic and scientific institutions on sustainability issues (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Incorporating environmental priorities and sustainability principles into school and 
university curricula (ESCWA, 2003). 
 
Figure 3-7: Media and education settings 
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3.3.2.3. Capacity Building 
In addition, to public education, further training is needed for those who are directly linked 
with the incorporation and implementation of IE. Hence, capacity building has emerged as an 
essential requirement for efficient planning and management of industrial systems. It aims at 
strengthening institutions, managerial systems and human resources on issues related to not 
only the environment but also good communication, exchange of information, and interaction 
among different stakeholders and levels. Capacity building applies to technical planners as 
well as industry and governmental managers who need continuous update on eco-industrial 
principles and methods (Geng and Yi, 2005). The outcome from IE is supported by a high 
level of capacity building (Boons et al., 2011). A successful capacity building program 
therefore, see Figure (3-8), has to observe the following: 
 Capacity building should directly reflect the needs and overall conditions of the industrial 
system concerned across different levels/sectors (Geng and Yi, 2005). 
 Capacity building should be a long-term process, with clearly stated short, medium and 
long-term goals which should be evaluated periodically. In this context, much literature 
gives more attention to the social features of IE as included in SD (Geng and Yi, 2005). 
Lambert and Boons (2002) describe the EIPs development as a social process dependent 
on social, ecological, and economic features. They highlight the significance of learning 
processes among social actors. On the one hand, achieving shallow short-term social 
changes is comparatively easy, but on the long term, the system could fail as social actors 
are subjected to fall back into their old behaviour model due to their embedment in an 
institutional context. On the other hand, to guarantee system change rather than system 
optimization, all actors of the system should be involved in the change process that 
should also emerge from the existing system (Boons et al., 2011).  
 Moreover, functional networks are an effective way to complement traditional technical 
assistance. They mainly target communication, information exchange and wide 
interactions between different partners (Geng and Yi, 2005). 
Figure 3-8: Capacity building settings 
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3.3.2.4. Science and New Technologies 
‘Techno-scientific state’ is critical in enhancing industrial competitiveness (Uttam, 2006) and 
central to finding sustainable solutions in terms of industrial processes and products. 
Contextualizing the concept of IE and theorizing on its implementation are basically 
scientific assignments. Improvement of techno-scientific conditions, see Figure (3-9), is 
dependent on: 
 Pursuing academic research on environmental sciences, SD and IE (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Institutionalising a bigger role for experts in policy making, planning and implementation 
(Sterr, 2005, Geng and Yi, 2005). 
 Inventing and marketing appropriate/context specific environmentally superior 
solutions/technologies (Geng and Yi, 2005). 
 
Figure 3-9: Science and new technologies settings 
 
 
3.3.2.5. Institutional Setup 
This subsection lays down the objectives that have to be ideally achieved regarding 
restructuring institutions to support governance processes for SD4, see Figure (3-10).  
 Set the system of governance to be society-centric as opposed to state-centric. The former 
suggests that the state has been progressively hollowed out in a new era of ‘governance 
without government’, moving more and more of its policy competences to regional 
organisations and/or non-state actors (Jordan, 2008). In turn, increase social involvement 
and institutionalize public consultation and participation (Geng and Yi, 2005). Establish 
permanent and effective national councils/forums with adequate input from governmental 
institutions and other stakeholders to serve as a mechanism for facilitating policy 
integration and coordination. In more conclusive words, adopt/support decentralisation 
(Geng and Yi, 2005) and participatory decision making processes. In light of this, Costa 
                                                          
4
 While the proposed setup is ultimately placeless, it cannot be completely separated from the Egyptian 
contextual socio-cultural and socio-political characteristics. 
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et al. (2010)5 argue that coordinating bodies and governmental policies can promote (or 
pose barriers to) the IS development by influencing the factors shaping the enabling 
context of IS. They mainly focus on the influence of policy development at different 
levels of decision making from supra international to local level6 (Boons et al., 2011).  
 Secure an open access to information to empower participatory decision making 
(ESCWA, 2003). 
 Hold government accountable to people (ESCWA, 2003).  
 Overcome bureaucracy and eliminate corruption to facilitate openness, transparency, and 
acceptance of change (ESCWA, 2003).  
 Fix artificial segmentation of administrative arrangements (Geng and Yi, 2005) towards 
more effective integrated ones (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Set clear jurisdictions and adequately assign implementation responsibilities to different 
authorities concerned. Overlapping jurisdictions lead to policy conflicts, program 
duplication and inefficiency. Further, secure a wider jurisdiction for environmental 
authorities to address cross-sectoral issues (ESCWA, 2003).  
 Resolve power politics (ESCWA, 2003), and coordinate among concerned authorities 
(Geng and Yi, 2005). Facilitate policy integration, coordination and complementarities 
among institutional bodies seeking to achieve sustainability, i.e., inter-sectoral/inter-
ministerial coordination. Provide adequate mechanisms to follow up on policy decisions, 
resolve deficiencies in policy integration and implementation, and settle disputes 
(ESCWA, 2003). 
 Set mechanisms to allow governmental institutions to over watch other institutions’ 
actions that affect their areas of competence. Alternatively, non-governmental 
forums/committees can over watch non-compliance and non-integration practices 
(ESCWA, 2003). 
 Advise institutions on means of integrating national SD priorities into their sector 
strategies, action plans and work programs (ESCWA, 2003).  
 Provide competence and mandate to environmental institutions. Secure the ability of 
environmental authorities to implement legislations (ESCWA, 2003). 
                                                          
5
 They build on the findings of Mirata (2004) in his assessment of the (National Industrial Symbiosis 
Programme) NISP in the United Kingdom (Boons et al., 2011). 
6
 Similarly, Costa and Ferrão (2010) see that the IS “can be shaped through an interactive process wherein the 
government, industries and other institutions are guided towards aligning their strategies in support of 
collaborative business strategies in resource management” (Boons et al., 2011, p.907).  
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 Enable existing regional environmental institutions to access and engage non 
environmental ministries on matters of SD in order to handle the task of supporting 
regional progress towards SD from a multidisciplinary perspective (ESCWA, 2003). 
 
Figure 3-10: Institutional setup settings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2.6. Regulatory setup 
Reconciling the legislative framework in line with the principles of industrial ecology is 
crucial. In support, Van Beers et al. (2009) state that the legislative framework poses 
particular challenges for applying IS in Australia (Boons et al., 2011). Therefore, under the 
general connotation that a shift from a regulation-based to incentive-based approach (Roberts, 
2004), or from a prescriptive to proscriptive code of law (Shalaby, 2010), is a necessity, an 
effective realistic regulatory setup, see Figure (3-11), tuned to IE requires the following: 
 Change planning regulations from segregated land uses to allowing mixed harmoniously 
located areas of industrial and non-industrial activities; and set standards for 
environmental protection of these mixed areas (Roberts, 2004).    
 Develop new regulations to promote waste reuse (Geng and Yi, 2005), and regulate 
environmental storage and handling of waste materials (Roberts, 2004). In support, Van 
Berkel et al. (2009) illustrate how the Eco-Town Program was became possible after the 
Japanese government set up a comprehensive legislative framework enabling a recycling-
based society.  
 Allow the creation of waste sinks or concentrations, and the establishment of reprocessing 
and energy recovery industries/activities (Roberts, 2004).   
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 Use economic instruments such as incentives, taxes, effluent charges, prices, and quotas 
to better allocate and use resources and services (Geng and Yi, 2005). For effective 
economic instruments, secure a strong monitoring system; a successful voluntary 
reporting system; a political will to remove subsidies and cancel exemption from 
complying with national environmental laws and standards; and fully and fairly apply 
these instruments to all concerned (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Enact laws for cleaner production promotion (Geng and Yi, 2005); take measures needed 
to enforce (ESCWA, 2003) and close loopholes in (Geng and Yi, 2005) laws; and 
establish effective mechanisms to resolve disputes (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Enact public right to know and access to information (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Revise and amend regulations contradicting the above-mentioned regulatory setup. 
 
Figure 3-11: Regulatory setup settings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2.7. Networking and Information Systems 
Networks among different stakeholders are crucial for coordination inside an EIP/region in 
which sustainable cyclic management could be realized. In these networks, industry meets 
science and politics. Stakeholders exercise interdisciplinary and inter-organisational 
knowledge and ideas exchange (Sterr, 2005). For Lambert and Boons (2002), achieving 
sustainability is particularly difficult in mixed EIPs due to conflicting interests of the 
involved actors, a lack of collective networking, and enough cooperation experience (Boons 
et al., 2011). That is why Gibbs and Deutz (2005) recommend that an EIP should be (in a real 
sense) a community of, and not just co-located, businesses. It is this networking activity that 
will potentially encourage materials interchange in the long term and distinguish eco-
industrial developments from other, more superficial, initiatives for the greening of industry. 
For Hewes and Lyons (2008), the development of social relationships is necessary to creating 
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an EIP, not just the technological connections. Indeed, systems make it work, people make it 
happen. They also emphasize on the role of champions of the local communities in building 
the trust needed for the establishment of social connections necessary for industrial symbiosis 
developments (Hewes and Lyons, 2008). For successful networking, see Figure (3-12), the 
following have to be considered regarding information systems: 
 Support/develop an information system/database that helps plan for/manage optimal 
reduction, reuse and recycling of resources (Sterr, 2005, Geng and Yi, 2005, ESCWA, 
2003). 
 Face the challenge of information lack of transparency and incompatibility in order that a 
useful database could be reached (Sterr, 2005). 
 
Figure 3-12: Networking and information systems settings 
 
3.3.2.8. Funding 
Systematic means to allocate, secure and monitor funding for SD initiatives and 
environmental protection are a must (Geng and Yi, 2005, ESCWA, 2003). This could be 
achieved through the following, see Figure (3-13) for abstract: 
 Integrate SD initiatives into national budget/plans. 
 Provide enough budget for environmental authorities and allow local and regional 
governmental institutions to raise funds and generate income through decentralized 
revenue collection schemes which capitalize on environmental taxes and pollution 
charges (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Secure complementary funding through international and national partnerships 
(expanding partnership with local civil society institutions) (ESCWA, 2003). Secure 
additional funds through opening new areas of investment, supporting privatization 
efforts, and expanding economic instruments usage (ESCWA, 2003). 
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Figure 3-13: Funding settings 
 
 
3.3.3. Planning role for industrial ecology 
The following presents the steps on national, regional and local levels to be taken to help 
setup the context and establish EIPs. 
3.3.3.1. National Level 
Governmental IE policies/plans/programs are usually referred to as a major conditioning 
factor that initially represents the political will to move towards IE. In support, the influence 
of policies is probably most evident in China. The Circular Economy Policy is one of the 
significant factors of influence on Chinese industrial symbiosis development (Boons et al., 
2011). In this regard, the following steps are necessary, see Figure (3-14) for abstract: 
 Define a national platform of SD including IE, taking into consideration local contextual 
characteristics (ESCWA, 2003).  
 Prepare a National Industrial Ecology Strategy7 (NIES) which is multidisciplinary and 
inter-sectoral. In NIES, identify and prioritise national goals of IE. These goals are 
concerned with incrementally enabling the context to incorporate IE (ESCWA, 2003). 
 Prepare National Programs of Industrial Ecology (NPIE) that are multidisciplinary and 
inter-sectoral. Give leverage to NPIE through funding in national budget. In NPIE, set 
financing, coordination and implementation mechanisms; adequately assign 
implementation responsibilities to different institutions, and synchronise policy measures; 
and set targets, triggers and indicators for assessing progress in achieving national IE 
priorities (ESCWA, 2003).  
 In light of NIES and NPIEs, relevant institutions should set out to prepare and implement 
work plans for funding and implementation (ESCWA, 2003).  
 A national interdisciplinary planning research team prepares a comprehensive national 
urban plan which takes on board IE principles. Preparing this plan is to be informed with 
contextual and environmental data collected by local and regional authorities. In addition, 
                                                          
7
 NIES is supposed to be one strategy in a series of integrated sustainable development strategies. 
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it is to be developed through back and forth dialogue/consultation with regional 
authorities (ESCWA, 2003). 
Figure 3-14: Planning process: national level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3.2. Regional level 
On the regional level, an interdisciplinary planning research team has the following tasks to 
perform regarding IE, see Figure (3-15) for abstract: 
 Surveying the region to identify actual and potential total and segmented wastewater, 
materials and energy volumes/flow patterns from natural/ production sources, local 
manufacturers and partners, reprocessing industries, and current practices of waste 
management (Roberts, 2004).  
 Assessment of community attitudes towards integrated manufacturing development 
planning, mixed industry development, and supportive waste management industries 
(Roberts, 2004).  
 Assessment of local government stability on the application of environmental policies and 
standards (Roberts, 2004). 
 Involving different stakeholders in learning/participatory networking activities to increase 
awareness of IE and encourage stakeholders to support it (Hewes and Lyons, 2008); and 
to build trust, social relationships, cooperation, and collaborative behaviour among 
stakeholders (Boons et al., 2011).  
 Preparing a Regional Eco-industrial Plan (REIP) step-by-step with all partners in light of 
NIES. The plan should indicate implications of the regional growth management strategy 
and planning schemes for SD on future industry locations; local champion/catalyst 
industries around which others can congregate (Hewes and Lyons, 2008); potential 
industrial clustering; actual/potential spatial concentrations and flows of waste by type; 
environmental sensitivities of regional locations for waste materials; water and energy 
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processing and reprocessing; potential reprocessing industries and cogeneration firms; a 
scheme of information systems and networks; different partners roles according to their 
awareness and attitudes towards IE (Boons et al., 2011); and further recommendations on 
institutional arrangements (ESCWA, 2003). The REIP is to be finalised through dialogue 
and consultation with national and local levels. 
 Assessing demands for potential EIPs available in the region. 
 
Figure 3-15: Planning process: regional level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3.3. Local Level 
A local planning team for preparing an EIP within a REIP will work with the 
champion/catalyst industry identified to develop other potential partners. This team will work 
side by side with all local partners on the following tasks, see Figure (3-16):  
 Designing different scenarios of industrial clustering and technologies to be used, using 
performance-based appraisal (Roberts, 2004).  
 Using systems dynamics and stimulation models to measure the strengths and weaknesses 
of different designed scenarios quantitatively in a triple bottom line base8 (Zhao et al., 
2008, Liwarska-Bizukojc et al., 2009).  
                                                          
8
 Triple bottom line (TBL or "People, Planet, Profit") accounting means expanding the traditional reporting 
framework to take into account environmental and social performance in addition to financial performance 
(Wikipedia, 2011b).  
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 Evaluating different scenarios operationally, in terms of their symbiosis’ environmental 
impacts and marketability, and choosing best possible ones (Zhao et al., 2008, Liwarska-
Bizukojc et al., 2009). 
 Working on the chosen scenarios with all partners, with the help and support from local 
community leaders, and the use of different social relationships, to come up with a case-
specific preferable scenario that would lay the foundations for an EIP that works (in a real 
sense) as a community of businesses (Gibbs and Deutz, 2005, Kim, 2007).  
 Trust, cooperation and collaborative behaviour need to be developed among 
establishments before they are prepared to link processes together in ways which have an 
impact on the economic viability of each establishment (Elabras Veiga and Magrini, 
2009). 
 Conducting economic and environmental risk assessment of waste and energy by-
products’ utilisation and exchange (Roberts, 2004) for the chosen scenario, for final 
tuning. 
 Working on detailed development plans of the chosen scenario which include locations of 
business activities, infrastructure, waste storage, transportation and future utility 
corridors. The latter aims at maximising the collection of industrial by-products, 
minimising transportation and conveying costs between producer and user establishments. 
Plans must consider landscaping and buildings’ utilities as a means of resource recovery, 
especially water; flexible tenancy agreements of building or land that will allow for 
seasonal or variable demand factors; multiple uses of common areas; and community 
infrastructure as a means of providing learning and leisure in addition to basic services for 
the community (Roberts, 2004). Plans must also show economically viable development 
phases (Gibbs and Deutz, 2005), organisational arrangements, recommended 
implementation processes, and training programs for potential implementation bodies 
(Kim, 2007). 
 Formulating an effective marketing plan for the chosen EIP (Roberts, 2004).   
 The park operator (Hollander, 2005), the waste operator and waste analyser9, already 
members of the local planning team, will continue, as permanent personnel, to monitor 
the incremental development of the EIP, and prepare supplementary scenarios of waste 
                                                          
9
 The park operator manages all or part of the infrastructure installations and provides or organizes the provision 
of the services. Since the operator is the manager of the site he/she will decide whether a new settler company 
may join the park, and will negotiate the conditions under which it may do so. The waste manager focuses on 
the companies' internal requirements, while the waste analyser concentrates on the aggregation and analysis of 
data on a supra-company level or the level of a corporate group. Both are supported by specialised software 
(Hollander, 2005).  
Chapter 3 
79 
 
and energy exchange accordingly within the EIP or with other regional counterparts. 
These permanent members will be supported by an in-house scientific institution for data 
collection and analysis, and problem solving (Sterr, 2004).    
   
Figure 3-16: Planning process: local level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Synthesizing the conceptual framework of the industrial ecology 
planning process 
This chapter constructs a conceptual framework of the potential process of planning EIPs. 
The developed framework is composed of three interrelated, interconnected parts: 
overarching governing concepts, context setup and the planning process towards the 
realisation of IE.  
The framework advocates the understanding that IE realisation is a societal task. Society as a 
whole has to locally define IE and take actions to make it viable. These actions, taken inside a 
continuously changing and complex context to bring about a complex issue, have to be 
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incremental, interdisciplinary, integrated, coordinated and subject to regular update. To insure 
the integrity and effectiveness of these actions, a context-specific and society-centric 
governance system has to be created. One of its powerful tools to guard the realisation of IE 
is, indeed, a proscriptive, incentive-based code of law, most preferable in such a complex 
unpredictable context. Also, there should be the concept that planning process for IE has to 
consider industrial symbiosis as a primary concern, waste as a source, EIPs as a means of 
affording variety and redundancy, and industrial regions as counterparts for EIPs. 
The context has to be geared/structured in light of these concepts. Society, as a whole, has to 
develop the will to bring about IE; education and media have to raise people awareness on 
SD/IE issues; capacity building has to advance planning and management skills of industrial 
systems; and science has to develop research on new technologies and theories of SD/IE. In 
addition, institutions have to be restructured to facilitate governance processes for SD; 
regulatory frameworks have to positively respond to IE requirements and be realistic and, 
effective; and sustainable networking has to be established/strengthened for inter-
organisational knowledge/materials exchange among different stakeholders/establishments. 
Further, funds have to be secured for SD/IE initiatives. 
The IE planning process starts with nationally defining a platform of SD and IE, and 
preparing a NIES and NPIE aimed at setting up the context. In light of the NIES, and with the 
participation of all stakeholders, an interdisciplinary national planning team prepares a 
contextual, comprehensive national urban plan. Within the national urban plan, an 
interdisciplinary regional planning team develops a REIP through a learning participatory 
approach in which champion industries will be identified in terms of industry type and 
location, taking advantage of regional natural resources and environmental sensitivities, and 
explores potential waste flows. In tune with the REIP, a local planning team develops and 
examines industrial clustering scenarios of the pioneer EIP to choose the preferable and 
marketable scenario with the highest industrial symbiosis. The team prepares a detailed plan 
in such a way that maximises the collection of industrial by-products, minimises 
transportation and conveys costs between producer and user establishments; and follows up, 
yet through its permanent personnel, with the development of the project phases to secure 
industrial symbiosis, whether inside the EIP or with regional counterparts. 
The importance of this framework emerges from being a tool for future research to help 
evaluate the ability of the current process in Egypt to produce sustainable IZs. That is utterly 
needed now, as Egypt is currently planning for an outstanding urban-industrial growth to 
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accommodate double its population up to 2050. This framework is to be used to initially help 
in collecting and organizing data relevant from the local Egyptian context. The data is then to 
be analysed inductively to gain an understanding of the current process of planning IZs, its 
shaping factors, and the obstacles it faces. Chapter (4) therefore, discusses the methodology 
through which the data relevant is collected using this framework in order to answer the 
research questions.  
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction  
On the international level, Chapter (2) identified a gap in the practice of sustainability where 
theories of governance for sustainable development are lacking. In other words, the literature 
is generic and needs more practices of ideas on the ground. Towards more focus into the 
research concern, Chapter (2) concluded that there is a gulf between the idea of industrial 
ecology (IE) and its implementation which requires more social research regarding the 
planning role in guiding the implementation of IE. On the local level, although Egypt is still 
away from SD in general, Chapter (2) shows that the Egyptian government has recently made 
some institutional/legislative arrangements in favour of environmental protection, and has 
announced taking steps to effectively incorporate SD. It then ends expressing the paramount 
need to examine the extent to which these steps/arrangements have considerably changed the 
planning process through which industrial zones (IZs) are founded, towards IE. In addition, 
identifying the factors which influence/shape the current prevailing process is essential for 
the development of the process as well as its product. Hence, Chapter (3) presents a 
conceptual framework of the planning process through which eco-industrial parks (EIPs) 
could be potentially developed. This framework is constructed to guide the formation of the 
methodology, and the structuring and analysis of data collected.   
This chapter therefore, first, discusses the research strategy that illustrates how the empirical 
study was conducted towards answering the research questions. Second, it explains how and 
why the case studies were chosen. Third, it covers/justifies how the needed data is derived 
from primary and secondary resources, and the research methods utilised therein. Fourth, it 
discusses the settings in which the stages of the field study were carried out. Fifth, it 
addresses how ethics are considerably respected in this research. Finally, this chapter shows 
how the data was analysed and reported, along with the instruments used in this concern.  
4.2. Research Strategy  
This research is a qualitative study in that it aims at identifying and analysing the current 
planning process through which the industrial zones in Egypt are founded as it is practised 
and conceived by the involved partners. In this regard, the research questions this study 
attempts to answer are: 
1. Does the Egyptian government have an operational planning framework that could 
lead to sustainable industrial zones? 
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a. What is the official framework of the process under which the industrial zones 
in Egypt should be planned? 
b. What is the actual process through which the industrial zones are planned? 
c. Consequently, to what extent is the current planning process sustainable and 
applying industrial ecology? 
2. What are the factors that influence/shape the current process through which the 
industrial zones are planned? 
To answer these research questions, this research strategy depends mainly on a case study 
design. A case study design was considered to be appropriate as case studies can be 
especially useful in explanatory studies of social processes (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) shows the 
importance of choosing case studies stating: “the distinctive need for case studies arises out 
of the desire to understand complex social phenomena” (p.4).  The selection of case studies is 
described in Section (4.3). In light of this, the research strategy sought data mainly on two 
broad issues. The first is about the process through which the IZs in Egypt are planned. This 
contains the detailed procedures and steps of the process, the involved actors and their roles 
and powers, and the prevailing relationships among those actors. The second issue is about 
the factors/forces which influence/shape this process. Accordingly, this research strategy 
depends on a multi-stage, multi-method approach. Johnson et al. (2007) defined the mixed 
methods research as “an intellectual and practical synthesis based on qualitative and 
quantitative research ...” (p.129). Brannen, J. (2008) gives a wider definition that explains the 
previous one, saying: 
Mixed methods research means adopting a research strategy employing more than 
one type of research method. The methods may be a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, a mix of quantitative methods or a mix of qualitative 
methods…. If mixed methods research is a research strategy does it represent a 
particular type of research design? The answer is both yes and no. Adopting a 
mixed method strategy may constitute a strategy in its own right or it may be 
subsumed within another research strategy, as in the case of adopting a case study 
design in which a number of different methods are embedded. (p.2)  
The variety of methods, as those this strategy applied, affords, according to John Brewer and 
Albert Hunter (2006), “rich opportunities for cross-validating and cross-fertilizing research 
procedures, findings, and theories.” (p.1). Johnson et al. (2007) agree with the previous 
advantages and also believe that such approach guarantees complete answers to the research 
questions as well as the most balanced and useful research results. Having said that, this 
Chapter 4 
84 
 
research strategy contains three layers that follow a multi-method approach with a case study 
design in its core as follows: 
a) The first layer is a pilot study involving conducting semi-structured interviews with a 
group of experts and secondary resources. It aimed at updating the general knowledge on 
the planning process of the IZs, choosing the research sample, and checking the accuracy 
of the design of the other research methods.   
b) The second layer, the core of the research strategy that has required most developmental 
effort, is a multi-method approach. These methods aimed mainly at answering the first 
research question while giving the base of preconceptions for the second one. Hence, this 
layer was divided into three interlocking sections as follows: 
• A case study design was adopted that contains; a) semi-structured interviews with the 
case studies partners, b) informal discussion with a group of experts who have enough 
knowledge on the case studies, and c) collecting related documentations. This design 
was mainly focusing on identifying the actual framework for the process through 
which the industrial zones are planned and whether they are sustainable. 
• Another design was conducted principally to cover the official framework for the 
process under which the industrial zones are developed. It contains; a) a documentary 
analysis, b) expert interviews with a group of governmental representatives and 
consultants of the involved bodies. 
• A number of informal observations at the governmental bodies involved in the 
planning process of the IZs, were conducted to triangulate some issues related to the 
licensing stage of the process.  
c) The final layer was primarily concerned with answering the last research question 
covering the governing factors of the current planning process of the IZs. A group of 
semi-structured interviews with key experts was conducted along with collecting the 
documentary evidences available.   
It is worth mentioning here that stating those three layers as shown above does not mean that 
they were completely separated. The research context/setting (discussed in details in Section 
(4-5)) mandated a considerable overlay among those layers.  
The strategy followed a specific order to answer the research question. This order was 
important to utilize one step findings to understand how to structure/develop the following 
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one. The research strategy, through this order and by using the above mentioned methods, 
was able to answer the research questions as follows:  
4.2.1. Identifying the official framework (research question No.1 a) 
Before attempting to answer the question about the actual process, that the case studies 
investigation is concerned with, it was essential to have the appropriate base/background on 
what officially the process should be. In other words, it was important to draw a 
comprehensive image on the current framework of the process through which the IZs ought 
to be officially planned (from the governmental view). This information is not available in 
any one place, and compiling and organizing it in an orderly way itself a contribution to our 
knowledge of the governance of IZs in Egypt. Although the researcher was not able to fully 
conclude this framework in the field prior to analysing the data collected, what he gained and 
was able to comprehend from the interviews, was enough to help organize/structure the case 
studies data. This framework includes; description of the stakeholders and their roles and 
powers, relationships among those stakeholders and how they have to coordinate with each 
other, and the institutional/legal arrangements governing such a process. To identify those 
issues, the study applied a group of methods as follows: 
1. Data was collected from primary documentary resources: such as laws, executive 
regulations, presidential/governmental decrees, initiatives, protocols and various 
conventions adopted by the State on the organization of the planning process of IZs. The 
focus was on the establishing laws/decrees of the involved bodies in the planning process, 
as they give the basic description of different bodies involved in the process, their 
roles/responsibilities, and institutional setup controlling the relationship among them. 
Data in this regard was collected by variant ways: 
• Interviewees from different fields/groups were asked, when appropriate, to support 
their opinions with documentary resources or to recommend the potential places from 
which the data could be collected. 
•  Governmental bodies were visited to collect the needed data in person. 
• Utilizing the internet as a last resort to use when discovering the need for some other 
data especially during the data analysis and reporting.  
2. Semi-structured interviews with a group of governmental representatives to identify how 
they perceive and comprehend those legal materials, were conducted. The official 
framework is about not only laws and decrees, but, more importantly, how these legal 
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resources are comprehended by those applying them. In addition, interviewing those 
representatives was important to fill some gaps in the legal material especially regarding 
the details of the official process. In particular, those representatives were chosen from 
the highest administrative levels of the departments that the IZs development is its main 
focus/responsibility like the Central Administration of IZs in the IDA and the IZs 
Development Department in the EEAA. Targeting top officials was essential, according 
to the work atmosphere in Egypt1, as they are the only ones who have the authority to 
partially take decisions according to what they understood from the legal resources, and 
more importantly, are allowed to disseminate data outside their departments. Due to the 
fact that , in an autocratic context like Egypt2 (Elbeshry, 2011, El-Barghothy, 2011), 
discussing politics and related issues especially in a governmental body is  problematic, 
unthreatening questions were imperative (Foddy, 1993) in this regard. The questions were 
in the shape of telling the official story of founding IZs avoiding any connection with any 
problems in laws/decrees except in the cases that the researcher felt the respondent was 
willing to speak. 
3. Semi-structured interviews with experts who work as consultants for those governmental 
bodies, were conducted. This was important, as it has been discussed that approaching 
governmental employees especially in Egypt, likely to result in skewed data. Without 
doubt, because of the observer's paradox (Labov, 1972) and for the reason stated earlier 
regarding the autocratic context causing anxieties to the governmental employees when 
being questioned about political or governmental issues. Once questioning the respondent, 
he/she starts to construct a form of how the process and its details ideally would be done, 
and from this form the answers may come out. Therefore, it was essential to triangulate 
their drawn understandings/answers from other respondents who have enough knowledge 
on the same issue and can respond in a way that is uninfluenced by such anxieties.  
4. Media interviews/statements made by high levels of administration of the concerned 
bodies and the government, were collected especially for those who refused to be 
interviewed. Collecting data from these secondary resources was important during the 
fieldwork and, more importantly during the data analysis and reporting to fill the gaps 
and/or discover the hidden points in the collected data from other data resources and to 
                                                          
1
 This will be established in Chapters (6 and 7), but see also El-Barghothy (2011) and Elbeshry (2011). 
2
 This issue is discussed in the research context in this chapter: Section (4.5), and it is fully analysed and proofed 
in Chapter (7), Section (7.2).  
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triangulate the data as well. Such interviews/statements were collected from the internet 
in the form of newspaper articles, reports, and governmental periodicals. 
This multi-method study applied, offered an answer for the first part of the research question 
mainly inquiring about the official framework of the process through which the IZs should be 
planned in Egypt. In addition, it gave initial indications on shortcomings embedded in the 
current legal system. This framework along with its shortcomings helped in 
structuring/triangulating the data collected from case studies to identify the actual framework 
of the process through which the IZs are planned. 
4.2.2. Identifying the actual process (research question No.1 b and c)  
To answer the second and third part of the first research question and partially the second 
question regarding the actual process through which the IZs are planned, whether it is 
sustainable, and giving a base of preconceptions on the shaping factors of the process, the 
research strategy used a case study design. As previously stated, case studies are particularly 
needed for understanding complex social phenomena (Yin, 2009). This design sought data 
mainly to identify the actual process through challenging the official/governmental view of 
the process. Further, identifying the differences between the official story of the planning 
process and the one through which the case studies were planned, helped spot a group of 
preconceptions on the shaping factors of such process. These preconceptions were used as a 
base to be build upon in the third layer in organizing and triangulating the data collected in 
response to the shaping factors questions.  
The case study design adopted depended in its core on interviewing different partners 
involved in a chosen sample of industrial parks (IPs) along with experts who have enough 
experience on those case studies’ development. Collecting data from primary and secondary 
resources, conducting informal discussions with a group of academics and investors, and field 
observations were complementary methods. Those methods were reasonably helpful in 
completing and triangulating data collected from interviews.  
In details, a sample of industrial zones was selected to investigate their planning process in 
terms of; a) detailed steps/procedures, partners and their roles and powers, and the prevailing 
relationships among partners and, b) initial indications of the shaping forces/factors. The 
process of choosing the sample was selective rather than random. This was because this 
research investigates the most recent and closer types of IZs to the application of SD/IE. 
Therefore, the chosen sample had to be from those types likely to be the closest to the 
application of IE ideas and concepts. Selection therefore, had to be based on different 
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constellations of public and private actors that are likely to make a difference in IZs 
developments towards IE. In other words, the chosen types should give greater opportunities 
for participation likely resulting in a more sympathetic approach to IE. More importantly, the 
selection had to seek the current prevailing practices which potentially influence IZs future 
development in Egypt.  
Out of this sampling process, discussed in details in Section (4.3), three IPs representing the 
Industrial Developer Program (IDP) were chosen as the research case studies. These IPs are: 
• “AL Tajamouat Industrial Park, a fully serviced and integrated industrial park” (Al 
Tagamouat IP). 
• “CPC Egypt, the one stop shop towards building the future” (CPC). 
• A third Company that its directors asked the researcher to hide their names and the 
company name (IP3). 
To identify the process through which those three IPs were planned and the shaping factors, 
the study sought data mainly from semi-structured interviews with different partners involved 
in the process. Partners of such process were mainly from the two key players of the IDP and 
the IDA (especially the CAID and the CAIZs)3 on one side, and the industrial developers of 
these cases on the other. Other important partners, albeit with lesser roles4, like the EEAA 
(especially the Legal and Environmental Assessment departments), local administrations, 
planning teams, NGOs, and others, were also interviewed. Seeking the process story from 
different views/interests/backgrounds appeared as a rigorous way to identify the actual 
process in details, along with triangulating the collected data. The process of choosing the 
respondents was selective at its beginning. Then, to gain access to other respondents, 
snowball sampling was utilized involving, according to Delamont (2002), “getting each 
respondent to help you find the next one” (p.83). Respondents were selected from the highest 
levels of governmental departments responsible for/concerned with the IDP. As stated earlier, 
according to the work atmosphere in Egypt, top officials are the only ones who relatively 
have a clear image and full details of the IDP process and are allowed to disseminate data.  
In addition to interviewing key governmental bodies, It was important to interview the 
consultants of these governmental bodies to triangulate the answers told by the governmental 
personnel. The reason is that approaching governmental employees especially in Egypt, as 
                                                          
3
 CAID: the Central Administration of Industrial Developer and CAIZs: Central Administration of the IZs 
4
 Detailing of this issue is discussed in Chapter (5), from the official view point and in Chapter (6) from the 
actual one. 
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indicated earlier, is likely to result in skewed data. The researcher targeted a specific key 
consultant5 in the IDA, who can respond in a way that is uninfluenced by the anxieties that 
the governmental employees influenced by when addressing political or governmental issues. 
The research sought, through his friends/fellows, an appropriate link to gain access to this 
consultant.  
The researcher did not get access to the planning teams of the chosen IPs for reasons out of 
his control6. The researcher, therefore, sought two other ways to overcome this issue. 
Conducting semi-structure interviews and informal discussions with planners worked in the 
planning teams of other IPs was the first way. The other way was collecting the planning 
reports of the chosen case studies. These methods allowed the researcher to identify the 
process from the planners’ view and triangulate the data collected from the industrial 
developers7. 
To verify and fill the gaps of the data gained from the previous methods, a number of 
methods were used as follows: 
1. Data from primary resources were collected. In addition to the planning reports of the 
case studies, other documentary evidence, such as different editions of the TOR of the 
IDP, the contract model between the IDA and the developers, related laws and decrees, 
and official correspondences between the concerned parties were collected during site 
visits and/or from the websites of the concerned parties.      
2. As stated earlier, informal observations were conducted at the governmental bodies 
concerned with the licensing process of the IPs. This was to feel the procedure from the 
ground and to verify the data collected from the interviews and documents.  
The research strategy so far, utilizing multi-method approach in this case study design of the 
IDP, completed the answer on the first research question mainly about the actual framework 
of the process through which the IZs are planned in Egypt. It also offered, through identifying 
this framework, the base needed to challenge the official framework and to analyze whether 
the process is sustainable. More importantly, it formed preconceptions of why the process 
took the current shape. These preconceptions construct a base that the next research layer 
built upon to organize the research methods in this layer to identify the shaping factors of the 
process. It was also helpful in triangulating the data collected in this regard. 
                                                          
5
 This consultant was recommended by many experts as a key expert in my research field. 
6
 See Section (4.5.1) for more details  
7
 As they are legally responsible to prepare the planning through their choice of planning teams, so they 
represented the planners in the conducted interviews.  
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4.2.3. Identifying the shaping factors of the process (research question No.2)  
The previous two sections show how the data was collected for theorizing on the official and 
actual frameworks of the planning process of the IZs, whether it is sustainable and 
preconceptions of the shaping factors. Findings from these two sections depended on the case 
of the IDP and its challenging to the official framework. To verify these findings on one hand 
and to circulate them to cover the Egyptian IZs in general on the other, they need to be 
discussed again but from a broader/ more comprehensive perspective. To do so, the research 
sought data through interviewing a group of experts who have a broad experiences on this 
issue like consultants of the concerned bodies, governmental representatives and industrial 
developers. Primary and secondary sources, were used for data triangulation.  
In more details, the main objective of interviewing the experts was to understand why the 
planning process of the IZs has taken its current shape. As the indications on the shaping 
factors that came out from the case studies were mostly on political and governmental issues, 
highly sensitive in the Egyptian context, the interview was carefully designed. The interview 
first sought the identification of the problems that the process faces and then the direct 
scientific explanation of how and why these problems exist. The interview after then built on 
the degree to which the expert was opened to speak and was redesigned on the spot targeting 
eventually the complete image of the shaping factors. The implications from the problems 
and the shaping factors on the environment and sustainability including the recent approaches 
to apply it especially industrial ecology were among the issues discussed. Applying this 
design, to answer the second research question, resulted in interviewing 5 key-experts that 
their sessions were comprehensive as they were inclusive of most of the issues; political, 
economic, societal, institutional and legal. In addition, there were also a considerable number 
of interviews, with experts from different backgrounds, which tackled some and not all of 
these issues, and were used to verify the data collected from the comprehensive interviews. 
Yet, the overall number of the interviews in this regard is about 25 interviews which is 
scientifically satisfactory in terms of the quality of the data collected. The researcher sought 
complementary data on these issues from different sources which were basically secondary 
rather than primary. This is a normal result in a political context that considers governmental 
information, especially what uncovers the mistakes/corruption of the government, top 
secrets8.    
                                                          
8
 This issue is discussed and proved in Section (7.6). 
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Yet, the problem of relying on interviews with modest supporting independent evidence from 
primary sources is abated by the fact that the researcher interviewed experts from different 
backgrounds. The core of those experts are professionals not only with full involvement in 
the planning process of IZs but, more importantly, close to the decision making circuits in 
governmental bodies concerned. Also, those experts were interviewed independently from 
each other, so their individual thoughts were used to triangulate the issues discussed.  
Furthermore, the interviews conducted with other experts, mainly academics and judges who 
have experiences on the discussed issues, were another tool which contributed to data 
triangulation. Last of all, collecting available/enough data from different secondary sources 
were utilized as practical to verify with interviews.  
4.2.4. Research strategy summary  
To summarize, this research is a qualitative research which adopted a multi-layer multi-
method approach that depends on a case study design in its core to answer the research 
questions. 
To answer the first research question, part a, about the official version of the planning process 
of the IZs, documentary evidences from primary sources was used.  The focus was on the 
establishing laws/decrees of the concerned bodies. These laws/decrees basically describe 
those bodies, their roles, and the institutional setup controlling the relationship among them. 
To identify how these legal resources are comprehended by those applying them, it was 
essential to interview a group of governmental top officials. This was also important to fill 
the gaps in legal documents regarding the details of the process. As approaching 
governmental employees is likely to result in skewed data, it was important to triangulate 
their constructs from other respondents. Interviewing academic consultants of those 
governmental bodies along with collecting available data from secondary resources were 
helpful. 
To answer the first research question, part b and c, and partially the second question about the 
actual planning process of IZs, its sustainability status and preconceptions of the shaping 
factors, the research strategy used a case study design. Data collection depended mainly on 
interviewing different partners involved in a chosen sample of the IPs, such as governmental 
officials, developers and planning teams, along with experts who have enough expertise on 
the IDP development. Seeking the process story from different partners was important to 
identify the whole actual process with its details and to triangulate the collected data. 
Governmental respondents were selected from the highest levels, usually the ones who have 
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full data and can disseminate them, of governmental departments responsible for/concerned 
with the IDP. Again, to avoid the skewed answers expected from the governmental 
employees and to triangulate them, semi-structured interviews with consultants of the 
concerned governmental bodies were conducted. To guarantee an impartial environment in 
those interviews, the researcher utilized his friends/fellows to informally gain access to 
specific qualified consultants that they know.  Lastly, to verify the data  gained from the 
previous methods and fill its gaps, collecting documentary data, conducting informal 
discussions with a group of professionals, and field observations were helpful in this concern.  
To answer the second question about the shaping factors of the actual planning process 
building upon the base of the preconceptions that inescapably came out from the case studies, 
the strategy sought data from a group of key-experts with a broader knowledge on the 
planning process of the IZs. The main objective from interviewing those experts was to 
identify the problems of the planning process and to understand why it takes its current shape. 
Due to the sensitivity of the political issues that the interviews was designed to seek, 
“unthreatening” questions were used. Due to the state of cloudiness controlling the 
government in Egypt, trials to collect enough documentary evidence were not successful, and, 
hence, data was alternatively collected from secondary rather than primary sources. This is 
abated by the fact that the researcher interviewed a satisfactory number of experts from 
different backgrounds and collected abundant secondary data, both of which provided 
together a suitable ground to triangulate data collected. 
To conclude, the research strategy applied different methods to acquire different sets of data 
that satisfactorily offered answers to the research questions. Furthermore, this multiple 
methods approach helped triangulating the collected data. 
4.3. Choosing Case studies  
4.3.1. Introduction 
As mentioned earlier, to answer the research questions, a case study design was adopted. This 
design sought data to identify the actual process through which the IZs are planned and 
whether it is sustainable. Accordingly, a sample of IZs was selected to investigate their 
planning process in full details. According to Shalaby (2003b), the IZs in Egypt founded prior 
to 2003, are having different insurmountable problems on top of  which are environmental 
ones (Shalaby, 2003b). This indicates that the planning process responsible for the 
development of these IZs was not sustainable. Recently, the Egyptian Government, has made 
some institutional/legislative arrangements in favour of environmental protection, and has 
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announced taking steps to effectively incorporate SD9. Investigating the extent to which these 
steps/arrangements have considerably changed the planning process through which IZs are 
founded, towards IE, is the focus of this research.  This is why the process of choosing a 
sample was selective and tended to look for the most recent, influential and closer types of 
IZs to the application of SD and IE ideas. This closeness was sensed by the presence of 
different interconnected networking constellations of public and private actors that, according 
to IE concepts (Boons et al., 2011), are going to make a difference in IZs developments 
towards IE. In other words, the chosen types should give greater opportunities for 
participation, likely resulting in a more sympathetic approach to IE. More importantly, the 
selected sample had to strongly represent the current prevailing practices which would 
potentially influence IZs future development in Egypt. 
In brief, the chosen sample came out as a result of two factors: adopting sympathetic 
approaches to IE, and influencing the IZs future development in Egypt. Time and resources 
limitations stand as the third factor. This section, accordingly, justifies selecting the research 
sample among a total number of 128 IZs included in five different types.   
This section, after defining Egyptian IZs and their types discussed in details in Appendix (I), 
identifies the most recent, influential and IE-related type. This section then justifies how the 
sample was selected from the chosen type.  
4.3.2. Choosing the case study 
The study of the Egyptian IZs’ definition and types, discussed in Appendix (I), came out with 
the exclusion of the governorate IZs inside cities and the heavy industries zones from the 
sample. The sampling process is therefore performed on the other three types: a) the 
governorate IZs outside cities, b) the IZs in the new cities, and c) the industrial parks (IPs) of 
the Industrial Developer Program (IDP). It is also important to mention that (a) and (b) types 
are both owned and managed completely by the government although they vary in location 
and mandate. Both types, therefore, represent the traditional way of founding the IZs. 
Due to the scarcity of in-depth published data10, especially on the internet, regarding the IZs 
of the chosen three types in a context like Egypt, it was hard to collect detailed data about 
those types that allows choosing the sample during designing the research methodology. The 
researcher, therefore, had to postpone this step to the fieldwork. The fieldwork, therefore, was 
                                                          
9
 Discussed in Chapter (2), Section (2.3.4). 
10
 Available data are mainly indentifying data with nothing related to the research focus on the planning process 
and items could help choosing the case studies.   
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designed, to adopt a pilot study11 as a first layer of the research strategy. This pilot study 
sought different groups of data, where data on the three IZs types came on top. Conducting 
semi-structured interviews with a group of experts was the main methods used in this regard. 
The researcher sought experts with enough expertise on IZs in general and those three types 
in particular. 15 interviews have mainly been conducted with different 
professionals/officials/investors to collect data related to the three IZs types.  In addition to 
the active listening during interviews, data collected from these interviews was quickly but 
consciously scanned looking for cross cutting factors that potentially could lead the choosing 
process. Some important findings came out and strongly influenced the choosing process 
towards the IDP as the case study. Such findings12 are as follows: 
• There has not been any significant change in the planning process of founding traditional 
governmental IZs since as discussed in Shalaby (2003b). The process of founding these 
IZs represents a clear top down process where the competent authority, in both new and 
existing cities, is in full charge of the whole process without the participation of other 
concerned parties even other governmental bodies (Ac-15, Ac-66, Ac-G-03, Ac-08, Ac-
G-11, and Ac-G-38). As stated earlier, the product of such processes was not sustainable.  
• Participation, when exceptionally applied in the traditional way, has been limited to the 
implementation stage exactly when extending the utilities networks13 (In-04, In-G-41, 
and In-G-58).  
• Since its establishment as the only governmental body responsible for industrial zones, 
the IDA stopped establishing new IZs of the traditional type, focusing instead on 
activating the existing ones (Ac-G-03, In-G-58, In-G-06).  
• Also, since its establishment and according to the industrial policy of the government, 
the IDA has changed its strategy of founding industrial zones, targeting the private-
public partnership that has allowed for the implementation of the IDP (IDP, 2011c, and 
Ac-G-03 and In-G-06). 
• The IPs of the IDP are the most advanced and recent IZs cases and as announced by the 
government as well as the IPs’ developers, they consider international environmental 
standards and apply SD concepts (In-28, In-47, En-G-32, IDP, 2011c, Altajamouat-
Egypt, 2011, and CPC-Egypt, 2011b). Therefore, when we theorise on the IDP we expect 
                                                          
11
 It is different from the pilot study, mentioned in Chapter (2), that its results have been used to narrow down 
the research focus. 
12
 These factors have been discussed in full details with enough evidences in the following Chapters (5, 6, and 7) 
13
 Lessons from such cases are considered when discussing the research recommendations. 
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that the situation regarding applying SD is to be worse when addressing the other types. 
According to the current situation and the announced phases of the IDP along with being 
adopted by the governmental industrial policy, it is expected14 that IPs are to be the 
future of the IZs development in Egypt (IDP, 2011b).  
As we stated in the introduction of this section, the criteria used for choosing the sample were 
mainly: adopting sympathetic approaches to IE, and influencing the IZs future development 
in Egypt. Yet, when analysing the previous mentioned findings together on one side and 
using the criteria to challenge the three IZs types on the other, it was concluded that both 
traditional types, the governorate and the new cities IZs, are to be excluded. Both IZs types 
are not sustainable and are no longer present in recent governmental plans. Now, the IDP is 
the way adopted by the Egyptian government and is expected to influence the future 
development of IZs. Having said that, the research depended only on the IDP as the case 
study to be analysed towards theorizing on the actual, as well as the expected, planning 
process of the IZs in Egypt.  
4.3.3. Choosing the research sample of the IDP 
After choosing the IDP as the case study of the research, a group of IPs were chosen to 
represent the IDP. Choosing a sample that has already gone through the planning stage, as 
the focus of the research, and represents different phases of the IDP, to come up with the 
whole picture of the program, were the criteria set for the choosing process. The procedure 
followed for this purpose is as follows: 
2- Collecting available identifying data on all IPs of the IDP was the starting step. This step 
sought data about: contact details, the phase of the IDP that these IPs belong to, and, more 
importantly, whether these IPs passed the planning stage. Such data has been sought 
mainly from the industrial data base available on the IDP website following the IDA and 
from the available websites of IPs. 
3- After analysing the data collected, the study concluded that the IDP has, until the time of 
the field work, three phases. The first phase and the most of the second one have passed 
the planning stage (Ac-G-03). The third one was announced in March 2009 (IDP, 2011c), 
which is very recent and still in early steps of contraction (Ac-G-03). Table (4-1) shows 
the 11 IPs that passed the planning stage from both the first and the second phases of the 
IDP.    
                                                          
14
 It is worth mentioning that the Heavy Industries Zones will be part of this future but it is excluded from the 
sample as they are in a very early step in the planning process as discussed in appendix (I).  
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4- All the 11 IPs have been contacted through their websites or by email requesting their 
approval to conduct interviews. The sent message/email presented the research focus 
and a brief on the interview subjects and questions, along with the confirmation on 
confidentiality, see Appendix (II) for a model of this email. Out of 11, three IPs cases 
responded and showed interest to take part. Two of them are from two different cities 
representing the first phase of the IDP. These two are as follows: 
a. “AL Tajamouat Industrial Park, a fully serviced and integrated industrial park” 
(Al Tagamouat IP), 10th of Ramadan City. 
b. “CPC Egypt, the one stop shop towards building the future” (CPC), 6th of 
October City. 
Table 4-1: Industrial parks that passed the planning stage 
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The third IP (IP3) represents the second phase of the IDP15. Having one IP from the 
second phase was important to check on whether a significant change has taken place 
in the planning process. What added to the importance of taking IP3 was that its 
executive director has already worked on projects preparation of the first phase. This 
helped more in triangulating the data and spotting the difference between the two 
phases.  
When comparing the three cases, see Appendix (III) for the sample description, it is possible 
to argue that Al Tajamouat Company is more experienced in the industrial development field. 
This is due to its previous involvement, as an industrial developer in establishing, and 
operating an industrial park in Jordan. This is not the case for CPC which is working only in 
the area of manufacturing building materials in such a way far from the idea of industrial 
developer. The third company differs from Al Tajamouat Company  despite the fact that its 
executive manager had been involved in the preparation for a first phase company. As all 
companies of the first and second phase have not been implemented and hence lack the 
experience of operating and production, this advantage particular to Al Tajamouat Company 
has uniquely influenced the process of initiating the IDP through discussions which the ex-
Minister of industry made with its directors16.  
To conclude, the choosing process of the research sample was selective. It consists of two 
main steps. The first was to study five different types of the IZs in Egypt then to choose the 
suitable types for addressing the research questions of this study. The criteria used in this step 
were: adopting sympathetic approaches to IE, and influencing the IZs future development in 
Egypt. Out of this step, the IDP was chosen as the case study. The second step was concerned 
with choosing a representative sample of the chosen case study, the IDP. The criteria used in 
this step were: passing the planning stage and covering different phases of the IDP. 
Resulting from applying such criteria were 11 IPs. Out of the 11, three IPs responded and 
showed interest to participate in the research. Those three IPs were taken as the research 
sample and were found enough to theorize on the actual planning process through which the 
IPs of the IDP were planned.    
  
                                                          
15
 The researcher is not able to tell any details could lead to identify this IP as requested by its executive 
director.  
16
 Discussed in details in Chapter (6). 
Chapter 4 
98 
 
4.4. Research Methods  
To collect data needed to answer the research questions, interviews and informal discussions, 
informal observations, and documentary studies were used.  
4.4.1. Interviews 
Two main reasons were behind using qualitative interviewing to collect data as the best 
method. First, data in an autocratic atmosphere like Egypt is mostly unobtainable17 where 
interviewing is the least affected among other methods. This matter magnifies when seeking 
data on socio-political and governmental issues like that of this research. Second, this 
research sought data mainly to explain why the planning process of the IZs in Egypt is taking 
its current shape. Such interpreting data is hard to be found in documentary sources inside 
and outside Egypt. This doubled difficulty directed the research towards interviewing as the 
only way available to collect the needed data. This was suggested by Mason (2002), saying:     
Rather more pragmatically, you may choose qualitative interviewing because the 
data you want may not feasibly be available in any other form, so that asking 
people for their accounts, talking and listening to them, and so on, is the only way 
to generate the kind of data you want (p.66).  
From another complementary side, seeking interpreting data required in-depth understanding 
of partners/experts’ contextual accounts and experiences where  interviewing appeared as the 
best choice for collecting such data. Mason (2002) considered the case of this research as one 
of the cases in which qualitative interviewing is recommended, writing:  
So, for example, you may wish to explain something about social process, social 
change, social organizations, social meaning, … [Y]ou may wish to achieve depth 
and roundedness of understanding in these areas, rather than a broad 
understanding of surface patterns. This is likely to mean that you take a 
distinctive approach to comparison, to analysing data and to the construction of 
arguments. You may aspire to the generation of cross-contextual generalities 
(p.65). 
Aiming at gaining depth and roundedness of understanding regarding the process through 
which IZs are planned in Egypt, this study gave a lot of consideration for interviewing. 
Conducting interviews was the most important part of the three layers of this research 
strategy. The interviews conducted in this study are diverse and interrelated. Semi-structured 
interviews were constructed based on: a) the knowledge of the researcher as an insider, b) the 
conceptual framework of the planning process of the EIPs that is constructed from the review 
of literature, and c) the informal discussion that were conducted during the pilot study while 
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 Ch 7 discusses this issue in full details. 
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reviewing the literature (7 months prior to the fieldwork). The interviews were prepared to 
cover four related purposes, these purposes, as discussed earlier, conclusively are: 
1- To choose the research sample in the first layer of the fieldwork. A group of experts was 
interviewed to discuss the current planning process of IZs and best models therein. 
2-  To identify how governmental bodies comprehend the official planning process 
expressed by legal resources. A group of officials from the concerned bodies was 
interviewed. 
3-  To identify the process through which the three IPs were planned. Different partners 
involved in the process of such IPs were interviewed.  
4- To identify the shaping factors of the planning process of the IZs. A group of experts with 
a broader knowledge on the planning process of the IZs were interviewed.  
These interviews, despite having variant purposes, are centred around one main topic which 
is the planning process of the IZs. Discussing the planning process of the IZs on one hand and 
covering these variant purposes and keeping cross cutting issues among these interviews on 
the other, required designing one flexible/loose framework for all the interviews. Robertson 
and McLaughlin (1996), see also (Mason, 2002)18, confirmed on this, saying: 
The semi-structured interview, or guided interview, allows the respondents to talk 
about those aspects of the topic which are relevant to them. It does so within a 
loose framework which is intended to ensure that all the issues thought to be 
important by the researcher are adequately covered. In essence, it’s a compromise 
which draws from both the checklist of the structured interview and the flexibility 
of the unstructured format. As a consequence, it makes the analysis of data more 
manageable, while retaining the opportunity to be flexible and open in certain 
areas of questioning.… The schedule should help keep the interview focused and 
provide a degree of continuity across a set of related interviews. (p.107). 
In light of this understanding, variant semi-structured interviews based on one flexible 
framework (see Appendix (IV) for the general framework of questions) were conducted to 
cover the previous shown purposes. This framework was divided into six topics, and each 
topic contained set of interrelated questions. These main topics are as follows: 
1- The story of the planning of the IZs, in general (the process and its steps, and different 
involved partners and relationships among them). 
                                                          
18
 Mason (2002) also considered flexibility as a common feature in qualitative interviews structures, saying: “A 
thematic, topic-centred, biographical or narrative approach, for example, where the researcher has a number of 
topics, themes or issues which they wish to cover, or a set of starting points for discussion, or specific ‘stories’ 
which they wish the interviewee to tell. The researcher is unlikely to have a complete and sequenced script of 
questions, and most qualitative interviews are designed to have fluid and flexible structure, and to allow 
researcher and interviewee(s) to develop unexpected themes.” (p. 62). 
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2- The detailed role of every particular involved partner in the process and its power, 
evaluated by the respondent.  
3- Relationships among partners and tools/arrangements adopted to develop these relations. 
4- Different obstacles/problems facing the process, the reasons behind them, and how to 
overcome them. 
5- The teamwork formation and environment (choosing the team, adopted studies, 
regulations and standards, the product and its approval). 
6- Sustainability and industrial ecology related issues. 
The following parts discuss the considerations on which the interviews were designed and 
conducted to collect the needed data.  
4.4.1.1. Introducing the research 
To ensure success in conducting the interviews, the researcher gave enough care to the way 
of approaching respondents and introducing the research to them. Bryman (2008) stated that 
the “prospective respondents have to be provided with a credible rationale for the research” 
(p.200). This is what Davies (1997) recommended as a way to ‘building trust’ to satisfy 
respondents before asking them to participate. To reach this goal, some principles were 
considered in designing the introductory statement, either written down such as emails and 
official letters, or spoken which is the verbal introduction (Bryman, 2008). These principles 
are, mainly stressing on the research importance and the purpose of the interview, the reasons 
behind choosing respondents, and confidentiality (Robertson and McLaughlin, 1996).  
Yet, there are many reasons that drive interviewers to vary the wording (Bryman, 2008) 
between respondents. Louisy (1997) mentioned that literature regarding this issue have 
different thoughts. Some suggested that the opportunity to accept being interviewed, in full 
detailed/real view of the research, should be given to possible respondents. In contrast, others 
argued that such view could direct respondents’ participation towards compromising the 
study findings. The Egyptian context, in which this study took place, influenced the 
researcher to make small changes in the wording of the introductory statement to some 
respondents especially the officials. Due to the sensitivity of discussing the 
governmental/political issues, the wording had to avoid talking negatively about such 
subjects or any other sensitive issues the research thought to be so. For example, the research 
title and the introduction have been amended to show that the research builds on the steps 
made by the government to improve applying SD. In other words, the interview was about 
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improving steps taken rather than criticizing their drawbacks. This, to some extent, helped 
create the needed environment of trust.  
4.4.1.2. Unthreatening questions 
Reporting on Kvale (1996), Bryman (2008) indicated  nine different types of questions that 
most interviews practically contain. Kvale’s types of questions are: introducing, follow-up, 
probing, specifying, direct, indirect, structuring, silence and interpreting (Bryman, 2008). The 
research employed some of Kvale’s nine types like introducing, follow-up and indirect 
questions. Some other types were used during the interview by being “very attentive to what 
the interviewee [was] saying or even not saying” (Bryman, 2008, p.447) such as probing, 
direct, and silence questions.  The most important type that the research used was the indirect 
type to avoid threatening question especially in the governmental context. In tune, Robertson 
and McLaughlin (1996) stated: 
The best interviews tend to occur when conducted in a comfortable, relaxed 
manner. This not only implies that the location for the interview should be 
familiar to the respondent, but that the interview session should not be perceived 
to be threatening’ (p.109) 
For instance, in identifying the extent to which top officials of governmental bodies 
comprehend the process as expressed in legal resources, indirect questions were imperative. 
The questions were in the shape of inquiring about the story of founding IZs, avoiding 
mentioning any problems in laws/decrees. This created a placid environment that allowed 
governmental employees to go on to speak. Surprisingly, the data collected from those 
employees was effective in challenging the process of legal materials towards concluding the 
official process of the Egyptian government. For example, to show the extent to which the 
data was surprising consider that a prominent official from the EEAA when answering a 
question on the authority granted to EEAA to interfere in approving projects during the 
planning process, did not try, as was expected, to show powerful role of his body or defend 
its weak situation. Instead, he completely agreed on what is ordained by laws, stating: 
You know the Egyptian system and how approvals could be gained: from the 
important/powerful entities like GOPP and the IDA. Everything is submitted to 
the Cabinet of Egypt after approvals from those bodies. Then, what is our role? If 
they consulted us, we give them the environmental dimensions that we need to 
apply. Then the decision is to be independently issued by the Cabinet. When this 
happens, you cannot do anything despite that the plans might be defective (En-G-
32).     
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4.4.1.3. Active interviewing and sensitivity 
Holstein and Gubrium (2004) argued that the active interview is not a particular type of 
interview. This is because they believe that all interviews are “unavoidably active meaning-
making ventures.” (p. 157). Being active is something driven by the nature of the interview 
process, with its interactional and interpretive activities (see also (Mason, 2002)19), that keeps 
the interviewer involved to a minimum (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004). It was not a call for 
not being active or decreasing the importance of being so, as Holstein and Gubrium (2004) 
gave many considerations to the advantages of active interviews when saying: 
The active view widens the analytical purview of interview research to consider a 
wider array of questions than are the bailiwick of standardized or naturalistic 
approaches…. The challenge of the active interview is to carefully consider what 
is said in relation to how, where, when, and by whom experiential information is 
conveyed, and to what end. Construing the interview as active, then, provides us 
with a much wider, more richly variegated field of inquiry than ever before. 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 2004, p.158)   
In light of this importance, the researcher was “very attentive to what the interviewee [was] 
saying or even not saying.” (Bryman, 2008, p.447)  . Asking for examples and/or using 
interpreting questions, along with other ways that obtain data on certain issues, were used. As 
stated earlier, these ways were variant such as posing alternatives20, silence, and checking on 
contradiction21.  This was performed, as suggested by Davies (1997), in a way applying “a 
balance between politeness and a little productive aggression” (p.146). 
For example, silence was helpful to politely express an objection on what a respondent was 
saying especially with those whom the researcher met for the first time. This was mainly used 
with governmental officials when addressing the official planning process of IZs. In such a 
situation, an inquiry about the mismatch/contradiction between what was told by the 
respondent and that stated in the legal documents was very briefly posed followed by a 
pause/silence, as Bryman (2008) said: “allow pauses to signal that you want to give the 
interviewee the opportunity to reflect and amplify and answer.” (p.447). In this sense, pauses 
proved to be more powerful in obtaining data than questioning.  
                                                          
19
 In support, Mason (2002) suggested that all qualitative interviewing has core features in common which “[t]he 
interactional exchange of dialogue” (p. 62) is one of them. She also said: “If you choose qualitative 
interviewing, you are highly likely to conceptualize yourself as active and reflexive in the process of data 
generation, and seek to examine this rather than aspiring to be a neutral data collector. While most qualitative 
researchers do have this kind of aspiration, it is important not to under-estimate the reflexive challenge posed by 
analysing your own role within the research process” (Mason, 2002, p. 66). 
20
 Like saying: “but, some would say ...” 
21
 Like saying (“Yeah, but I thought that you said ...?”) 
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Being an active and reflexive in interviewing experts did not affect the respect given to 
participants during sessions. In this regard, the researcher was used to be, as suggested by 
Mason (2002), “sensitive to the interviewees, to their needs and rights” (p. 74)22. Due to the 
variation of participants and the extent to which they were close to the researcher, the 
sensitivity degree accordingly differed from one interview to another. With those whom the 
researcher was meeting for the first time, sensitivity degree increased, and it decreased with 
fellows and friends.  
Being sensitive to fears23 that were expected to arise when addressing political and 
governmental issues was in the focus of the researcher, through posing indirect question or 
avoiding stressing on these fears when arisen .   
Being sensitive to participants included also, as mentioned by Robertson and McLaughlin 
(1996), rephrasing and reordering questions, or probing questions. In this regard, obtaining 
data sought on the shaping factors of the planning process of the IZs, was mainly depended 
on the judgement instantly/continuously made by the researcher regarding the appropriate 
time of probing for more information and the response of the participants on those questions. 
Being highly sensitive was greatly essential to maintain the interview sessions interactive and 
enjoyable to both participants and the researcher.   
This interviewing approach, which combined unthreatening questions with being active, 
reflexive and sensitive, was adopted to obtain the needed data away from annoying 
participants to avoid bias or negatively affect their interaction.  
4.4.2. Observations 
As interviewing is seen by many qualitative researchers as part of ethnographic research 
practices, others argued that qualitative interviewing takes research gaze away from 
observational, visual and spatial social worlds (Mason, 2002). Observations, therefore, were 
used, as a part of the ethnography practices, to verify the data collected through the 
interviews on the planning process of IZs and its shaping factors.  Observations were useful 
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 She gave more details in this, saying: “Observing, picking up verbal and non-verbal cues about the social 
situation, its visual and spatial dynamics, and the mood of your interviewee(s). This means making sure you are 
tuned in to body language and to demeanour, but be unable to interpret it. This should include understandings, 
anticipating and interpreting the social dynamics of interviewing, for example, showing appropriate respect and 
courtesy to your participants.” (Mason, 2002, p. 75).  
23
 These fears were largely noticed. They have been spotted when respondents asked the researcher to stop 
recording when speaking negatively about the government or, by nature, speaking with low voice when 
mentioning negative things about important people/bodies and raised it again to normal when talking about 
positive things (like what happened from: Ac-G-11, En-G-32 and En-65).  
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means of gaining understanding about the licensing process of industrial projects and mainly 
the investors’ satisfaction and behaviour regarding this process. In this research, some visits 
were paid to the Environmental Assessment Department of the EEAA and licensing 
departments in governmental bodies like the IDA and new cities’ councils. These visits 
included observing investors’ reactions towards the licensing procedure and the extent to 
which they were satisfied with it. It also included conducting some informal discussions with 
a group of those investors. Again, using the observation method is seen as a complementary 
method to verify the data collected from interviews regarding the licensing process. 
To make benefit from such a method, the researcher started the observations in a covert role 
to easily gain access (Bryman, 2008) to the waiting areas in the previous mentioned 
departments seeking common attitudes towards the licensing procedure. What was more 
important is that starting with a covert role was essential to fairly observe the investors’ 
actions, as “they are less likely to adjust their behaviour because of the researcher’s presence” 
(Bryman, 2008, p. 406). Moving from covert role to an overt one, as stated by Bryman (2008) 
as a common action from some ethnographers24, was ethically important to being able to 
conduct some informal discussions with some investors and to cite the data elicited from their 
talks after having their consents. The researcher, therefore, introduced the research as well as 
himself to those whom a direct contact happened with them during observation sessions. To 
avoid transgressing the ethical tenets regarding the common perceptions gained from these 
sessions, those perceptions were cited in common rather than to particular individuals. This 
was also the case even when the researcher identified some of those individuals, as there was 
no opportunity to gain informed consent.   
To conclude, such a research method was practical and productive to the extent that the data 
collected from interviews on the licensing procedure was triangulated. 
4.4.3. Documentary evidence 
Data was collected using documentary studies in addition to interviews and observational 
method. Documentary studies were used mainly to theorize on the official framework of the 
process through which IZs in Egypt are planned. In this regard, primary resources used are; 
laws, executive regulations, presidential/governmental decrees, initiatives, protocols and 
various conventions adopted by the State on the organization of the planning process of IZs. 
Secondary resources were also used in this regard such as interviews made by the media 
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means with/ statements made by high levels of administration of the concerned bodies and 
the government. The documentary evidence was also used to triangulate data collected from 
other methods. On the actual process of the chosen sample, in addition to the case studies 
planning reports, other documentary evidence on the actual process were utilised, such as 
different editions of the TOR of the IDP, the contract model between the IDA and developers, 
related laws and decrees, and official correspondences among the concerned parties. On why 
the process is taking its current shape,  primary sources were unobtainable. Instead, available 
data from different secondary sources was utilized as practical to triangulate data collected 
from interviews. 
Documentary evidence was collected by various means: 
• Asking the interviewees from different fields, when appropriate, to support their opinions 
by documentary resources or to recommend the potential places from which the data 
could be collected. 
• Visiting the governmental bodies to collect the needed data in person was another way. 
Utilizing formal letters from the FURP25, where the research usually works, directed to 
those bodies to facilitate collecting the data, was helpful to some extent in this regard. 
• Utilizing the internet is seen to be the last resort method to use when discovering the need 
for some other data especially during the data analysis and reporting. Through this way, 
visiting the governmental websites and purchasing online access to legal networks26 were 
done. The case studies’ websites and different newspapers articles, papers, and 
governmental periodicals. 
4.5. Research Context  
This part discusses the fieldwork context of this study. This discussion is important as it 
allows the reader to be aware of the limitation/difficulty of collecting data in a Third World 
country like Egypt.  
4.5.1. Gaining access 
One of the biggest problems that social sciences face, especially in a qualitative research like 
this research, is to gain access to respondents, become familiar to them, and get them to 
speak. These problems increase in a context like Egypt where autocracy, fear27, and lack of 
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 Like the Arab Legal Information Network: http://www.eastlaws.com/ 
27
 The fieldwork of this research were conducted during three months started on the first week of November 
2009. This means about 14 months before the 25th of January 2011 Revolution happened in Egypt what the 
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interest in scientific research28 are dominant. This research discusses the planning process of 
Egyptian IZs and its shaping factors where the government is almost in control. This means 
that discussing socio-political issues was a must, and, indeed, added more 
limitation/difficulty to gaining access. Designing and then applying techniques to gain access 
in such a context were not easy tasks.  
Depending on personal contacts in gaining access was a key factor. It was expected that the 
difficulty of gaining access would vary from one place to another and one group of 
respondents to another according to the extent to which the researcher was able to build the 
needed connections in those places and to those groups. Therefore, the researcher started by 
the FURP where he work back home as a Teaching Assistant and keeps good relationships 
with his fellows. This allowed the researcher to use some of the FURP staff as respondents as 
well as links to other potential respondents. Similarly, Delamont (2002) in referring to 
fieldwork she conducted noted: “we started with personal contacts and places we felt we 
would get cooperation. It is an excellent idea to use contacts to get started on access 
negotiations.” (p.71). 
In this context, the group of experts from the academic field in general and those from the 
FURP in specific was expected to be easy to access. Trust and support were expected from 
the FURP educational environment with some limitations in discussing the political issues. 
These expectations decreased to some extent but still existed in the case of 
academics/judges/NGOs that the researcher used his contacts from the FURP to gain access 
to. For example, a relative to a key-expert, who works in the FURP where the researcher 
usually works, was a good link that created the appropriate environment for this expert to 
respond freely/impartially and generously. 
For the group of the developers of the IPs, the researcher did not hold any ties or contacts. In 
addition, as these IPs are part of a competitive market, there was fear that their managers 
would probably be conservative in disseminating real data about their IPs if not rejecting the 
interviewing idea in the first place. That is why the researcher contacted all the IPs in Egypt 
to maximize the opportunity to gain access to welcoming IPs. Out of this action, three IPs 
positively responded. Only one of them was conservative to some extent.  
Regarding governmental officials, the researcher, like the case of the developers, did not hold 
any contacts. Access to this group was expected to be very hard. In addition, fears from 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
researcher believes, and did not practice yet as being away from home, it changed the context to a great extent 
regarding the people’s fear from discussing governmental and political issues.    
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disseminating skewed data from this group, if accessed, were highly expected. Accessing this 
group via personal contacts to overcome these fears was very essential towards obtaining the 
data needed. 
By expecting this variant degrees of difficulty, the researcher tried as much as possible and in 
early stages of the research to build/develop connections to gain access to different groups. 
The researcher, at first, conducted two pilot studies mainly to build these connections. The 
first was around seven months prior to the fieldwork and it was a good source in this regard. 
During this pilot study, the researcher was able to be connected, through his close contacts 
and then by snowball sampling, with a few number of employees in the concerned 
governmental bodies, mainly the IDA and the EEAA, who were willing to help. The 
researcher kept himself, during those seven months, in contact with those employees. The 
researcher then utilized these new connections with those already available in the FURP in 
the second pilot study29 to add more employees to the connection list. These unofficial 
attempts to gain access continued to be the researcher’s main concern when conducting the 
main field study. In addition, the official letter issued from the FURP was another helping 
tool to access the areas that the researcher’s connection list did not cover. The letter was also 
very important when some employees, being disseminating official data30, asked for an 
official cover for themselves.  
Most groups that the researcher managed to gain access to, were interviewed. In some cases, 
only when using the official way of gaining access to governmental bodies, employees 
refused to be interviewed giving different excuses. Asking them for recommending other 
colleagues in the same specialisation/department seemed as the best way to deal with this 
issue. In other unexpected cases, the researcher did not get access to the planning teams of the 
chosen IPs. This is because the planning team of two of the chosen IPs is located outside 
Egypt. The researcher contacted its head by phone, but he was not helpful and asked the 
researcher to check the planning reports. Regarding the third case study, its executive director 
refused to disseminate any data on the planning team of his IP. As a substitute, the researcher 
interviewed other IPs’ planners to triangulate the planning data told by the IPs’ developers 
along with studying the planning reports as recommended. These methods were quite enough 
to collect the needed data.   
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30
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To conclude, while gaining access to academics and experts were already secured, that of IPs 
and governmental employees needed many efforts that continued for months. 
4.5.2. Conducting interviews  
It has been argued that qualitative interviewing is difficult, challenging, and heavily 
consumes time and effort (Mason, 2002). When considering the Egyptian context, we have to 
admit that these concerns largely increase. This section discusses difficulties faced in such 
context and how they were dealt with.  
Every typical interview took a long time to start due to the need for socialising, normally with 
close respondents and necessarily with other respondents to bring about familiarity. 
Differences between living in Egypt and the UK especially in the educational context were 
common topics to address to allow the interview to comfortably start. Some respondents, 
especially those whom the researcher met without previous arrangements as a result of using 
the official way of gaining access, seemed to be very busy, hence the introductory statement 
on the research was reasonably thought to be enough.  
In total, the researcher conducted almost 65 interviews with an average of 40 
minutes/interviewee. While some interviews lasted for more than 2 hours, others were almost 
around 20 minutes or less. Many reasons were behind the large number of interviews. These 
reasons are as follows: 
• Although gaining access to conduct interviews in the governmental context, almost the 
main source of respondents, was expected to be hard, it was surprisingly found it to be 
hard to conduct/complete interviews as planned. Bureaucracy, unwillingness to 
disseminate data, and chaos, characterize this context. In such context, therefore, the 
researcher found it hard to complete the interview and ask all the needed questions in 
many cases. The researcher, then, had to seek alternative interviewees who were able to 
give the appropriate time and concentration to uncover the hidden areas. In such 
situations, when the researcher felt the respondents were busy31/reluctant to be 
interviewed/conservative in their speech, they were asked to nominate other qualified 
individual in the same department. 
• Due to the nature of the semi-structured interview that the researcher was always 
sensitive to benefit from, some interviewees addressed new issues which they know about 
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the best. In such cases, seeking other respondents to triangulate these emerging issues was 
another reason that increased the number of interviews.  
• In other cases, if rare, respondents rather than clarifying things were, with/without intent, 
adding ambiguities and creating contradictions that the researcher struggled to clarify 
from them or by seeking other respondents.  
Getting hold of respondents within the Egyptian context is quite difficult and challenging. 
The fieldwork difficulties started with arranging with respondents, from different groups, to 
set a meeting. Phone calls, rather than emails, were the preferable way for most of the 
respondent to contact them. Phone calls, in many cases, were used just to set a first meeting 
in order to set an appointment for an interview! In such cases, the respondents were mainly 
senior staff. It was thought, for cultural reasons, that it is improper to ask those seniors for 
conducting an interview by phone as they might received it coolly.  Others, like some of the 
IPs developers, wanted first to have full details about the interview topics before deciding 
whether to conduct the interview due to the competition with other IPs.  
The difficulty was not only regarding arranging for the meeting, but after succeeding in that 
and even after phoning again to confirm the meeting, many appointments were changed. 
Some of them have been changed occasionally at the last minute. In some other cases, 
respondents came late or did not come leaving a message in the meeting place asking for 
another appointment.  
4.5.3.  Collecting documentary evidence  
The legal/institutional framework of Egypt suffers from the abundance of and conflict among 
laws, decrees and regulations governing the work system32. Once laws and decrees issued 
they legally must be published in the official newspaper. The problem, therefore, is not in 
collecting them but the problem is in accounting/identifying them. The reason is that there is 
no structured/organized/classified inventory that can be used to identify a list of the legal 
documents relevant to a specific subject. Some agencies and ministries, one of which is the 
MTI, publish, on their websites, their establishing laws/decrees with some other basic related 
legal documents. This published material is not comprehensive or organized and cannot be 
seen as an updated inventory that is classified by type. Therefore, the problem regarding legal 
documentations needed for theorizing on the official framework of the process through which 
IZs are planned, was on how to count and identify them not to collect them. The group of 
employees the researcher contacted in the first pilot study, as stated earlier, was very helpful 
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in this regard. Considering their willingness to help, the researcher was in contact with those 
employees since then and up to the time of fieldwork, collecting some of the data needed. 
During the fieldwork he collected most of the required data on a second visit. 
Data on political/governmental issues especially what proves the mistakes/corruption of the 
government, is considered in the institutional framework of Egypt as top secrets33. This 
context resulted in the shortage of documentary evidence from primary resources of the 
shaping factors of the planning process of the IZs as they are mainly governmental/political 
factors34. Yet, this was abated by satisfactorily interviewing experts from different 
background, conducting informal discussions with other experts, and collecting 
available/enough data from different secondary sources.  
4.5.4. Limitations 
The research context, we discussed earlier, put a lot of pressure physically as well as 
psychologically on the researcher and made him busy with collecting data and arranging for 
meetings most of the time. The researcher then was not able as was planned, and as stated by 
Robertson and McLaughlin (1996), to sit at his desk/PC to study the data while being 
collected35. The researcher had initially hoped to have the data analysis done to revisit the key 
respondents to discuss the fieldwork results, if initial. The researcher hoped to discuss/initiate 
possible long-term, incremental and context-specific scenarios towards the application of the 
EIPs in Egypt. The researcher then according to time/money limits decided to consider these 
hopes as avenues for near future research.      
The empirical study of this research was conducted in the authoritarian atmosphere of Egypt 
prior to the 25th of January 2011 revolution. Although the obstacles this study faced have 
been overcome by following the techniques discussed earlier, reporting on the data collected 
and presenting it to the context where the researcher usually work or keep business 
relationships would cause harassments or embarrassment to him. Though there has been a 
revolution, by default many governance structures and attitudes remain in place or are at least 
not yet replaced in total - there are always continuities as well as ruptures. Though, this 
matter had a psychological effect on the researcher, he did his best not to negatively affect 
reporting properly on the data collected. 
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 This differs from what the researcher was keen to do in time before and after the data collecting trips. In such 
time, the researcher used to take notes/ideas and conclude comments after interviews/visits.  
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4.5.5. Researcher background 
Two key elements in the researcher’s background had a profound impact on the steps of this 
research in general and the fieldwork study in particular. The first element is the 
experience/knowledge gained by the researcher from his work over 12 years before the start 
of this research. This experience included both practical and scientific branches. Working as a 
professional planner in major projects allowed the researcher to go through different planning 
processes (the focus of this research). This practical expertise was developed by the scientific 
experience the researcher obtained from his work as a teaching assistant and two diplomas 
and a masters in Urban Planning. The master in particular studied IZs in Egypt and the ways 
to develop them environmentally. Scientific and practical experience gained by the researcher 
can be summarized as the trio of: planning processes, environment and industrial zones. This 
experience gave the researcher the ability to identify the research problem, questions and 
goals in a reasonable way. As the researcher experienced the Egyptian research context of 
this trio before, he was able to set up a strategy of this research that enabled him to collect the 
required data and then analyze them to answer the research questions including theorizing on 
the planning process of the IZs and its shaping factors. 
The second element is the social network that the researcher built during his career. This 
network, especially friends/fellows from work, worked significantly as the main tool that 
allowed the researcher to gain access to different places/groups to collect the needed data.  
4.6. Ethics 
It has been argued by many scholars in social sciences, one of them is Bryman (2008), that 
ethics tenets are to be considered whenever the research is conducted with participants. The 
informed consent comes on top of these tenets as it can cover other tenets like confidentiality. 
In the Egyptian context, there are practical difficulties with getting a signature or written 
consent from participants. This would be, culturally, regarded as impolite or even insulting to 
ask for a signature on paper rather than receiving acceptance by word of mouth or through 
emails. As the informed consent introduced the research to participants to allow them to take 
a decision on whether to participate, the consent was gained from those who participated 
through their replies to the introductory statement36. Such replies were received through 
emails or orally, see Appendix (II) for an example.   
Recording is highly recommended as fully as the researcher can do for the qualitative 
interviewing (Mason, 2002). While it was also argued by many social researchers, like 
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(Bryman, 2008) and (Mason, 2002), that recording should be ethically overt rather than 
covert, others see covert recording as a preferable way for specific situations. For an example, 
the BBC website, under the Editorial Guidelines, Section 7: Privacy, Secret Recording, states 
that the BBC uses secret recording only for some purposes that include: 
- [T]o obtain material outside the UK where a country's laws make the normal 
and responsible gathering of material extraordinarily difficult or impossible. 
- [A]s a method of … social research in the public interest, where no other 
methods could naturally capture the attitudes or behaviour in question. (BBC, 
2011) 
Actually, this is the case of Egypt. Collecting data is something very difficult, as discussed 
before as well as in details in Chapter (7). Difficulty increases whenever the data is on 
political and governmental issues like the case of this research. The researcher in this context 
tried to overtly record interviews in the pilot study, but the result was not scientifically 
acceptable. In some situations, respondents refused to record meetings, expectedly because of 
fear, and became sceptical about what they thought the researcher’ hidden purposes. Some 
respondents refused to continue giving any excuses while others continued with scepticism 
that led mainly to skewed and partial data. In other cases, respondents, mainly from 
governmental officials, conservatively accepted recording, and this also produced partial data. 
The researcher, in this context, contented with that recording the interview was mentioned 
clearly in the introductory statement where none of the participants did not express a refusal 
to record except one case in which the researcher abided. Based on this, the researcher used 
covert recording in contexts that he felt being overt could scientifically affect the data 
collected. This is despite the fact that anonymity is applied when referring to those 
participants in this thesis in order not to inflict any harm on them by any means. 
Consequently, it is impossible for any reader to recognize those participants. Furthermore, 
due to the sensitivity of the issues discussed in this research, it was preferable to use codes for 
all participants, not only those we mentioned earlier, to cover their identities, (see Appendix 
(V) for codes and participants list). Yet, to give credibility to this research findings, 
role/position and experience of participants are exposed so that the reader can judge the 
significance of their views. 
4.7. Data Analysis and Reporting  
This research did not test an existing theory because of the lack of theorising on the 
research’s concern on one hand. On the other, considering the complexity of social sciences, 
it was also because of the researcher’s belief that a theory worked in one environment/context 
cannot be applied in another. Therefore, this research is an inductive one attempting to build a 
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theory that explains realistic events as they emerge from the data, not a deductive research 
that works, as mentioned by LeCompte et al. (1993), “to find data to match a theory” (p.42)37. 
It therefore depends on coding analysis that is “a form of content analysis to find and 
conceptualise the underlying issues amongst the ‘noise’ of the data” (Allan, 2003, p.1). The 
conceptual framework constructed in Chapter (3) was helpful not only in organizing the data 
while being collected, but also in generating coding categories deductively at the start of the 
analysis. After this start, the whole analysis process was about discovering rather than 
creating facts (Robertson and McLaughlin, 1996) where coding categories were repeatedly 
developed according to the data discovered.  
This study produced qualitative data from interviews and documentary resources. For 
interviews, the total number is almost 65 interviews where almost 45 are considered as full 
and important interviews while the other 20 are considered complementary ones. The 
recordings of 45 interviews were transcribed verbatim where the other complementary 20 
interviews were summarised and the parts thought to be related to the research questions were 
briefly outlined in the transcriptions. The documentary resources have been studied and 
prepared for the software analysis. After becoming familiar with the data, it was found that 
the data is very complex, multiple and interrelated that is hard to be coded by hand38. 
Therefore, Atlas.ti 5 software has been employed. The researcher compared between Atlas.ti 
and other qualitative analysis softwares. The researcher found Atlas.ti to be more flexible, 
functional, and easier to use. What is more important, as this research is mainly an inductive 
one, is that Atlas.ti was chosen as it offers all the tools needed to analyzing unstructured data 
as of  this research. The transcribed interviews and documentary resources were ‘assigned’ as 
different ‘documents’ to one ‘project’ in Atlas.ti. The researcher then revisited all documents 
and repeatedly interrogated them looking for themes that would help answering the research 
questions. As indicated earlier, the researcher generated coding categories deductively at the 
start from the conceptual framework and, then, developed these codes during the analysis 
process inductively according to what emerged from data. Accordingly, through Atlas.ti, 
tasks of coding with appropriate related quotations along with different relationships39 
between codes and quotations were gradually constructed. Codes and, accordingly, related 
quotations were classified and distributed under ‘family’ codes where each family answer a 
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research question or a part of it. Those families with its contents were extracted from Atlas.ti 
to Microsoft Word files where every group of families shaped one chapter. The quotations 
forming the chapters have been revised, reclassified and grouped into main subjects forming 
the main structure of each chapter. For an example for this procedure, Table (4-2) illustrates 
how the family codes of Chapter (6) constructed to answer the second and third parts of the 
first research question, asking about the actual process of the planning process of the 
Egyptian IZs and whether sustainable, and give preconceptions for the second research 
question, asking about the governing factors of the process. This includes a group of sub-
families that each of them contains a number of codes and quotations and represents a part of 
Chapter (6) structure. This hierarchical formation has been extracted with its quotations, and 
relationships between them to Micro Soft Word forming the initial construction of Chapter 
(6).    
During the analysis, the need for more data, mainly to triangulate data from interviews and 
documentary resources, emerged.  The researcher sought this data through the internet as 
soon as they were needed.  
It is important here to mention that all the data collected and hence the extracted quotations 
were in Arabic. Translation to English consumed a lot of time and efforts adding to the 
difficulty of conducting this research.  
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Table 4-2: Hierarchical formation of codes of chapter 6 and relations with the research questions 
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4.8. Summary  
This research is a qualitative research which adopted a multi-layer multi-method approach 
that depends on a case study design in its core. This chapter detailed the research strategy 
followed illustrating how the empirical study was conducted to answer the research questions, 
and the context under which the various stages of investigations were carried out. 
Development of contacts and how access was gained, were discussed. This chapter also 
covered the research methods and derivation of data collected from primary and secondary 
sources. It explained how and why the Industrial Developer Program was chosen as the case 
study and then how and why three representative industrial parks were chosen as the research 
sample. Collecting documentary evidences, conducting interviews, and observations were the 
research methods this chapter justified addressing how issues of validity and reliability were 
addressed and finally how ethics were considerably respected.  
The following chapters therefore analyze and then reporting on the data collected to answer 
the research question. Chapter (5) discusses and concludes the official framework of the 
process through which the Egyptian IZs should be planned answering by this the first part of 
the first research question. To answer the second and third parts of the research question and 
initially the second research question, Chapter (6) deals with the case study analysis and 
concludes the actual process through which the industrial parks are planned and 
preconceptions on the governing factors. Chapter (7) therefore discusses the governing 
factors of the planning process answering the second research question.  
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: PLANNING PROCESS OF INDUSTRIAL ZONES: 
THE OFFICIAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STATE 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter (2) discusses the recent arrangements of the institutional and legal framework 
governing the planning process of the Egyptian industrial zones (IZs) related to governance 
for sustainable development (SD) in the last decade. This chapter therefore discusses the 
extent to which these changes influenced the official framework. It aims at normatively1 
describing, understanding and then theorizing for this framework. This includes; theorizing 
on the stakeholders, their respective roles, relationships and how they coordinate between 
each other as well as the institutional and legal arrangements governing the planning process 
of IZs. This chapter deals with the official viewpoint of the State as comprehended from legal 
documents and interviews with officials. In other words, the official version is based on the 
laws issued in this regard, decrees whether presidential or governmental, initiatives, protocols 
and various conventions adopted by the State on the organization of the planning process of 
IZs. Additionally, it depends on the interviews conducted with a number of governmental 
representatives, and, in particular, those who are focusing on the explanation of the official 
framework. It finally depends on interviews and statements taken by various media regarding 
this matter. This chapter therefore, helps addressing parts of the first research question asking 
about the official framework for the process under which industrial zones could be planned in 
Egypt and whether the process is sustainable. Reaching this answer is a contribution to 
knowledge, because at present there is no single place where this official framework can be 
found, and there exists considerable confusion about the process even in the minds of those 
involved in it. That fact itself suggests that it is not likely to be very influential in shaping the 
process in reality, though parts of the framework may have influence, of course. 
To analyze the extent to which this official framework is applied on the ground, the 
subsequent chapter will challenge three case studies against the official framework concluded 
in this chapter. This will help determine problems and challenges facing the planning process 
of IZs, and how near Egypt and its institutions are from the application of the principles of 
SD and industrial ecology (IE). Accordingly, it will help theorizing for the application of eco-
industrial parks in Egypt which will contribute to the knowledge at the local level as well as 
enriching the global debate about the application of industrial ecology. 
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In this context, this chapter synthesizes the official framework of the State through 
concluding phases and steps that are supposed to be officially followed, as well as main roles 
and relationships among the relevant bodies in Egypt concerning the planning process of IZs. 
It, then, concludes the most important characteristics and problems of the State official 
framework for the planning process of IZs.     
5.2. The State official framework of the planning process of Egyptian 
industrial zones 
Appendix (VI) discusses in details various concerned governmental bodies involved in the 
process through which the Egyptian IZs are planned, and their competences, roles, and 
institutional arrangements legally imposed to tighten the relationships among those bodies2. 
Depending on this appendix, this chapter synthesizes the official framework of the planning 
process of IZs. This comes by concluding phases of the process, and their steps and 
procedures supposed to be followed by the concerned bodies regarding the planning of IZs. 
All are addressed together with flowcharts showing and explaining this framework including 
partners, roles and relationships. 
Many phases and steps are mentioned by the Egyptian law during addressing the planning 
process of IZs. They are not displayed in order but they can be classified into six main phases 
that each of them contains a number of tasks/steps. They begin with ‘Setting up Policies’: the 
phase of preparing studies at national level and setting the State policies by sector. It is 
followed by four phases: a) ‘Pre-Planning’: the phase of preparation of studies and land 
allocation, b) ‘Planning’, c) ‘Regulations and Legislations’: the phase of preparation of 
legislation and governing regulations for land allocation, its planning, approvals and licenses, 
and d) ‘Licensing, Approvals and Accreditation’ phase. The Egyptian Law also intensively 
displays functions/tasks of coordination among bodies concerned with planning and 
following-up of the implementation of the prepared policies, plans and programs of the 
various aforementioned phases. Hence it is not a phase by itself but rather a set of multiple 
interlocking tasks that appear in various phases of the planning process. These tasks are 
gathered here under the ‘Coordination and follow-up’ phase. 
This section discusses in detail each phase, concluding the most important steps and functions 
of each one, authorities in charge, and different partners and the role of each of them. This 
discussion is supported by a matrix of tasks and roles with a flowchart illustrating the 
previous mentioned elements.  
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It is worth mentioning here that many of these phases contain several cross-cutting steps the 
location of which, in the IZs production process, can vary according to the nature of the 
project. Therefore, the researcher does not claim that he develops, in this part of the research, 
a logical and unilateral order for those phases and steps. However, what has been mentioned 
earlier regarding those six phases is just to facilitate the presentation of the various stages 
linked to the bodies responsible for implementation and the inter-relatedness relationships 
with other bodies. 
5.2.1. Setting up Policies 
Reviewing policies here is confined mainly to the industrial sector with industrial policy 
related particularly to IZs, and urban and environmental matters. As shown in Table (5-1) and 
Figure (5-1), in the industrial sector, the most important player is the Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA). While the Egyptian law has singled out the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI) as the only body responsible for setting up industrial policies, it singled out the IDA as 
the sole body to implement such policies. It also assigned the IDA to develop and implement 
policies of land development for industrial purposes, as well as policies to stimulate and 
encourage investment, and improve its overall environment. The IDA is alone competent to 
decide on the establishment of IZs and the expansion of existing ones. In addition, it is also 
competent to develop policies and plans necessary for the training of industrial workers, and 
policies and mechanisms required for connecting industrial development requirements to 
scientific research activities and associated technology. The Egyptian Law does not mention 
any partners of the IDA that should be involved in the previously mentioned roles and tasks 
but in two things. First, concerning the tasks related to the development and implementation 
of policies for industrial lands, the IDA is obligated to coordinate with governorates and 
authorities concerned thereby. Second, on investment promoting/improving policies, the IDA 
should coordinate with the General Authority for Investment (GAFI). 
As for urban policies (which their outcomes could contain new, or extensions of, IZs), there 
are two key players with overlapping in responsibilities between them. The Egyptian law 
singled out the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) as the body to study, propose, 
implement and follow-up plans, policies and programs of the establishment of new urban 
communities. As for planning and sustainable urban development, the General Organization 
for Physical Planning (GOPP) is by law the State’s apparatus in charge of laying down the 
general policy in this regard that the Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development 
(SCPUD) should approve in a next step. The Provinces Executive Council (PEC) participates 
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with GOPP, at the province level, in setting up policies and goals. The Provinces local 
People's Council (PLPC) also formulates planning needs at the local level that GOPP builds 
on in laying down urban policies. 
With regard to environmental policies and according to the law, the Egyptian Environmental 
Affairs Agency’s (EEAA) competences are limited to setting up policies and plans necessary 
to preserve the environment while it is not responsible for their implementation, which is 
assigned to the competent administrative authorities. Regarding following-up on 
implementation such policies and programs, EEAA should coordinate with those authorities. 
However, the law gave EEAA the authority to undertake the implementation of some pilot 
projects. 
By analyzing the above-mentioned bodies and assignments and with the consideration of 
Figure (5-1), it is found that the legal obligation regarding cooperation and partnership among 
the three sectors industrial, urbanism and environmental - that are supposed to be the most 
connected - is mostly missing3. It is also observed that there is overlapping among those 
assignments. This gives an indication - which the subsequent chapters examine - on the 
domination of each of the IDA, the GOPP and the NUCA on its own territory separately and 
away from the EEAA participation in policy formulation, whether industrial or urbanism. 
Overlapping in responsibilities in a context lacking coordination among its partners make this 
phase away from principles of governance for SD (Jordan, 2008).  
 
  
                                                          
3
 Absence of relationships arrows between those sectors could be observed in Figure (5-1) and also by the 
shaded cells in Table (5-1). 
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Table 5-1: Matrix of the Setting up Policies phase  
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Figure 5-1: Simplified flowchart of the Setting up Policies phase 
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5.2.2. Pre-Planning 
As shown in Table (5-2) and Figure (5-2) regarding the pre-planning phase, the tasks/steps 
mentioned by the Egyptian law related to the IZs are: a) marketing and publicity of IZs, b) 
qualifying of and contracting with companies/investors, and c) land allocation. In addition to 
the above, extending infrastructure is also presented that contains utilities supply inside and 
outside IZs and regional infrastructure. 
With respect to the first three tasks, it is notable that the law has singled out the IDA for their 
responsibilities. The law does not stipulate on any other partners with the IDA in these 
responsibilities, but at marketing and publicity of IZs. The IDA, in this regard, is obliged to 
coordinate with the competent body of investment (the GAFI) to facilitate the exposure of the 
projects to a wide range of investors. 
With regard to infrastructure, it is found that there are three sub-tasks: infrastructure outside 
IZs, inside IZs and regional infrastructure for new urban communities. Starting from 
infrastructure outside IZs, the law authorizes the IDA to coordinate with the competent 
governmental bodies to include its projects within the plans of these bodies to implement 
them. The law in this regard does not give the IDA any power over these bodies. The matter 
was not significantly different with regard to infrastructure inside IZs. IDA’s role is limited to 
the coordination with local competent authorities yet through the Fund for Supporting the 
Establishment, Extending Public Utilities and Development of IZs (FSEEDIZ). The 
FSEEDIZ coordinates with the NUCA with respect to IZs in new urban communities, and 
with provinces with respect to existing IZs within its ownership boundaries. Regarding 
regional infrastructure, the NUCA alone has absolute powers in the study and 
implementation of regional infrastructure necessary for new urban communities.  
Coordination among partners outwardly appears in this phase in a better way than the 
previous phase although the existence of some areas lacking it (see the shaded cells in Table 
(5-2)). The reason here is that the IDA although having the mandate over industrial 
development, lacks powers needed to extend infrastructure to its projects. The law therefore, 
obliges the IDA to coordinate with those bodies having the power; the NUCA and 
governorates. In a contradictory way, the law did not oblige those in power to coordinate with 
the IDA and let it facing them without stating mechanisms could activate such coordination. 
This context having unbalanced powers among partners with absence of coordination 
mechanisms, again, lacks the principles of governance for SD (Geng and Yi, 2005, ESCWA, 
2003) where problems regarding infrastructure implementation are therefore, expected. 
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Table 5-2: Matrix of the Pre-Planning phase 
 
 
   
 
Chapter 5 
125 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Simplified flowchart of the pre-planning phase 
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5.2.3. Planning 
As shown in Table (5-3) and Figure (5-3), the planning phase is divided internally into 4 
sections: planning for industry, planning for urban development, planning for the State’s 
lands outside the provinces’ reins and environmental planning.  
First, starting with planning for industry, in general, it is found that planning is managed by 
the IDA through its technical team and finally prepared by specialized consultancy offices. 
These offices are assigned by the competent bodies in terms of the project location. With 
regard to existing IZs, they are divided into two types, ‘new cities’ and ‘provinces’ IZs. The 
NUCA is singled out legally to be responsible for the planning of its possession of IZs, but it 
entrusted the task to the GOPP that finally assigned consultancy offices for doing the job. 
Regarding existing IZs within provinces, plans are prepared by provinces through specialized 
consultancy offices. Regarding industrial parks (IPs), developers of such zones are in charge 
of the task through entrusting consultancy offices. In this general context, the law specifically 
highlighted two tasks because of their importance. These are; the selection of IZs locations 
and lands, and the identification of their activities and related services. For both tasks, the 
IDA is responsible by law. In the first task, the IDA is legally obliged to coordinate with the 
National Centre for Planning the State Lands Uses (NCPSLU). For the second task, the IDA 
is compelled by law to coordinate with all relevant bodies in general and the EEAA in 
specific. 
Second, with regard to the planning for urban development, this depends entirely on the 
national program of strategic planning. The strategic planning program is basically the GOPP 
responsibility under the condition that the outcome is to be accredited by the SCPUD. In 
details, it can be said that this program has three levels; national, regional and local. For the 
national and regional levels, the GOPP is in charge of studying, preparing and implementing 
such a program. However, the SCPUD is competent for accreditation before the 
implementation. There are two parties that sharing the GOPP in such a task other than the 
SCPUD. The first is the NCPSLU that is required to participate in the site selection of key 
projects in the country. The second is provinces which identify their planning needs and 
priorities which the GOPP has to consider when preparing the strategic plan. With respect to 
the local level, there are three cases as follows: 
1. In new urban communities, the NUCA is legally competent but through the GOPP 
which entrusts specialized consultancy offices to do such tasks. In such case, the law 
does not mention the necessity of accrediting schemes by the SCPUD. 
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2. In existing urban communities, regional centres of the GOPP are competent therein 
through local departments of planning of governorates. Those departments contract 
with specialized consultancy offices to do the task under the supervision and the 
auspices of the GOPP. 
3. For projects outside the adopted boundaries of urban masses of existing urban 
communities, the SCPUD is in charge of selecting sites and boundaries of such 
projects. 
Third, for State lands outside the reins of provinces, the NCPSLU is generally in charge of 
planning. However, with regard to land allocated to new urban communities owned by the 
NUCA, the NUCA is solely in charge of the whole process.  
Finally, regarding environmental planning, the law states only two main functions in which 
the EEAA is in charge to perform. The first is related to the preparation of environmental 
studies, plans and programs of the State. The second is regarded collecting and processing the 
environmental information required by the State in preparation of its plans. Yet, the law does 
not mention the presence of any partners with the EEAA in this matter and even does not 
grant the EEAA the powers necessary for the implementation of its limited tasks. 
The relationships network of the planning phase is considered to be the most influential if 
compared to that of other phases, as seen in Figure (5-3) through multiplicity of partners, 
roles and relationships among them. Although the urban planning in most cases is carried out 
by specialized consultancy offices, but till getting to this step it is required to pass through 
many of the steps and interrelationships which could be sometimes conflicting. Starting with 
planning IZs outside the provinces reins, it is found that the role of the NCPSLU and the IDA 
contradicts with powers legally given to the NUCA controlling in full over the whole 
planning process of new urban communities. Similar contradiction applies in the process of 
planning lands within the provinces reins. The role of the GOPP with cooperation from 
provinces, in preparation of the strategic planning at all levels, may end with identifying 
locations for industrial development rather than the physical planning for them. The effect of 
these positions of contradiction maximizes by two issues: a) accreditation body of schemes 
vary according to the competent administrative authority and b) the law does not oblige 
bodies in many cases to coordinate with each other. The latter issue strongly appears 
regarding the environmental role. Governmental bodies are mostly not legally required to 
coordinate with the EEAA. Hence, the EEAA is kept without sufficient powers enabling it to 
enforce/activate its work within the competent bodies. 
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To conclude, the planning phase suffers from contradictions/overlapping jurisdictions among 
involved partners in addition to lacking coordination in some areas that maximize the effects 
from contradictions in responsibilities especially on the environment. This overlapping could 
lead to policy conflicts, program duplication and inefficiency (ESCWA, 2003). Therefore, the 
planning phase is legally missing some of the principles of governance for SD/IE. 
 
Table 5-3: Matrix of the Planning phase 
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Figure 5-3: Simplified flowchart of the planning phase 
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5.2.4. Regulations and Legislations 
As shown in Table (5-4) and Figure (5-4), the IDA is clearly competent to set up regulations, 
conditions and governing rules of industry and IZs in Egypt. A few partners may share the 
IDA in these competences. 
Starting from regulations of industry in general, the IDA is competent to set them up and 
manage this task alone without partners. To give importance to regulations of the 
establishment of IZs and to stress on them as being within the competences of the IDA, the 
law mentions them clearly despite of being covered within regulations related to industry. 
For conditions and governing rules, the law mentions two cases: 
• Conditions and governing rules of the use, development and pricing of industrial lands 
are the responsibility of the IDA alone without the partnership of others but the 
pricing committee (consists of the IDA, the GAFI and other partners like financial 
organizations), which the IDA has to coordinate with regarding land pricing. 
Regarding conditions for improving the investment atmosphere, the IDA is in charge 
of coordination with the GAFI then the outcome is to be accredited by the SCPUD. 
Additionally, the FSEEDIZ develops incentives to push forward the IZs development 
then to be accredited by the Cabinet.  
• Regarding conditions and governing rules of establishing and managing IPs (of the 
IDP), the IDA is competent and acts as a regulator for the entire program. It also acts 
as a facilitator to manage provision of infrastructure and coordinates with utilities’ 
providers in this concern.    
For studying legislations and laws related to industry and suggesting amendments in this 
regard, the MTI and the IDA are in charge. 
As regards new urban communities, the NUCA plays alone the role of setting up zones 
regulations and building specifications. 
In respect to environmental affairs, the EEAA, in coordination with the MOF, is in charge of 
formulating economic incentives for investors protecting the environment. It is also 
competent to develop and issue environmental guidelines and standards to be observed when 
planning for different uses, as well as for the preparation of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) studies. Furthermore, The EEAA is competent to study and review 
environmental legislations and laws as well as suggesting appropriate amendments without 
the partnership of others. 
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For different land uses of urban development, the GOPP is in charge of developing all land 
uses’ guidelines and standards. These guidelines are to be reviewed and modified by the 
competent authorities, then to be finally accredited by the SCPUD. For studying and 
reviewing legislations and laws on urban development and suggesting appropriate 
amendments, both the GOPP and the SCPUD are in charge. 
  
Chapter 5 
133 
 
Table 5-4: Matrix of the Regulations and Legislations phase 
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Figure 5-4: Simplified flowchart of the regulations and legislations phase 
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5.2.5. Licensing, Approvals and Accreditation 
It can be seen from Table (5-5) and Figure (5-5) that multiplicity of the authorities 
responsible for this phase are observed where the SCPUD is on top. For urban development 
projects of all authorities including the IDA, the SCPUD is competent to examine all 
prescribed conditions and governing rules issued by different laws/resolutions/decrees from 
those authorities. Based on this examination, the SCPUD shall issue a unified set of 
conditions and governing rules for licensing to be followed without any further permissions 
from concerned authorities. This task is under processing and therefore, the IDA is still 
legally in charge of licensing, approvals and accreditation of the industrial projects in general 
except for the EIA studies. In details: 
• Conditions and governing rules for licensing, required for industrial projects, are set 
and issued by the IDA. Approvals for IZs and industrial projects plans, development 
plans and detailed plans, are generally accredited by the IDA according to regulations 
to be issued by the SCPUD. The IDA may authorize one of the concerned 
administration authorities in issuing such approvals and licenses. For example, the 
NUCA is authorized by the IDA in issuing building licenses for industrial projects in 
new cities. Approvals for IZs and industrial projects’ detailed plans in provinces are 
accredited by the mayor after the approval from the PLPC. 
• EIA studies are firstly prepared by investors through their consultancy offices. Then, 
concerned administrative authorities, such as the NUCA in the new urban 
communities and provinces in existing communities, receive and check these studies, 
and then send to the EEAA for a reasoned opinion. . The law authorized the EEAA to 
send back any incomplete or defective study to the administrative authority to be 
reformed/amended by its investor. This cycle may be repeated till the full satisfaction 
of the EEAA on the EIA study before issuing its final decision. The whole process 
must be done before the implementation of the project.   
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Table 5-5: Matrix of the Licensing, Approvals and Accreditation phase 
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Figure 5-5: Simplified flowchart of the licensing, approvals and accreditation phase 
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5.2.6. Coordination and Follow Up 
In this research context, coordination has three applications. It is the function that an 
authority is basically created to perform, such as in the case of the SCPUD and NCPSLU. 
Otherwise, coordination is a role that an authority has to willingly play to fulfil its tasks, like 
in the case of the EEAA and the NUCA. And, sometimes, coordination is a routine that is 
imposed on an authority in order to accomplish its main roles, such as in the case of the IDA. 
To explain these cases, shown in Table (5-6) and Figure (5-6), the following could be 
considered:  
Firstly, the SCPUD and the NCPSLU are two entities that have been recently established 
basically in order to overcome the bureaucracy that the institutional framework in Egypt 
widely suffers from.  Their main role is the coordination among all the State’s entities 
concerned with the planning process. To go into details, tasks of both are as follows:  
• The NCPSLU assures the complete coordination among the State’s entities to achieve 
the best possible use of the State’s lands besides resolve conflicts among different 
bodies regarding possession of such lands. It is also competent to following up the 
development of the State lands, and monitoring and prohibiting the encroachments on 
such lands.  
• The SCPUD coordinates among the authorities concerned with the process of 
planning and urban development. Particularly, it is in charge of coordinating among 
authorities involved in setting and implementing the national strategic plan. In 
addition, it enables all partners to carry out their roles and responsibilities towards the 
achievement of national goals. Regarding the follow up, the SCPUD overmatches the 
implementation of urban development plans and programs which are followed up, 
verified and submitted by the GOPP. It then evaluates results of programs and assigns 
ministries and agencies to follow up on implementation. 
Secondly, as the entity concerned with the environment, the EEAA should produce and 
implement/follow up the implementation of environmental plans and programs in different 
agencies/sectors. However, the EEAA has no power to implement such programs/plans or 
even guarantee their implementation in relevant competent bodies. So, it is understandable to 
include coordination as a main role of EEAA. In this regard, the EEAA coordinates among all 
authorities concerned with the environmental plans and programs. It also supports the 
relationships and coordinates between Egypt and regional and international organizations. 
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The EEAA also observes concerned authorities in the implementation of environmental plans 
and programs.  
Also, a body like the NUCA has multiple and varied powers starting from the preparation of 
policies and specialized studies to planning and implementation. It also holds monopoly over 
the establishment and development of new urban communities. To apply such tasks, the 
NUCA must deal with several bodies and ministries. Therefore, coordination and follow up 
should appear as one of the main roles of an entity like the NUCA. In this concern, it 
organizes, coordinates and exchanges advice with authorities concerned with urban activities 
in new urban communities. The NUCA also follows up on the implementation of new urban 
communities plans, overcomes what may hinder their implementation and evaluate 
achievements. 
Thirdly, the IDA is not represented in Table (5-6) and Figure (5-6) in relation to coordination. 
The IDA is required by law, in some areas indicated previously, to coordinate with other 
concerned entities but it is not one of its main functions like in the case of the SCPUD and 
NCPSLU. The IDA just follows up the implementation of industrial development schemes in 
coordination with concerned authorities. Further, it oversees projects financed from grants or 
foreign loans. 
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Table 5-6: Matrix of the Coordination and Follow up phase 
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Figure 5-6: Simplified flowchart of the coordination, follow up and supervision phase 
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5.3. Conclusion 
Egypt has witnessed several changes and amendments in the legal framework governing the 
planning process of IZs, see Appendix (VI) and Chapter (2), Section (2.3.4) for full details on 
these changes. These changes aimed basically at improving the general investment 
atmosphere through overcoming the bureaucracy resulted from the plenty of laws and the 
contradictions among them. Hence, unified laws have been issued such as the Building 
Unified Law as well as applying the One Window Policy in many governmental bodies in 
general and specifically in the IDA. The changes also targeted speeding up the process of 
decision making regarding the EIA studies to reduce the pressures on investors, and 
strengthening the respect to the environment by giving more powers to the EEAA. The 
changes also reached the institutional framework, as Egypt has also witnessed some 
transformations in the nature of some working bodies in the planning framework of IZs 
besides the establishment of new entities therein. The most important changes were; a) the 
transformation of the General Authority for Manufacturing to the IDA aiming at improving 
the investment atmosphere through giving the IDA the authority of directing the industrial 
investment, and b) the establishment of both the NCPSLU and the SCPUD aiming at 
coordinating among the parties involved in the planning process. These changes are supposed 
to improve the coordination system but taking into considerations the newness of most of 
them, it could be said that effects of such changes on the current planning framework of IZs 
need to be actually examined. 
This chapter has come up with a clear picture of the phases formin0 
g the official framework of the process through which the Egyptian IZs could be planned. By 
reviewing these phases, it could be said that “the isolated islands” (In-G-03) is the best 
expression that could describe governmental bodies and sectors of such framework. 
Explanations of this in details are as follows:  
• One to two agencies govern one of the sectors whether industrial, urban or 
environmental with no connections among them regarding the policies preparation 
phase which is the most important phase. This could give an indication that must be 
examined in the following chapters on the domination of each sector on its own 
territory separately and away from the EEAA participation in policy formulation 
whether industrial or urban. 
• Pre-planning phase suffers from fragmentations in powers with absence of 
coordination mechanisms among involved partners particularly regarding extending 
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infrastructure to IZs sites. While the mandate over the IZs is for the IDA, utilities in 
general lay under the control of the sovereign bodies such as the ministries of 
electricity, gas and water and sanitation. It is also the responsibility of provinces and 
the NUCA to extend utilities within their respective regions according to ownership. 
Therefore, the IDA, according to an expert, is "a body without blood vessels" 
especially as Egypt lacks coordination among/within sectors and different bodies. 
• Planning phase is characterized by conflicting roles among the involved partners. 
Roles of the NUCA, in new urban communities, and the GOPP with provinces, in 
preparing strategic planning, contradicts with, mainly, the NCPSLU and then with the 
IDA.  Differentiation of the accreditation body of schemes and lacking coordination in 
some areas in the process, particularly with environmental bodies, maximize the effect 
of the problem. Policy conflicts, program duplication and inefficiency are expected.  
• With respect to licensing and the setting of its conditions for industrial projects, the 
IDA is competent therein. However, due to the multiplicity of land owners each of 
which set up its own conditions, the nature of proceedings and conditions that are 
supposed to be followed is confusing. This led recently to the establishment of the 
SCPUD and to be given a central role to deal with this matter. It works on collecting 
all conditions/rules from all bodies, studying them and then issuing a full unified set 
of conditions that is binding for all. It is therefore expected that confusion in licensing 
will be resolved what the next chapter will examine.   
• On the environmental side, regarding the coordination among different competent 
administrative bodies for the implementation of environmental plans prepared by the 
EEAA, it is found that the EEAA is in charge but with no power over these bodies to 
ensure implementation. 
In an attempt to overcome this situation of internal isolation and poor coordination, the State 
has established, as we pointed out previously, the NCPSLU and the SCPUD. While the first 
is authorised to set clear jurisdictions to various bodies and determine the optimal use of the 
State lands, the latter is competent to coordinate among the State bodies involved in the 
planning process for different lands and in particular with regard to lands within the reins of 
provinces. Yet, establishment of such entities has not yet influenced the State legal setup as 
their roles contradicts with others roles as stated in laws and as comprehended from the 
governmental officials. This issue therefore, is under examination by the next chapter.  
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To conclude, this chapter synthesizes the official framework of the process through which the 
Egyptian IZs could be planned. Due to contradicting responsibilities and lacking coordination 
among concerned bodies, the official framework analysed in this chapter is theoretically not 
applying principles of governance for SD/IE and therefore, unable to produce sustainable IZs. 
Egypt has recently made some institutional and legal arrangements to overcome these 
problems towards the application of sustainable development principles. Effects of such 
changes on the current planning framework of IZs need to be actually examined. The 
following chapter discusses this issue through analysing three case studies. 
Finally, by synthesizing the official planning process and theoretically concluding its lacking 
of sustainability principles, this chapter has answered part (a) and incompletely part (c) of the 
first research question. 
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6. CHAPTER SIX: PLANNING PROCESS OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPER PROGRAM 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to analyze the planning process of the case studies of private industrial 
zones, entitled in Egypt “industrial parks (IPs)”, of the Industrial Developer Program (IDP). 
In this analysis, the study follows the same classification of phases of the planning process 
used in the previous chapter; describing then concluding the official framework of the 
planning process of industrial zones in Egypt. Using the same classification allows 
challenging the planning process of the case study versus the official one (that has been 
analyzed in the previous chapter). This is to be done aiming at investigating the extent to 
which the official process is applied and hence exploring the differences between the official 
framework and the one in practice, as well as identifying the problems of the application. 
Therefore, this chapter contributes to the knowledge by formulating the closest image of the 
actual planning process of industrial zones (IZs) in Egypt and hence, analyzing the extent to 
which this process could produce sustainable IZs. This chapter by doing so completes 
answering the first research question that was incompletely answered in Chapter (5). At the 
same degree of importance, this chapter also partially answers the second research question 
by concluding preconceptions on the factors governing the planning process. It, in this frame, 
forms the base that the following chapter will be built upon to complete answering the second 
research question.  
This chapter is divided into three parts: a) A brief about the IDP and the cases chosen to 
represent it, b) Discussing the process followed in three IPs. This section also deals with the 
developers’ thoughts on the process followed and the problems faced by them during the 
process, and c) Discussion and conclusion.   
6.2. Introduction to the Industrial Developer Program and the case studies 
The Industrial Developer Program is part of the State plan recently encouraging the 
partnership with the private sector. The key reasons behind this program were due to the 
weakness of the State budget that forced the State to enter a partner. What helped the State 
doing so were the plans put aiming at solving industrial development problems, and on top of 
which was the unserious dealing of the investors regarding the lands they posses. This led to 
changing the thought to involve the private sector in management, and giving it part of the 
responsibility (for more details, see Appendix (VII) that addresses the nature, importance, 
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purposes and key reasons behind the IDP). This research analyzes three IPs representing this 
program, they are as follows: 
c. “AL Tajamouat Industrial Park, a fully serviced and integrated industrial park” (Al 
Tagamouat IP), 10th of Ramadan City. 
d. “CPC Egypt, the one stop shop towards building the future” (CPC), 6th of October City. 
e. The third IP (IP3)1 
When comparing2 the three cases, it is possible to argue that Al Tajamouat Company is more 
experienced in the industrial development field. This is due to its previous involvement, as an 
industrial developer in establishing, and operating an industrial park in Jordan. This is not the 
case for CPC which is working only in the area of manufacturing building materials in such a 
way far from the idea of industrial developer. It is also not the case for the third company 
despite the fact that its executive manager had been involved in the preparation for a first 
phase company, as all companies of the first and second phase have not been implemented 
and hence lack the experience of operating and production. This advantage particular to Al 
Tajamouat Company has uniquely influenced the process of initiating the IDP, as discussed 
in details in section (6.3.1).  
6.3.  Planning process of the industrial parks 
This section discusses in details stages and steps of the planning process of the three case 
studies which almost refer to setting up policy, pre-planning, planning, approvals and 
licenses, regulations and legislation, and ultimately coordination and networking. Although 
they are as a whole arranged according to time but some steps are not. The incoming parts 
explain these stages3 separately in details and in order according to time as follows: 
6.3.1. Setting up the policy and strategy: generating the idea and putting it into effect 
This stage addresses the generation of the idea of the program and developing the 
institutional legal framework of the State to become ready for the implementation of the idea. 
This is through the development of a governmental protocol establishing the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA) and giving it the power to implement the program. Then, it 
addresses the steps taking the program from idea to implementation through the preparation 
                                                          
1
 The researcher is not able to tell any details could lead to identify this IP as requested by its executive director.  
2
 More details are provided in Appendix (III). 
3
 The last two stages; "Regulations and Legislations" and "Coordination, Networking and Participation" are 
already discussed and analyzed through the first four stages. Hence, they are not discussed again separately. 
Therefore results of these two stages are concluded in the part called “discussions and Conclusions” where they 
discussed comprehensively with the results of the other stages to bring out the final conclusion of this chapter. 
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of the executive framework of the program. This stage is characterized by the availability of 
the political will, achieving communication and good relationships among part of the 
involved parties, as well as creating the institutional legal framework and respecting the 
systematic way of thinking to some extent. In light of this, it was found, according to De-284, 
the Executive Director of Al Tagamouat IP, that the program idea returns to early 2005 due to 
the interest that the former minister of industry showed and his relationships with 
businessmen that led him to her company. A dialogue was held about the nature of the idea of 
developing IZs by the contribution of the private sector. The former minister found it an 
unsuitable idea for implementation because the authorities of the General Authority of 
Manufacturing (GAM) as well as the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) do not permit 
such idea. This led to the creation of the IDA with its authority5 which helped adopting the 
idea and thus opened communication channels with the developers. Detailing this, (De-28) 
said: 
It was an individual personal initiative from [Ex] Minister Rashid. There was no 
Republic protocol at that time giving the IDA this power [the power of land 
allocation to private companies to develop them industrially] as the IDA was 
originally established in 2005 ... He [the ex-minister] heard about us in Jordan 
and we were in one of the working visits to Egypt via a businessman ... So, he 
told the businessman that he wants to meet us. We met in 03/2005 and he asked 
us to market the IZs in Egypt. We said that our work is not marketing, we develop 
and our product is to be marketed. He said that in Egypt the government is the 
only entity that establishes the IZs. We told him that we will be ready when the 
private sector is permitted to do so. (De-28) 
With conviction of the Ex-Minister with the idea of developing IZs with the participation of 
the private sector, the Ex-Minister with the MTI sought to change the legal framework 
governing the GAM to be able to apply the idea. This led to the establishment of the IDA 
with its authority over the GAM entity in 2005 by Presidential Decree No. 350 of the year 
2005 (Mubarak, 2005). Such a Decree was a start for the change of prevailing concepts 
towards private sector involvement in the management of IZs. The emerging authority IDA 
became qualified to study how to operationalize the program idea and taking it into effect. 
Also,  the re-communication started again by the Ex-Minister with industrial developers as 
indicated by De-28, the Executive Director of Al Tagamouat IP, in the sequel to her previous 
talk: 
                                                          
4
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
5 For more details, see Appendix (VI)  
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Concepts have changed after almost a year [she means from the date of the 
meeting with the Ex-Minister in March 2005]. The ministry contacted us again 
and asked us to come saying that they have made a protocol and lands are 
available. Then we met the group of the IDA. (De-28) 
In an attempt to find out the role of the involved parties in the protocol preparation, De-43, 
the Executive Director of CPC, said: "No, this is the thought of the State and studies are made 
by the State". De-28 added to this, saying: 
No, the protocol is a governmental Egyptian task.  I mean it is a protocol whereby 
the government set up the IDA. The government put the decisions regarding 
industrial lands under the authority of the IDA through the allocation of industrial 
lands to investors or developers. It means it is a Republican decision to establish 
an agency which developers cannot interfere in. (De-28) 
Regarding utilities, the Protocol setup included coordination between the Ex-Minister of 
industry and other ministers in charge of utilities to ensure providing the program with its 
needs. Specific quantities of electricity, water, gas, etc., were agreed to be adopted as the 
State limitations to the IPs. De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, agree with this adding that 
the role of utilities providers in the IDP is limited to the stage of the Protocol and at the actual 
extension of utilities at the time of implementation.  
After the establishment of the IDA; Amr Assal6, its Ex-Head, sought to operationalize the 
idea through his series of visits to various industrial countries to learn about their experiences 
in creating and managing new IZs, and to attract foreign investors to the IDP. Officially it 
could be said that the IDP actually began in the mid-2006 with preparatory workshops 
organized by the IDA and sponsored by the former Industry Minister. They included 21 
developers of different nationalities who have considerable experience in industrial 
development as well as international and financial institutions, and banks. The most 
important results of this workshop were the recommendations and proposals of global trends 
for the establishment and management of IZs using the concept of partnership between 
governments and the private sector. Another important result was the benchmarking between 
firms on the basis of expertise, financial capacity and final service level provided by the 
industrial developer, as well as the efficiency of development projects implementation and 
zone management (IDP, 2011c, Assal, 2010). 
To conclude, the political will is represented in this stage in the former Industry Minister’s 
will. His relationships and dialogue he conducted with investors, by virtue being one of them, 
had led him to be introduced to the IDP idea as well as his conviction with it. He then 
                                                          
6
 Was a director of a major real estate investment company in Egypt before holding the responsibilities of the 
IDA. 
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overcome the obstacle of that the institutional legal framework does not permit the 
implementation of the IDP idea leading the cabinet-level to adopt issuing the decree No. 350 
of 2005 establishing the IDA. His movement at the cabinet-level also allowed the inter-
ministerial coordination to take place for ensuring the utilities supply to the IDP. Another role 
began afterword which is the role of the emerging IDA Head, who has administration and 
investment background allowing him to have networking with the investment expertise 
partners. He started with exploratory field visits to foreign IPs models to transfer the expertise 
and promote for the IDP. This was followed by inviting a large number of global experienced 
developers along with the financial institutions in preparatory workshops for the formulation 
of an operational framework for the IDP. Therefore this stage is depended on will of 
individuals who hold good relationships with the investors that allowed for generating the 
IDP idea and then taking it into implementation. 
6.3.2. Pre-planning stage  
6.3.2.1. TOR, offering the program, qualifying developers and drafting the contract  
This part addresses the preparation of the regulatory framework of the program (TOR) that 
allows the administration to offer the program in its different phases to the developers. It also 
discusses how the companies applied to the program, how they have been selected to join the 
program as industrial developers and the way the administration used to draft the contract. In 
these steps, while the IDA was in charge of the TOR preparation as well as the program 
marketing alone without other stakeholders, it adopted interactive discussions with the 
applying companies in the qualifying step as well as in drafting the contract. The IDA aimed 
from this at reaching the best possible start for the IDP that ensures compatibility in visions 
between the administration and developers.  
For the TOR of the IDP, the IDA, in the first phase of the IDP, intended to expand the market 
of the program (IDP, 2011c) aiming at attracting the most expertise capacities available in the 
field of developing IZs (IDA, 2008b). It for that adopted transparent and participatory 
approach with the expertise developers through the workshops made, as indicated earlier, for 
preparing the operational framework at the start of the IDP. Then, the IDA invited many 
developers again to study the workshops outcomes, and the program details before the 
announcement of the launch of the first phase and in the selection process of bidders of the 
first phase of the IDP (IDP, 2011c). Applying such approach is confirmed also by De-28, the 
Executive Director of Al Tagamouat IP, by saying: 
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As one of the models found in the Arab region, we have been invited to Egypt, to 
study the idea, examine the proposed plots of land and explore the whole topic. 
(De-28)  
Thus, the IDA through the TOR for the first phase of the IDP broadened offering the IDP for 
marketing purposes and to measure the demand on it before implementation. It also benefited 
from the outcomes of these workshops to outline the TOR of the first phase of the IDP. 
However, as confirmed by In-G-06, Director of the Central Administration of the IZs in the 
IDA, the preparation and the formulation of such TOR is a task that the IDA made 
individually, saying “exclusively by the IDA” (In-G-06). It should be noted that the IDA has 
developed the method of offering the IDP and qualifying developers starting from the second 
phase of the IDP. The steps start by a public announcement for registration of companies, 
followed by a primary stage of qualifying in which the IDA selects a group of companies that 
are to be invited to progress and get the TOR. The chosen companies then present the full 
documents and their projects ideas for entering the actual qualification final phase (IDA, 
2008b, De-64). Thus, the IDA opened registration for all companies to estimate the demand 
and attract a large number of companies that allow it to efficiently choose from. Then it 
restricted the use of the TOR only on the chosen companies.  
After offering the program and announcing for one of the IDP phases, the IDA starts the 
qualifying step, see Figure (6-1) and Appendix (VIII) for full details and more evidence, and 
then carries out the final evaluation and choice of companies followed by preparing for 
contracting procedures. IPs developers confirmed and praised the dialogue formula and 
participatory approach adopted by the IDA in the qualifying step. It was in an attempt to 
reach the best possible models for IPs as well as to prepare a preliminary consensual draft of 
the contract (De-28, De-43). De-43, the Executive Director of CPC, adds that the IDA 
rejected some companies which had real estate perspective to insure real industrial 
development. Furthermore, with the presence of management experience in dealing with the 
program and also with the many companies wishing to obtain more lands; the IDA, starting 
from the second phase, uses criteria-based evaluation system to assess companies and chose 
from according to total points of each. Competitive criteria are: development activity, level of 
service, technical competence and financial efficiency (IDA, 2008b, De-64). 
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From the above it can be inferred that the IDA took sole responsibility preparing for the TOR 
depending on experience it gained through the preparatory workshops made for preparing the 
IDP framework. The IDA also conducted the marketing for and offering the program without 
any partnership from any side. In addition, the IDA offered the IDP through a method which 
explored the demand on the IDP and attracted the needed number of qualified developers. 
After gaining the necessary expertise from the first phase of the IDP, the IDA developed the 
method through development of a criteria-based evaluation system. It is noted that the IDA 
tries to achieve the required industrial development from the IDP not real estate development. 
The IDA also adopted, during the qualifying process and the preparation of a preliminary 
version of the contract, interactive discussions with developers aiming at reaching 
compatibility in visions between the administration and developers to ensure realistic and 
smooth implementation. 
6.3.2.2. Land allotment، signing the contract and receiving the land  
The Egyptian Government aimed at guaranteeing the developer's commitment to achieve 
industrial development in the IPs, through a compliance contract. The lack of readiness of the 
Government to extend utilities to the IPs, as well as determining a low price for developers 
for selling their plots of land allotted for industry, are important elements that negatively 
affected the achievement of this aim. To explain how this happened, this part discusses how 
the IPs sites are allotted to the chosen developers and analyzes the contract and its influences 
on the development process. It also shows the contract signing step and its requirements 
followed by receiving the lands by the developers. 
The IDA aimed at reaching balanced contracts that are for the interests of their parties taking 
into account the objectives of the IDA. This is as well as taking into account the dynamic 
Figure 6-1: Qualifying Step in Detail 
Reference: (IDP, 2011c) 
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nature of the development and providing the necessary flexibility to the industrial developer 
for competition, and response to market changes and mechanisms (IDA, 2008b). We have 
indicated in the preceding section that the IDA, through exchanging ideas in workshops with 
the developers, has reached an initial formulation of the contract. Subsequent to this, the IDA 
contacted the accepted bidders to attend a meeting for primary allotment of lands according 
to the priority and competitive order of bidders. Then both sides proceeded to the contracting 
procedures in accordance with the regulations in the TOR. After the initial allotment, the 
founding of a joint stocks company is one of the most important steps undertaken by the 
industrial developer in the General Authority for Investment (GAFI) to be able  to complete 
the contracting procedures and then sign it with the IDA (IDP, 2011c, De-28, De-43, De-64).  
About the nature of the contract and the opinions of experts and developers, we found general 
agreement on being a compliance contract for the Egyptian government. It is obliging the 
developers with implementation and management to ensure achieving industrial 
development, not just real estate development. In this regard, De-43, the Executive Director 
of CPC, from the developers of the first phase, explained: 
The State feared that a foreign investor takes land with a specific price and sells it 
with another price. The State fears that public opinion says they are selling 
Egypt’s land and they do so and so, and so on. For this, they have put a very strict 
contract committing us with implementation and management. (De-43) 
Based on the text of Section XIII of the development contract of an IP, which states that “in 
case of delay of the IDA in extending the utilities according to its commitment in this 
contract, the developer is granted an additional period consistent with the impact on the 
timetable for the project” (IDA, 2008a, p.27). De-64 on behalf of company IP3 from the 
second phase, agreed with what proceeded  but argued that this item is an important point in 
favour of the developer, saying: 
There is nothing in the contract, as a compliance contract, against the interest of 
the IDA where all terms and fines are on the developer who does not conform. 
However, the only point in favour of the developer is that he/she can proof any 
delay he did not commit. This delay will be omitted from the period stipulated in 
the contract. (De-64) 
To illustrate the importance of this point and its influences on the industrial development 
process transferring part of it to real estate development, Ac-G-03, Consultant of the IDA 
Head, quoting one of the largest developers in Egypt, who confirmed on the above as a 
whole, but he feels that the contract stands, as it is, in his favour. Therefore, this point helped 
some developers who intend to enter the IDP from a real state investment perspective, not 
keen to achieve real industrial development. In this context Ac-G-03 said: 
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Look, I will give you the words of Kareem Sami Saad, one of the largest 
developers. He said: "When you read the contract made by the IDA, one should 
throw it out on the street. It has so many mistakes, but all these mistakes are in 
my favour. If something happens and we raise a case for trial, we are the ones 
who will win". For this he takes land as much as he wants. He endorsed the land. 
However, when you ask him did you develop or not he will have much to say…. 
If the developer did not commit, the first thing he will say is: the IDA is supposed 
to provide the utilities to the head of the land, where are they? The IDA is the one 
not to fulfil first. (Ac-G-03) 
Meanwhile, De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, finds another mistake that the IDA 
committed in the contract by putting limits for the factories land prices. This prevents the 
developer from spending money on the project in the way which guarantees providing the 
highest possible service for manufacturers and therefore achieving faster marketing and 
selling of land plots. That is due to the fact that the developer counts it economically. 
Therefore, the developer decides on the amount of money he/she will spend according to the 
selling price. De-43, the Executive Director of CPC, also agreed on this proposition. He saw 
that putting low limits for the factories land prices was a major reason for the reluctance of 
international developers form applying to the IDP. The international developers present high 
quality services which they will not be able to commit with within the limits of the land price 
put in the contract.  So, they refused to apply to the IDP (De-43).   
The question poses itself now is why the enrolled developers accept such prices. It can be 
claimed that there is a number of scenarios could explain the reasons and answer this 
question. First, it may be due to the real purpose of the developers is not in industrial 
development but in real estate investment through speculation on the whole land of their IPs. 
Thus, they are not interested in the issue of the factories land price within the site. Secondly, 
it also may be due to the intention of the developers to decrease the services level they will 
provide, compared to the level of the international developers, to maintain their profit margin. 
Therefore, reduction of the services level and accordingly the expected level of manufacturers 
who will settle in these IPs, is logically expected. Thirdly, it may be because of the nature of 
the developer and whether manufacturer or a real developer. Big manufacturers, like the case 
of CPC and according to what its executive director said: “we agreed as we have investment 
goals in Egypt” (De-43), accepted the contract terms and conditions because they will 
maintain most of the land plots for their companies. In this case, the percentage of the land 
plots they will sell is relatively little. Therefore and to achieve their goals in the expansion of 
their industrial base and to open a new market, they may not be fully concerned with the 
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factories land prices. This is especially when “the offered area for sale is below 30% of the 
total area” (De-43) of the IPs like in the case of CPC . 
According to the contract between the IDA and the developer, after completion of the 
contract in an official form and paying the contracting instalment, the IDA delivers the land 
to the developer (IDA, 2008a). What actually happens differs from this, as the IDA receives 
the land from the city council, owner of the land, and delivers it as it is at the same time to the 
industrial developer (De-28, De-43, De-64). De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, in the 
second phase, added that the IDA does not do what is supposed to be done regarding 
receiving the land and ensuring its readiness, saying: 
Currently, receiving the land from the city council is by the IDA which receives 
from the council and delivers the developers at the same time … The IDA tried 
again to deliver the land to developers with the hills of landfill from neighbouring 
sites and in its unaccepted state with a promise to settle down the land to them 
later. But the investors learned the promises lesson and refused to receive the land 
until it is settled down, what has actually happened. (De-64) 
Furthermore, it could be understood from the previous text, as well as the failure of the IDA 
to fulfil its responsibilities in the light of the contract, that the IDA has already promised the 
developers with things that it did not commit with. It, by doing that is interested in the 
completion of the procedure quickly with exporting the emerging problems to the future time 
even if this is at the expense of work efficiency and interest of the developers. Or that the 
IDA lacks the appropriate powers on the ground to do what it promises to do and the 
authority is completely for the cities councils, incoming sections examine this issue.  
To conclude, the contract in its entirety is a compliance contract to the Egyptian Government 
in which it guarantees the developer's commitment to achieving industrial development on 
the allotted land. However, the lack of readiness of the Egyptian Government to extend 
utilities to the land borders is an important factor for the developers’ non-compliance with the 
agreed timetables with the IDA. This situation helped some companies to enter the IDP for a 
real estate investment aim, not for achievement of industrial development. Another matter, 
which is considered as a disadvantage, referred to by the developers, is the determination of 
the factories land plots price in the contract. This led to; first; the reluctance of international 
developers from applying to the IDP for what they see from the inadequacy of prices with 
their distinctive services. These services can achieve quick marketing and sale of land and 
thus reach the aspired profit, what also accelerates running the factories and achieve rapid 
industrial development. However, this did not happen. The second thing is; lowering the 
service level by the enrolled developers compared to the international level to achieve a 
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balance between cost and revenue. This might give an indication of the nature of the settled 
industrialists in the IDP and gives a negative indicator for the achievement of the objectives 
of the IDP as a whole. 
From another side, the IDA might lack the authority on the ground over the city councils that 
make it unwilling to reform the lands in the new cities and make them suitable for delivery to 
the developers. The IDA also might have the interest to accelerate the implementation of the 
IDP even if not in a proper way. 
6.3.2.3. Providing utilities 
According to the IDP website, the IDA is responsible for the coordination with the 
governorates and  other governmental bodies or the private sector, which manages the IPs and 
provides utilities to the investors therein (IDP, 2011a). In this context, the contract at its item 
No. 13 under the title of providing utilities, mentions that the IDA is obliged to provide major 
utilities and infrastructure of water, sanitation, roads and electricity to the borders of the land 
according to quantities7 and dates set out in annexes of the contract (IDA, 2008a). In-G-06, 
Director of the Central Administration of the IZs in the IDA, interprets this role of the IDA as 
a ‘facilitator and coordinator’ between the utilities authorities and the developer to facilitate 
the utilities supply to the IPs. However, the role that the IDA played in reality is seen by the 
developers as far from what is mentioned before. De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, does 
not see the role of the IDA more than a Secretary and finds it contradicting the provisions of 
the contract, saying: 
With regard to utilities and its delivery to the site, it is no more than the IDA 
taking the role of being a secretary. It receives requests from developers and turns 
it into utilities sectors and vice versa as well, without any action or intervention to 
resolve or whatever.... which is contrary to the contract between the developer 
and the IDA. (De-64) 
De-43, the Executive Director of CPC, agreed with De-64 , adding examples of tiring and 
bureaucratic problems he faced with the utilities providers especially the New Urban 
Communities Authority (NUCA) without effective intervention from the IDA to facilitate or 
coordinate to sort out these problems. According to him, in addition to lacking commitment 
to provide the IPs with utilities, the IDA lacks transparency in dealing with the developers as 
they know nothing about when  they can get the utilities. This of course, as De-43 said, 
negatively affects the developers’ thought and timetable and their contracts with other parties, 
saying: “then the developer gets lost and consequently everyone after him.” (De-43). The 
                                                          
7
 The capacity of utilities provided to the IPs has been decided at the beginning of the IDP by the Cabinet as 
stated in Section (6.3.1). 
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causes of the failure of the IDA to commit with the contract are explained by Ac-G-03, 
Consultant of the IDA Head. While the commitment lies on the IDA as a mandate authority 
for the IZs, it does not have the authority to extend utilities, nor the authority over the NUCA, 
as the owner and dominant over the new cities where the IPs lie, to do so. In details he said: 
Regarding the new cities, I gave you the brain which is the centre of businesses, 
the IDA, while I did not give you the arteries which is the NUCA, how come! 
They handed IZs to the IDA, but the whole infrastructure is subordinated to the 
NUCA. In the first stage [of the IDP], the NUCA partially extended the needed 
infrastructure to the IPs. When the industrial extensions took place, the NUCA 
asked the IDA to pay for the infrastructure saying that we have no budget for 
these extensions and they are not in our plan. The IDA asked: Pay! Pay what? I 
am not in charge of paying for the infrastructure. That is it. I mean, you gave me a 
body without blood vessels, how could the blood feed the body? So, it is a big 
problem and the situation is very bad. For this reason the IDP will fail. (Ac-G-03) 
Yet, the IDA is legally competent in coordination with the utilities authorities as mentioned in 
the previous chapter as well as in this section. Even if the IDA lacks the power of utilities 
supply and that power is in hands of NUCA, the question that poses itself is; what is the 
reason behind the failure of coordination between both bodies, the IDA and the NUCA, 
causing lack of utilities supply to the IPs? De-G-57, Director of the Projects Administration 
in Sixth of October City Council that contains a group of IPs, answered this question stating 
that the industrial land allotted to the IPs was not part of the current NUCA’s nor the cities 
councils’ plan although they are trying to feed the IPs up on stages. In details she said: 
The IDP was not in our plan. It put us in jam, because our plans for providing the 
utilities for its area are in the future plan. We did not consider this in our 
calculations now and it became a status quo for us. Of course, we provide them 
but on stages and we are not able to provide them at once. We have planned the 
city this way for now and for the future, now suddenly it becomes another way. 
So we are obliged to give but on stages. (De-G-57) 
Therefore, the coordination is not the only problem between the IDA and the utilities 
authorities; the NUCA particularly, but also the institutional setup suffers from unbalanced 
powers system as well as planning problems regarding the joint projects between institutions 
like in our case of the IDP. What confirms this more is that a contract between the IDA and 
the Holding Company for Natural Gases was signed at 28/10/2010, after nearly three years 
from signing the contracts between the IDA and the developers, as a first phase for supplying 
the IDP in Sixth of October and Tenth of Ramadan cities (eg.2lex.org, 2010). Within this 
timeframe, developers, according to the contract, were supposed to finish operating 75% of 
the whole area of their lands not only waiting for the governmental authorities to sign utilities 
supplying contract, as exactly happened. For that, De-43, the Executive Director of CPC, 
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highlighted the importance of that planning, preparing, coordinating for and providing 
utilities must be prior to the implementation of the program and before inviting developers to 
join it, what did not happened. He showed anger from the way the Egyptian Government 
handled the IDP added: “this way is not suitable or acceptable for the companies coming to 
invest here in Egypt.” (De-43).  
To conclude, although the IDA is legally obliged to provide utilities to the IPs, this does not 
happen in reality. The IDA works in the best cases as orders delivery secretary, while the 
developer finds him/herself compelled to take action, make effort and spend time and a lot of 
money to push the utilities competent authorities to do their job. The utilities providers 
excuse by the weak capacity they have and that the IPs program is not within their existing 
plans. This confirms what is indicated earlier in the stage of setting up policies  that 
coordination at the inter-ministerial level did not address the plans details nor discuss the 
compatibility between the IPs program plans and the concerned utilities ministries plans. 
Now, the role the IDA is supposed to do in the preparation phase of the IPs program did not 
take place due to two reasons. First, the IDA lacks the needed authorities to provide utilities 
or coordinate with utilities providers to do so, what shows unbalanced powers within the 
institutional setup confirming what is indicated in the previous section in that the power in 
new cities is for the NUCA. Second, this happens because of the weakness of the sectoral 
plans preparation as well as weakness in the coordination between the competent authorities 
in studying and planning for joint projects.  
6.3.3. Planning stage 
As classified through the analytical study of the official framework in the previous chapter 
this phase discusses; choosing the IPs locations8 and activities9, the marketing plan10, the 
urban planning as well as the environmental planning of the IPs sites. 
  
                                                          
8
 Choosing the IPs locations is a step that the IDA did with other steps before announcing the launch of the first 
phase of the program what means it is supposed to be discussed in the pre-planning stage not here in the 
planning stage. But as choosing the locations for industrial projects is a planning task and it is supposed to be 
done by planners, whoever they are governmental or not, as well as this step not discussed in the official 
framework of the state in the previous chapter in the planning phase, so, the researcher, for these reasons and to 
facilitate the analytical comparison between the official framework and the applied framework of the IPs 
Program, preferred to deal with this step in the planning step. 
9
 Choosing the IPs activities is a task that the developers did before signing the contract and are supposed to be 
in the pre-planning stage. However, since this step is linked in its relationships and effects to the rest of the steps 
of this phase, the researcher preferred to discuss it here in the planning phase.   
10
 Marketing plan, which the developer does, is separated from offering the IDP that the IDA does, that we 
already discussed within the Pre-Planning phase. This is because the marketing plan timing is considered to be a 
part of the Planning phase with its relationships and impacts linked to the other tasks of the planning phase. 
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6.3.3.1. Choosing IPs locations: 
Choosing the IPs locations is a task that has been done by the IDA alone in a short time 
period away from the planning experts and basics of the systematic planning studies. 
Choosing sites for IPs, which the developers will compete to acquire any of them, was 
required to reach a framework for the IDP leading to the launch of the first phase of the IDP. 
The IDP website mentions that after the preparatory workshops, which were in late July 
2006, the announcement of the launch of the first phase was in mid-October 2006 (IDP, 
2011c). It means that it was after just two months and a half from the preparatory workshops 
the IDA conducted to put the IDP framework. The question arises here is about the shortness 
of this period compared to the expected tasks supposed to be done to launch the first phase of 
the IDP. They include; first, the preparation of various studies including the site selection 
studies and the preparation of the IDP. Ac-G-03, Planning Consultant of the IDA Head, 
answered and denounced the way that has been used for the sites selection. He explained that 
this step was marred by a lot of confusion and was carried away from the experts' eyes as 
well as the planners who updated the planning of the new cities where the IPs located. He 
gave an example about Sixth of October City where the CPC exists, see Appendix (III) for 
the location map. In details he said: 
There was an IZ in Sixth of October City with a green belt in the east. The NUCA 
made an extension and then added another area as stores zone for the needy 
investors in this IZ. The NUCA then said there is a demand on factories so it put 
the new factories on the stores zone and so on…. The NUCA then worked on the 
western extensions as well as the northern ones where the IPs were located later 
on. (Regarding participation of other stakeholders specifically the city planners, 
he added) No, no, not at all. Nothing to do with this, as long as the land is in the 5 
km as the city campus11, the NUCA can do whatever it want…. It is true without 
any exaggeration; this is what happens ... The NUCA gave that land already 
divided into plots to the IDA. The IDA alone, without consulting the planning 
experts, allocated the developers on those plots … I mean the NUCA gave us a 
number of plots around few million m2 each … one plot for each developer. (Ac-
G-03) 
In-G-06, Director of the Central Administration of IZs in IDA, confirmed on that way of 
selection mentioning a difference in the role of selecting the site and dividing the land into 
plots, being the IDA’s role not the NUCA, saying:   
The extension of the industrial zone within the campus of October City is the 
responsibility of the NUCA since 1979 … There were 8 million m2 as an 
accredited extension within the master plan of October City, how can we develop 
this extension? … It is already accredited as an industrial zone but it is also still 
                                                          
11
 Every new city in Egypt is established by a presidential decree that determines its location and boundaries in 
addition to a 5 km as a campus around its boundaries to be used for the city extensions. 
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desert without any kind of development, and there is no infrastructure.  We 
decided to apply the IDP on this extension. (In-G-06, In-G-29)12  
De-G-57, Director of the Projects Administration in Sixth of October City Council following 
the NUCA, addressed the same way including the confirmation on the role of the IDA in 
selecting the site and dividing it into plots not the NUCA. She confirmed also on that this 
happened through the consultations between only the leaders in both the IDA and the NUCA 
(De-G-57). From another side, Ac-G-60, the planning expert, the member of the FSEEDIZ13 
board of directors and the member of the SCPUD14, in his answer about the participation of 
the concerned parties in the planning process whatever they are investors, governmental 
bodies, environmental bodies and so on. He answered briefly and strictly “no they don’t 
participate” (Ac-G-60). De-43, the Executive Director of CPC, added that the environmental 
dimensions have not been considered in the sites selection, saying: 
The sites have not been selected in the way that could achieve the maximum 
environmental protection because it is early for Egypt, very pre-mature to do so, it 
is too early. (De-43) 
To confirm on what has been said by De-43 regarding avoiding taking the environmental 
dimension into consideration, De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, confirmed on the lack of 
any role of the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) in this process from the 
beginning of the IDP, through formulating the protocol and the contract,  to selecting sites 
and activities (De-64).  
It could be said now that the selection of the IPs sites did not happen on the basis of proper 
planning methodology. It was away from the experts’ eyes as well as from the planning teams 
responsible of the planning of the containing cities of these sites. What makes this conclusion 
more sensible is the shortness of the time period available for that process along with other 
steps, what in total have been achieved in no more than two months and a half. Sites selection 
is also a role that the IDA is legally and practically in charge of, in coordination with the 
NUCA as the land owner, away from the other concerned parties including the EEAA. In the 
previous chapter we also proved, from a legal point of view, that this process lacks any 
effective role of the environmental bodies. It is confirmed now that the sites selection process 
did not consider the environmental dimensions applicable in this regard. This is discussed 
later in this chapter. Therefore, environmental imbalance in the IPs is highly expected. 
                                                          
12  KN, the Technical Advisor of the IDA Head, confirmed on the same as told by In-G-06, Director of the 
Central Administration of the IZs in the IDA, while the words are for the latter. 
13
 Fund for Supporting the Establishment, Extending public utilities and Development of IZs 
14
 Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development. 
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According to what is mentioned above, it is plausible to argue here that the IDA overcomes 
the roles of other partners by which the implementation of the IDP could be delayed or 
amended away from it. It speeded up the process targeting economic or socio-political gains. 
In this context, in a way confirming this argument, De-28, the Executive Director of Al 
Tagamouat IP, suspended on that speed made by the IDA and the pressures exerted by it on 
the developers in order to speed up the construction works. She confirmed on that the IDA 
aims from this attitude to improve its image in front of the Egyptian public opinion showing 
that the lands were distributed, and that developers began to work (De-28). Similarly, Ac-G-
03, Consultant of the IDA Head, confirmed on the previous conclusion pointing to political 
motives that are behind the actions of the government like this matter. In his response to a 
question about his opinion on the announcement by the Government on the completion of the 
first three phases of the IDP in a short time he said:  
All of this is just propaganda, all of this is governmental rhetoric but we know the 
entire story. Talk of propaganda like the 1.000 factories that the IDA established 
[he meant one of the elements of the electoral program of the former president 
what is entitled ‘the Thousand Factories program’], when you have a look at them 
you will discover that those thousand factories are just plots of lands with no 
productive factories or constructions on the ground. You applied for a textile 
factory, you became one of the thousand factories, go and feel happy! (Ac-G-03) 
Vision of Ac-G-03’s on governmental rhetoric is confirmed by a large number of statements 
by the Government and opponents of the previous regime. Come on top of these statements is 
for Ahmed Nazief, the Ex-Prime Minister, see for example (Alnahar-egypt, 2008, Elyoum7, 
2010). Such rhetoric clearly stating that the Ex-Government has succeeded in achieving full 
implementation of Mubarak’s electoral program, the deposed president by 25th of January 
revolution. In addition to the propaganda, several local, international and governmental 
reports, see for example; (BBCArabic.com, 2010, Transparency-International, 2010, 
ar.wikipedia.org, 2011), indicate on the increasing corruption in various governmental bodies 
and authorities in Egypt in Mubarak’s era what paved to the explosion of the 25th of January 
Egyptian Revolution.  
To conclude, the selection of the IPs sites was not conducted on the basis of proper planning 
methodology. This is confirmed by the shortness of the time period it took. The IDA, in 
coordination with the NUCA, was in charge of this task away from other concerned parties 
on top of which;  the EEAA. The selection process therefore, did not consider the 
environmental dimensions and accordingly environmental imbalance in the IPs is highly 
expected. Speed and lack of proficiency through which  this important step was conducted  to 
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show constructions on the IPs sites, is reasoned by corrupted political agenda of the previous 
Government aiming at publically improving its image.  
6.3.3.2. Choosing IPs activities 
The way by which the IPs activities have been chosen expresses that these IPs, after full 
implementation and operating, are subjected to environmental imbalance. Lacking of the 
appropriate activities distribution that considers the environmental dimensions, in addition to 
giving the developer the freedom of selection based on his/her economic and marketing 
studies; both factors are behind this expectation. This section justifies this step in details. 
The contract between the IDA and the developers doesn’t oblige the developers by specific 
kinds of activities they should choose from according to a proper planned vision. It gives the 
developers the freedom to decide according to his/her market and economic studies to choose 
the industrial activity to be mentioned in the contract. After this, the chosen activity becomes 
obligatory on the developer not to be changed without the permission from the IDA (In-G-06, 
IDA, 2008a, Subject 2). The developers’ answers confirmed this understanding on the official 
context stated above while the developers’ methods to choose the activity type vary from one 
to another. De-28, the Executive Director of Al Tagamouat IP, from the first phase, in an 
answer on a question on how they chose the activity and if it was mandatory or not, said: 
No, it was not mandatory…. The foreign industries that settled in our zone in 
Jordan were clothes industries. So, we have strong relations with the clothes 
industrialists around the world. For that we said as we will go to Egypt, it is better 
to start with what we know (De-28) 
De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, from the second phase, confirmed on the selection issue 
as for the first phase and added that the IDA put two conditions the developers have to take 
into account in their selection, saying:  
Type of activity is not selected based on a national, regional or even local vision 
from the IDA. All its conditions in this regards are: not to be heavy use of energy 
and not from the black list of severe polluting industries such as cement and 
compost industries and so on ... Type of activity is determined by the developer 
only through his/her economic and marketing studies... (De-64) 
This may raise so many questions about the nature of homogeneity between the various 
activities within the IP, between one IP and other IPs or between this new IPs configuration 
and what is around it, whether they are old industrial sites adjacent to the new one or 
residential areas. As with the availability of choice given to the developers in the activity 
selection, the question to be asked is how the IDA ensures homogeneity and lack of risks 
exerted from one area on another. Ac-G-03, Consultant of the IDA Head, addressed the lack 
Chapter 6 
162 
 
of environmental awareness inside the IDA and his objection on the way the IDA followed in 
this regard. This was in his answer to a question on how were the IPs activities selected, 
saying: 
Nobody knows anything or interested to know, is this incompatible with that or 
not? Nobody knows. Each developer selects in a wrong way according only to the 
market and as the customer comes. (Ac-G-03) 
What increases the importance of the previous questions is the way the developer followed in 
light of the freedom of choice they have been given. CPC for example gathers in one zone the 
building materials industry as a major activity, what is a polluting activity, and the food 
industry, what is supposed scientifically to be away from any source of pollution. About this 
De-43, the Executive Director of CPC, said : 
We divided our zone into 3 activities: the major activity is for building materials 
which is 60% or 65%, and the rest is for food and textile industries depending on 
the industrial demand. During marketing we found that there is no demand on the 
textile industries so we asked to change it. (De-43) 
Therefore, the proportion of food industries is expected to increase after the low demand on 
textile industries what means exacerbating of the problem. For IP3, the company's approach 
was to widen the scope to attract a diversity of activities what also means increase in the 
expectation of mixed polluting industries with others supposed to be away from the pollution. 
This could happen especially with the existence of the engineering industries as a main 
activity what are, of course, polluting activities. In this, De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, 
illustrates the basis on which they chose their approach, saying: 
The company has expanded the marketing scope by choosing the engineering 
industries as a major activity that has 60% of the industrial area. This was because 
the engineering industries contain large range of industries. We also chose the 
diverse industries as a complementary activity of the ratio of 100%. Therefore 
almost everything is available within my site. (De-64) 
So, the philosophy of IP3 in deciding the type of activity they will attract is; to have 
everything available in their site! Therefore, it is clear from now that the environmental 
standards have not been taken into account in the developers’ choices of industrial activity, 
neither by the companies nor by the IDA or even taking the approval of the environmental 
bodies before accepting such choices in the contract.  
It is well known now that IPs activities selection is prior to signing the contract and therefore, 
the stated activity in the contract is binding to both sides of the contract, the IDA and the 
developer. With the possibility of modifying these activities if the developer wanted after the 
IDA approval, the questions that arise here are: Whether the IDA requires the approval of the 
EEAA on the developer’s choice? Is this environmental approval, if any, prior to the IDA’s 
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adoption and agreeing on it in the contract? Does the IDA request this environmental 
approval from the developer in case of any modification? Is there any way the IDA follows to 
involve the environmental bodies into the process to ensure that the selected industrial 
activities are compatible with the environmental standards?  The answers15 from a number of 
developers, experts and governmental officials in their entirety deny any role of the EEAA. In 
details, NGO-30, the Environmental Expert and the Vice Dean of the Institute of 
Environmental Studies, said: 
The role of the environmental bodies, whether the MSEA16 or the EEAA is 
limited to expressing an opinion regarding the environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) and does not interfere at all in the various stages of the planning process. 
However, the role clearly appears later in the control over operating.... The nature 
of the laws in Egypt and the nature of the MSEA as a ministry of State do not 
give it powers or authorities over other ministries and bodies. (NGO-30) 
Ac-G-03, Consultant of the IDA Head, who is responsible for reviewing the developers’ 
schemes, adds, to that the environmental bodies lack the appropriate authorities to intervene 
in the process, another dimension which is the lack of coordination between state agencies, 
saying: 
As a reviewer, I have no authority to check the activity selection or any other 
topic, no authority at all. [About the role of the environmental bodies he said] 
There is no such role or anything like this, everyone works alone in his own 
island. (Ac-G-03) 
To conclude, the IPs are highly subjected to environmental imbalance; within the IP itself and 
in relation to their outer surroundings with their full implementation. The reason is the 
absence of accredited regional or local planned vision for activities distribution that the 
developer has to comply with to ensure compatibility with the urban surroundings and taking 
the environmental standards into account. With the absence of such vision, the developer 
takes sole responsibilities in deciding the industrial activity based on his/her economic and 
marketing studies. Hence, the outcome is from a purely economic marketing perspective and 
therefore do not take into account any environmental standards. This is commonly 
demonstrated by the combination of polluting activities with other activities that are supposed 
to be away from pollution. Lastly, the environmental bodies are kept away from interfering to 
correct the course of this process17.  
                                                          
15
 We have already mentioned some of them earlier in this chapter such as the one told by De-64, the Executive 
Director of IP3, saying: "There is no role of the MSEA or the EEAA in the process from the beginning of the 
program through formulating the protocol or the contract, or selection of sites and industrial activities. 
16
 Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs.  
17
 It is worth mentioning, and to make sure from what has been inferred here, that the research and during the 
discussion of the preparation of the IP planning as well as the adoption of planning, will re-examine this points. 
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6.3.3.3. Marketing plan 
The industrial developer by virtue of his contract with the IDA is committed to submit 
detailed marketing plan, during three months from the date of signing  the contract, to the 
IDA for its approval (IDA, 2008a, paragraph 2-6). What is meant here is the detailed plan for 
marketing of land plots while the marketing and economic studies are set up by the industrial 
developers in advance of the contract, as stated before (De-28, De-43, De-64).  
It is worth mentioning that, according to the developers, the marketing plan continues for a 
long time even after the delivery and adoption of the IP master plan as well as the detailed 
schemes. Therefore, master plan and accordingly detailed schemes are highly subjected to 
modifications according to the outcomes from marketing (De-28, De-43, De-64). 
Modification in planning is confirmed also from the standpoint of the government; De-G-31, 
Head of the Central Administration of the Industrial Developer in the IDA, on a question 
about the nature of the marketing plan and its impacts on the rest of the steps of the planning 
process he said: 
Marketing is as for example; you have textile zone here, chemical zone here and 
metal industries zone here and so on. After the accreditation of the master plan, 
the developer found that the demand on chemicals is higher than the others so he 
becomes in need to cut from the textile to add to the chemicals. This is because 
marketing for this activity is going better than other kinds. And that is why he/she 
changes the master plan according to the direction to which the market is going . 
(De-G-31) 
The question posing itself now is for how long will the marketing be allowing developers to 
change? What about the time limits agreed in the contract regarding implementation and 
operating? Analyzing cases of IPs answers these questions. In the case of Al Tagamouat IP, 
for example, they received the land in February 2008 and until the date of the interview with 
its Executive Director; De-28 in December 2009, after nearly 22 months and the company 
had no idea about the settled factories in their IP. In a question about how to take advantage 
of industrial waste internally between factories, her answer was as follows: 
I still don’t have factories and I don’t know what I will have, but definitely there 
will be if there are wastes. However, until now I don’t have 3 or 4 actual investors 
who I can say they could benefit from each other. (De-28) 
Then when De-28 was asked to justify that delay in marketing she referred to the delay of the 
IDA committed to supply the IPs sites by the needed infrastructure18. In details she said: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
As perhaps the IDA and the environmental bodies have any other mechanisms allowing them to ensure the 
compatibility of the selected activities environmentally. 
18
 This issue is discussed and proved in Section (6.3.2.3) 
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I am not a land seller so I cannot bring people telling them: come and buy land 
and hopefully you get the infrastructure this year or the next year. What I mean is 
that when we first came to Egypt our plan was that in September 2009 we will be 
operating. Now, we are in December 2009 and have not finished the 
infrastructure yet. So, ‘when we sell, we sell commitment’. When I sell you a 
land I ask you that within 19 months you should have a building suitable for 
operation. If you come, took the land and built a building without utilities, I will 
be committed to provide you with the infrastructure. But, if the government does 
not provide me the infrastructure, what will I do then? (De-28) 
Therefore, it is understood from the foregoing that the failure of the government to fulfil its 
commitments to provide the IPs with utilities makes the marketing process harder and it takes 
longer time. This also leads to instability in the developers’ thoughts and marketing, and 
hence continuous change in the activities distribution. Thus, how could it be accepted that the 
developers complete their master plans and their adoption including adoption of the EIA, as 
well as the completion and adoption of the detailed schemes which include detailed maps of 
networks19, while the marketing is not yet finished. Accordingly, the types of industrial 
activities are subject to change from time to time. Next section discusses these steps in details 
to investigate how the administration of the IDP avoided such modifications, if they did.  
6.3.3.4. Urban planning preparation 
This part addresses the step of the physical planning preparation for the IPs sites. It has been 
found that it is the role of the developer to do such task through his/her own choice from the 
consultancy offices. The IDA did not put any restrictions on the offices level of efficiency. 
Therefore, the quality of the planning depends on the developer’s level and the extent to 
which he/she wants to do it in a proper way. It also depends on the extent to which the 
planning regulations are respected, what the IDA is not fully applying. 
After signing the contract and receiving the land, the developer begins directly to prepare for 
the urban planning of the IP and then comes up with the master plan so that it can be adopted. 
As the developer by virtue of the contract with the IDA, is committed to submit the general 
and detailed planning to the IDA during a period not exceeding six months from the date of 
signing the contract. This is then for approval and issuance of the adoption resolution on 
planning and zoning. The developer is also committed not to make any amendments or 
changes to the approved plans without prior written consent from the IDA (IDA, 2008a, 
paragraph 2-6). So, it is understood now that the preparation of the urban planning of the IP is 
the responsibility of the developer. How does the developer do this role? De-28, the 
                                                          
19 Each of these steps will be discussed later in this chapter 
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Executive Director of Al Tagamouat IP, confirmed on the above, and explained the details of 
the steps20, saying: 
After signing the contract we received the land from the council of Tenth of 
Ramadan City on February the 24th, 2008. Then, we started directly with the 
planning and the master plan for the entire zone ... by Dar Al Handasa up to 
schematic level. They also gave us an architectural project, zone regulations, 
all architectural designs and regulatory regulations of the project as well as the 
infrastructure plans up to schematic level. They recommended other designers for 
the detailed infrastructure design. (De-28) 
On the nature of the relationship between the company and the consultancy office, and their 
respective roles in the planning process, De-28 identified this nature in the fact that 
constructive networking discussions were conducted by the consultant to know our needs and 
desirable visions. The consultant then put the planning perception that was reviewed by the 
company technical team through debate between the two sides to develop it until it 
reaches the optimum position, achieving the company’s visions in the best possible scientific 
way (De-28)21. Many confirmations22 on the same process have been received from 
government officials, developers and planners, while the planning teams’ levels varied 
according to the developer desire and financial ability. While CPC and AL Tagamouat 
selected Dar Alahandasa as one of the best consultancy offices in the world in this 
discipline23, some others chose lower level offices depending on the absence of restrictions 
on the degree or efficiency of the consultancy offices what the IDA did not consider unlike 
what many governmental bodies do in similar issues. These bodies announce a list of 
authorized and licensed consultants that investors have to choose from to ensure a minimum 
level of efficiency. Ac-G-03, Consultant of the IDA Head, criticizes this issue in his response 
to a question about the responsibility and freedom of the developer to choose his/her planning 
team, saying:   
Yes, the developer is free to choose, he can go to Hamza’s office or Dr. Sahar’s. 
There is also one called ZZ24 who I don’t know at all. His master plan was just 
presented to me this day ... I even found him incapable at all of doing such 
planning. You can say that he gave it to a student in primary six to do it for him. I 
refused it and returned it all back to him. (Ac-G-03) 
                                                          
20
 Same steps were approved by the other two developers. 
21
 Same process happened with CPC as the consultant, Dar Alhandasa, is the same for both IPs; CPC and Al 
Tagamouat. 
22
 Ac-01, Ac-08, Ac-44, De-64, De-G-31, and In-G-06 
23
 According to De-28 and De-43 the executive directors of Al Tagamouat and CPC respectively, as well as to 
Dar Alahandasa website: http://www.dargroup.com/flash/index_flash.php?isvars=false 
24
 To avoid causing any harm to this Consultancy Office, the Researcher preferred not to mention its real name 
or data. 
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The problem appearing here is in giving the developer the choice to choose their consultants 
whatever the efficiency level is. Another problem also appears; given that the revision on the 
urban planning is made by only one consultant25 who is Ac-G-03, it is plausible to suggest 
that depending on one vision only is doubtful in its outcome in terms of the efficiency degree. 
That is unless this vision is governed by a clear and comprehensive code of planning 
regulations what could decrease the doubts on the outcomes to some extent. Actually, there is 
no special code for planning IPs and the revision depends on some chosen regulations from 
the Unified Building Law26. Yet, it is known, according to De-64, that even that chosen 
regulations are subjected to be overcome by the IDA. Regarding the planning and the land 
division, De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, said27:  
To divide the land within the plan and as an advice from the IDA for the 
developers to do the division of land into small pieces, which the law allows their 
collection in future, and avoid large pieces that law prohibits their division after 
adoption of the master plan. That is to benefit from this information to respond to 
the industrial request according to the marketing study. (De-64)  
Therefore, it is understood that the IDA is aware of the law and also aware of how to 
overcome it. Changing the layout of the project, whatever the type of change is, has different 
implications on the built environment where it is supposed that the entity that has to care 
about such implications and respect laws related to IZs is the IDA more than other entities. 
Yet, it is now known that the IDA advises developers in how to override the law. The goal 
behind this could be that the IDA tries to overcome some of the deadlock in the law. 
However, the researcher can reasonably say that this kind of attempts must be done in a legal 
way. It also should be done in coordination with competent authorities, particularly 
environmental authorities to avoid any negative effects that could happen. Therefore, 
depending on further evidence where a number of them were exposed in this chapter, we 
found that the most likely is that the IDA aims by overriding some provisions to speed up the 
process driven by the government political desires to produce something on the ground to use 
as propaganda for itself. 
To conclude, the IDA does not place restrictions on the efficiency level of consultancy offices 
that the developers should refer to when choosing their consultants as many governmental 
bodies do in similar issues to ensure a minimum level of efficiency. Therefore the outcomes; 
                                                          
25
 This issue is discussed and proved in Section (6.3.4.1). 
26
 This issue is discussed and proved in Section (6.3.4.1). 
27
 In addition to De-64, the researcher knows as well as his fellows through their experiences by virtue of being 
urban planners that the governmental bodies can overcome some planning regulations to speed the process of 
some projects especially those achieving political gains. 
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the urban planning, from such offices vary according to the developer desires and financial 
ability. These outcomes are then reviewed in a process that increases the doubts on the 
efficiency of such outcomes. The revision process, discussed in full details in Section (6.3.4), 
depends on one consultant doing his task without a special code for planning IPs but 
depending on chosen regulations from the law that the IDA advises the developers on how to 
overcome it! The IDA by doing so, supported by evidences exposed in other areas in this 
chapter and the one after, targets speeding up the planning process for achieving political 
gains. It was also found, according to the case studies discussed, that the process through 
which the IP urban planning is prepared, is governed by constructive networking discussions 
conducted by the consultancy office with the developer and his/her technical team aiming at 
developing the best possible scientific planning that could achieve the developer’s desires.  
6.3.3.5. Environmental planning preparation 
The relationship of the IDP with the natural environment and its protection is restricted in the 
contract between the IDA and the developers in interference of the EEAA to review and then 
approve the master plan and detailed schemes of an IP. The developer, by the contract, takes 
sole responsibility for any damage that may occur to the environment (IDA, 2008a). 
Therefore, the questions arise here are what is the process to be followed, what standards the 
developers are asked to achieve, how the environmental study is prepared, and finally how 
the schemes are accredited. All of these questions are about important steps that the contract 
had not specified. This, at first place, gives an indication for the low importance that the 
environment takes in this contract and by the authority that formulated it which is the IDA. 
Regarding the environmental standards/regulations that the developers are required to comply 
with in their studies and their source; De-28, the Executive Director of Al Tagamouat IP, 
emphasized on that the only role of the EEAA is to revise the environmental impact 
assessment study (EIA) that contain the master plan and detailed schemes of the IP. She also 
explained that the regulations that the EEAA depends on in this revision are those stated in an 
appendix attached to the contract which are chosen from the environmental law (De-28). Yet, 
reviewing the contract and its appendices shows that the appendix referred to by De-28 is 
only for a list of maximum allowed limits for waste water. This is a small part from the 
regulations and standards specified by the Egyptian environmental law and are not all the 
standards and conditions that should be taken into account in environmental planning (IDA, 
2008a, Mubarak, 2009). En-G-13, an Environmental Consultant in the EEAA, confirmed on 
that industrial zones must be environmentally planned according to regulations and standards 
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of the environmental law (En-G-13). De-43, the Executive Director of CPC, agreed with En-
G-13. He also added that applying the law with its general standards on the IDP is difficult 
due to the case specificity of the IP that differs from other IZs. This implicitly means the lack 
of suitability and consideration of the nature of the IPs, due to the multiplicity of their 
industrial types, their requirement, and their ways of compatibility with the environment 
inside and around these areas. That is why every factory is required to submit an EIA to 
describe in detail its commitment to these general standards (De-43). Ac-G-03, Consultant of 
the IDA Head, added two important factors that could explain more the difficulty facing the 
application of the law standards not just on the IDP but in general. He said: 
Protecting the environment lacks priority in our case. Yes, I swear I am very 
honest with you…. Today, if you are already unable to provide a good investment 
atmosphere to a factory, you tell me, as a small factory with space of 2000 m2, I 
want you to install a waste treatment device. I will refuse and leave. This is the 
problem in Egypt today. Today, small factories are not able to provide separate 
waste treatment. It must be central and to be so they must be gathered in one 
cluster in one place so that their wastes are to be treated together not everyone 
with its own treatment technique. When you bring a treatment station suitable for 
their cluster in size, type and economies, the cost is distributed on everyone. 
Therefore, you have made something good but who thinks in this? No one does. 
(Ac-G-03) 
So, the environmental protection in Egyptian lacks priority of caring and it is difficult to be 
addressed in light of the problems that the investors suffer from28, mainly the lack of good 
investment atmosphere. The second factor is the chaotic distribution of industries (Shalaby, 
2003b) that prevents the application of modern environmental techniques like central 
treatment infrastructure. In light of such difficulties facing the environmental protection, 
importance of the EIA studies as the only tool available to the environmental authorities to 
direct IZs to protect the environment, is increasing. Examining EIAs and their feasibility are 
addressed in the phase of approvals and licensing in Section (6.3.4.2).  
To conclude, the role of the EEAA, which is the governmental authority competent to 
guarantee that development does not harm the environment, is limited in the IDP to revising 
the master-plan and detailed schemes within the EIA that the developer submit. 
Environmental law regulations and standards are supposed to govern this revision. Yet, the 
responsibility for any environmental damage is on the developer. So, the developer has to 
refer to the law as the only source to use to environmentally prepare the IP planning. 
                                                          
28  It is worth mentioning that many scholars, experts, investors and governmental representatives have the same 
understanding about the priority of caring for the environment in a country like Egypt that suffers institutionally, 
economically and socially. This issue is discussed in detail and proved in Chapter (7), Section (7.5.1). 
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However, applying the regulation of the law, which has been formulated prior to the IDP, on 
the IDP faces some difficulties due to its specificity as a case that differs from other IZs. 
What also increases the difficulty of applying the regulations of the law not only in the IDP 
case but also in general is the common understanding dealing with environmental protection 
with indifference, discussed in Section (7.5.1). This is due to the problems plaguing the 
country as a whole, and investors in particular suffering from lack of good investment 
atmosphere. Furthermore, the chaotic physical distribution of industries in the IZs containing 
the IPs is another important factor. How can industrial distribution on environmental basis be 
applied to an IP that is located within or on the edge of an IZ characterized by such chaotic 
distribution causing multiple environmental problems inside and outside its boundaries? This 
is explained later during discussing the EIA, the only tool of the EEAA to control and direct 
the planning process to ensure compatibility with the environment.  
6.3.4. Approvals & Licensing stage 
This section discusses the details of the stage of approvals and licensing. It starts with the 
procedures of the approval process of urban planning and then the EIA studies. It then 
discusses the licensing procedures.   
6.3.4.1. Urban planning approvals 
This section addresses the details of the approvals procedures of the general and detailed 
urban planning including the adoption of the detailed utilities plans. It discusses 
responsibilities and roles of different actors as legally stated in the contract between the 
developers and the IDA, and realities of these roles through addressing different viewpoints 
of the involved parties. It also discusses the regulations and their sources on which the 
revision and thus the accreditation of the schemes are based. It is found that the IDA is 
responsible for reviewing and accrediting the IPs urban schemes. The utilities authorities, 
each with its specialization, share the IDA in accrediting the detailed plans of utilities. 
Industrial activities distribution shown in the master plan is also adopted by the EEAA29 after 
the adoption of the IDA. The approval process is characterized by a number of defects mainly 
including limiting the revision to one consultant with lack of special code of urban planning 
for IPs. Moreover, rather than depending on comprehensive regulations for revision, the IDA 
has overcome some of the regulations stipulated in the laws.   
Starting with the legal obligation, the developer is required, during a period not exceeding six 
months from contracting, to submit the master plan and detailed schemes plans for approval 
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 This is included in the EIA study discussed in the next section. 
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and adoption to the IDA to revise and then issue the planning and zoning resolution. The 
developer is also obliged not to make any modifications on the approved plans without 
written consent from the IDA (IDA, 2008a). From practice and according to the 
Governmental view, De-G-31, Head of the Central Administration of the industrial developer 
in the IDA, confirmed on the contract context with regard to the role of the IDA in 
accreditation, including the re-adoption of the plans by the IDA in case of any modification, 
saying:  
We as the IDA adopt the plan ... Also in case of amendment ... The developer 
must return the master plan and bring it to me for adoption and redo the 
environmental approval to be able to complete. (De-G-31) 
From the perspective of industrial developer, all developers of the case studies confirmed on 
the role of the IDA in adoption of the plan and also the approval of the EEAA on the 
distribution of industrial sectors within the master plan. However, they added that there is 
coordination between the IDA and cities councils, as they are the competent administrative 
authorities and owners of the land of industrial developers’ sites, in adopting the plans after 
the IDA adoption although the IDA carries alone the responsibility and dealing with 
developers. Detailing this De-28, the Executive Director of Al Tagamouat IP, addressed what 
the developers agreed on by saying: 
We submitted the master plan to the IDA that adopted it in a month. The IDA 
revised internally with the city council but the IDA carried the responsibility for 
that. After that, we submitted the detailed plan for adoption first by the IDA and 
then by the city council. (De-28) 
On the nature of the accreditation procedures by the IDA; the developers stated that the step 
is easy and quick on the IDA side which is a sign of the IDA’s desire to speed up the process 
and remove the obstacles in front of investors. In this context, De-28 said: 
Overall, there were no problems with the IDA in adopting the plan.... to be honest 
they have an excellent engineering team in the IDA with good experience in 
urban planning.... The story was not complicated so we presented the plans in 
May and within a month it was completely adopted, just very simple 
amendments. (De-28) 
As for the involved parties in the procedures of adopting the utilities detailed plans; the 
contract has obligated the developer, and during the same six months period, to adopt them 
by the competent authorities so that the drainage network concept is approved by the EEAA 
prior to obtaining the adoption of the Water and Sewerage Authority for the drainage network 
(IDA, 2008a). In this context, De-43, the Executive Director of CPC explained that the 
decision of the approval of the utilities detailed plans is for the utilities authorities, saying: 
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The plans adoption authorities; part of which is the IDA, but we go to the utilities 
authorities.... I refer to the IDA in things but the utilities authorities decide ... For 
example, regarding the effluent drainage ... Each factory is responsible for its 
sewage treatment, takes approvals and after that it can drain ... Liquid waste if not 
thrown in the sewage, it is to be thrown in another place specified by the EEAA. 
(De-43) 
Therefore we can conclude that the adoption of the IPs is being handled in the first place by 
the IDA so that the EEAA approves afterwards the distribution of industrial activities and 
approves the designs of effluent drainage network of the IP. The same happens with the 
respective utilities authorities each in its specialization. 
If we linked between the ease and speed of accreditation, and what was said earlier about the 
excesses of the IDA in a similar case30, it can be concluded that the IDA is aiming here to 
reach the implementation of the IPs to show constructions on the ground for political gains 
even if it is at the expense of efficiency. Discussing the bases that the IDA depends on for 
accreditation, could explain why efficiency is lacked. De-G-31, Head of the Central 
Administration of the industrial developer in the IDA, answered a question about the 
planning regulations on which accreditation is based, saying: 
Regulations are the general regulations of urban planning of industrial zones; 
street width, spaces of free areas, spaces of green areas, which are found in urban 
planning not from me ... The planning consultant is responsible of that not us. 
Here we are interested in industry as we are basically industrialists. For planning 
we brought a doctor of urban planning who revises the planning standards ... So, 
for urban planning, I have only Dr. Ac-G-03. (De-G-31) 
The answer was general regarding the planning regulations to some extent where De-G-31 
tried to throw the responsibility of revision on the planning consultant. Similarly, In-G-06, 
Director of the Central Administration of the IZs in the IDA, refers to the absence of 
specialised code in planning for IPs/IZs, stressing on his conviction with that the right thing is 
to depend on the planning consultants like Dr. Ac-G-03 (In-G-06). By directing the same 
question on the nature and origin of the regulations to Ac-G-03, Consultant of the IDA Head, 
the only urban planning consultant of the IDA, and who revises/accredits the urban plans for 
IPs, he replied that these regulations have been formulated in a session by his consultancy but 
the IDA overrode them, saying: 
Regulations are partially chosen from the Unified Building law.... The problem is 
that The IDA raised the ratios somewhat for the sake of the developers so as to 
encourage them as it claims, although this is against the law? ... When the 
developer submits the master plan, I only revise the planning whether the ratios 
                                                          
30 Overtaking the regulations by the IDA for the sake of the developers and avoiding putting restrictions on the 
nature of the consultancy offices. 
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are achieved or not based only on the regulations stated in the contract and not 
more than that. (Ac-G-03) 
Therefore, the IDA violated the law for the benefit of the industrial developer. The role of the 
reviewer is limited in checking whether ratios and regulations stipulated by the contract only 
are applied. 
From another side, the developers’ consultants prepare the zone regulations and 
specifications of building which all manufacturers must comply with within the IPs. The zone 
regulations have to meet the terms and general regulations put by the city council (De-28, De-
43).  
To conclude, the IDA is legally and practically responsible for reviewing and accrediting the 
urban planning of the IPs. It is found that the IDA coordinates with the city councils in such 
task as they are the competent administrative authorities and owners of the land of industrial 
developers’ sites. Developers are legally required to have a written consent from the IDA on 
any modifications they made on the master plan. The EEAA after that approves the main 
sectors of activities distribution of the IPs within the master plan. Detailed schemes of 
utilities after being accredited by the IDA are reviewed and accredited by the utilities 
authorities. This process has proved to be defective. The IDA only depends in revision on one 
consultant in a context that lacks a special code that guarantees efficient planning of the IPs. 
In addition, the regulations on which the revision is based, as stated in the contract, are 
chosen from the general regulations of the law in a way not covering all fields of urban 
planning. What increases the problem is that even those partially chosen regulations were 
illegally modified by the IDA for the benefit of the developers to encourage them. Therefore, 
we are here in front of another overtaking of the law and confirmation on what the IDA does 
in this regard. If it is to be formulated along with the rest of the IDA actions discussed in the 
rest of stages, it is found that the IDA aims from that to decrease the obstacles in front of the 
developers in order to speed up the emergence of the projects constructions, even if it was at 
the expense of efficiency, to achieve political gains. 
6.3.4.2. Environmental planning approvals (EIA Studies) 
The EIA study is an important step that the developer should ‘legally’ complete. Appendix 
(IX)31 discusses in detail this study and analyzes with evidences what has been done in the 
three case studies of the IDP. This section therefore, synthesizes the nature and type of the 
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 To avoid interrupting the reader and his/her focus away from the discussed line in the chapter, the researcher 
preferred to put the analysis study of the EIA in an appendix. The EIA analysis is found to be very long, more 
than 5000 word, to be put in its detailed form.   
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EIA and how it is prepared, approved, the parties involved and the role of each partner. It 
addresses the application problems of the procedures and their impact on the actual feasibility 
of the study, and finally whether the study achieves its purposes.  
The legal obligation of the EIA 
The contract between the IDA and the developer obliges the developer to obtain an approval 
from the EEAA on the master plan presented through the EIA prepared by the developer via 
specialized technical offices (En-G-36)(En-G-36)(En-G-36)(En-G-36). The EIA is to be 
submitted to the competent administrative authority, which is in our case the city council that 
ensures the fulfilment of the study before sending it to the EEAA for revision and then taking 
the decision (De-28, De-43, De-64, De-G-31, En-G-36)  
The nature of the EIA 
The EIA is divided into 3 sections: basic data of the project, description of the project and its 
details, and the environmental management and monitoring plans (En-G-36). The industrial 
developer is required to make an EIA for the IP as a whole with its three divisions what is 
called level (C)  32 (En-G-36, En-G-52). Then each manufacturer wishes to settle in the IP 
makes a further study for his factory containing the second and third sections what is called 
level (B) without the need for the first section, as it had already been submitted in the IP one 
(En-65, En-G-36). The main reason behind demanding the IPs to present a complete study is 
the shift from IZs owned by the Government to involving the private developers as partners 
in the process. As the EEAA performed pressures on the developers, taking benefit of their 
eagerness for speeding up their lands marketing and attracting investors, in imposing making 
the study for the IP as a whole (En-65). This was applied through an agreement made 
between the EEAA and the NUCA (En-65, En-G-16). It is worth noting that this is an 
undeclared policy and not based on legal obligation. Or at least there are legal loopholes to 
prevent its application otherwise the EEAA would not have resorted to a separate contract to 
guarantee its application. Therefore the competent administrative authorities, including the 
IDA and the NUCA, do not deal very seriously with this study and perhaps the absence of 
legal obligation, together with dealing with indifference with the environmental protection 
are behind the lack of respect for the EIA study as well as the attempts of neglecting it  
conducted by those authorities. 
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 The assumed level of the study that the investor provides is linked to the level of his own project and its 
classification according to its negative impact on the environment according to the declared lists and enacted in 
this regard ranging from the white, gray and black lists offset respectively by the level of study to be done, 
starting from level A, then B and then C. 
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The problems facing the study and its impact 
The problems start with that the revision depends, according to the contract, only on a master 
plan, which does not display more than the sectoral division of the industrial activities 
without actual allocation of factories (En-G-36, De-43, In-G-06). This leads to expand the 
range in front of the developer regarding choosing activities types which could not be 
environmentally compatible with each other or with neighbours. This happens due to 
responding to the industrial demand in marketing33 and thus the image varies from that 
approved by the EEAA, as it is proved that this approval is made only for one time (De-43, 
De-64).Therefore, this means that such study is just a form that lacks real feasibility (En-G-
36). What confirmed this more is the non-legal obligation (according to the contract) for the 
developers to take consent of the EEAA in the case of any amendment or change (IDA, 
2008a). Any change to the plan means practical change in carrying capacity measurements of 
the IP contrary to what had been approved by the EEAA. In addition, contradictory 
statements from officials of the EEAA (En-G-36) led to the understanding that developers are 
not bound basically to doing carrying capacity measurements. 
Other administrative and legal problems are clear in weakening this study to reduce the 
obstacles in front of the developers. It is found that while the project is implemented or 
operating without obtaining the approval of the EEAA, the EEAA is surprised by receiving 
the project EIA study34 (En-G-36, En-G-16). This means putting the EEAA in front of 
existing condition and therefore it becomes impossible to change the location if it is 
inappropriate or avoid its impact either internally or on its surroundings (En-G-36, Ac-09, 
Ac-15, Ac-G-11). This common problem happened due to the disappearance of fines from the 
law. Moreover, it continued to happen despite adding fines to the amended law35, owing to 
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 See Section (6.3.3.2) for more details.  
34
 See Appendix (X) for a copy of some of official letters, as examples of a lot of letters, directed to, En-G-16, 
the Director of Legal Administration in the EEAA, from many local administrations (Sixth of October and other 
cities councils and local administrations) reporting cases on operating factories that did not gain the 
environmental approval.  
35 A fine has been developed on offenders in the amendment of the Environment Law, which was in 2009, but 
has not been activated to the time of the research interviews, and still seriousness is lacking in the transfer of 
offenders to court. This is affirmed by the Director of Legal Department of the EEAA in his answer to a 
question from the researcher on the movement of the environmental legal records after amending the law, he 
said: 
I did not make legal records yet and I refuse doing them ... Because what do they send me? Pulp 
toaster- plastic crusher — I will show you the models [see Appendix (X) for some of these 
models] they sent to me and you will laugh. I mean they (Department of environmental 
assessment) sent me things I'm sorry will bother you psychologically.... Heavy factory are not  
sent, these kinds enter on Saturday and take the approval on Thursday. On the other side they send 
me to complete for a restaurant; the chimney is retort or non-conforming, or the model was not 
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the lack of the seriousness of the Government in activating these penalties especially on 
big/important investors (En-G-16, En-G-36). Adding to the above and confirming on 
marginalizing the role of EEAA and its only tool, the EIA, what is stated by the EEAA from 
complaints from the competent administrative authorities in non-transparent dealing and not 
providing correct information about the projects to push the EEAA to approve the projects 
(En-G-16). Furthermore, these administrations lack the necessary seriousness in reviewing 
the studies assuring their fulfilment and correctness before being sent to the EEAA (En-G-16, 
En-G-36). This leads to the EEAA request of completing which means prolonging the 
duration of the process on the project owner (En-G-52). 
6.3.4.3. Licensing 
With respect to the licensing procedures, the contract stated that the developer obtains all 
licenses required for the implementation of his commitments where the IDA within its 
powers issues all approvals and permits for construction and operation. The IDA assists the 
developer to obtain the necessary licences from other concerned governmental authorities. In 
case of refusal to issue a licence the developer has applied for; the IDA is committed to assist 
the developer in getting this license within the legal powers of the IDA and in accordance 
with the provisions of the law (IDA, 2008a). In practice, the role of the IDA regarding 
licensing utilities is restricted to receiving and sending the developers’ requests like an 
intermediate/mediator which is contrary to the previous text (De-64, De-43). De-64, the 
Executive Director of IP3, explained the nature of the licensing procedures in the IDP. Due to 
lack of coordination between State authorities, the program was not known to the various 
authorities and they used to deal with it as a factory which caused many bureaucratic 
problems, but they disappeared in the second phase of the program with the start of the 
implementation of the Unified Building Law. In details, he said: 
The developer used to prepare his drawings and take them to the IDA as well as 
to other concerned authorities such as utilities and he doesn't find who accredits 
it. Everyone evades because the program is unknown to the authorities … Also 
there is no coordination or program definition from the IDA to the authorities that 
deal with the developer as a manufacturer and ask for the same regulations that do 
not fit with the developer. They seek for several details when the developer is far 
away from them such as types of factories and their operating rates and etc which 
are difficult to apply.... This problem was resolved in the second phase of the 
program where Unified Building Law is applied where the IDA adopts the 
drawings as long as the project consultant adopts them, and then for some 
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send the heavy and important factories.   
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drawings such as electricity a second accreditation is taken from the electricity 
authority. (De-64) 
This is consistent to a great extent with what was followed in the IDA regarding the policy of 
One-Stop Window36 where the investor hands over the license applications to the IDA 
window where initial approvals from various authorities are obtained in the same place (IDA, 
2009). This initial approval is valid for one year and the investor is obliged within this 
timeframe to obtain all the necessary special and general approvals as required by laws and 
regulations (Rasheed, 2008c). This is considered as a sort of simplification of procedures to 
some extent according to De-43’s statement, the Executive Director of CPC, where he said: 
Before that One-Stop Window, for you to get a formal sheet you go to 7 different 
authorities located in 7 different places. They are to be thanked for simplifying 
it…. Those 7 are now in one window not in 7 different places, only in one place. 
(De-43) 
A number of articles discussing problems of the IZs addressed the licensing issue and the 
complaints from investors regarding the licensing procedures and the ineffective nature of the 
one stop window (for example see (digital.ahram.org.eg, 2011)). Emphasizing on this, the 
field observation of the IDA window through multiple visits; it was found that there is a 
general form of grumbling from procedures and a number of investors say terms carrying 
meanings of "why is it one window then, since we also have to go to the utilities authorities?” 
(Shalaby, 2010b). This is confirmed and the reasons for its occurrence are explained by De-
43 where he blamed the lack of competence of the staff at this level for decision-making what 
makes the one window a form more than a function by saying: 
When you go to submit your papers, it has to be clear that the most important 
thing is that the 7 who are sitting have the authority to sign. This is the most 
important thing, not to find one telling you for this it is necessary to go 
somewhere or something of this sort. This is related to the administrative level, 
level of the employee himself and the power available to him. (De-43) 
Ac-G-03, Consultant of the IDA Head, confirms on the above considering the one-stop 
window as governmental propaganda without enabled application on the ground because of 
the corruption plaguing Egypt, saying: 
For you to enter Egypt as an investor you have to know the big head and the small 
head as they enter as partners with you at the first place to allow you enter Egypt. 
Forget about it, I am talking to you about something else and forget about the 
one-stop window or one window or such nonsense deceitful talk as it is just 
newspapers talk. As any investor comes they cut him his hair [slang expression: 
being deceived], sorry for the word. (Ac-G-03) 
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 See Section (2.3.4.3), Chapter (2), for more details. 
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Added to the fact that the One-Stop Window did not achieve the goal of its existence; the 
IDA assigned some of the licensing tasks to other authorities by virtue of the authority 
granted to it by law. This authority over the industrial lands was granted to it by the 
presidential decree No. 350/2005 (Mubarak, 2005) what obligated the NUCA to transfer all 
of the authorities and competences  of its ownership of the industrial lands in all the new 
cities where the IPs locate to the IDA (Al-Maghraby, 2006). So, regarding licensing for 
industrial projects; the IDA authorized the NUCA to do such task (Assal, 2006). On the 
ground, this was confirmed by several specialists of different natures as well as the field visits 
to the new cities (Shalaby, 2010c, De-43, De-G-57). De-43, the Executive Director of CPC, 
confirmed on that and explained the reason behind it, saying: 
The IDA gave the NUCA through the cities councils the authority of licensing 
like building licensing, why? This is because the IDA does not have the staff for 
doing this…. Also, the law permits it to do so. (De-43) 
The role of the NUCA is not restricted onto the size of building licenses only, but more 
importantly is the total control in the public utilities licensing, in which the role of the IDA is 
completely confined. This is reasonable as the control over extending the utilities is for the 
NUCA, as proved in Section (6.3.2.3). This is due to the fact that the NUCA is the owner of 
land where the IPs are located. Ac-G-03, Consultant of the IDA Head, used a metaphor for 
the IZs in this case as the body with a head represented by the IDA while this body is missing 
the blood arteries that feed the body which are the utilities in reference to the NUCA37. He 
mentioned this metaphor in his criticism of the conversion of the responsibility of the IZs 
with their different locations to the IDA. This conversion has caused many problems in 
practice which is illustrated by De-28, Executive Director of Al Tajamouaat, in response to a 
question about licensing problems and how difficult it is to be done, where she replied: 
Our big problem is the 10th of Ramadan council.… These councils do not 
understand what happened. They used to be decision-makers and they used to 
have the authority over the land; suddenly someone came, took the land and 
started giving it to the developers. Now they are dealing with me as a factory 
while I am very different from being a factory. You can’t bind me by the 
restrictions given to a factory. There are regulations imposed on me which should 
not exist because you are not dealing with a single project. (De-28) 
Then she mentioned a number of examples of the obstacles put by the city council in front of 
them from; treating and tying them with what a factory was tied to. Also conflict and hiding 
information from them38    and exploiting their power in licensing in amending the project 
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 The same complaints of bureaucracy of cities councils in dealing repeated from both, De-43, the Executive 
Director of CPC IP and a number of planners and engineers who the researcher interviewed; (Ac-66, Ac-08, Ac-
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based on further suddenly emerging information. Example of problems that De-28 reported is 
in providing information about surrounding roads levels so that the engineering team can 
complete the utilities detailed plans and begin implementation. Obtaining this information 
delayed nearly nine months because of a piece of paper that is already available at the city 
council. In addition, the council pushed them for executing incorrectly or by changing the 
inputs in a conflicting way and demanding an amendment, which caused to them both 
financial and time harm39.  
Therefore, it is understood from the foregoing that the transfer of the authorities of the IZs 
from the NUCA to the IDA which means withdrawing jurisdiction of such power from the 
NUCA working teams in general and the new cities councils in particular after they were in 
charge of it since its inception of new cities, was considered by them as derogation from their 
rights. More specifically; their financial rights which used to benefit the work teams of the 
cities councils. This was as a result of the operation of projects of the size of the industrial 
zones being transferred to the IDA. In this regard; De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, 
summarized this problem and confirms on it by saying: 
Of the most important obstacles facing the developer with the cities councils is 
that after the transfer of the jurisdiction over the land from the cities councils to 
the IDA and therefore moving the benefits, which used to return to the staff 
working in the councils when running the factories, to the IDA. The cities 
councils staff worked on becoming hostile to and impeding the IDA and the 
industrial developers program by delaying the papers, drawings and 
accreditations and … (De-64) 
De-28, the Executive Director of Al Tajamouat IP, also confirmed this in her response to  
questions about the reason behind the cities councils dealing with them negatively, how to 
solve these problems, and the role of the IDA in this especially as the contract obliges it to 
help the developer in case of not receiving any of the licenses. She said: 
The IDA intervenes BUT at the end, 10th of Ramadan council is the one which 
deals with you … They have internal anger inside them as the IDA took their 
role. They insist on hiding the information. For example the pumping plans, not 
the road level, it took us 11 months and they do not want to give them to us. Only 
when the Minister of Industry intervened with the Minister of Housing we took 
them. It is unbelievable that in 4 days they have made the complete plans, all 
what they have done is that they opened the drawer and gave them to me. Then 
why were they hiding it from me? It is unjustified. (De-28) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
15, ... and others) as well as personal experiences that can confirm the same complaints of a number of cities 
councils and in particular 6th of October and 10th of Ramadan where case studies of industrial developers 
program lie. 
39
 See Appendix (XI) for full details of such problem told by De-28. 
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Therefore it is understood that the intervention of the IDA is weak and ineffectual because of 
the presence of the actual authority on the ground for the city council and that the problem 
was solved only with the intervention of the Minister of Industry with Housing Minister 
personally. Concluding from the foregoing, we can confirm the opinion of Ac-G-03, 
Consultant of the IDA Head, saying that the IDA does not have actual authority over the IZs 
following the new cities and that the power is for the NUCA. We can also conclude that the 
management and work atmosphere of the official authorities represented in this case in the 
IDA and the NUCA is governed by other dimensions than the Public interest. This makes the 
action of each party within the scope of its powers on the ground in isolation from others, 
which is more like isolated islands as characterized by Ac-55, Assistant Professor at the 
Faculty of urban and regional planning at Cairo University (Ac-55). By saying so on one side, 
with De-28’s statement in her last comment that the problem was not resolved until the 
intervention of the ministers of the two authorities along with De-43’s former comment on 
the lack of decision-making powers for the staff on the other hand, we can confirm the 
centrality40 controlling the work within the institutional framework governing the production 
of the IPs. De-64, the Executive Director of IP3, summarized what is concluded above, 
saying: 
Of the major institutional and administrative problems; is the centrality where the 
developer can't solve it with the medium and lower levels of officials in the IDA. 
Not a lot of things can be solved except through addressing the Minister 
personally by developers to take action to resolve them; in particular with regard 
to the relationship between the IDA and cities councils where there is no authority 
for the IDA on cities councils and thus it cannot carry out its promises nor what is 
agreed upon in the contract. This is due to the councils putting obstacles in front 
of it. Hence developers resort to the Minister of Industry to deal with the Minister 
of New Communities to solve the problem. But developers can't work and repeat 
these means continuously and therefore it is a problem. (De-64) 
To conclude, although the contract between the developer and the IDA obligates it to assist 
the developer in difficulties of licensing, but the reality on the ground proves lack of validity 
of the IDA with regard to the IPs  in new cities (knowing that all IPs locate in new cities so 
far). It also proves that full validity over there is for the NUCA and in particular with regard 
to public utilities licensing. It is also found that the IDA authorized the NUCA to conduct the 
building licensing procedures due to its lack of appropriate work teams. The industrial 
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 The comment on the centrality of decision-making and the interference of the upper levels of the 
administration to resolve minor problems at the lower levels, has been repeated in more than one interview with 
different interviewees, as well as numerous newspapers articles which we have studied in the first chapters of 
the research. 
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developers’ experience with new cities councils regarding licensing emphasizes on the 
foregoing and also confirms on the many obstacles put by the councils in front of the 
developers. Hiding information and giving contradictory information are examples of such 
obstacles that cause delaying of projects despite the availability of correct information. 
Specialists explained this work atmosphere as a result of withdrawal of the competence of IZs 
within the new cities from the NUCA and thus new cities councils to the IDA. Consequently 
this led to a deduction of part of the powers of the cities councils on part of their lands as well 
as loosing financial benefits resulting from dealing with large projects, which used to be 
directed to NUCA work groups in general and cities councils in particular. This asserts a 
description for experts41 that they said about the governmental bodies’ way of thinking in 
Egypt defining their strength in the land that they can possess and control. This added to a 
great extent to the difficulty the developers face in dealing with cities councils. That difficulty 
is already maximized by the overall shape of the institutional framework of the State which is 
already characterised by centrality in decision-making, lack of coordination, and conflict 
between institutions. The centrality characterising the institutional framework prevented 
giving authority for low and medium decision-making levels causing many simple problems, 
if we can say, that require the intervention of the level of ministers for their resolution. It also 
prevented achieving the goal of the policy of the One-Stop Window to the extent that 
specialists regarded it as shape without function aiming at governmental propaganda and no 
more. 
6.4. Discussions & Conclusion 
This chapter aims at analyzing three case studies (IPs) of the IDP in order to identify and 
form the planning process framework (the IDP actual framework)42 they adopt including the 
detailed steps of the process, key players, role of each of them and the nature of the 
relationships governing this framework. To reach this goal, detailed analysis of the planning 
process phases of the IPs has been conducted where each phase has ended by a conclusion 
explaining its framework; its nature, the key actors and their respective roles and relations 
among them. To complete reaching the goal, this section conducts an analytical comparison 
between the actual framework of each stage and its like in the official framework of the 
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 Ac-G-03, Consultant of the IDA Head and other governmental authorities and Ac-55, Consultant of many 
governmental authorities. 
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 The applied framework of the planning process of the IDP is abbreviated as “the IDP actual framework”. 
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State43 (the official framework) concluded in the previous chapter. This will allows 
abstracting the agreements and differences between the two frameworks, the reasons behind 
them and the implications on the planning process allowing to decide on whether the process 
is sustainable. This is discussed and displayed through a concluded description of each phase. 
It is worth mentioning that the concluded description of each phase will be put in the form of 
a flowchart diagram similar to what was done in the previous chapter to facilitate on the 
reader to follow-up the comparison and understand the results there in. 
6.4.1. Synthesizing the IDP actual framework and its relationships to the official 
Framework 
6.4.1.1. The Founding Phase of the IDP 
Based on the previously studied and analyzed sections regarding the founding phase of the 
IDP in parallel with examining its flowchart, see Figure (6-2), with its like in the previous 
chapter, see Figure (5-1), as well as the concluded description there in, the following could be 
abstracted: 
In total, it can be said that the founding phase is characterized by the presence of a political 
will – that is questionable in its purposes – and reformation of the legal institutional 
framework of the State to accommodate the implementation of the program. It is also 
characterized by applying networking and good relationships between the partners of the 
program, the administration and the industrial developer, with absence of the State concerned 
bodies in a clear contradiction to the official framework which negatively affected the 
guarantee of the components of the success and implementation of the IDP. 
Generally, there is an agreement between the official framework and the IDP actual 
framework with respect to the role of the MTI and the IDA; where the MTI is responsible in 
both frameworks for the preparation of policies and strategies. The MTI has developed an 
industrial strategy based on partnership between public and private sectors and depending on 
the relations of the former Industry Minister with businessmen, by virtue of being one of 
them. He communicated and made a dialogue with the businessmen generating the idea of the 
IDP. The MTI accordingly moved to reform the legal institutional setup to accommodate the 
idea. They prepared for the protocol of initiating the IDA, which was adopted at the Cabinet 
giving the IDA development authorities that allow it to implement the IDP program. The IDA 
also endured the responsibility for policies implementation in both frameworks, and this is 
clear in the case of the IDP that the IDA sought for its implementation. To operationalize the 
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idea, the head of the initiated IDA conducted a number of exploratory field visits to global 
models for the transfer of experience as well as marketing for the Egyptian economy. He also 
communicated, based on his investment management background, with businessmen and 
financial institutions. Accordingly, the IDA involved a number of expertise industrial 
developers and financial institutions in a series of workshops that contributed to the 
formulation of an operational framework for the IDP. 
For the relationships network between the MTI and the IDA from one side and other related 
parties on the other side, we find that there is a clear difference between the official 
framework and the IDP actual framework. It is found that the framework adopted by the 
administration (the MTI and the IDA) at this stage was characterized as a whole by 
networking with developers and financial bodies and they were in the centre of attention of 
the administration. On the contrary, and in violation of the official framework, the 
coordination with the State agencies in general was absent and the administration did not 
involve them in studying the program and its implementation components and requirements. 
On top of these bodies are the concerned authorities of utilities as the main constituent of the 
program. The coordination with them was lacking except on the Cabinet level where it was 
general, and did not address sectors plans details nor reconcile between them. This led to a 
lack of commitment from the IDA to extend utilities to the developers as it is legally obliged 
and as planned. On another hand, as the coordination with the EEAA is missing in the official 
framework, it is not surprising that the EEAA was not involved in the preparation and 
development of the program policies. This is what had an impact on marginalizing the 
integration of environmental dimensions in the thought of the program. Therefore; it can be 
said that the administration gave attention to ensuring compatibility with the developers' 
thought in order to attract them at the expense of ensuring the regulations and needs of the 
program practically. Thus, if we considered that the highest administrative officials44 of the 
IDP are on trial in corruption cases at the time of writing these lines, the doubt in their 
purposes/intentions and accordingly the institution purposes from establishing a functionally 
successful program increases for the benefit of either personal or political interests of the 
government. 
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6.4.1.2. The Pre-Planning Stage 
Based on the previously studied and analyzed section regarding the pre-planning phase of the 
IDP in parallel with examining its flowchart, see Figure (6-3) with its like in the previous 
chapter, see Figure (5-2) as well as the concluded description there in, the following could be 
abstracted: 
Emphasising on the opinions of some experts45 who believe that the agencies in Egypt act 
regarding land by considering that their strength is in their possession of land that they can 
control; the IDA monopolized doing many steps in this stage starting from marketing of the 
program and determining the land prices or managing extending the utilities unlike to the way 
drawn by the official framework. 
Starting from marketing and land pricing, there is a clear difference between the official 
framework and the IDP actual framework. This is for the monopoly that the IDA has adopted 
in such steps - away from the investment bodies of the State – leading to relatively decreasing 
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 Ac-G-03, Consultant of the IDA Head and other governmental authorities, Ac-55, Consultant of many 
governmental authorities. 
Figure 6-2: Simplified flowchart of the IPs setting up policy phase 
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the maximum limit of prices that the developer cannot exceed in selling the industrial land 
plots inside their IPs. This led to reluctance of the international developers to apply to the IDP 
because of the unbalance they felt in such prices compared to the services they provide. It is 
also expected from the Arab and local developers that they will decrease the level of services 
they will provide compared to the global level to achieve a balance between cost and revenue 
what may give a negative indication for the level of the settled manufacturers in the IPs and 
accordingly the bad effect on achieving the overall objectives from the IDP. Regarding the 
land allotment, it is found that the official framework - in a way lacking the understanding of 
the actual nature of the powers/authorities on the ground - has wrongly put the responsibility 
of land allotment for the IDA. This is because the IDA lacks any authority over the land that 
led to confining its role to be only as an intermediary between developers and city council. 
City council which is the owner of the land has full legal and actual authority over the land 
including the authority to reform the land for its delivery. That is why the IDA seeks the city 
council to implement such step. 
Concerning utilities, it is previously indicated that the founding phase of the program lacked 
the reconciliation between sectoral plans to ensure the availability of the program 
requirements, especially the utilities. Instead of operationalizing the IDA role to compensate 
this shortcoming as decided by the official framework as well as the provisions of the 
contract between the IDA and developers; the role of the IDA came inappropriate stressing 
the isolation of the IDA from other sectors. Furthermore, the IDA loses any actual authority 
to manage this issue as the official framework entrusted it with the management of utilities 
and obliged it to coordinate with concerned bodies without granting it any authorities over 
those bodies which have full authority in this regard. The effort that the IDA should legally 
do, to manage and follow up this process and coordinate with the utilities authorities, to push 
them to discharge in their tasks was actually the developers’ role. Therefore, the weak legal 
authority of the IDA with the deficiencies in the coordination regarding utilities led to the 
inability to provide the IPs with its needs. This deficit resulted in large delay, in the first 
phase of the IDP, in implementation according to the agreed timetables with the IDA based 
on the contract which obliges the IDA to compensate the developers for any delay they did 
not cause. Accordingly and based on the emerging knowledge on the government's inability 
to commit to extend the utilities, some companies joined the second and third phases of the 
IDP aiming at real-estate investment not at achieving earnest/reasonable industrial 
development. 
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For the regulatory setup of the program, the TOR, the IDA depended on the outcomes of the 
workshops conducted to prepare the IDP operational framework, to develop alone the TOR. 
In qualifying bidders and contracting process, the IDA, although the official framework has 
not obliged it to involve any partners, redressed a part of this defect and involved the 
developers in this step through workshops.  The IDA targeted from participating the 
developers to achieve compatibility with them in desires and ideas to ensure realistic and 
smooth implementation of the contract which has faced many difficulties and problems in the 
application. Therefore, it is plausible to say that the partnership reached in this step by the 
IDA, with its economic investment background, and the developers, who already have the 
same orientation, lacked the consideration of many other dimensions. More importantly, it 
highlights the doubts regarding the purpose behind involving the developers without the 
others, as previously noted. Some of the most important parties that were supposed to be 
involved especially in the qualifying and contracting steps are the utilities concerned bodies 
Figure 6-3: Simplified flowchart of the IPs pre-planning phase 
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and the EEAA. Those, for sure, have variant considerations and views that could enrich the 
foundations of the qualifying step and guide the developers to take into their account the 
environmental preservation and guarantee lower energy consumption activities. Furthermore, 
the utilities authorities and the EEAA should have a different contribution in the formulation 
of the contract to ensure avoiding mistakes in the implementation of the IDP, especially in 
extending the utilities that actually faced many problems. 
6.4.1.3. The Planning phase  
Based on the previously studied and analyzed section regarding the planning phase of the IDP 
in parallel with examining its flowchart, see Figure (6-4), with its like in the previous chapter, 
see Figure (5-3), as well as the concluded description there in, the following could be 
abstracted: 
With respect to choosing the IPs locations, it can be said that; the governmental political 
corruption that aimed at improving the image of the former president and the government, 
was behind the rush that caused the failure to follow an appropriate planning methodology. 
The IDA, as being legally competent, monopolized adopting the idea of putting the IPs in 
new cities. Then, and because of the nature of land ownership, it has coordinated with the 
NUCA regarding the selection of sites within each city. Therefore, the IDA by this action has 
clearly transcended the official framework which obliged it to coordinate with the NCSLP to 
ensure the best selection of the locations as well the coordination with the other concerned 
agencies, but this is not what happened. The selection depended only on adopting the IDA’s 
point of view which tend to the economic and investment thought driven by propaganda 
aiming at improving the political image of the government. This led to the easy and fast 
choice of implementing projects without thinking of applying real industrial development; 
where the IDA chose the areas already depleted by the State investment over the past decades 
and now these areas enjoy the availability of the components of industry. On the contrary, it 
ignored the remote areas rich in natural resources as developing such areas takes longer time. 
This caused not only delaying the development in these areas as the State cannot develop 
them easily as a matter of financial reasons and the misuse of natural resources for real 
industrial development but also wasting the public fund for the sake of the developers46.  
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In addition to neglecting the NCSLP, the IDA ignored the planning experts and planning 
teams who updated the planning of the cities containing the IPs in addition to the rest of the 
government concerned parties. The EEAA comes on top of these bodies, which also has been 
ignored by the official framework. This gives an indication on that the selection of the IPs 
sites did not consider the environmental criteria and principles. 
As for the selection of the industrial activities of the IPs, the official framework gave this 
responsibility to the IDA and obligated it to coordinate with all relevant parties in general and 
the EEAA in particular but this did not happen. In light of: a) the absence of a regional or 
local vision for the IPs industrial activities that guarantees compatible selection with the 
urban surrounding and taking into account the environmental dimensions, b) the chaotic 
distribution of industries in the vicinities of the IPs. The IDA gave the developers this 
responsibility to do it alone based on their marketing and economic studies. Then the 
developer’s selection is approved by the IDA without any coordination with other authorities 
including the EEAA. Thus, in light of these factors, this would lead to increase the 
expectations of having an environmental imbalance caused by a distribution based purely on 
marketing and economic logic away from the environmental considerations. 
As for urban planning of the IPs, there is a match between the official framework and the 
actual IDP framework, where urban planning is prepared by the developer through his/her 
selection from the specialized consultancy offices. Discussions and dialogue construct 
conducted by the planning consultant with the developer was followed to reach the best 
engineering planning meeting the developers’ requirements and wishes. The IDA agreed with 
the official framework in waiving putting identifying restrictions for the nature of the 
consultancy offices supposed to ensure efficient and proper planning of the IPs. Furthermore, 
it was noted that the IDA advised the developers on how to overcome some of the urban 
planning law articles targeting speeding up the process to achieve political gains. 
With regard to the integration of environmental dimension in planning, it can be said that this 
is governed by a common understanding of specialists in industrial zones in different fields, 
whether investors or governmental, that protecting the environment in the Egyptian case is a 
marginal issue and it is difficult to be addressed in light of the problems that the country faces 
in general and those problems the investors suffer from in particular. The foremost of these 
problems is lacking the good investment atmosphere. This understanding led to that the role 
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of the EEAA, the State’s apparatus entrusted with achieving this integration, was limited in 
reviewing and adopting the IP master plan and detailed design of the utilities in accordance 
with regulations. It is a role that is almost meaningless in light of the previous conclusions; 
IPs sites selection was on the basis of economic/investment logic and identifying the 
industrial activities were in accordance to the marketing foundations in a process that lacked 
considering the environmental dimensions. What increases this situation is that there is no 
special environmental code for planning the IPs and the reliance is on the general 
environmental standards stated in the environmental law; the main source of such standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These standards were formulated in an atmosphere prior to the IDP what carries an implicit 
expectation of lacking relevance to and not taking into account the specificity of the IPs. This 
is because of their modernity on Egypt and their management nature that is controlled by the 
private sector thought. It is also because of the complexity/diversity of industrial activities 
types and their requirements and methods to reconcile with the environment within these 
Figure 6-4: Simplified flowchart of the IPs planning phase 
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zones. What also increases the difficulty and the privacy of the case of the IPs which requires 
special regulations for each zone is that these IPs exist inside or on the outskirts of industrial 
zones characterized by a chaotic distribution of industrial activities. This means increase in 
the negative impact on each other, as well as the problematic carrying capacity of an 
environment of a new industrial zone that its planning is characterized - after the approval of 
the EEAA – by change in accordance to the market. This makes it difficult to control such 
planning without real monitoring in light of absence of the EEAA regarding this role. 
6.4.1.4.  Approvals & licensing phase 
Based on the previously studied and analyzed section regarding the approvals and licensing 
phase of the IDP in parallel with examining its flowchart, see Figure (6-5), with its like in the 
previous chapter, see Figure (5-4), as well as the concluded description there in, the following 
could be abstracted: 
Regarding the approval of urban planning and the adoption of the IPs master plans, the 
responsibility in the official framework is for the IDA alone without the partnerships of 
others what the IDA clearly implemented in the IDP actual framework. In light of the absence 
of a special code for the planning of the IPs as noted earlier, the sole consultant of the IDA 
reviewed and approved the IPs master plans in accordance with a number of regulations 
partially taken from the Unified Building law. By relying on one reviewer using regulations 
that don’t cover various planning and environmental areas so, the probability of causing 
errors is high. In addition, the IDA exceeded the law regulations for the sake of the 
developers. Thus, it can be read again on the IDA side as an attempt to reduce the obstacles in 
front of the investors to encourage them to speed up the implementation regardless of 
ensuring quality to achieve political gains. 
As for the approval of the EIA studies; there is no difference in the overall shape of the nature 
of the proceedings between the official framework and the IDP actual framework. In both 
frameworks, it is found that the developer is the one who prepares the study via the 
consultancy office he/she chooses. Then it is presented to the city council (the administrative 
concerned body) to be checked whether it is fulfilled and then to be sent to the EEAA for 
taking the appropriate decision thereon. The EEAA has the right to address a request to the 
city council to complete, update or correct information regarding the study. The EEAA then 
issues the approval decision to be sent to the city council, which in turn sends it to the 
developer to be able to start the implementation of the project. This is what formally happens 
but these procedures in the IDP actual framework have been affected by many changes and 
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problems that make the study as a whole just a procedure without true feasibility or function. 
The IDA initially works on marginalizing the EEAA role as it often permits the investors to 
begin implementation of the project and when they request the IDA for the operating permit, 
it asks them to consent the EEAA on the project through the EIA study. This puts the EEAA 
in front of existing condition that eliminates the study feasibility through the difficulty of 
changing the site in case it is inappropriate to avoid its impacts, either internally or on its 
surroundings. This happened as a result of the disappearance of the law fines. However, it 
continued to happen despite adding fines to the last amended law on 2009 because of the lack 
of seriousness by the government in activation of the environmental violations especially on 
big investors (En-G-16). 
In addition, the competent administrative authorities are not serious in reviewing the studies 
and ascertaining their compliance and accuracy before being sent to the EEAA as well as 
dealing without transparency when providing information on the projects to push the EEAA 
to approve the projects. As for the study and its content, while the law requires projects of 
level C; the most polluting category, to submit a carrying capacity study to ensure that the 
project does not result in pollutants that infringe the environment capacity, it is found that the 
EEAA doesn’t obligate the developers to do so, given that their IPs are in non-polluted sites, 
what is a misconception. In addition, the study is mainly based on a master plan for a 
distribution of the industrial activities types without real allocation of factories what expands 
the range for the developer to choose activities that could be incompatible with each other 
and with their surroundings. This happens as a response to the industrial demand according to 
the marketing and actual sales. Accordingly, the matter became different from the one 
approved by the EEAA. Furthermore, in cases of amendment, what happens frequently, it is 
sufficient to gain the IDA approval without the need to renew the approval from the EEAA. 
Therefore, the strength of the legal institutional position of the IDA is much larger compared 
to the EEAA position which was marginalized with its only tool by which it can intervene to 
environmentally adjust the planning process path. So; the EIA became a useless procedure 
without real feasibility or guarantee to make the planning of the IPs compatible with the 
environmental standards. This attitude is considered not only a product of the common 
culture dealing with the environmental issue as a non worthwhile file, but also the 
government aims from it to reduce the obstacles in front of the developers to speed up the 
pace of the projects implementation. 
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Figure 6-5: Simplified flowchart of the IPs approvals phase 
Chapter 6 
193 
 
With respect to the licensing of industrial projects, there are large differences between the 
official framework and the IDP actual framework. The official framework puts the full 
responsibility in this concern on the IDA including issuing the license rules and having the 
authority to delegate the competent bodies acting on behalf of it in licensing. In practice, 
given the multiplicity of licensing authorities, as shown in Figure (6-6), the IDA established 
the One-Stop Window, where developers/investors can submit their projects documents and 
apply for licenses. It includes representatives from all competent authorities of necessary 
licensing. However, the practical application of this window proved it is a figurehead that the 
Government targets achieving propaganda from it no more. That is because it practically does 
not give more than just a preliminary agreement that the developer afterwards needs to go 
into many bureaucratic procedures to get an approval from each of the concerned bodies 
especially with regard to utilities.  
 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Simplified flowchart of the IPs licensing phase 
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This effort made by the developer happened although the IDA is legally obliged by the 
contract to facilitate on the developer getting the licenses what doesn’t happen on the ground. 
Perhaps the most important reason behind the useless effect of the One-stop window is the 
centrality issue - which the institutional setup of the state suffers from - that made the 
representatives of the concerned bodies within this window lack the power to take decisions. 
It also affected the institutional setup making many minor problems requiring the intervention 
of the ministerial level to resolve them. In addition, the coordination is missing between the 
State bodies and each of them deals with isolationism and controls over its mandate. It has 
proven that the dominance on the ground on both permits for buildings or utilities is for the 
cities councils by virtue of being the owners of the land and responsible for utilities budgets. 
The cities councils also have the appropriate teams that can do such tasks of licensing which 
are, in addition to the previous factors, not available to the IDA. Perhaps the most important 
problems that the developers face in this regard are the slow procedures and that the cities 
councils deal in an inoperative and hostile way without transparency and with intention to 
conceal information. The reason behind this way of dealing is the transfer of the jurisdiction 
over the industrial zones from the cities councils to the IDA by the resolution No. 350/2005. 
This means that the cities councils lost part of their powers over the lands they own and 
accordingly they lost the financial benefits that they used to gain from such large projects as 
the IPs. 
6.4.1.5. Regulation and legislation phase 
Based on the previously studied and analyzed section regarding the regulation and legislation 
phase of the IDP in parallel with examining its flowchart, see Figure (6-7) with its like in the 
previous chapter, Figure (5-4) as well as the concluded description there in, the following 
could be abstracted: 
Overall, it can be said that the prevalent thought of the industrial bodies; the MTI and the 
IDA, in most cases regarding dealing with legislation and regulation, adopts individual 
visions and lacks the coordination with other State sectors and agencies. This does not 
necessarily mean that the move was always wrong, where it depends on individuals not on a 
system so it seldom does the right thing while makes mistakes most of the times. 
Beginning with reviewing laws and proposing amendments; it is found that the official 
framework places this responsibility on both the MTI and the IDA. Both have the right to 
review laws and legislations related to industry and to suggest modifications in either existing 
laws or proposals to new ones. In the IDP actual framework and due to that the emergence of 
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its idea was before the establishment of the IDA, the MTI worked on the amendment of the 
legal and institutional framework governing the development of the IZs. The MTI did so 
through issuing the establishing decree of the IDA giving it the development authorities that 
qualify the IDA to set up and implement the IDA. The steps followed do not differ between 
the official and the IDP actual framework in terms of the preparation of the proposal by the 
MTI, which the Minister submitted to the Cabinet for approval. In light of what we concluded 
before regarding the problems of transfer of jurisdiction over the IZs in the new cities from 
the NUCA to the IDA47 as well as problems of coordination regarding utilities48, it can be 
said that both frameworks made a mistake by not placing the appropriate mechanisms to 
ensure a thorough study of all dimensions, involving all relevant parties, prior to drafting the 
final proposal to be presented to the Cabinet for approval. However, what happened is the 
contrary to this, as the reliance was on individual efforts by the former Minister of Industry, 
or even the ministry without coordination with or study from all relevant parties to the IDP. 
With respect to setting up regulations and governing rules of the development of the IPs we 
find that, the overall shape of both frameworks; the official framework and the IDP actual 
one, put this responsibility on the IDA but they differ in some bodies that both of them have 
intervened in the process. Beginning from the perspective of the official framework it is 
found that; matters related to investment and land pricing are tasks of the IDA in coordination 
with the State competent bodies like the FSEEDIZ and the GAFI as well as the land pricing 
committee, and then decisions are to be adopted by the Cabinet. Regarding setting up the 
governing rules of extending utilities, the official framework obligates the IDA to do so in 
coordination with the utilities competent bodies. Also with regard to selection of industrial 
activities, the IDA is obliged to coordinate with the competent bodies and with the EEAA on 
the top of them. As from the perspective of the IDP actual framework, it is found that 
the IDA is fully accounted for legislation and regulation for the IDP way from 
the government concerned agencies. However, the IDA instead of listening to the views 
of those bodies and considering them in the legislation for the program to avoid the above-
mentioned disadvantages, it is found that the IDA involved the industrial developer 
partially in some actions aiming at achieving self interests. This specifically was such as; 
the involvement of the developer either to gain experience in dealing with the preparation of 
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 What resulted in the incompatibility in plans and programs between the NUCA and the utilities bodies from a 
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the IDP or to ensure compatibility with the thought of the developers as in the processing of 
the contract with them. This as well as the incident impact of the involvement of the 
developer with economic investment background, which converges with that of the IDA as 
previously mentioned. This engraved on the IDP in the tendency to give priority to the 
interest of the developer even by passing the laws by the IDA for the benefit of the developer. 
It was also for the convergence of interests between them which returns back to the IDA by 
accelerating the implementation of the project even if it was on the expense of efficiency to 
meet the political interests of the government. Thus to summarize this, it is found that the 
IDA was not committed in the legislation and regulation of the IDP to what the official 
framework decided for it, which if followed by the IDA was supposed to avoid the IDP a 
number of problems that we stated earlier. The reason is due to the centrality in the 
institutional framework, poor coordination among its bodies as well as the desire of the 
Government to speed up the implementation of projects to exploit that in propaganda for 
political gains. 
With regard to setting up the regulations and standards of urban planning, the official 
framework singled out the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) for this 
responsibility so that its production is to be reviewed by the IDA (as a competent industrial 
zones management authority) and that accreditation is to be from the SCPUD. The IDP actual 
framework disagreed with that, as we previously mentioned, where no regulations and 
standards were set for the IPs planning and the IDA replaced them by taking a set of partial 
general regulations for the IPs from the Unified Building Law, prepared by the GOPP49. 
However, the IDA as well as taking this general group which does not include all areas of 
planning, it modified them (this group of regulations) for the benefit of the industrial 
developer. It was also mentioned that the IDA advised the developers how to overcome some 
of the regulations; the cause behind this was already mentioned regarding the desire of the 
IDA in speeding up implementation of the IDP program.  
Regarding zoning regulations within the IPs; setting them in the official framework is the 
specialisation of the NUCA, the owner of the new cities land (where the IPs located). This is 
what the industrial developer was committed to through his/her consultants in putting 
regulations that comply with the general regulations set by the city council where the IP 
located. 
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Figure 6-7: Simplified flowchart of the IPs regulation and legislation phase 
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With regard to environmental regulations, there is no difference than the case of the urban 
planning regulations. The official framework put them under the jurisdiction of the EEAA. 
However, the IDA has, in the IDP actual framework, thrown the responsibility for any 
possible environmental damage on the developer alone and refers him/her to the general 
standards and regulations in the environmental law. The IDA also does not refer to the EEAA 
for preparing an environmental code for the program that considers the specificity of the case 
of the IPs as well as of the environmental status for the sites containing the IPs. This leads to 
an expected decline of the environmental situation for these sites and the IPs either internally 
or externally. 
6.4.1.6.  Coordination, Networking and Participation 
It is important here to note that the elements of comparison between the State’s official 
framework and the IDP actual one, competent with coordination and communication between 
the various parties, were addressed individually during the discussion of the previous stages. 
Depending on this, the foregoing is to be summarized with reconstruction in a collective form 
through which we can give an overview and justification for the differences and similarities 
between the two frameworks. Thus and by examination of the previous findings concerning 
coordination and communication with the various parties of the previous phases of the IDP, 
these findings could be put into a flowchart as shown in Figure (6-8). By comparing them 
(the conclusions and the figure) with their likes in the official framework of the State50 the 
following could be concluded: 
At the outset, it could be said that the compatibility between the two frameworks; the official 
framework and the IDP actual one, rarely takes place while disagreement between them is 
substantial and has multiple images. While the official framework committed the IDA to 
coordinate with some parties, the IDA did not commit, which is dominant to a great extent. 
The contrary is also true; the IDA coordinated and communicated with parties that were not 
mentioned in the official framework, which are the few cases of coordination. 
I. Starting from the steps where the IDA did not comply with the law regarding 
coordination with different authorities; these steps can be determined in the following 
points: 
• The official framework committed the IDA to coordinate with different State 
authorities related to the implementation of policies of industrial land development, 
which the IDA did not do, where no coordination was mentioned regarding studying 
                                                          
50 See Chapter (5), Figure (5-6). 
Chapter 6 
199 
 
the program, the possibilities of its implementation and its various requirements 
specially the utilities. On the contrary, the IDA followed a participatory approach with 
representatives of the private sector from developers and financial institutions to 
develop an operational framework for the IDP program. 
• With respect to matters related to investment, land pricing and marketing of the 
program, the official framework committed the IDA to coordinate with the competent 
State bodies such as the GAFI or the FSEEDIZ as well as pricing committees, so that 
the adoption of resolutions is from the Cabinet. This did not happen and the IDA 
accounted for that alone.  
• Regarding choosing locations for the IPs; the official framework committed the IDA 
to coordinate with the NCSLP to ensure the best selection, as well as to ensure 
coordination with the concerned State bodies, where this is the basic role of the 
NCSLP. In contrary, the IDA has not adhered to this commitment and accounted for 
choosing the locations and coordinated only with owner of the land, the NUCA, to 
determine the land within the selected sites. 
• Concerning choosing the industrial activities of the IPs, the official framework 
committed the IDA to coordinate with all relevant parties in general and with the 
EEAA in particular. However, the IDA gave the responsibility to the industrial 
developer to choose according to his/her economic and marketing studies. 
• Regarding putting the regulations and standards of urban planning, the official 
framework committed the IDA to coordinate with the GOPP for the preparation of the 
regulations and then reviewing them so that they are adopted by the SCPUD. The IDA 
replaced this by taking a set of partial general regulations of the IZs from the Unified 
Building law as well as modifying them for the benefit of the industrial developer. 
• With respect to environmental regulations, the official framework committed the IDA 
to coordinate with the EEAA to practice its jurisdictions in the preparation of these 
regulations. Nevertheless, the IDA merely threw the responsibility of any possible 
environmental damage on the developer and referred him/her back to the general 
regulations and standards of the environment law. 
II. As for the coordination of the IDA (and before its establishment, the MTI) with parties 
not mentioned in the official framework; the MTI followed a dialogue and 
communication with businessmen, financial institutions and developers, and involved 
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them in some steps starting from the formulation of the idea and the transfer of expertise, 
to prepare an operational framework for the IDP program. After its establishment, the 
IDA involved the developers in the qualifying step of the developers companies and in 
drafting the contract. 
III. As for the agreement between the two frameworks, the official framework and the IDP 
actual one, which is rare as previously noted, it has happened only in one case.  
Specifically this was in the approval procedures for urban plans where the official 
framework made it the responsibility of the IDA individually without requiring a partner 
to it or point an authority to coordinate with, what was carried out by the IDA. 
 
  
Figure 6-8: Simplified flowchart of the IPs coordination, networking and participation phase 
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If we analyzed the previous three sections, it could be said that the IDA is fully accounted for 
the preparation, regulation and legislation of the program in a clear violation of the law. This 
conclusion is clearly strengthened by the large number and multiple images, shown 
previously, of lacking commitment of the IDA to the official framework regarding the 
imposed parties that the IDA should have coordinated with. Even the only step that the IDA 
conducted in accordance with the official framework was an exclusive work of the IDA. 
As for the parties the MTI and later the IDA communicated with, after its establishment, they 
were due to a must or we can say a need to transfer the experience and understand how to 
deal with a new idea that has not been applied in Egypt before. The organizers wanted to 
learn how to prepare for this idea and take it towards implementation. More importantly, it is 
not unlikely that behind this state of networking is the pursuit of personal interests, see 
(Mohammed et al., 2011, Ismail, 2011)51. Thus the researcher argues that this was not at all 
participation in its known scientific sense. As if it is the case, the commitment to the law and 
involvement of the parties mentioned in the law was better to be done than the introduction of 
a party – even if scientifically and functionally concerned – that is not legally interested in the 
program. 
Overall and finally it can be said that the framework of the IDP suffers from centrality in 
decision-making which emerged clearly in the IDA often monopolizing the majority of steps 
with absence of coordination between the IDA and the concerned parties related to the 
program. In some bodies it even reached to being against the program because of the loss of 
the financial benefits they used to gain from their jurisdiction over the IZs before transferring 
it to the IDA. The ruling purpose, in most of the program steps, was limited to achieving 
political gains for the government52; which seeks speeding up the implementation of projects 
to exploit this for propaganda and even if it was at the expense of efficiency. This comes 
through avoiding any step that could hinder or slow down the implementation such as; 
discussing coordination issues with the utilities authorities and reconciling their plans with 
the program plans and phases, or steps concerning the environment and studying the 
mechanisms of such steps or obliging developers by them.  
  
                                                          
51
 The two heads of the MTI (Rasheed M Rasheed) and the IDA (Amr Assal) are sentenced in corruption cases 
for abuse of official position to profit and facilitate the access of businessmen to merits that are not their right. 
Rasheed has been sentenced for 15 years and, now is escaping and wanted by the Interpol.  Assal has been 
sentenced with 10 years (Mohammed et al., 2011, Ismail, 2011) 
52 We discussed this point before and provided proofs for it in different positions in this chapter, see for example 
Sections (6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.4 and 6.3.4.1). 
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6.4.2. Conclusion 
This chapter so far has constructed the actual framework of the process through which the IPs 
have been planned in Egypt. By doing so, it has mainly answered the first research question. 
This section, through the analyses of the case studies and the formulation of the process, 
concludes the governing factors and forces that influenced the construction of this process, 
see Figure (6-9). These factors, in this way, represent preconceptions on the factors governing 
the planning process of the entire industrial zones in Egypt that the next chapter will address 
to answer the second research question.   
• Having the political will: 
The political will had a big role in the foundation of the program and that was through the 
generation and adoption of the idea of the IDP program then amending the legal institutional 
framework to accommodate the program. However, the general purpose ruling this will is 
doubted as it was in most of the program steps limited to achieving political gains by 
accelerating the implementation of projects to exploit this in propaganda even if it was at the 
expense of efficiency. This happened by avoiding any step that could hinder or slow down 
the implementation such as issues of coordination with the parties related to the program 
specially utilities authorities in reconciling their plans with the plans and phases of the IDP 
program. Furthermore, this occurred in cases affecting the environment and studying the 
mechanisms of the steps followed in these cases or obliging the developers by these 
mechanisms. 
• Networking and generating the idea:  
The investment background and good relations network available to the management had a 
significant impact in generating the program idea and in achieving communication between 
the main two parties of the program which are; the administration and the developer. 
• Institutional fragmentation and lack of participation:  
There is a common culture for the authorities in Egypt, which considers the strength of each 
authority is to be measured by its possession of the land that it can control. This makes the 
authority seeking to include land to its possession and monopolize the decision thereon. The 
IDA acting exclusively in deciding and implementing the majority of the steps to the contrary 
to what is decided in the official framework is as an example for that culture. The agreement 
between the official framework of the IDP and the actual framework regarding coordination 
and communication between the parties relevant to the program was rare, while the difference 
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between them was essential and had multi-images. The prevailing image was the lack of 
commitment of the IDA to what is decided by the official framework in a desire to 
monopolize the decision. Also, the agreement between them, knowing its rarity, was, as well, 
just an application of monopolizing the decision by the IDA. The breach of the official 
framework through avoiding the participation of the State agencies in the preparation of the 
program had a negative impact on ensuring the viability and implementation of the program 
and especially the utilities. This led to many problems and errors (not to reconcile plans 
sectorally caused the deficit in providing utilities - the implications of the low selling price of 
land - the selection of sites – etc). This could theoretically be avoided if the IDA committed 
in legislation and regulation of the program to what the official framework decided on the 
involvement of the relevant parties which were supposed, if they were brought, to spare the 
program a several number of these problems. On the contrary, the administration mostly was 
interested during some of the steps in involving the developers either to gain experience of 
dealing or to ensure compatibility with their thoughts at the expense of practically ensuring 
the availability of requirements and needs of the program. The investment economic 
background of the developer, which converges with its counterparts in the administration of 
the MTI and the IDA, had a significant impact on the leaning of the program towards the 
interest of the developer even if this was through violation of the law. This was due to the 
convergence of interests between them in the light of doubts about the corruption of officials 
as well as the interests accruing to government as a result of accelerating the implementation 
of projects to achieve political interests. It should be noted here that the official framework 
needs development to accommodate those who the IDA coordinated or communicated with 
such as the industrial developers, while not mentioned in the official framework. In addition, 
the official framework needs to accommodate those not involved in the IDP such as civil 
society organizations, and expected users and local community of the projects. The official 
framework also requires re-considering and studying for the purpose of awarding the IDA 
powers and appropriate mechanisms to manage the coordination with various sides and in 
particular the utilities authorities as the IDA in its current legal institutional position is tied up 
and isolated without power on these authorities. 
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Figure 6-9: Simplified flowchart of the actual framework features and governing factors 
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• Centrality:  
The IDP actual framework suffers, as in the institutional framework of the State, from 
centrality in decision-making. This was proven by the practical application of the One-stop 
window, one of the IDA’s mechanisms to eliminate bureaucracy, in the lack of decision-
making power to representatives of bodies within this window and that it is just a procedure 
with useless effect. It does not achieve except a little of the goal behind its establishment and 
the government uses it to achieve publicity not more. However, what deepens the centrality 
ruling the framework is that many of the minor problems in medium and minimum levels of 
work require intervention at the ministerial level to resolve them. 
• Protecting the environment is well-being: 
There is a common understanding of the involved parties in industrial zones founding process 
that protecting the environment in the Egyptian case is welfare and difficult to address in light 
of the problems facing the country in general and the investors in particular suffering  from 
many problems; the foremost of which is the lack of good investment atmosphere. This may 
be a reason behind that the State’s official framework not involving the EEAA in the 
foundation of the IDP program and therefore it was not surprising that the IDP actual 
framework also did not involve it in the preparation. Therefore, this legal weakening affected 
in marginalizing the role of the EEAA and thus the integration of environmental dimensions 
in the thought and implementation of the program. It was clear that the strength of the legal 
and institutional position of the IDA and the developer on one side is much larger than the 
strength of the EEAA which has been marginalized along with its tool of intervention which 
is the EIA. The marginalization took place by the effect of various means including the 
disappearance of the fines from the law, but it continued despite their addition to the amended 
law and this is because of the lack of seriousness of the government in the activation of these 
violations especially on big/important investors like the IPs. The studies became just a 
procedure without actual feasibility or guarantee that the planning of the IPs is compatible 
with the environmental considerations. This marginalization is not only a product of the 
general culture that deals with the environmental file as well-being, but also the government 
aiming, through it, at reducing obstacles in front of developers to speed up the pace of project 
implementation. 
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• Useless timing and nature of the environmental approval:  
The timing and how to present the urban plans to the EEAA for approval within the EIA 
studies need to be reviewed. The EEAA approval is only for one-time that is not renewed in 
cases of urban plans modification. It also depends on a master plan showing the distribution 
of industrial activities types without actual allocation of factories. This leads to expanding the 
range in front of the developer, according to marketing and actual selling of land plots, to 
select industrial activities that could be environmentally incompatible with each other 
internally or externally. Therefore the picture becomes different from that approved by the 
EEAA. 
• Monopoly of legislation:  
Overall we can say that the general thought of the government and especially the industrial 
bodies in its dealings with respect to legislation and regulation for the program in most cases 
depends on the individual vision and lack of coordination with other sectors and agencies of 
the State. This does not necessarily mean that the move had been always wrong where 
moving individually and not on the level of the whole system sometimes takes right actions 
while makes mistakes many times. This affected in causing a gap between; the distribution of 
competences and roles in the official framework, and their actual reality on the ground. The 
mandate for industrial land is for the IDA, while the ownership, providing utilities and 
appropriate work teams and therefore actual control on the ground is for the NUCA. This led 
to weakness and sometimes the disappearance of the role of the IDA decided by the official 
framework, while, carried out actually by the NUCA but in a manner marked by being 
against it sometimes and lacking transparency and bureaucracy at other times as a result of 
the withdrawal of their jurisdiction and thus the financial benefits they used to receive. This 
leads to another gap between planning and implementation which may be due to a lack of 
understanding of the legislators to the reality or due to an error in the distribution of 
competences as a result of lack of coordination between all parties in the formulation or 
revision of the legislation before it is approved. Therefore, it is worth reconsidering the 
State’s official framework regarding industrial zones to develop mechanisms and regulations 
that ensure a thorough examination of all dimensions, involving all parties relevant with a 
legislation and their approval on it before the preparation of its integrated and final draft. 
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• The IDP and neglecting science:  
There is a gap in the IDP program between preparation and planning on one hand, and 
following the systematic methodologies of planning and respecting specialists on the other 
side. It is found that the administration of the IDP program in a number of steps monopolized 
planning away from the competent State authorities, which is considered a violation of the 
official framework. Furthermore, the planning experts and teams were absent from 
participating, as in choosing the IPs locations. The choice adopted the IDA’s perspective 
alone, which leaned towards the investment thought for the developer’s sake pushed by 
political desires to improve the image of the government. Nor is there a special code for the 
urban planning of the IPs and the dependence is only on a set of regulations that the IDA 
partially quoted from the Unified Building Code, and adjusted some of them for the benefit of 
the developer. Nor is there a special environmental code for planning the IPs and that reliance 
is on the regulations of the environmental law which was drafted prior to the IDP initiation 
which carries an implicit of being irrelevant and oblivious to the specificity of the case of the 
IPs. The program also witnessed the IDA’s waiver of some of the responsibilities entrusted to 
it in the official framework for the sake of the industrial developers as choosing the activity 
of the IPs without a planning study, clear vision or specific controls to ensure the 
compatibility of the activity with its surroundings. In addition, the IDA gave the developer 
the mandate of the preparation of urban planning of IPs without identifying restrictions to the 
nature and efficiency level of consultancy offices to ensure proper planning. 
• Lack of transparency:  
Transparency was absent in the dealings between the authorities and each other or between 
the authorities and the developer. This appeared clearly in the lack of transparency of 
administrative bodies to provide information on the projects presenting EIA to the EEAA or 
in the lack of transparency of the cities councils in dealing with developers regarding the 
licensing. 
• Overriding the law:  
We should also point out that there are reasons that prompted the IDA to override the law and 
prompted those who are above it administratively in the institutional framework to overrun its 
work. These reasons were indicated in detail in several locations before in this chapter. But, 
we can summarize that what happened was a response for the whole institutional system 
which we dealt here with a part of it that could be a model for the rest. This part included the 
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IDA with the rest of the parties dealing in the IZs production, which miss the coordination 
between these bodies resembling isolated islands in each monopolizing decision and ruling 
the property or land under their hand. This part does not respect the science or the law except 
only in what serves the governing authority or those in charge who seek to accelerate the 
implementation of projects regardless of their efficiency to improve the image of their 
institutions and the government in front of the public opinion to achieve political or personal 
gains. This part represents the institutional system ruled with high centrality by a 
regime/authority which monopolized the rule for three decades until the people revolted on 
the twenty-fifth of January 2011 and remained in revolution over eighteen days to drop it 
down on the eleventh of February 2011. 
To conclude, this chapter constructed the actual framework of the process through which the 
Egyptian IPs are planned. It also through the comparison between the actual and official 
framework has come up with preconceptions on the features and governing factors of the 
actual process and why it has took its current shape. The actual process has proven so far that 
it faces many defects that could be summarized in: a) central and fragmented institutional 
framework, b) monopolizing decision making and legislation, c) lacking effective networking 
and participation, d) marginalizing science, e) dealing with the environmental protection with 
indifference, and f) overriding the law and lacking transparency.  The process that contains 
such features and governed by such factors that we summarized above is of course not 
applying principles of governance for sustainable development and industrial ecology, and 
therefore, unable to produce sustainable IZs.  
Finally, by constructing the actual planning process and practically concluding its lack of 
sustainability principles, this chapter has completed answering the first research question. It 
also presents preconceptions on features and factors shaping the current planning process of 
the Egyptian IPs. It therefore helps answering the second research question. These 
preconceptions that came up out of the analysis of the IPs, constructed in Figure (6-9) will 
work as a base that the next chapter will build upon to theorize for the governing factors 
shaping the process through which the entire Egyptian industrial zones are planned. Doing so 
answers the second research question. 
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN: GOVERNING FACTORS OF THE PLANNING 
PROCESS OF THE INDUSTRIAL ZONES IN EGYPT 
7.1. Introduction  
Constructing the actual framework of the planning process of the Industrial Developer 
Program (IDP) has been concluded in Chapter (6). This was through analyzing the process 
through which three case studies of the IDP, three industrial parks (IPs), were planned. The 
analysis discussed different phases of the planning process including setting up policies, pre-
planning, planning, approvals and licenses, and regulation and legislation. The analysis also 
addressed detailed steps of these phases, partners and their views, their roles and size of each 
role, and finally the relationships between those partners including coordination, networking 
and participation. To investigate the differences between what officially should be done and 
what actually has been done, as well as identifying the problems of the application, the 
planning process of the IDP has been compared to the official framework of the State 
(concluded in Chapter (5)). The analysis of the case studies along with the comparison 
between the actual and the official process has come up with preconceptions about the factors 
that have influenced the actual planning process of the IPs. To confirm these findings on the 
one hand and to generalise them on the other to cover industrial zones (IZs) in Egypt in 
general is the focus of this chapter. To do so, these findings need to be re-discussed but 
through a more comprehensive perspective that include different themes of the legislative, 
legal, and institutional framework ruling the planning process of the IZs in Egypt. To 
construct/organize the themes of this chapter, this chapter builds upon the preconceptions 
previously concluded (see Figure (6-9) that show these preconceptions and links among 
them). This chapter contributes to knowledge by exploring/confirming the problems of the 
actual framework (initially discussed in Chapter (6)) and, most importantly, justifies the 
factors governing the actual process in its current form in thought and application. It also 
justifies how these factors have shaped the Egyptian context and specifically the planning 
process to disabling the application of industrial ecology (IE) concepts. This chapter, by 
doing so, answers the second research question about the factors that influence/shape the 
current prevailing process through which industrial zones are planned in Egypt.  
To achieve this goal, this chapter, in addition to the introduction and conclusion, is divided 
into six sections. Each section discusses one of the major factors shaping the process through 
which the IZs were planned. It discusses how each factor is linked to, influenced by and 
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affects other factors. It also discusses the implications of each factor on generating minor 
factors and justifies how they affect the application of IE. In the conclusion, this chapter 
synthesises, in an integrated construct, the factors and their implications to justify how and 
why the environmental role and its tools were weakened thus disabling the application of the 
IE concepts. 
7.2. Authoritarian regime and centrality 
Egypt has been controlled for many years by an authoritarian regime1 (EIU, 2010). Perhaps 
this regime, Mubarak’s regime, comes on top of the most important factors that have had a 
significant impact on influencing other factors, and shaping and formulating the State 
framework in Egypt. It has led to the centralization of power. This regime has reflected 
negatively on all aspects of life in Egypt (Elbeshry, 2011a) .  In light of that, this section 
examines the most important manifestations of such an impact, how they occur and their 
causes. It discusses how decision-making levels were weakened, as well as the organized 
chaos and its impact on weakening the State action system. 
7.2.1. Weakening the decision making levels 
For several decades, Egypt has been deprived of an official institutional system that has been 
replaced by individuals who have controlled the state. Everything used to start and end at the 
boss’s will, whoever the boss is or whatever level he/she controls. This is not because Egypt 
lacks institutions and leaders or is unable to have a staff with the ability to work, but because 
of the influence of the authoritarian regime and the ascendancy of the President. The 
President's name is higher than the State’s. He is the one to order and forbid. He applies the 
law and exempts from it. He is the one who opens and closes files. In several files, it was not 
allowed to issue a decision or start any action except in the name, permission and directives 
of the President in national and even international issues (Ayoub, 2011). The nature of this 
authoritarian regime has substantially weakened the levels of decision-making and made 
them almost helpless in the face of many routine matters. The public in Egypt are aware 
about this and realize that such routine matters are only resolved with the intervention of the 
President personally, whatever the administrative level is. Complicating matters, then issuing 
a Presidential decision to resolve them, is something the ruling power is used to do to win the 
confidence of people towards the head of State (Ac-66, In-47). There are many examples in 
this regard but it is better to show an example from within the IZs system as for the case of 
                                                          
1
 Discussed and defined in Section (1.2.1). 
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Anchass IZ. In-472, University Professor and one of Anchass investors, explained this case by 
saying: 
Because of the conditions of Anchass IZ already operating without an issued 
establishment decree and therefore has an illegal situation, Anchass industrial 
investors in solidarity made a complaint to the President personally. It cost them 
80 thousand pounds [which is a large amount for small investors like them to 
bear]. The Governor of Sharqeya was then forced to invite the investors to give 
them the licenses they wanted. (In-47) 
As noted from this statement, the remarkable forced change in the attitude of the 
administration towards investors gives a clear indication about the nature of governance in 
Egypt. This strongly- influenced administration levels in the State institutional framework 
made them unable to take decisions despite the authority that administrators have. That is 
because administrators and leaders have been selected according to their loyalty to the 
hierarchy. Thus, they work to satisfy their superiors in a series of levels that ends at the top 
with the head of State. Ac-553 explained in detail how this imbalance took place when he 
said: 
Decision-making is by the President of the Republic. He chooses the officials 
beneath him. The standard for choice is loyalty. That is according to what many 
ministers said as being appointed by the President. Therefore, they work for his 
satisfaction. The Republic President by virtue of the nature of things cannot 
master every detail of everything in the country. There should be delegation of 
authority. When a minister comes to power, s/he wants to stay in her/his position. 
S/He does not establish a second row beneath her/him that is capable of carrying 
out the work. Thus, the result is that the minister is the decision maker and those 
beneath him only try to satisfy her/him. For example, if I send a first 
undersecretary to attend the governing council of any authority, s/he has to refer 
to the minister. Thus, s/he is not delegated in decision-making … Beside this, 
originally, not all issues are displayed to the governing council because the 
authority to select cases to be displayed is under the jurisdiction of the minister or 
the head of the body. Therefore, many decisions are not displayed on the board of 
directors. Here the balance of power appears. If it happens that the head of the 
IDA is a member of its board of directors as well as the GOPP4,and, at the same 
time, the head of the GOPP is a member of the board of the IDA,  [the implicit 
governing role of their relationship is that] you permit my work and I permit 
yours. There are no specific criteria to assess performance. Consequently, 
performance evaluation and follow-up do not exist in Egypt. (Ac-55)  
                                                          
2
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
3
 Is an Assistant Professor and Head of Environmental Planning Department in Faculty of Urban and Regional 
Planning, Cairo University. He  has wide scientific and practical expertise, and good contact with planning 
decision-making circuits by virtue of being an urban planner, an expert and a consultant to many governmental 
agencies and governorates. 
4
 General Organization for Physical Planning. 
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From the statement, we can also read that there are other factors5, generated due to autocracy, 
that have helped weaken the ability of various administrative levels to make sound decisions 
on a scientific basis. These factors include, lack of coordination that has been replaced by 
conflict and balance of forces where each party tries to achieve benefit. This has also been 
fuelled by the loss of the basis and criteria for evaluating performance. This was due to 
selecting officials mainly, as explained before, based on loyalty and not efficiency. 
7.2.2. Order of chaos and weakening the work System of the State 
The authoritarian regime, for a period of almost thirty years, did not stop at weakening 
decision-making levels. It exceeded that to largely weakening the entire State system. This is 
confirmed by several experts at different locations and with different specialties. Ac-G-11, 
with his practical and scientific experience, and his contact with decision-making circles6 , 
said in this regard: 
The institutional setup is weak … we are not planning for anything. That is the 
reason for being a developing country; not that we do not have resources. It is 
because we are not organized in the way allowing us to take full advantage of our 
resources. There are many opportunities, but mistakes are continuously made. For 
example: Ramses garage [car parking place] which they decided to build. While 
building it and after they spent millions of Egyptian pounds on it, when the floors 
had risen and the bridge appeared [from the higher floors of the garage], someone 
… told them: this garage will cause a disaster as we won’t be able to ensure the 
safety of anything [moving] on 6th of October Bridge. So, they demolished it.... 
Why is this happening? Because of the butchery we are living in. Who will pay 
for this? If you have a good institutional setup with well studied frameworks this 
would never happen. However, all of the system is weak.  
He then added that some initiatives may succeed as their leaders are enthusiastic and want to 
do things properly, but usually they fail due to our defective system (Ac-G-11). Ac-G-037, 
Consultant of the Head of the Industrial Deveopemnt Authority (IDA), also confirmed the 
weakness of the system, and that cases of success in Egypt are only individual initiatives, 
stating: 
You can dream but our system and work atmosphere are not proper at all ... Most 
importantly, you will be surprised that all good things in Egypt are individual 
initiatives. [He gave an example and then wondered]: Where is the State? What 
did they say there? [He means those individuals responsible of the case of the 
example] They said: “The Sea is in front of us, the lake is behind us, and we do 
not have any relation with the State. All we care about is to be able to export and 
                                                          
5
 These factors are discussed in details later. 
6
 As an academic and urban planner as well as a consultant of the Head of the GOPP and the Head of the 
General Secretariat for new cities in the GOPP. 
7
 Is an Urban Planner, an Academic and a Consultant of many of the State bodies, on top of which is the IDA. 
Thus, he combines practical and scientific experience, and proximity to decision-making circles, especially the 
industrial ones in Egypt. 
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we do not want the State to know anything about us nor help us in anything: May 
Allah protect us from their evils”. If there is something good, you must be sure it 
is an individual initiative. (Ac-G-03) 
The former two statements shed light on the importance of two linked issues that deeply 
influence the nature of governance. The first statement highlights the issue of security and the 
central role played by those in charge of shaping the State. Those in charge of security 
interfere in all walks of life in Egypt, working on securing the regime and its interests not the 
State. Then from the last statement comes the importance of the refusal of successful 
individual entrepreneurs to request assistance from the Government. They accept not to 
expand their business to avoid fame and be recognized by the Government, to avoid its 
‘evils’. There are several cases in this regard. The owner of a group of El-Sharif companies is 
an example. He said at the end of an episode on a television broadcast that he has regretted 
the expansion of his trade and industries from the manufacture of plastic to manufacturing 
computers. He explained that this has angered many State officials after his refusal to obey 
them. He added saying: 
"I wish I have learnt from the story of Moses and Alkhedr. I should have spoiled 
my ship for fear of the king who takes every ship by force. I was showing my 
trade and announcing here and there. I tricked myself and thought I was able to 
face any storm, which was not the case. The Government broke my back in just 
one hour." (El-Sherief, 2011) 
Several people, including Mohammed Barghuthi, find that the weakness of the system was 
not only a result of the autocratic regime of Mubarak that lasted for about 30 years. It is a 
deliberate act, accompanied by the weakening of the system of values and replacing it with 
corrupted values in each workplace. This regime worked diligently to exclude competent 
professionals from senior management positions. It promoted inappropriate persons, security 
agents and those who are weak both professionally and ethically. During the Mubarak years, 
the work system turned into a sick environment dominated by the ethics of opportunism, 
adulation, corruption, and nepotism. Those attempting to resist this atmosphere were subject 
to problems reaching up to fabricating charges, trials, imprisonment, and defamation (El-
Barghothy, 2011). Security officers carried this out as mentioned earlier. A number of 
intellectuals/authors, like Bozo (2011) and Eisa (2011), along with Ac-55 agreed with this 
proposition. Ac-55 stressed on that the regime was deliberately causing chaos to achieve its 
own interests. He said: 
[Correcting the researcher for his description of the State system as being 
disturbed], this is not disturbance. It is an Order of Chaos. It is chaos, and because 
many people are taking advantage of this, they legislate it this way. If you want to 
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say “disturbance” then it is an intended organized disturbance, disturbance that is 
meant to be in this way. (Ac-55)  
From the above it could be concluded that the nature of the autocratic regime, experienced by 
Egypt for many years, has anchored on its security arm working on securing and ensuring its 
interests and the interests of its followers. This system of governance has depended on 
legislating for and establishing an organized chaos that has affected all walks of life, to be 
able to continue achieving its objectives. This chaos has weakened the entire State work 
system. It has replaced the system of values of work, construction and moral values with less 
desirable values. This has led to weakening the decision-making levels. The decision, for its 
makers, was associated with the satisfaction of their superiors. Thus, it lacks efficiency. The 
planning process for the IZs, as part of the total, has been affected by the chaos and loss of 
values. The process of decision making has become random and unsustainable, as concluded 
by the previous two chapters.  
It is worth noting that the factors governing the process of planning IZs, which have made 
them unsustainable, are several and interrelated. Each of these factors affects the other and is 
influenced by it. It is difficult to determine a starting point of this influence or its strength, or 
separate these factors from each other8. Nevertheless, the apparent control of this 
authoritarian regime, supported by the absence of the societal will, is what shows the tyranny 
of this system as a key factor in the formulation of other factors which the following sections 
discuss. It can be considered that the premise of this regime’s absence was likely to help treat 
these factors. This is negated by the regime existence as an obstacle for it to happen. For such 
reason, this chapter took the nature of that regime as a starting point, followed by detailed 
factors affecting and affected by it. These factors ruled the real shape of the framework for 
planning IZs. The next sections work on their discussion and interpretation. 
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 The researcher believes that this is a logical reason for the suffering he experienced during restructuring this 
chapter. The researcher tried as much as possible to put the factors and classify them reasonably. He denies that 
the mentioned restructuring in this chapter cannot be placed in another logic way. It is up to the nature of the 
research, its questions, and the previous interim results reached by the researcher in previous chapters. The 
researcher also avoided repetition in addressing any of the details of a factor during the discussion of the other 
factors. However, that does not deny that the researcher had in some locations, to even the correct interpretation 
and explanation and to complete the picture of each factor with its causes and its implications to the reader, the 
researcher was forced when necessary to mention one of the factors during the discussion of another one. This is 
due to the extreme entanglement between them, whether as a cause or an effect. It is also important to mention 
that deciding on the nature and order of the themes discussed in this chapter is initially built on the 
preconceptions, concluded in the previous chapter (see Figure (6-9)), and the relations and links to each other 
therein.  
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7.3. Chaos of the regulatory framework (legislative and legal) 
The State suffers from legislative chaos founded in the era of the deposed regime. This 
regime remained for years setting legislations and laws to achieve its own benefits as well as 
its followers regardless of any further matter. Those carrying out legislations had never 
thought effectively of  treating this mess and modifying the legal legislative system (Nagati, 
2011). That system suffers from many problems that have affected heavily the production 
process in general and the industry in particular. A corrupt legislative authority, unreflective 
of the Egyptian people’s conscience and will, has controlled putting up the regulatory 
framework, and thus it has become characterized by imbalance and deficiency. It is not based 
on professional and scientific knowledge and suffers from contradictory responsibilities 
among partners of the development process. It also lacks an Egyptian index standards in a 
legal context that is best characterized by conflicted laws due to them being plenty, old and 
undeveloped (Ac-55). This framework is also characterized by disproportion between 
punishment and contravention especially in the environmental field (Ju-48). This has helped 
restrain the hands of the judiciary in dealing with environmental offences. It has had a 
profound impact on deepening the culture of disrespect for the environment in the 
development process in general and in the industrial process in particular. 
This section justifies the most important factors creating this mess, causing a legislative 
defect, leading to the weakening of legal deterrence towards environmental issues. Thus, it 
has led to weakening the role of environmental agencies and their legal instruments of 
environmental protection, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) in particular, their only 
tool to ensure respect for the environment and its consideration into the planning process of 
IZs. Then, the chapter ends with a clarification of how the absence of justice has negatively 
affected trust between partners of this process. This has caused obstruction to the application 
of SD and IE concepts and mechanisms. 
7.3.1. legislative imbalance and weakening the legal deterrence 
7.3.1.1. Unlawful corrupt legislature and monopoly of the legislations production: 
background 9 
The legislative authority is supposed to be a sincere expression of the community conscience, 
where the judiciary role is to protect what the community expresses by disgracing those who 
violate rules and protecting those whose rights have been violated. Here, the importance of 
legislation comes because if it becomes corrupt, as in Egypt, everything follows in the system 
                                                          
9
 For more details see Appendix (XII). 
Chapter 7 
216 
 
crashes (Ju-48). Voluminous studies, articles and investigations, both locally and globally, 
that talk about elections fraud in Egypt, put us in front of the fact that the legislative authority 
in Egypt is unreflective of the conscience of the Egyptian community (Gharieb, 2011, 
Abdesalam, 2010, El-Ebrashi, 2010, Khamas-Hawas, 2011, Abo-Bakr, 2011b, EIU, 2010). 
This corrupt legislative authority is accounted for the development of legislations away from 
people’s will and the professional and scientific knowledge10 (LCHR, 2009, Hammad, 2011). 
It has even excluded the official technical authorities and the governmental bodies proposing 
the legislation or those which the legislation lies in their competence (Ac-55, En-G-16). This 
legislative authority has founded disorder and chaos in the legislative framework (Ac-55, Ju-
48). Accordingly, the defective legislative framework has negatively affected the judicial 
authority and almost eliminated its existence (Ac-55, Ju-14, Ju-67).  Ju-48, emphasized on the 
corruption of the legislative authority and its results which is the biggest problem experienced 
by the judiciary in Egypt. He added: 
The basic point that has uncovered the flaws of the entire process is that the 
Egyptian legislative authority is unreflective and is an unreal expression of the 
Egyptian society ... Therefore what is the result? The result is a legal legislative 
defect weakening the judicial authority and disabling the law because ‘each pot 
exudes its including’ [Arabic proverb]. (Ju-48) 
Focusing on the environmental issue under study in this research, Ju-48, with confirmation 
from En-G-16, Ju-14, and Ju-67, highlighted the disorder in the Environment Law No. 9 of 
2009, reasoning the imbalance and lack of relevance to the nature of Egyptian society, 
especially with regard to the existence of conflicting and imbalanced penalties. This is due to 
the issuance of the law for presidential desires, “for showing off, as a claim that we have … a 
strong law of environment.” (Ju-48). These desires are according to Egypt's commitment to 
international agreements which were not approved by the people (Ju-48). It is important here 
to shed light on the importance that for the regulatory and legal setup to be favourable, 
effective and realistic, as indicated in Chapter (3), it has to be not only context-specific, but 
also case-specific (Roberts, 2004). The environmental law, to be consistent with international 
agreements, came out of the Egyptian context in a way that caused disabling to its sanctions 
as discussed in the next section.  
 To conclude, the monopoly of legislation by the corrupt legislative authority to serve their 
interests and the interests of the corrupt ruling class, has caused a legislative imbalance. This 
imbalance is represented in the chaos of a large number of legislations with conflicting 
multiple and imbalanced penalties particularly in the environmental law. Thus, this had its 
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impacts on weakening the legal deterrence in general, and regarding environmental issues 
under consideration in particular. This, therefore, has weakened the role of environmental 
agencies and their legal tools for environmental protection, especially, EIA, their only tool to 
ensure respect for the environment and its consideration by the planning process of the IZs. 
The next section covers this in details. 
7.3.1.2. Weakening legal deterrence and its effect on weakening environmental 
protection tools 
As understood from the previous section, the nature of defect in legislation is diverse and 
multifaceted. The laws include multi-crimes for the same act, and penalties vary according to 
different laws (Ju-67). Ju-48 adds that conflicting provisions and imbalanced penalties are 
common defects due to the speed of legislations issuing for the benefits of the ruling class. In 
a projection on the Environment Law No. 9 of 2009, as indicated earlier, it came out as a 
response to the international treaties signed by the former president without the consent of the 
people or even the parliament (despite its corruption). Although this law gives powers that 
were not available in the former laws to the EEAA, legal experts and judges do not recognize 
that, considering it inapplicable. They argued that the nature of sanctions, their imbalance 
with the offenses and their exaggerated stringent as well as not being detailed to take into 
account the types and degrees of different offenses, led, at the end, to the members of the 
prosecution to waive the violations, to the extent permitted by the law, under the pretext of 
lack of importance (Ju-48, Ju-14, Ju-67). In the cases converted to trials, judges use their 
authorities, given to them by law, to disable these sanctions either through the provisions of 
the patent for any reason, or by giving a consistent rule with the sanctions but with a stay of 
execution (Ju-48). To go on to justify how the concerned authorities deal with environmental 
cases under the amended law of environment, discussing both parties of such cases: editor of 
the records, which is the legal administration in the EEAA represented by En-G-16 as the 
manager, on one side, and the judiciary on the other, is important. Starting with the 
originators of the case, En-G-16 strongly faulted the law especially regarding the penalties 
prescribed for those running their business without an EIA and then submitting an application 
to get the EEAA approval. He said: 
The Law No. 9 for the year 2009 has no value ... After they issues the law I told 
them to consider that the punishment must be suitable in relation to the offense. 
You cannot execute me for scratching you…. The judge must differentiate 
between them. Therefore, penalties must vary ... It is stupidity from those putting 
the law to exaggerate the punishment and put it within a large range between 
50,000 to one million pounds. Meanwhile, it did not identify which projects are 
falling under the criminality text in different situations. (En-G-16) 
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Based on practical legal experience of 21 years in the EEAA, En-G-16 objects on the strict 
unbalanced punishment compared to the type and classification of the offense. He also 
faulted expanding the punishment range without specifying categories suitable for the 
violation nature according to the EIA classification and the size of the project. In light of 
these defects, along with the nature of the violations, for small violations, either in size or in 
the environmental impact, that were transferred to him from the DEI11, he  could not edit 
records as the minimum penalty amount is so much exaggerated. In this context, he said: 
I have not edited any records yet and I refuse to do so. I myself refuse them. Do 
you know what they [the inspection department] are sending to me? They send 
cases of a roastery – a plastic crusher – I will show you examples of what they 
sent, for you to laugh. They send cases that I am sorry to say: the cases bother you 
psychologically.... The environmental inspection is asking me to apply 
compensations on these cases! What do they want me to do?! That’s why I apply 
fines on the mobile work stations of 10.000 EGP and the restaurant 5.000 EGP ... 
I mean that, psychologically, I cannot be harsh with them. (En-G-16) 
As noted from the text that even with the pressure exerted from the DEI, En-G-16 reported 
such cases with much less compensations than that stated by the law. With mercy and justice, 
he tended to cancel, disable or reduce the penalty. If this is the action of a person who reports 
cases from the environmental body, how does he see the judiciary dealing? En-G-16 
believes12 that the judge would seek to acquit offenders for the same reasons leading him to 
deal with mercy with such cases, adding: 
It is impossible for the judge to equal between a roastery or a bakery and a plant 
of fertilizers or cement.... Unfortunately, it is left to the judge who gives acquit. 
The judge is a human being like you and me. Let us say there is a case presented 
to the judge of a small restaurant that did not present a model (A) [of the EIA]. 
The study is just a couple of papers study. However, the penalty for that is 
between 50,000 to one million pounds. I ask you, if you are the judge sitting on 
the platform to sentence ‘uncle Attia’ [he means the owner of the restaurant with 
a very small environmental impact] what will you do? ... How much is his 
capital? It is all about nothing. Will he pay 50.000 pounds for this ‘nothing’?! The 
judge must acquit him of course then he will not be a violator... Even the 
Inspection [what is meant here is the judicial inspection over the judges] will 
support the judge... The judge does this via searching for gaps in the case, for 
wrong procedures, for anything. (En-G-16) 
Therefore, as far as En-G-16 expected, the judge will spare no effort in light of what is legally 
available to him to acquit the violators of this unfair item. He will even find support from the 
administration of judicial inspection for his action. This is an attitude worthy to study and 
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clarify, to make sure that judges deal with it in this way as well as to justify the reasons that 
compel them to do so. 
• Interpretation of judges’ dealing with environmental cases and its impact on disabling 
sanctions: 
This brings us to the other side of the environmental cases which is the judges’ side.  Judges 
believe that the punishment in general must agree with the offense in balance without 
negligence or exaggeration for achieving public and private deterrence (Ju-14, Ju-48, Ju-67). 
Ju-48 finds that the penalties stipulated in the most common environmental crimes are not 
consistent with the appropriate standards of legal deterrence with its two types public and 
private. The public deterrence is that the law prevents the rest of the people from thinking to 
commit a similar act. The private deterrence is to prevent the same person from re-
committing the same act again. If the sentence is less than the real and due punishment in 
accordance with the person's culture, the public and private deterrence will not be consistent. 
If the punishment exceeds the limit, it will be faced by a type of indifference (Ju-48). In 
support, Dr. Hamdy Hashem, environmental studies and environmental urban expert, 
mentions that environmental laws in Third World countries, including Egypt, are stalled 
between the legislation and the application. He attributes the reason for this to that those laws 
did not realize that the estimation of punishment and reward should be in the context of 
having the environmental problem related to a moral nature. It is related to the citizen’s 
culture and a sense of responsibility towards the environment. Thus these laws are out of the 
activation circle of the values system toward the preservation of the environment from 
pollution and its conservation for future generations (Hashem, 2010). 
Environmental violations and its severe penalties/sanctions: 
Within the context of the previous introduction; the question that arises here is how the 
judiciary deals with both types whether environmental violations or environmental crimes13. 
Starting with environmental violations and their severe penalties, Ju-48 believes that any 
judge under his judicial conscience is forced to disable them, saying: 
Sanctions in the environmental law in general are not consistent with the actual 
reality of the offense ... The nature of these sanctions is not consistent with the 
Egyptian environmental culture.... They are very strict over what can be endured 
by an individual. For example, what does it mean for a simple person who is used 
to bathing his buffalo, that costs 8000 EGP, in a waterway for irrigation to be 
imprisoned for a whole year and pay a fine of 10,000 pounds?! ... The penalty 
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does not fit the culture of the people nor their abilities ... If you fine him with 20 
pounds he will never repeat it again. All what you have to do is to initiate an 
apparatus that can honestly collect only the 20 pounds. The clearest example for 
that is if someone eats pulps or smokes a cigarette in the subway station, he/she 
pays 10 EGP as a fine. It is, therefore, impossible to find anyone doing so there. 
On the other hand, if the punishment was 10,000 pounds no one will care about it 
and the execution of the sentence will be very hard. I mean the door will be 
opened to corrupt police secretaries to take any bribe from the violator and let 
him/her go ... The judge is faced by a legal text that he can not apply. He is forced 
by his living judicial conscience not to apply it ... Therefore, when the judge feels 
that the punishment is exaggerated, he applies the minimum level. If the 
minimum level of the penalty is exaggerated he stops applying it if he had mer. 
(Ju-48) 
According to Ju-48; this kind of tough sanctions towards environmental violations does not 
get along with the Egyptian environmental culture in general. It also lacks balance between 
the offense and its size, and the financial capabilities of the offenders. It is, therefore, difficult 
for judges to be separated from this context while adjudicating cases. Judge Dr. Osama 
Abdul-Aziz, in his article, put a frame that confirms and explains this, saying: 
Justice requires from the judge not to be a deaf tool for the administration of 
justice. He should apply the legal text after interpreting it and understanding its 
causes. He must not perform this role away from the social context in which he 
lives. Above this he watches the transformations and changes in the society 
around him. He has to balance between the different interpretations that fit with 
the changes occurring around him (Abdelaziz, 2010). 
The maximum level of sanctions do not fit the environmental crimes14 and their damages: 
On the opposite side of what is presented earlier about adopting a hard-line policy against the 
environmental violations in an inconsistent way with the culture and the capacity of 
offenders, the maximum penalties with respect to environmental crimes are lesser than the 
offense committed or the cost of its treatment. Some of these crimes cannot be compensated 
with money. In this context, Ju-48 said: 
With regard to major crimes and felonies, such as dumping harmful and toxic 
substances in the Egyptian coasts, these are not caught. If they are caught they are 
edited in any way, unless it reaches the public prosecutor. When reaching the 
prosecution, reconciliation is done before reaching the court. I have many 
examples. I have an example which is not nice (shocking) of a ship accident, 
called Nabbota, in the year 89. It has dropped a quantity of oil in front of Raas 
Ntrany at Sharm El-Sheikh. The Public Prosecutor ordered to catch and bring the 
shipmaster. He also prevented the shipmaster from leaving the country and the 
legal actions were taken. Then the shipmaster was released and the ship was 
allowed to leave after a letter of guarantee with one million and a half dollars. 
These are the maximum limits of the fine. To perform a purifying and clearing 
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process of the oil, it will cost us a lot, let alone the aquatic life that we lost. Thus 
the fine is much less than the true value15. (Ju-48) 
Therefore, the law stresses with those unable to pay the fine although they were not harmful 
to the environment, while it tolerates with those who can bear and deserve the harsh 
punishment despite the serious injury inflicted to the environment. The effects of this, as we 
have mentioned previously, led to disruption of the law with most of the cases. For  the cases 
often associated with groups weakly affecting the environment, this occurs through 
provisions of patent or to sentence the offender with a suspended sentence. For the severe 
impact environmental crimes, in case they are caught and if a compromise was not reached 
before the public prosecutor and the judiciary, the maximum penalties prescribed by the law 
does not compensate for the offense. Ju-48 summarized this in precise words, where he said 
about the law: 
It tightens on those who are unable to execute the sentence and tolerates those 
who deserve and are capable to execute the severe punishment. Here the injustice 
occurs and, therefore, the right and beauty values fall in front of the citizen’s 
eyes. This is because linking the values of right and beauty is the value of justice. 
If the value of justice falls down, the right and beauty values fall as well. The 
right value is the virtues in general and the beauty value is discipline of life. That 
is because the balancing force is the value of justice. The penalty therefore, must 
be consistent with the deed. If it is more or less things become imbalanced. (Ju-
48) 
Therefore, and with the lack of the value of justice in the community (individuals and 
officials), the legal deterrence is weakened. Imbalance occurs and the community deals, in 
particular, with the environmental regard with indifference. This explains dealing carelessly 
with the EIA’s, especially regarding major projects as previously explained in the former two 
chapters. This has effectively helped eliminate the only tool by which environmental agencies 
can intervene to ensure putting the planning process of the IZs on the path of respecting the 
environment. 
7.3.2. Absence of the prompt justice and hindering the application of industrial 
ecology 
Mubarak and his successive governments’ rhetoric about exerting more efforts and 
accelerating ruling in cases for everyone without long waiting or prolonged suffering for 
litigants (Damatsoft, 2011), did not bring anything new for almost 30 years which is the 
duration of Mubarak's rule. Rather, Mubarak called for the achievement of something he and 
his regime were the first to stand up against . This is the content of what a number of senior 
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judges in Egypt believe in (Abo-Bakr, 2011a, Al-Asswany, 2011). This section briefly 
addresses the factors causing the absence of prompt justice, notably the lack of judiciary 
independence and the administrative corruption. It also summarizes the impact of these two 
factors on the planning process and, in particular, the environmental regard. Then, it outlines 
the impact of the absence of justice on the lack of confidence, and its influence on disabling 
the application of SD and IE mechanisms. See Appendix (XIII) for more details and 
evidences. 
7.3.2.1. Executive authority with administrative corruption hinder the independence of 
the judiciary 
As understood from the previous sections, when the law has become a tool for the expression 
of the ruler’s will rather than the people’s will, the imbalance has leaked out to everything. 
Under the central autocracy, the executive authority has dominated over the legislative and 
judiciary authorities (Al-Refaai, 2011, Ju-48, Abo-Bakr, 2011a). The executive authority has 
intervened in judiciary affairs with several means including the pressure on the judges 
through judicial inspection (following the Minister of Justice), the distribution of certain 
cases in the courts on certain judges, the assignment of judges to work in governmental 
bodies, and the executive authority controlling the bulk of the salaries of judges (Hassan, 
2011, Ju-48). This has led to weakening the judiciary's ability to protect rights, where the 
financial and political influence has intervened in the implementation of the law and 
provisions (Arafa, 2009)16. This has led to shacking the prestige of the law. The people feel 
that it is a sword hanging over their heads not protecting them. Thus, they have antagonized 
the law and circumvented it. So, corruption spread (Hassan, 2011). The environmental issue 
is not an exception, where, despite the abundance of environmental laws, the corruption has 
disrupted them in several ways (Arafa, 2009). First, this is through disabling the 
implementation of the provisions on influential people, and applying them on the weak. It is 
not only regarding non-implementation of sentences, but also it has reached up to the 
violation of judicial decisions of the top administrative judiciary in Egypt, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, by governmental authorities! (Essisy, 2011, Ju-48). Second, by the 
judges themselves, where they block the application of the law, knowing that irregularities 
are edited against the weak people not because they are violators as much as they refused to 
respond to the records editors requesting bribes to not to edit these records (Ju-48, Ju-14). In 
this regard, Judge Ju-48 strongly said: “this is the real situation: the administrative corruption 
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is the tragedy of the Egyptian environment”. Third, it is through the exploitation of the 
administrative corruption to legalize the situation of pollution sources. A large proportion of 
pollution sources has been working apparently in a legal way by running permits, illegally 
obtained from the competent administrative authorities. Thus, this way has blocked the 
judiciary interference to correct the illegal situation of such pollution sources, even if 
individually, as prosecutors will be blamed by the judicial inspection (following the executive 
authority). Furthermore, there is another important reason that practically prevents 
prosecutors from doing so. A prosecutor is a part of the Egyptian people who, in general, do 
consider the environmental issue a priority17 (Ju-48). 
7.3.2.2. Absence of trust and hindering the application of industrial symbiosis 
Environmentally, and within the frame of the above, it could be said that the problem does 
not stop at the limit of environmental destruction, as a result of the encroachment of the 
executive authority over other authorities, specifically the judiciary, the spread of 
administrative corruption and the lack of implementation of verdicts. Most importantly, all of 
these factors have caused the Egyptian society to lose the feeling of justice because of the 
absence of prompt justice. That was through slow litigation and its weakness in the restitution 
of rights to their respective owners18(Sedky, 2010). People under such context found 
themselves forced to waive their rights, or part of them, to avoid engagement in these 
stressful procedures of slow litigation, which are time and money consuming (Qusya.com, 
2010). En-65 tended to confirm this culture and illustrates it in details, saying: 
Ideally, among the things encouraging people to do business together, in addition 
to trust, is that if this trust has been shaken, they still have another line of defence 
which is contracts and the judiciary. For us, this second line of defence does not 
exist at all. If we have a contract, between me and you, we sign the contract to 
register our confidence. But the truth is that if you would violate the contract I 
cannot think about going to the judiciary. It doesn’t worth with the size of our 
contracts. (En-65) 
With loosing the last defence wall for the citizen which is the judiciary, lacking prompt 
justice has created a general exaggerated atmosphere of mistrust, affecting the reciprocal 
relationships between partners of the development process where confidence of citizens in the 
ruling authority first, and, secondly, in each other has been lacking. As a result, to avoid 
problems, the cooperative relations disappeared between dealers in money in general, and 
between the parties within the system of IZs in particular (En-65). Lacking these relations 
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contradicts one of the most important principles of IE required to achieve industrial symbiosis 
(IS) (Boons et al., 2011). Therefore, attempts to apply mechanisms of IS have disappeared, 
because of the lack of the necessary context for cooperation in Egypt (En-65). 
7.3.3. Setting legislations ignores professional and scientific thinking 
We talked in the previous sections about the legislative defect and its imbalance in sanctions. 
Sanctions have become multiple, conflicting and incompatible with the violations in general 
and regarding the environmental issue in particular. This has weakened the legal deterrence 
regarding the environmental violations, and left its negative impact on the role of 
environmental agencies and their tools for environmental protection. This imbalance is a 
natural result of the monopoly of an illegitimate legislative authority of the legislation setting. 
They are driven by corruption and the intent to preserve their benefits and the interests of 
those appointing them – and in total - ignore the professional and scientific knowledge in 
legislation. In details, the legislative chaos has increased and the clear roles and 
responsibilities of the partners have disappeared in the planning process. The legislative 
framework has lacked scientific methodologies, codes, rates, and standards for planning. 
Thus planning has adopted individual diligence for work teams. The mechanisms for 
monitoring and professionally accounting planners have disappeared. This has led to 
choosing teams and consultants on the basis of loyalty and obedience, not on expertise and 
efficiency. Thus planning has gotten worse and the procedural shape has dominated the 
planning process rather than efficiency. Outcomes from the planning process have become 
chaotic or without a real impact on the ground. By ignoring science, it is logical that the law 
does not serve the environment practically, and does not accommodate modern thoughts in its 
protection, such as IE.  This is an important factor that impedes individual initiatives that 
attempt to apply this thought in Egypt. This section deals with these factors in detail and their 
effects on the planning process in general and environmentally in particular. It is worth 
mentioning here that the implications of these factors have been discussed previously, both 
officially, in Chapter (5), and actually in analyzing the case studies of the IPs in the previous 
chapter. We are here not just emphasizing and generalizing them to cover the Egyptian IZs 
but, more importantly, answering how and why they have happened, which is the main 
purpose of the entire chapter.  
7.3.3.1. Lacking clear and balanced responsibilities and roles 
A number of experts, like: (En-65), (Ac-08), (Ac-15), and (Ac-01), saw that the legislative 
framework lacks determining clear responsibilities and roles that are not conflicting for each 
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of the partners whether within the government, experts or investors and so on. Ac-55 
confirmed this -adding that this legislative imbalance led to transferring the problem to the 
institutional framework for those making the decision. With the absence of a clear framework 
of responsibilities, conflicts appear between different bodies. This is especially with the 
absence of a coordination mechanism among them in an effective way. The product at the 
end comes as a result of a personal vision or desires resulting from pressure from outside the 
institutional framework (Ac-55). Ac-55 gave an example of this, saying: 
For example, there is no legislative framework in Egypt for locating or selecting 
industrial development sites. It is left to the decision-maker: When taking a 
decision for establishing an IZ, who takes the decision? There is the MIT through 
the IDA. Also, there is the GOPP through urban plans. What is the mechanism of 
coordination between the two: There is none. They both have the same role but as 
if they lie in different valleys, no coordination at all ... How come? (Ac-55) 
Then he explained how this works and its effects. Each of these bodies has an establishment 
law/decree determining its role in the planning process. However, these roles overlap and 
conflict with each other. In the previous example and in accordance with the Unified Building 
Law, the GOPP chooses the IZ location within its plans according to the schematic level. On 
the other hand and according to the establishing decree of the IDA, the choice of sites for 
industrial development is the IDA’s responsibility. Thus the IDA chooses other sites in an 
action not involving the GOPP, leading to conflict and wrestle. In other cases, the IDA 
specifies the function of IZs located by the GOPP and here the product is chaotic: the one to 
choose the location did not choose the function and the one selecting the function did not pick 
the site. Therefore this occurs as a result of the lack of clear and detailed responsibilities in 
the legislative framework for each partner. Also, it is due to the lack of coordination19 
between these bodies which helps collapse the situation (Ac-55). On another complementary 
side and from environmental perspective, En-65 believes that there is a large gap between the 
legislative framework and the role assigned to the EEAA, and the nature of the supposed 
proper role of the authority according to the professional and scientific knowledge. The 
authority job must be political more than technical. This is to put the productive sectors 
especially the industry on the correct environmental path and ensuring its works to be 
environmentally successful (En-65). He completed comparing this role to the role of the 
bassist (rhythm adjuster) in the band, saying:  
You know, a musician cannot work without a drummer. The drummer is the 
bassist ... The EEAA job is strategic. It achieves its goals when reaching main 
streaming. While the IDA is working for industry, the environmental work is to 
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 The coordination issue is discussed in Section (7.7). 
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be done. When the agriculture performs its work, the environmental work is to be 
done as well. You are not supposed to take everything on your lap and say I will 
do the environment work. No one is working this way. The correct thing in a band 
is that you drum for the others to play flute (play music) to reach a music 
symphony (harmony). If we are all playing flute there will be no harmony at all. 
If people did not listen to what they want to listen they will not continue playing 
on the rhythm. (En-65) 
The EEAA, therefore, as understood from the previous statement, is responsible for forcing 
the IDA to integrate environment into their work. It has succeeded to a large extent in 
achieving this in one single case monitored in the previous chapter. This is when it exerted 
pressure on the IPs of the industrial developer for making the EIAs at the level of the entire 
IZs, not only at the level of each factory. Therefore, the EEAA in this case dealt politically 
not just according to its official role to enforce the competent authorities to respond positively 
to its environmental views. Yet, En-65 sees that the EEAA’s way in this case should be 
generalized for all of its role and tasks, but the nature of the legislation weakening the role of 
the EEAA obstacles achieving that. The law lacks committing various bodies with 
coordination and cooperation with the EEAA regarding the full steps of the planning process. 
On the other hand, it commits the EEAA to coordinate with all other bodies. Similarly, Prof. 
Dr. Salah Arafa, the international expert on sustainable development and environment, sees 
that the balance of power is not in favour of the EEAA at all compared to the MTI for 
example. This is in light of the culture of ego and lack of coordination which is not provided 
by the law. Moreover, the governmental agencies override the law committing many offenses 
that the EEAA cannot stop or address. In this context, he adds in his article: 
It would not be fair to accuse the MSEA of failing because it is so much 
overloaded in light of its limited potential and influence ...  All ministries are 
supposed to work on the protection of environment. They should be accounted for 
any failure to the environment particularly with regard to factories and the Nile 
River. (Arafa, 2009). 
So, the environmental agencies are weak compared to other authorities and ministries such as 
the MTI. There are many who have the same belief and recognition of the reality of that 
weakness, within the EEAA itself. En-G-32, director of one of the most interacting 
administrations with IZs in the EEAA, addressed the approvals for the creation of IZs and 
their role in them, saying: 
You must know the system in Egypt: Who gives the approvals? Higher levels, 
like the GOPP and MTI, do. Then it is all raised to the Cabinet after its approval 
by these ministries. What is our role? If they consult us, we tell them about the 
environmental dimensions we need. The decision is then issued from the Cabinet. 
As the decision is issued, you cannot do anything although it is possible that it has 
included incorrect things. (En-G-32) 
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So the ministries and agencies of industry and urban planning, according to the logic of a 
senior official from the EEAA, are considerable entities that decide where and how to select 
sites for the IZs. On the other hand, the role of the EEAA is no more than providing technical 
advice on the environmental dimensions if requested. That is what happens even in case of 
errors. Therefore, the rule set by NGO-3020 is correct. She (NGO-30) said "the nature of laws 
in Egypt and the nature of the MSEA as a state ministry, do not give it any powers or 
sovereignty over other ministries or bodies. Therefore, to guarantee moving towards 
environmental protection and applying sustainable development, resolving this kind of 
imbalanced power politics is significant (ESCWA, 2003).  
On another complementary hand to the nature of the role and weakness of the environmental 
agencies not recognized in the law, Dr. Hala Barakat, Advisor of the CDCNH21, explained 
that, the policy of the MSEA and the EEAA, its executive apparatus, is not based on facing 
and preventing violations before they occur. Rather, it is based on accounting after the crime 
is committed. The environmental apparatus allows the crime to take place. Then it applies the 
punishment and fines. Therefore, it is performing the policy of collecting money and not the 
policy of protecting the natural resources of the country (Barakat, 2011). The MSEA does 
nothing to treat any of the several environmental problems facing the Egyptian community, 
although the methods of treatment are through using the axioms of science applied in many 
countries in the world. Egypt so far does not have any governmental plan22 for the recycling 
of solid wastes. These are considered worldwide as a wealth possible to recycle and get from 
them tremendous benefits rather than considering them as harmful material to the 
environment. (Barakat, 2011). Therefore, the actual role of the EEAA comes after the 
execution during monitoring the effects of development on the environment. Its role is not in 
limiting these impacts during preparation and planning. This adds an important dimension to 
the weakness of the environmental agencies in protecting the environment. 
To conclude, with regard to the nature of the role of the EEAA, the EEAA provides 
specialized technical support and advice when needed or develops policies and general 
environmental programs that are legally non-binding to other sectors. In order to achieve the 
political part of the EEAA role, it is required to give some powers that qualify it for that, 
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 Environmental Studies Institute Deputy and a member of board of directors of a number of environmental 
NGOs 
21
 The Centre of Documentation of Cultural and Natural Heritage. 
22
 There are individual cases in this regard, including the case of El-Safa Company for Environmental 
Investment. It succeeded in implementing a project to produce electricity from waste recycling after suffering of 
the government bureaucracy. However, there are no governmental plans in this field (Alborsa, 2011). 
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what is not included in the law. The EEAA is legally committed to coordinate with other 
bodies while the contrary is not true. It is also found that the focus of the EEAA role 
practically is to monitor the impacts of production and punish the offenders not to think and 
plan to limit the effects during the preparation of projects. This, as a whole, is referring to the 
obvious weakness of the strength and powers of the EEAA making it difficult to achieve the 
supposed role in a correct way. This is negatively reflected on the planning process in 
general, causing lack of sustainability.   
7.3.3.2. Lacking methodologies and standards, and hindering the application of SD 
This section deals with the imbalance in the legislative framework of planning. It discusses 
the lack of updated and detailed methodologies allowing the respect of the planning 
considerations in a comprehensive integrated perspective. This framework also lacks 
environmental standards and rates. Thus, it becomes defective, leading to an inevitable result: 
being harmful to the environment and disabling practical accommodation of SD and methods 
of its application. 
• Legislative framework of planning lacks methodologies and regulations on scientific 
basis: 
From the planning view, it can be said that the Unified Building Law is inaccurate and 
incomplete. It does not address the details and mechanisms of the current and future 
situations according to systematic studies23. The law deals generally with the supposed to 
follow procedures for the preparation of planning. It also deals with the planning nature as a 
product without discussing methodologies, regulations, and details of rates and overall 
requirements that should be followed for the preparation of planning. Thus it leaves the 
details to work teams and different bodies, which set standards and regulations for each 
project separately (Ac-55, Ac-G-03, En-65, Ac-66). In this context, Ac-55 stated: 
The law does not mention anything about methodologies. Alternatively, it 
concentrates on the shape of the product. It, for example, asks for a map of the 
IZs without mentioning how to do it or stating on which rates. Therefore, it is left 
for each expert on his own vision. Despite its disadvantages, the old Urban 
Planning Law was specific to some extent but it was replaced by the Unified 
Building Law which is something gelatinous. (Ac-55) 
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 Similarly, Ac-G-03 talked about the shortage of laws in Egypt in general as well as not accommodating the 
future status, saying: In the past when I used to be like you making post graduate studies, a German doctor in 
our University asked me a question. At that time the issue of the new cities was new. They used to give an 
exemption for 10 years for investors. He asked if the investor changed the activity after 10 years, what are we 
going to do with the investor? Will the investor take another 10 years of exemption? The doctor was looking 
forward as an investor, after 10 years and changing the activity. He said it was not stated in the law... We were 
not able to answer his question! (Ac-G-03). 
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Ac-G-03, as a consultant of the IDA Head, added that the Unified Building Law mentions 
some of the required regulations but does not include all the appropriate needed ones for all 
types of planning projects, especially the industrial ones. He also confirmed the indifference 
in how they prepare industrial projects regulations in the IDA, saying: “In a hurry, they ask 
me: please Dr. [Ac-G-03] can you just tell us what does the planning law mention regarding 
this issue? and that is it” (Ac-G-03). This is in addition to the existing mistakes in the law that 
can hinder the commitment to the few mentioned regulations. In this regard, Ac-G-03, as the 
one edited the draft of the IZs planning section in the Unified Building Law, explained this 
saying: 
Even the one who completed editing after me is funny! Although I put the 
regulations for the IZs in general, he made them specific just for the IZs within 
the urban cordons of cities and villages, and this is wrong ... His mind led him to 
that we are only working within these cordons thus, the IZs are to be only within 
them. What a way of thinking! There are IZs in the provinces outside these 
cordons, what about them? It is supposed that they will not follow this law in this 
case! (Ac-G-03) 
Therefore, it is understood from the foregoing that with the absence of detailed legislative 
framework of planning, authorities of work teams increase in the preparation of regulations 
for planning projects. It is clear as shown above and according to what is confirmed by Ac-55 
that these teams, at their different efficiency levels and governmental nature, deal in a non-
professional way. Satisfaction of those who appointed them, whoever they are: the project 
team leader or the body having jurisdiction on the project, predominates over the process. 
Those appointing the planning teams are also responsive to the pressure exerted on them 
whether higher governmental pressure, from their leaders, or the investors (Ac-55, Ac-66, 
Ac-G-03). Ac-55 gave an example of the strategic failure as a result of the UBL lacking the 
methodologies and clear standards obliging work parties. He said about the project of the 
preparation of strategic plans for villages in Egypt: 
On what basis did they [the GOPP] plan the first tier of 500 villages? On the basis 
of cordon 86. After they finished the planning, they found it inappropriate and 
threw all the plans/schemes in the bin. Then they changed the thought deciding on 
making new cordon. The GOPP made it for the second tier. [He then told the 
story of the second tier finishing with the failure of it and its reasons] ... This 
means that the GOPP has worked according to a first and second wrong Terms of 
Reference (TORs).  What did it reach at the end: nothing, and so on. Thus you 
have been spending money for 10 years without any real return. (Ac-55) 
The regulatory framework for planning, therefore, is neither thorough nor detailed 
professionally to prevent such chaos that we referred to in the previous example. The 
framework states the product nature and its leading procedures in just a form without 
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mentioning clear and detailed planning methodologies. It does not address the mechanisms 
and details of appropriate planning rates for different projects. Therefore, it leaves the 
opportunity for diligence and discretion to work teams. This, with other factors like weak 
education system in general and planning education specifically24, significantly puts the 
operation at risk of error. That is especially in light of pressures exerted on work teams and 
the desires of some of them to please officials. In addition, there is a lack of attention to the 
systematic study and a way of dealing carelessly and unprofessionally with projects by work 
teams. 
• The law does not practically serve the environment nor accommodating modern 
thought for its protection: 
To complete what is mentioned above, and considering that protecting the environment or not 
is a product of the planning process, the planning process in light of this dysfunctional 
legislative framework will only produce unsustainable products (Shalaby, 2003b). Ac-55 
demonstrated on this, considering that lacking the appropriate environmental rates and 
regulations in the legislative framework was the reason for shackling the hands of the 
judiciary regarding protecting the environment. This is like the failure to stop one of the most 
famous environmental cases, Agrium plant, that has concerned the Egyptian public opinion. 
This led to its implementation despite the severe damage to the environment. He explained 
this issue saying: 
If the legislative framework is malformed then the judiciary is shackled. The 
legislative framework does not state the amount and rates of pollution.  The 
legislative framework mentions procedural steps they [in Agrium plant and the 
Government] already have followed. That means they presented an EIA where 
the MSEA should accept or reject this study.  If it was accepted, as happened, the 
judiciary is committed to the decision in accordance with the law and its text. 
(Ac-55) 
Therefore, limiting the legislative framework to the procedures without discussing details of 
the conditions and environmental standards scientifically, contributes to the damage to the 
environment. On another complementary side, and from a quick analytical view of the 
schemes of some IZs models in Egypt, owned by international companies, a decline in the 
standards of respecting the environment25 has been strongly observed. This was clear when 
comparing the product from the environmental perspective to what is theoretically expected 
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 Is discussed in Section (7.4.2). 
25
 As simple examples of the decline of these standards: the lack of a drainage system for industrial activities 
separated from the domestic sewage system. The low percentage of green areas below 3 percent of the surface, 
see Section (1.2.2) for similar cases. 
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to be provided by such companies regarding respecting the environmental standards as well 
as international standards or modern ideas in this regard, such as the IE. En-65 and Ac-55, 
shared the same justification of this: in the absence of a scientifically correct detailed 
legislative framework that is mandatory to these companies (Ac-55, En-65). Ac-55 added:  
There are regulations which they follow, but what is the degree of accuracy of 
these regulations? ... For example; water pollution: if there is an IZ treating water. 
If the POD and COD26 concentrations are 10 over 10, it will be allowed. What 
does 10 over 10 mean? It means that if there were a factory producing daily a 
million cubic meters with a concentration of 10/10, it is allowed. It means 
producing 10 tons of pollutants every day. This is a terrible (capacity) load but 
they only took the concentration in consideration...  Thus, this work does not 
follow the scientific method as it does not follow the (capacity) load concept27.... 
Therefore, as the specification put in the legislative framework does not state that, 
the company coming will follow your specification. Where, the company is not to 
be more “Royal” than the “King”. (Ac-55) 
Therefore, wrong scientific dealing with the nature of regulations and standards and staying 
away from new ones being circulated globally gets the specifications out of their correct 
environmental frame. En-65 added another dimension, stating that it is not limited to 
environmental standards and their scientific accuracy only, but also the nature of the planning 
regulations; which are placed without studying their environmental impacts, bears part of the 
problem. He gave an example of a company which was facing a problem in getting rid of the 
wastewater used in its industrial operations. This led the company to use this water in the 
cultivation of tree forests in lands it has. However, he explained that this situation was 
difficult for them to circulate because of the lack of suitable land according to the planning 
regulations applied for dividing the IZs land plots. In such regulations the industrial plots 
sizes and the percentage of building on them did not take into account such matters and other 
environmental issues (En-65). Ac-G-03, agreeing with this argument, gave an example of the 
officials’ way of thinking in the IDA in depending on terms of the law in refusing to consider 
the application of the thought of separate industrial wastewater networks, saying: 
There are no separate industrial wastewater networks at all in Egypt, in neither 
private nor governmental IZs. Upon mentioning this, they [in the IDA] tell you 
each plant treats itself, as what comes out from plants must be identical to the 
specifications. What if it was not identical to the specifications? They say it is 
their problem with the MSEA not the problem of the IDA28. (Ac-G-03) 
                                                          
26 Wastewater quality indicators.  
27
 The concept of qualitative (capacity) load was added in the modified Environment Act of 2009 as one of the 
studies made by the entrepreneurs within the EIAs to obtain the environmental approval. However, they were 
not activated, as explained in the previous chapter, see also Appendix (IX). In addition monitoring the 
contaminants of the factories are based on tables of pollutants. These tables adopt the thought referred to by Ac-
55 and not the thought based on the qualitative (capacity) load. 
28
 En-G-52 shared Ac-G-03 his opinion and also the absence of separate drainage systems in industrial zones. 
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Thus, it could be understood that the legislative capacity for the practical mechanisms of 
environmental protection and modern environmental thought, is very weak. It is non-binding 
to the partners of the IZs planning process to respect the environment and its protection 
mechanisms. It, in this context, helps the industrial sector officials limiting their attention 
only on economic and industrial issues, and delaying the environmental problems to post-
implementation. Then, their occurrence is to be in the jurisdiction of the environmental 
agencies. In light of this, it is difficult to achieve SD and apply IE. Ac-55 agreed with that the 
existing legislative framework is linked only to studying the local impact of development 
through the EIAs of the unit and not for the zone as a whole neither the strategic dimension of 
projects and programs. Thus, it eliminates the thought of optimal use and protection and 
becomes out of the equation of SD and its application mechanisms (Ac-55). This is not 
distinctive to the Egyptian legislative framework in that it is disabling SD and IE. Some other 
countries face the same situation like Australia that its legislative framework poses particular 
challenges for applying IE (Boons et al., 2011). Reforming the legislative framework for IZs 
developing process in line with the principles and ideas of SD and IE is crucial (Roberts, 
2004).  
To conclude, the process governed by a defective legislative framework results in planning 
that does not respect the environment. That is since the framework is limited to procedures. It 
is neither detailed nor containing rates and environmental standards that are scientifically 
correct and updated. Therefore, this framework is flawed restricting the judiciary from 
dealing in a proper way that could protect the environment. Also, it is not appropriate for the 
application of environmental thoughts and SD with its modern mechanisms such as IE. It 
helps deepen the economic perception of the industrial sector officials at the expense of 
caring about environmental protection. Reforming the legislative framework to apply SD and 
IE principles is, therefore, significant. 
7.3.3.3. Lacking performance assessment to strengthen the loyalty-driven assignment 
It is discussed in the previous section that the lack of a planning code in the legislative 
framework based on a professional and scientific knowledge including methodologies and 
regulations. Also, the work teams depend on individual diligence based on thought and 
efficiency of each team. This leads to chaos in the planning process and lowers the product 
level schematically and environmentally. What worsens the problem and works on increasing 
it more is the lack of a mechanism or provisions in the legislative framework for accounting 
the planners and assessing their performance. This is what was confirmed by a number of 
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experts, like (Ac-G-03), (Ac-G-11), (Ac-66), (Ac-15), (Ac-01), and (Ac-55). The latter 
detailed the nature of the problem, saying: 
With the absence of the legislative framework, if a planner did any work whether 
good or bad, can anyone account or assess him/her? How to account them without 
a code? ... Even the list of practice standards found in the Engineers Syndicate is 
talking about procedures not a scientific method of evaluation. Therefore, it is 
away from the professional and scientific knowledge.... I mean, for example, civil 
engineering has a weak code like so: the engineer and the contractor are 
responsible for the building for ten years, if it collapses or something happens to 
it they are to be imprisoned. OK, this is a building, what about those responsible 
for a city with a hundred thousand buildings? If they are mistaken, what is their 
penalty? Nothing! … It does not have rooting for the process itself; it did not give 
a scientific definition for the planner and his exact work nature. So, you can find 
unqualified graduates working as planners … So, the legislative framework is 
failing. (Ac-55) 
From this statement along with what preceded, it could be realized that the planning process 
in all its dimensions, including the planner definition and, the way to account and assess 
his/her performance, suffers from a legislative defect emptying it from its scientific content. 
This helps increase its mistakes and problems. Moreover, the absence of a scientific 
accounting system helps choose work teams and consultants on the basis of loyalty and 
obedience not on expertise and efficiency. Mamdouh Ismaeil (2008) agrees in general on the 
prevalence of this matter. He asserts that most of the administrative system consultants and 
experts lack professionalism. Most of them are people of trust and loyalty. They are usually 
appointed through courtesy and mediation. Such type of jobs turned out to be just a source of 
money, unfortunately under the knowledge and acceptance of the Government. He adds that 
this hits the principle of equal opportunities and prevents communication among generations. 
It infects the administrative system with inertia (Ismaeil, 2008). Reflecting on the planning 
process in general and the IZs in particular, this can be confirmed from several sources, like 
(Ac-55), (Ac-G-03), and (Ac-G-11).  Ac-G-11 confirmed this phenomenon and considers it a 
result of the absence of professional and scientific approach for planning. He then gave an 
example regarding the selection of industrial development experts in the new cities planning 
work teams, saying: 
Nothing is given to the concerned specialists ...  For example, you request an 
industrial development expert, they bring Dr. "........"29, who is a doctor of 
industrial planning and specialized in industrial setup; industries and so on.  They 
do not bring someone from the IDA.  Do you understand what I mean? They 
bring this man as they know him well; they try to make things easy for 
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 The expert name has been withheld in order to protect his interests and not to affect him and his reputation. 
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themselves. Well, industrial planning is important but this is not the appropriate 
required specialization. (Ac-G-11) 
So, confidence is respected at the expense of efficiency and expertise in the selection of 
specialized experts to the project of planning new cities in the GOPP. It is also confirmed by 
Ac-G-03 from his personal experience. This experience is from inside the body responsible 
for IZs by virtue of him being a consultant of the IDA Head30. He said: 
The dominating pattern became the “Yes Man”. For example, the IDA head 
cancelled a contract of an Engineer... An Engineer with great experience and a 
high capacity for follow-up ... I was surprised, the Head did so because the 
engineer tells him what he should do. However, others who always say “Amen” 
are fine to him. The engineer came telling me can you believe? … I told him it 
looks that I will be next. The IDA Head tried dismissing me several times, 
however, his Assistants advised him not to do so. They said the doctor saves us in 
specific needs. That is because the technical stuff, chosen by the Head and well 
known to him, know nothing about technical matters ... Meanwhile, he wants to 
dismiss me as I am not pleasing him. I do not dissemble him. Hypocrisy is the 
way to reach higher ranks in Egypt nowadays. (Ac-G-03) 
Therefore, the dominating pattern within the IDA does not differ from the general framework 
of the State apparatus. The pattern of assignment starts with the appointment of the IDA Head 
of non-specialists in the industrial field. Thus, he has appointed those below him in the career 
ladder, on the basis of confidence, not on experience and efficiency. Moreover, everyone 
opposing the IDA Head in opinion has been dispensed. He has only retained the hypocrites as 
stated by Ac-G-03. 
It could be concluded from the foregoing that the absence of a scientific and legal system for 
accounting experts and work teams, leads not only to lack of seriousness and professionalism 
causing weakness of the product, but also helps choose work teams and consultants on the 
basis of loyalty and obedience, not expertise and professionalism. Therefore, things get even 
worse with the exclusion of professionalism of the work teams. That is after unloading the 
governing legislative framework from the professional content. Consequently, the gap 
between the planning process and what it produces, and sustainability, increases. 
7.4. Marginalizing science 
Governments before the Twenty Fifth of January Revolution followed wrong and 
indiscriminate policies (Qusya.com, 2010) in making administrative decisions in isolation 
from the professional and scientific knowledge (Almasalla, 2009). Several problems that are 
not familiar to the Egyptian society emerged and the inability of governments to deal with 
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 The IDA head, referred to in these paragraphs, is currently serving his prison term after his punishment on 
charges of corruption (Mohammed et al., 2011, Ismail, 2011). 
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these problems appeared as well. Such problems are: solid waste, fertilizers, loaf of bread, 
land speculation (Qusya.com, 2010)، high rates of road accidents (Almasalla, 2009) and 
others. On the economic side, the rich class increased at the expense of increasing the number 
of the poor (Qusya.com, 2010). On the community level, the chaos hit the community as one 
of its features, which the Government bears responsibility for it as a result of its wrong 
policies. The urban situation worsened to the point that Egypt occupied the first rank globally 
in terms of poor urban planning (El-Sherief, 2011). In an interpretation of this, experts and 
specialists (Almasalla, 2009, Appadi, 2010, Ismaeil, 2008) have loaded the successive 
governments, especially the last one, the responsibility for that. This is due to the absence of 
governmental planning based on professional and scientific knowledge, as well as absence of 
the systematic method in the management of crises and urgent problems (Appadi, 2010). This 
in its entirety is a result of the minimization of the levels of respecting science to the 
maximum grades in light of these governments. That was reflected in the weakness of the 
budget allocated to scientific research (Qusya.com, 2010). It was accompanied by lowering 
the level of education and thus the level of graduates, and they became ineligible to enter the 
work market (Qusya.com, 2010). In addition to the low level of graduates, the systematic 
method for the planning for human resources was absent (Ismaeil, 2008) which increased the 
severeness of the problem due to the separation between the education system and the work 
system. This led to problems of weak trained workers referred to by many specialists from 
the industrial sector (Ac-G-03, Ac-55, De-28, De-43, De-64). 
In light of this general introduction on the Egyptian community, which explains the effect of 
the absence of science and the systematic method in planning on life in Egypt before the 
revolution and up till now, this section explains the nature of the problem in the actual 
framework of the planning process of IZs. It also explains the effect of the lack of respect for 
science and poor education on the chaos of planning. These as a whole are important complex 
factors, which have lead up to one another, leading ultimately to non-sustainability of the 
process responsible for the planning of IZs in Egypt. 
7.4.1. Lack of respect for science: 
Alsharkawy (2009) speaks generally about the missing respect for science in Egypt. He 
invokes the argument of a contemporary writer defining the problem of scientific research 
and the crisis origin. The writer says: "Our countries will not develop unless the minds of 
scientists become more expensive than the feet of football players." Our country does not pay 
the least interest to scientific research and does not consider it as a priority. The previous 
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regime ignored science and allotted less than 0.23% of the GDP to the scientific research 
(Muhammad, 2010). Also, the regime outcome of bureaucracy stood as an obstacle in the 
way of any real contribution to the march of scientific progress (Alsharkawy, 2009). Ac-55 
agrees with this, referring to the Egyptian regime which used to spread lies and false 
arguments to justify the bad situation of the country. He said: 
India, for example, adopted the new thought. However here in Egypt, in each visit 
for the President, he says from where I shall bring you money. The population 
growth takes away everything.  How can he say so?! We are no more than 80 
million while India is one billion and one tenth ... Japan’s population is 140 
million and its potentials are not equal to 10 percent of ours. Oppositely, there are 
areas of earthquakes, tornados and lots of other problems. However, they know 
how to use their existing powers and plan their use in a sound systematic manner. 
(Ac-55) 
Ac-66, Ac-G-11, and Ac-G-03 agreed with Ac-55’s argument. Ac-G-03 added that lacking 
interest in science, represented in the views of qualified specialized consultants or technical 
studies, has reached the planning decision-making circuit at all its levels. This has produced a 
culture of disregard for the views of consultants and academics, considering them living in an 
ideal world, and that their views are theoretical and separated from reality. He said:  
I am giving you an idea about the situation. These words are from officials. They 
say: the University Professors’ talk has no relation with reality.... Do not consider 
the University Professors’ talk as we are not taking a lecture. We are not living in 
Utopia! (Ac-G-03) 
It should be noted that the majority of consultants and academics working in the field of 
planning are also professionals. They have experienced applied work in planning; either 
through their private offices or through studies and research units in their Universities. 
Therefore, they should never be considered separated from practical and professional work as 
it is wrongly thought in governmental bodies as mentioned by Ac-G-03. Thus, Ac-G-03 and 
Ac-55 confirmed that officials only look for the consultant who accepts their opinions, as 
discussed in Section (7.3.3.3), and adapt them in a scientific way or transform their views into 
the required technical product. Here comes the function and importance of the consultant for 
officials. They do not participate in decision-making but they formulate techniques that serve 
this decision. Then Ac-G-03 explained this saying: 
I myself have many arguments with the Head of the IDA. At the end he tells me 
thank you, we do not need your help, and we know what we are doing.... The 
consultant in Egypt is just like a burials wagon. They ask him to go to Aswan and 
he does. He goes and the dead is to be buried and thus he did his work. It is not 
his concern whether the dead person goes to Heaven or to Hell. They need the 
consultant in technical issues, but the decision-making is theirs. The consultant 
only has to bury. What does a consultant really mean? It means taking my opinion 
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not as they are doing. He does not like me, why? This is because in every meeting 
I say the right thing to do. But the rest of the Egyptians obey him to achieve their 
own interests. (Ac-G-03) 
In addition to the governmental bodies way in looking to and dealing with consultants and 
their scientific views, they do not care as well about technical studies or expressing a 
technical opinion on the specialized studies presented to them (Ac-G-11, Ac-G-03, Ac-66). 
This can also be understood from a statement of Ac-G-38, one of the GOPP president’s 
consultants. He talked about the bodies being not interested in expressing their technical 
views in general and specifically regarding industrial projects manual. He said: 
No, unfortunately. All bodies including the EEAA are blamed for being not 
interested in studying or reading to express specialized technical opinion from 
their point of view. We as the GOPP do not receive any comments from all 
authorities. (Ac-G-38) 
Therefore, and in addition to ignoring science by the governmental bodies, it is further 
understood from the previous statements that the major category of consultants employed by 
these bodies are inclined negatively to ignoring professional knowledge. They have accepted 
to be a mere tool in the hands of decision-makers. They use them to justify their decisions 
which are not based on systematic study. Added to these consultants is a large numbers of 
researchers who have accepted for their researches to be just a way leading to promotion 
without having the real scientific payoff. This is what Alsharkawy (2009) sees, away from the 
political regime, that the scientific, intellectual and media elites have shares also in ignoring 
professional and scientific knowledge in our country (Alsharkawy, 2009). Ac-G-03 also 
monitored part of this, referring to planners who are forced by the general economic life of 
Egypt to deal passively and without professionalism with the work presented to them, 
targeting financial return. Ac-G-03 explained this saying: 
An IZ project we were judging these days; a sketch of 87 km 2 in an A4 paper 
without any details. Can you imagine that there is not even a large panel? Please 
imagine that is the way it is presented to you.... Then, when I go to the consultant 
trying to explain it to him; he says I did not take my money! I just want my 
money and please stop bothering me! (Ac-G-03) 
So, concern for science and diligent work has become a culture that does not exist. The 
concerns have focused more on the fees due to what the country faces in general from a bad 
economic situation. This situation has hit everyone and forced them to do so. Confirming this 
meaning, Ac-G-03 completed his former speech saying: 
You have to bear in mind that science, industry and planning do not provide 
suitable jobs in this country. You are now interested about the issue because you 
are making postgraduate studies. As soon as you get the Doctorate degree you 
will look for what brings you money. You will not live as a Messenger for 
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industry. Let's be clear and honest. We have to excuse them as they are all doing 
the same thing. 
From the above we can say that the nature of the former regime and the absence of political 
will towards progress and advancement, its ignorance of science and its expenditure, and 
economic deterioration of the country, are all factors that have left a significant impact on 
spreading a culture of general lack of interest in science, professional and scientific 
knowledge and those in charge of it. This culture has been reflected in disrespecting the 
views of consultants, and the lack of interest of officials and experts in performing and 
reviewing specialized technical studies. This has affected and has been affected at the same 
time by the education weakness in general and planning education as part of this total. The 
next section discusses the issue of planning education. 
7.4.2. Planning education is scientifically incapable 
The educational system in general has been affected the most by this culture of ignoring 
science. It has had a significant impact on lack of efficiency, scientific and professional 
capacity of graduates and their ability to give within the labour market specially the trained 
technical labour (Ac-G-11, De-28, De-43, De-64). Ac-G-03 also agreed with this opinion and 
said: "We are used to say that the Egyptian labour is cheap. It is no longer cheap. There is no 
labour at all, neither skilled nor technical. This is because the level of your education is 
falling." (Ac-G-03). What has happened to the education in general has hit the planning 
education in particular. Many argued that there is a great imbalance in the system of planning 
education, like Ac-66, Ac-01, and Ac-44 along with Ac-55 who said: 
The planning education is imbalanced, in definitions, methodologies, research 
and identifying problems. Thus how will the resulting planner look like? (Ac-55) 
Given the existing defect of the planning education system as understood from the previous 
statement, Ac-55’s question seems logical about the form, and scientific and practical ability 
of the planner as product of this dysfunctional system.  Having Egypt obtaining the first place 
globally in 2009 in terms of poor urban planning (El-Sherief, 2009) is an answer the question. 
The planner have taken part of the responsibility about this failure, along with other elements 
previously mentioned like a corrupt system missing political will for progress and 
advancement. Thus, scientific knowledge has been kept away from decision-making circles 
with a common culture of lacking respect for science. These factors have produced together 
chaos of planning at all levels of decision-making. The next section discusses the chaos of 
planning detailing reasons and factors leading to this chaos and the effects on the planning 
process of the IZs. 
Chapter 7 
239 
 
7.4.3. Chaotic planning: the governing factors 
It is understood from the previous sections that the Egyptian urbanization suffers from chaos 
caused by the lack of respect for the professional and scientific knowledge. This culture 
resulted in, with other political and financial factors, the weakness of the educational system 
in general and the planning education system in particular, which has led to the weakness of 
the work system of planners. This system has missed the practical framework of concepts, 
rates, methodologies, and integrated visions, and hence become characterized by traditional 
thoughts. Within this context, political decision, influenced by security concerns and 
maintaining the regime, has controlled planning decision at its various levels. All of these 
variables have taken planning in Egypt away from sustainable development.  
In light of this introduction, the following sections discuss the two main factors that have had 
the greatest influence on the chaos of planning: the political decision controlling the planning 
process and the scientific weakness of the planners’ work system. 
7.4.3.1. Planning decisions are politically driven 
People in power  have a strong influence on guiding the decisions within the planning process 
or on changing the planning during implementation (NGO-30). Many cities and major 
projects in Egypt were created by political decisions, without any study (De-G-57). 
Therefore, problems abounded due to such decisions. Perhaps the most prominent of which 
are the problems of the destruction of the natural environment. That is as what happened in 
Helwan from the concentration of polluting heavy industries according to the political 
decision (Ac-G-11). Ac-55 explained the error of the method followed in such a case, saying: 
The political decision was: We want a labour conglomerate in Helwan so that if a 
counter-revolution evolved they can stand against it. Now they are repeating the 
same process ... Therefore, allocation of industry, both now or earlier is not based 
on scientific knowledge. (Ac-55) 
Therefore, the political decision is in control in order to preserve the regime security and 
stability, even if by violating the systematic study. In addition to the political dimensions 
guiding the planning decision-making, according to Ac-G-03, corruption has had the biggest 
influence on guiding the decision-making. He also gave a number of examples, see appendix 
(XIV) for some of them. He meant by giving these examples to say that planning decisions 
are made in a compliment to those with political and financial powers. Despite the knowledge 
of the officials that these decisions are legally wrong, it does not stop them from passing 
them. He then said it clearly: “Everything can be illegally accessed just for being someone 
powerful” (Ac-G-03). Ac-55 agreed with that. He added that this is clear and continuing in 
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order to guide decision making towards what achieves personal gains for those in charge. He 
said in this regard: 
There is no appropriate legislative framework that is attributable to the 
institutional framework which is no longer objective. The institutional framework 
has become personal or subjective based on what satisfies this Minister or that. 
Otherwise, when there is a struggle between various forces and parties that is 
governed by a set of interests, along with rampant corruption, the decision is then 
based on satisfying this investor or that or that. Thus it is cancelling the existing 
scientific framework. (Ac-55) 
Therefore, struggle between powers, controlled by interests and corruption, makes the 
decision subjective to please influential people in the absence of legislation and legal 
deterrence. Therefore, it is assumed that who puts laws, adjusts the irregularities and moves 
the lawsuits against the violators, which is the executive authority, is the first to violate the 
law pursuant to the interests of influential people. Thus, absence of legal deterrence helps the 
personification of the legal and political decision and its direction to serve the interests of 
influential people along with neglecting scientific logic and studies ensuring efficient 
planning leading to chaos of the planning process and messy product. 
7.4.3.2.  Non-scientific planners  work system 
Away from the factors considering decision-makers as the cause of chaotic planning, there is 
a number of other factors within the work system of the planners themselves, and especially 
scientifically. In this context, the scientific framework for planning in Egypt could be 
analyzed and the most important planning factors affecting its randomness could be 
identified. These factors start, at first, with the absence of a comprehensive framework of 
concepts, planning methodologies and integrated visions, where, the dependence becomes on 
individual visions and interpretations. Ac-55 said in this regard: "There are no agreed 
methodologies. Everyone makes up their own ones. Even the policy, visions and strategic 
levels; they are all messed up" (Ac-55). Ac-G-03 confirmed this adding that there is not any 
integrated vision of the national planning, as well as for the different sectors citing the 
example of the industrial sector, where he said: 
There is no complete vision. Nothing integrated is applied on planning. For 
example there is no industrial map for Egypt ... The problem started because the 
late (GIA) used to build plants and they became endemic due to the central 
system. When the municipalities started operating, every governor having a piece 
of land has taken the approval of the Prime Minister and adopted this land as an 
IZ without a plan of the State associating all of this together... Then, a problem 
emerged in funding the infrastructure of the governorates. They got to overdraft 
from the National Investment Bank (NIB).  They wanted to extend to the region, 
no matter what happens, without a plan and without anything. Money has been 
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withdrawn but without any yield. Thus, they reformulated the authority and the 
IDA was established.... I will give you a very simple example in Beni Suef in 
Bayyad ElArab. There is an IZ about 800 acres and next to it is New Beni Suef. 
Both of them did not work... There are 2.5 km between them. Then at a distance 
of 5 km they established a heavy industries zone including cement factories. 
Therefore, there is not a general view at the governorate level... What about at 
Egypt’s level! ... Allocating IZs in Egypt is without a general vision. There is no 
map. Thus it is not based on high level studies. They are all just whims. (Ac-G-
03) 
Ac-G-11, confirming and commenting on the absence of the overall planning vision, the 
planning and the sectoral coordination, said: "Do we have sectoral planning? Is there cross 
cutting issues? Does the IDA have Plans for IZs in Egypt, their expectations developments 
and ambitions? Does this happen in coordination with other agencies? There is nothing of this 
at all. (Ac-G-11) 
Second: Indicators and planning rates used in the decision-making are non-scientific: The 
decision-makers depend - because of their eagerness to improve their appearance not to 
achieve real development - on using indicators that mostly measure quantity and not quality. 
This often leads to poor performance and the emergence of problems. Ac-55 gave an example 
on this from the reality of the indicators used in water supply, where he said:  
Indicators used in planning are all nonsense... What does the Index equal? Total 
water production on the total population.... How can I increase the total 
production? The existing stations have been expanded! Thus the deprived areas 
are still deprived. When the stations were expanded, the water pressure increased. 
The pipes were not able to carry. So, they exploded because the pipes follow the 
governorates not the National Authority for water. The result is that you spent 12 
billion to replenish groundwater by sweet water. What is the yield? It is the same. 
The water is available for 97% of the citizens while the actual recipients are 63% 
... Thus, you chose a wrong indicator and you used it incorrectly as well. 
However, when assessing the performance, they say we raised the performance, 
we added a station! 
Third: Traditional thought of planning experts: Experts refer this to the planning thoughts 
circulation system being not based on scientific research and modern ideas (Ac-G-03, Ac-55).  
Here, Ac-55 drove an example on a research he has supervised. This research has questioned 
about 40 Professors of planning, experts and government officials about the reflection of the 
dramatic development of information technology and communications on the methodologies 
of urban planning. Most of the answers were confined to the fact that the communications are 
steps within the process of preparing the physical planning for a project. He said literally 
about their answers: 
Our relationship with communications is that when we finish the Master Plan, we 
give it to a communications expert to make us the telephones network " (Ac-55). 
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He denounced the experts’ failure to appreciate the lifestyle change accompanying the change 
in the evolution of communication and its use in practice. For example, in e-commerce and its 
impact on the change of the productive base, this inevitably will change the urban planning 
thought. However, they did not recognize that. However, Ac-G-03 believes that many experts 
surrounding decision-making circuits are even not aware of the traditional thought in 
planning at the first place. He then cited an example of a governor along with his experts not 
understanding the planning thought of IZs and the priority of marketing in conjunction with 
planning, not after implementation as they do. He said:  
Let’s take an IZ with established infrastructure but without plants. They say we 
were not able to market it, the problem is in the marketing ... We as a governorate 
work on a local level! (Ac-G-03). 
Ac-G-03 denounced first their delay in marketing and secondly their awareness that the 
governorate deals in marketing only at a local scale.  
To conclude, the general framework of the planning process is infected with chaos missing 
the respect for the professional and scientific knowledge. This chaos is primarily due to the 
lack of the political will to bring about renaissance and development. The political decision, 
directed by security reasons and maintaining the regime, controlled the planning process. The 
political decision became characterized by subjectivity not objectivity and it became in 
service of politically and financially influential people. As for the scientific aspect of the 
system, its framework lacked the comprehensiveness of concepts, planning methodologies 
and integrated visions. Indicators and planning rates also lacked the right scientific basis. The 
traditional thinking dominated planning experts. This chaos led to the delinquency of the 
planning process away from sustainable development and the environment lacking proper 
planning which is the most important factor that maintains respecting the considerations of 
preserving the environment. The next section shows the effect of chaotic planning on the 
environment and the absence of sustainable development. 
7.4.4. Chaotic planning and its impact on sustainability 
There is no doubt that the human needs and activities have negative impacts that affect, to 
varying degrees, the elements of the biosphere system. This effect increases reaching up to 
environmental disruption, in the case of chaotic planning and not considering the 
comprehensive vision that takes into account the environmental dimensions. As indicated 
earlier, from the most prominent factors that led to chaotic planning and had the most 
negative impact on the environment is the absence of governmental planning based on 
systematic study (Hesham, 2010). It resulted in a large increase in the population pressure  on 
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the urban area of the Republic, that is only around 6% of the total surface area of Egypt 
(Hashem, 2010). This  has led to chaos in the urban growth and the spread of slums (Hesham, 
2010) on the expense of the scarcity of agricultural land and, as well as overuse of the 
components of the natural environment, correlated with the disruption of ecological balance 
at the local and regional levels. It has also led to the failure to fulfil the utilities service and 
upgrading them especially in the countryside. Thus, the gap between rural and urban areas 
has increased (Hashem, 2010). Ac-G-11 - Consultant of the GOPP Head and the President of 
the General Secretariat of New Cities in the GOPP - added that the economic vision adopted 
by the State dealt with the environmental considerations as obstacles, and thus disabled them. 
He demonstrated that this was through the non-inclusion of strategic EIAs, despite their 
benefits and effects on the planning process, within the studies to be prepared for the new 
cities. He said in details:  
The economic goal was preventing you form putting requirements that might 
seem as obstructing the development process ... There were nothing in the TOR 
[terms of reference] for Sadat and 10th of Ramadan cities, about the EIA. I was 
asking, at which level do you ask about the environmental impacts here? We must 
study the strategic impact assessment (SIA). They will identify the possible types 
of industries or give very large mitigation majors on the planning level. The 
drainage of different industries cannot go together. Thus you need more than one 
network. So, studying the details of industry affects the planning. However, we 
do not apply this here. Our main concern is to create IZ without environmental 
considerations, without knowledge ... The institutional setup needs adjustment as 
well ... In my doctorate, I have reached the fact that the strategic assessment is a 
tool that our system does not accommodate its application. Where, its application 
depends on sound planning that we do not have. (Ac-G-11) 
Therefore, the economic vision ignoring the environmental considerations, in addition to the 
absence of proper planning based on a systemic study, are all factors adopted by and 
weakened the institutional framework making it disabling for the application of SIA. 
According to Ac-55, even the EIA studies for individual establishments are also without 
feasibility under the institutional framework marginalizing the systemic study, saying: 
Allocation of industry, whether now or earlier, has not been based on a systemic 
study.... Then, the Ministry of Environment requests an EIA to decide. On what 
basis are they going to decide? Since they do not locate the place or the function, 
on what basis are they going to object? ... For example, Agrium plant in 
Damietta: The MSEA objected after what? After the MTI and the GOPP 
approvals on the location which is a change in land use as it is a political decision 
of the governorate somehow. The IDA approved aiming eventually to attract the 
largest possible amount of investments. The MSEA objected based on a 
considerable environmental dimension? Well, if they have coordinated together 
initially, nothing of this could have happened. (Ac-55) 
Chapter 7 
244 
 
Therefore, the failure to follow the systematic study to develop a comprehensive vision for 
the allocation of industry in participation and coordination with other stakeholders especially 
the MSEA has weakened the process. The MSEA’s role was delayed until after proceeding of 
the project making it useless and hence, the project was implemented despite objections from 
the MSEA (Ac-55). In response to pressure exerted by the political leadership, the MSEA 
was eventually forced to agree after making non effective adjustments of the project31 (Ac-G-
03, Ac-55). Ac-G-11 stressed on the absence of the systematic study especially in the 
relationship between the residential areas and the IZs, where, the political decision governs 
the choice of the locations of these uses without planning studies. This ultimately leads to 
natural disasters. Ac-G-11 derived the example of an IZ and its extensions in Sixth of 
October City, which turned into a contaminated island surrounded by residential areas from 
most quarters. Furthermore, industries of all types and environmental levels,  from polluting 
to the light polluting in addition to pharmaceutical industries, have been distributed randomly 
in direct response to supply and demand of land that changes the prepared plans are supposed 
to consider the environmental considerations (Shalaby, 2003b, En-65, En-G-60). De-G-57 
and En-G-52, environmental officials in six of October City, confirmed on that schemes were 
amended in a response to demand on land that is driven by the growing self interest and 
corruption.  In details De-G-57 said: 
However, I am afraid to say that at the end self interests prevail on all of this. Do 
you understand? It means; it is possible that the scheme has a specific zone for a 
specific activity; they change it without care.... For example, an area was planned 
as stores zone. Suddenly, the IDA decided to make it for manufacturing plants. 
This is because they do not have more land allocated for industry.... The IDA 
started implementing directly without bearing in mind what this land was planned 
for or its relationship with the surrounding. (De-G-57) 
Responding to the demand on industrial land in the way shown above does not only lead to 
negative environmental relationships between activities, but also, depending on this way on 
the expense of systematic study in industrial allocation, leads to disruption to applying the 
environmental methods in planning. Ac-G-03 agreed with this argument considering it as a 
major cause for disabling the implementation of separate industrial drainage in IZs, adding:  
Nothing integrated is presented in planning. For example in an IZ, as you supply 
pipes for water, drainage, electricity and pressure, you must check how the 
industrial drainage will be. You find that they tell you we do not know what will 
resettle as it is according to supply and demand... They are supposed to study 
marketing first and know exactly the types before planning. Unfortunately, 
nothing of this happens! (Ac-G-03) 
                                                          
31
 The project location has been changed after severe public pressure exercised by the people of Damietta. 
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So, it could be understood so far that the planning decision makers in the IDA depend on the 
thought of supply and demand of land in industry allocation. It lacks the application of 
scientific thinking in constructing a comprehensive vision that considers different 
dimensions. It also lacks balancing between marketing and planning that could achieve 
flexible vision could to be implemented but respects the environment as far as possible. 
However, this does not take place because of the random modification of planning in 
accordance with supply and demand. This blocks the application of standards and methods of 
environmental protection especially regarding IE. En-65, sustainable development expert, 
sees a difficulty in the application of IE under the existing way of planning and the constant 
change in schemes. He said: 
Upon trying to apply the thought of IE, for example, when implementing an IZ 
for foods industries and you find that the foods are not highly demanded. Thus, 
some chemical industries are to be involved as well. That is indiscipline! If you 
want to make correct planning and be committed to a goal such as the IE and 
things like that, you must be committed first to the plan. But which plan? You 
need first to conduct studies, marketing and so on, to decide which activity you 
are capable to attract. You must make a perfect study to ensure that... Your 
thought must be clear. Unfortunately, this is not found. (En-65) 
He also added another example of the intellectual poverty surrounding the planning decision-
makers, where he said: 
Ain Sukhna does not have water.... This is one of the problems which we have 
discussed, that establishing an IZ in Ain Sokhna is something very nice and the 
site is very good, near to the harbour and Cairo. The problem is the settlement of 
many industries with intensive water use while already there is no water. Paper 
Industry, Steel Industry and others have been located there. All of these were put 
in a place where the water is scarce. This is a kind of intellectual poverty. (En-65) 
Thus, the lack of understanding of the planning decision-maker to the issue of water scarcity 
and then the resettlement of intensive water consuming industries, certainly mean a lot of 
problems, whether environmental or economic. The decision makers were to avoid such 
problems, if they have realized the nature of the problem in a scientific way. 
On another complementary hand32, in light of lacking integrated comprehensive planning, 
Egypt has received many dirty industries with severe damage to the environment - such as the 
case of the Canadian Agrium factory referred to before, and many cement plants, etc. This 
has increased the destruction of the environment in addition to the economic loss as a result 
of the spread of diseases associated with industrial pollution and the deterioration of the 
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 Given the difference in the vision towards development and environment in Egypt as a developing country 
than that in the developed countries, and with the growing role of the environmental NGOs in developed 
countries and the decline of their role in Egypt. 
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general health of the population. Also, with the absence of the political will to promote, 
develop and achieve sustainable development (Tolba, 2008) and the weakness of the 
country's economy (Hashem, 2010), the system of education has been weakened and 
environmental illiteracy has spread33, not only at the public level but also at the level of work 
teams in the field of planning (Tolba, 2008). So, it was a natural result to marginalize the 
solutions respecting the environment as well as the mechanisms of its protection in the 
planning process (Hassan, 2011). Ac-G-11 gave an example; if we consider the analysis of 
the environmental problem we find that; experts do not study it in the proper way with 
perception and awareness of all the dimensions of the problem. He added:      
Upon discussing the problem of the cement factories in Helwan; all experts have 
been talking about zone 1 surrounding the plants and the disaster there. The 
problem is that people who are more vulnerable are not those around the factory 
but those farther; those receiving the lighter atoms which they inhale. Therefore, 
your analysis and awareness of the problem and its dimensions are not correct. 
You are dealing only with the apparent problem, the largest dust particles fall 
there and cause visual pollution. However, those are difficult to inhale. The health 
problem could be greater at the zones 2 and 3. Moreover, dealing with each case 
needs different ways in dealing and this does not happen. (Ac-G-11) 
Therefore, as a result of the analysis of the problem in this way, dealing is only with the 
apparent pollution. Meanwhile, the effects of the lighter weight pollutants are the most 
dangerous to health. This is other than the study of only the prevailing direction of the 
polluting winds to avoid its negative impacts on the surrounding. The issue is that the 
prevailing direction could be up to 40% of the year, what about the rest of the year? The 
change of wind directions during the year is not considered at all. This leads to many negative 
environmental impacts on the affected areas (Shalaby, 2003b).  
To concluded, the nature of the former regime and the absence of a political will to achieve 
progress along with the economic downturn and thus ignoring science and its expenditure, 
have led to weakening the education system and spreading a culture of disrespect of science 
and of those caring about it. This has been associated with controlling the planning process 
by the political decision that is oriented by security purposes to maintain the regime. Because 
of all of this, the planning education has weakened. Thus, the framework of the planning 
process has become infected by chaos missing the respect of the professional and scientific 
knowledge. Moreover, under the pressure of economic life, the planning teams and experts 
dealt passively and without professionalism with the work presented to them and with the 
technical justification for the wishes of the decision-makers. Scientifically, the framework of 
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the planning process lacks encompassing the planning concepts and methodologies, 
integrated planning visions, and planning standards and indicators based on sound scientific 
base. In light of this, a comprehensive vision for industry allocation has been lacked that has 
helped - with political pressures driven by corruption - in delaying the environmental 
agencies’ role to a stage where it is difficult to take or enforce the right decision. They could 
not prevent the implementation of contaminating projects and the environment has been 
negatively affected. In addition, lacking proper and integrated planning resulted in a weak 
institutional framework and so, it has become unable to accommodate the application of the 
SIAs. In addition, traditional planning thought has dominated the planning experts and even 
so, the adopted planning has been changed in response to industrial demand that dominated 
the competent IZs administrative bodies. This has produced serious negative ecological 
relationships between land uses as well as blocking the application of methods and 
mechanisms for environmental protection, such as; separate industrial drainage or central 
treatments stations. Furthermore, the lack of environmental awareness has dominated the 
planning specialists leading to a failure to study the environmental problem according to the 
systematic study and to properly realize all the dimensions of the problem. This has resulted 
in the absence of solutions that respect the environment and thus environmental disruption 
increases. The planning process is, therefore, away from sustainable development. 
7.5. Corrupting the society and marginalizing its will and role 
Mubarak’s military regime dealt with the Egyptian civil society with a lot of ignorance by 
several legal, legislative, and institutional means, including preventing funding (Mansour, 
2006). It did not stop at this, it reached up to falsifying the people’s will, choice and 
participation in the political life. Perhaps the election fraud at all its levels in a crude way 
using several means including bullying, buying votes, preventing the emergence of parties  
and authoritarianism on the society by the emergency law which lasted throughout the 
Mubarak ruling period, attest as the best proof on this issue (Gharieb, 2011, Abdesalam, 
2010, El-Ebrashi, 2010). Falsifying the people’s will had a severe effect on a moral 
degradation in the citizens awareness by giving them the example in the legitimacy of 
forgery, deception and bullying. It also created a general feeling of hopelessness of change 
and reform. This led to colouring the majority of the society by negativity, indifference and 
staying away from political participation, since they are unable to influence with their vote in 
the legislative council. In addition, the election fraud largely spoils the governmental bodies 
supervising, organizing, and implementing the elections as they become contaminated by 
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flawed practices. Those belonging to these bodies get used to these practices and lost 
confidence in their leaders who ordered to, hinted for, or covered up fraud. With repetition, 
these practices turned into a lasting governmental and popular behaviour accepting lying, 
fraud, bribery, bullying and other scourges of unfair and unclean elections (Almahdy, 2011). 
Hence, this regime has spread by its practices corruption in all the files of the Egyptian 
people, causing an imbalance civil society (Moussa, 2011). The Egyptian environment had 
not been an exception or spared from corruption especially by those with power and influence 
(Hafez, 2011). Abuses of the authority and lack of respect of law in general and the 
environmental law in particular, along with the country's low economic status, may have 
messed up the Egyptian society contrary to its civilized, cultural, and religious nature 
respecting the environment and its protection. This inherited a general culture of lack of 
concern for the environment and sometimes hostility by those in positions of responsibility. 
However, variant Egyptian groups remained coherent fighting images of marginalization, 
forgery, and corruption despite the harassment and persecution. They have been working for 
to break this authoritarianism. The last of their trials and the strongest was the protest on the 
25th of January. The accumulation of internal anger helped to develop the protest to be 
wrapped and embraced by millions of the Egyptian people. This led to the popular 
overwhelming revolution that toppled the regime in order to begin a new era in Egypt of the 
people dominance, activating the people’s participation and their decisions to be governing 
(Al-Turkey, 2011, Kamel, 2011, Lau, 2011). 
From the above, a range of factors that helped spoil the society: its view and way of dealing 
with the environment emerges. In addition, the factors that marginalize the societal will in 
general and affect the planning process of IZs in particular as a part of the whole also 
emerges. This section explains these factors in detail concentrating, at first, on the societal 
perception of the environmental protection and the factors shaped this perception. It then 
discusses the role of environmental NGOs in the planning process. This role was 
characterized by individual successes away from the State system. Then it examines the 
factors that led to marginalizing the role of public participation, in particular the 
environmental NGOs. This starts from environmental bodies themselves ignoring these 
NGOs, while they are supposed to be the most caring within the State system to support the 
environmental NGOs. They deliberately failed to involve the environmental NGOs and 
benefit from their roles while referring the NGOs work to themselves. In addition, they did 
not give the needed financial support. This section also deals with the nature of the 
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institutional legislative framework with all what it has from corruption, bureaucracy, lack of 
transparency and slow justice, which have worked not only on marginalizing popular 
participation but also even on disabling the individual initiatives/attempts to reform made by 
the civil society. 
7.5.1. Societal perception of the environment 
This section discusses the issue of dealing with indifference and sometimes hostility with the 
environment and considering its protection a kind of luxury, and explains the factors leading 
to this. As noted earlier, the authoritarian regime along with the economic decline it caused 
that hit most of the Egyptians34, messed up the look of the Egyptian society to the 
environment to be treated with indifference. The issue of bridging the financial vulnerability 
was put in the forefront of the Egyptian society interest. All other walks of life have been 
ignored especially those that cost financially as it is mistakenly understood about the 
protection of the environment. This perception - along with the previously mentioned factors 
- left a significant impact on disrupting the legal deterrence of the environmental 
legislations35. This undermined the role of environmental agencies and made them unable to 
protect the environment in general and to intervene in the process of planning IZs in 
particular to ensure environmental sustainability. In addition to marginalizing the civil 
society, that culture has helped  deepen this marginalization towards the NGOs interested in 
environmental affairs, whether from the society or from the institutional framework of the 
State and also from the environmental agencies themselves. 
7.5.1.1. Between antagonism and indifference 
By knowing that the environmental problem is of a moral nature stemming from the 
awareness and understanding of the responsibility towards the environment and its biosphere 
(Hashem, 2010), Nelly Youssef, the editor and specialist in the Egyptian environmental 
matter at Goethe-Institute Cairo, considered that the culture of environmental protection 
requires reforming the relationship between the citizen and the environment. This is to 
convert it from an adversarial relationship or indifference to the relationship of concern and 
respect. She demonstrated on that by her interpretation of the emergence of new terms used 
by the Egyptian youth such as the word "environment" which if used in the description of 
someone or somewhere, it means a very low level and being characterized by inferiority and 
                                                          
34
 The terms of the authoritarian rule and the laws bypass have been discussed in earlier sections of this chapter. 
So, this section will focus only on the impact of the deteriorating economic situation and its impact on placing 
the environment in a late stage of the priorities of the Egyptian society. 
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 This has been addressed in Section (7.3.1.2). 
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deterioration. This indicates that young people look to the environment around them and treat 
it as being steep/descended and polluted because these young people grew up in a society 
lacking the culture of environmental protection and attention (Youssof, 2011). Ju-48 agreed 
with this stressing in his reply on the eligibility of the public prosecutor in addressing 
environmental violations, without waiting for being presented by the editors of environmental 
records. He confirmed that the public prosecutor is part of the Egyptian people, culturally 
bound, by the nature of the general Egyptian case, economically and socially and he puts the 
environmental issue at low levels of his priorities. He explained this by saying: 
It is his right of course, however where is the culture allowing him to do so? Of 
course there is not... If the prosecutor, in his constituency, finds an incident he 
will address it. The incident has to be in his own culture, not his technical one. He 
must know that it is shameful and this is not available for the environmental 
violations. If I see someone beating a person in the street I will arrest him. Also, if 
I saw someone steeling in my constituency I will arrest him. From my point of 
view or in my general culture this is shameful.... These are the crimes in the 
culture of the Egyptian people. Environmental crime is not considered in its 
natural sense in the culture of the people. The people do not give it any attention 
unless it has a large impact such as harmful or toxic wastes or oil leakage from a 
ship.... The most practical is that he will be accused by being a crazy person. 
Otherwise he will be accused by having a personal interest in doing so. (Ju-48) 
Therefore, the general culture of the Egyptian society towards the environment has laid it 
outside the circle of attention. This is the case even for the judges who are assigned to apply 
the law. In fact, it's up to the point of describing those interested in environment protection 
and those against breaching it, even if it is the core of their competences, by seeking an illegal 
interest or being insane. In a complementary side of the previous scene and in a way 
confirming the same culture and the same way of dealing with the environment issue and its 
respect from another category entrusted with the protection of the law, Ac-G-11 condemned 
the culture of the Egyptian citizen towards the environment. He also condemned the 
ignorance of traffic officers dealing with the control of traffic violations and their lack of 
awareness of the cases of environmental pollution on their plentiful and their negative 
environmental impacts on the health of citizens. He hit an example of an incident that has 
occurred with him. He was described after this by insanity. He said: 
When will we understand? When will we understand that that guy with his car 
emitting pollution is killing us? You find the traffic officers asking about the seat 
belt. In Moqatam there was a traffic commission. A microbus in front of me was 
emitting smoke and lots of gases. The police officers stopped it for a while then 
they let it go. In my turn they did not stop me. However I stopped. One of the 
officers asked me what the matter? I asked him how he let the microbus go. He 
said he did nothing wrong as his license is valid. I wondered if they did not see 
the smoke coming out of the microbus. I told him he is killing us. If I were 
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reckless, thoughtless, and not wearing my seat belt, I will kill myself on my own. 
But the man in the microbus is killing us all. I told the officer you are standing in 
the streets smelling the exhaust, your lung is ossifying and you are dying in your 
place. You are not taking care now but in 10, 15 or 20 years you will take care. 
Another officer standing with him said: Is this guy crazy or what? He meant me 
of course. 
The public negative culture towards the environment along with the law men as part of the 
whole, which is understood from the preceding, does not stop at this point. But the 
intellectual frame of the officials in general and the administrators of the  process of  IZs 
production in particular, lacks the proper awareness towards environmental issues, interest in 
them and their protection (Ac-G-03). Even within the EEAA as the State entity entrusted with 
understanding and caring about the environment and its protection, its leaders, members and 
experts lack the proper environmental awareness (Ac-G-11). Ac-G-11 monitored one of these 
cases. He confirmed its recurrence, where he said: 
I was talking to the Head of the Protection of Nature administration in the EEAA. 
I was telling him about a project with the USAID where we were performing 
Programmatic Assessment. He started making fun of me. He said to the American 
Project Manager: “you are bringing some youth to make fun of us. They are a 
bunch of young people who know nothing. Programmatic! You do not know. It is 
called Environmental Impact Assessment.” They were all laughing. I told him my 
PhD is in this subject. This Programmatic Assessment is applied in the USA since 
the sixties. He has never heard about it despite he is a senior official in the EEAA 
and responsible of nature protection. Then what could we expect from the 
others?! (Ac-G-11) 
The case is the same within the framework of experts and academics involved in planning as 
it is within the EEAA. Without denying the existence of professionals who are conscious of 
the nature of the environment and its protection having the novelty of science in this area, but 
what is common among planners is other than that. They also put the concern for the 
environment and its protection at the end of their lists of priorities, where they do not think 
about it before achieving the issues before it. Cases in this regard are so many, but it should 
be noted that the researcher was not able to monitor them all. However an example of them 
could be mentioned as a model. One of the most important of them is for the understanding of 
a well-known senior academic36 in the field of planning for industry with extensive 
experience and contact with planning and industrial decision-making circuits and thus 
influencing them. This expert said about the protection of the environment: 
"I cannot deceive you. The entire system is wrong. It is too early to speak about 
the environment. The system needs to be adjusted first. Then I can start thinking 
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about the environment. But today you are thinking about the environment while 
the system is already corrupted?!" (Ac-G-03). 
Here, the expert meant it is required to reform the system before considering the protection of 
the environment. It is a common understanding that the protection of the environment 
requires additional cumbersome costs that could not be borne by the system. However, this 
understanding is wrong and contrary to the ideas and mechanisms of sustainable development 
including the IE. These rely on achieving economic savings in conjunction with stopping 
depletion of resources and environmental protection (Shalaby, 2003b). 
It could be concluded that the existence of an overview of the Egyptian society ignores the 
environment and its protection. This view is caused by several factors ranging between the 
corruption and the authority abuses in general and towards the environmental laws 
particularly. This has spoiled the nature of the community in contradiction to its cultural and 
civilization covenantal towards the environment. The deteriorating economic situation of the 
country and its reflection on the economic need of the community members have also helped 
in limiting their attention on improving their living conditions and ignoring what is below; 
the other inferior things. This takes place especially in the case of a prevailing concept that 
environmental protection is a disabling and financially exhausting matter. This is to suggest a 
major reason behind the endemic culture of lack of concern for the environment. The next 
section discusses and interprets the effect of the State’s economic and developmental 
situation on the deployment of such a culture. 
7.5.1.2. Why does this perception exist?  
Egypt has lived before the revolution - which did not bear its fruits yet - a period of 
intellectual concern for the future under pitch-black conditions with no hope of changing 
them. The economic situation and living conditions of the country have reached the rock 
bottom. There were high rates of poverty and unemployment as well as rampant corruption, 
social injustice, erosion of the social structures and deterioration of living standards of the 
lowest income strata of the society (Ezz-Edeen, 2011). In such a situation and by knowing the 
low environmental awareness, which we discussed in the earlier sections, the interest of the 
Egyptian society was limited in searching for a source of living (Al-Wali, 2009). In order to 
achieve it, anything delaying achieving this target was ignored. Voluntary work has been 
ignored in general and in particular volunteering for protection of the environment. In such 
economic conditions experienced by Egypt; rich classes have become devoted to manage 
their money while the poor resorted to work as long as possible to improve the living 
conditions (Eibeed, 2009). What is valid for the society was also valid for the State 
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institutions. Is has detected in the previous chapter how the marginalization of the 
environmental dimension and the role of environmental bodies, was made to avoid any 
disruption of the speed with which the IDA wanted to implement industrial projects for media 
show. 
Starting with the State and its problems, Dr. Farouk Al-Baz, Director of the Center for 
Remote Sensing at Boston University, through his wide scientific and practical experience37, 
proposed a national project named “Desert Development Corridor”. This proposal would 
offer several opportunities in around 2,000 km strip of the Western Desert for the 
development of industry, new communities, tourism, agriculture, and trade. He gave a clear 
statement about the current situation of development of Egypt and explained why the project 
has not been implemented, saying:  
“For whatever reasons, the Government of Egypt was unable or unwilling to 
pursue the project, when I first proposed it 20 years ago.  Because the country is 
presently facing insurmountable problems, the proposal is resubmitted for 
consideration by the private sector – local, Arab and international investors” (Al-
Baz, 2010). 
From Dr. El-Baz’s statement using the word "unwilling" in the interpretation of the cause 
which has prevented the Egyptian government from implementing the project over twenty 
years, it is plausibly understood that the former regime was rejecting the project without 
logical reasons. Also, this nature and way of careless dealing with the serious projects is what 
has led the country, as described by El-Baz, to the suffering of insoluble problems. This is the 
reality of the situation experienced by Egypt in the status quo. If this is the general situation 
of the country, by focusing on the industry being the most development sectors polluting the 
environment, it did not differ much from the previous. It is part of that whole. Ac-55 
emphasized this seeing that what is in Egypt is not to be considered as industrial development 
since the concept was lacking. He said: 
We are here talking about IZs not industrial development. The development issue 
is falling in Egypt. Thus the result is: You are not talking about sustainable 
development or local development. You are not discussing anything of that. You 
are just establishing IZs." (Ac-55). 
Ac-G-03 explained this, saying that what is occurring in Egypt is real estate investment not 
industrial development. He explained this in detail, saying: 
The industrial investor is the serious one making real development. He/she 
imports machines, brings machines, raw materials, and sophisticated means of 
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transport. He employs workers. But what are they doing now? They seize lands 
and keep them until their price increases. Then they sell them. What is the 
evidence on that? ... What is the need for having housing inside the IZ? [Referring 
to the IPs of the industrial developers] They want to diversify their real estate. 
They want to have industrial land along with residential units and so and so ... 
This is real estate. It is a very complicated issue with so many details. Finally, the 
conclusion is that on the ground there is nothing called industrial development. 
(Ac-G-03) 
Therefore, the missing seriousness of the investors and the absence of a binding system for 
them to achieve real development, lead to the conversion of the establishment of IZs to real 
estate investment. The State loses the development expected from this sector. It does not stop 
at this point, but several IZs that huge budgets were spent in providing their utilities and that 
consumed a considerable sum of the State budget,  they do not work (En-65). Many of these 
areas, which are spread in Egypt, for example, contain a drainage system connected to a 
sewage treatment station where the station building is established but without mechanical 
works. It is not free of corruption, which took advantage of the State budget in order to profit 
from it without achieving development (Ac-G-03). In addition to the above, the operating 
areas suffer from many problems - some of which are discussed in the previous chapters - 
have made their system dysfunctional unable to give. In light of these problems the level of 
concern for the environment has inclined. Its protection was considered as a drag or 
disruption that should be bypassed for the sake of a more important issue. In this context, En-
G-52 denounced the investors’ opposition to the long time of decision making by the EEAA 
regarding the EIAs despite that it should not exceed thirty days in accordance with the law. 
She added saying: 
The time required for the EEAA to reply used to be within 60 days. In the new 
law they are 30 days now and the investor still thinks it is time wasting.... A study 
of this type could take a whole year in the developed world. So, we need to 
respect the environment. However, they do not understand and they do not care 
about this. (En-G-52) 
Therefore, if it were not for what has settled in the mind of investors from indifference and 
lack of concern for the environment and its protection, they would not have considered the 
thirty days for an important study such as the EIA, a disruption to the procedures and time. 
Also, if this can be justified as a matter of the investors being often keen to achieve financial 
gains more than anything else; it is unacceptable that the lack of attention to the environment 
and considering its protection a block for the development comes from responsible leaders 
within the institutional framework for the production of the IZs. En-G-60, board member of 
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FSEEDIZ38, a fund which was established recently to repair things in the IZs that have been 
funded but did not work yet, denounced this. He talked about an experience out of many he 
experienced by virtue of his contact with the planning decision-making circuits within the 
planning framework. He said: 
When they started working in Upper Egypt. I told them at the board of the 
FSIDES to take care as they started working, there will be cement industries, and 
there are requests from abroad and so and so... If you please we want to put 
something like the strategic EIA for the industry in Upper Egypt. We need it for 
the environmental pollution especially as we do not have drainage outlets. Every 
factory will finally throw wastes in the Nile river. They told me please do not put 
obstacles in the way! I mean, they wanted to tell me to keep away. This is the 
mentality taking decisions. This is a disaster. (En-G-60) 
The mentality leads to the disaster stated by En-G-60 is that failure to address environmental 
issues in order to avoid disabling the development process. This is the prevailing mentality 
for specialists in the industrial sector governs the IZs planning process and even for the 
experts concerned with guiding them in the urban planning. On a confirmation on the experts’ 
side, a well-known expert, who is close to the planning industrial decision-making circles39, 
his view on the environment and its protection matches the previous case. He said "You are a 
specialist in the environment. Which environment do you want me to consider while I am 
unable to produce, provide salaries for the workers or to export?” Though the logic behind 
this concept could be understood from an economic point of view in a previous time, it is not 
accepted now with new ideas and concepts of SD and IE achieving economic savings while 
protecting the environment (Shalaby, 2003b), see Chapter (3). Such environmental concepts 
are still away from the real practice of planning for the Egyptian IZs. 
It could be concluded that the failure to protect the environment in Egypt is a result of many 
factors. Frome one side, there are the deterioration of the general situation of the country 
specifically economically, and the accumulation of knowledge in the community; individuals 
and institutions; expressed in that the protection of the environment needs budgets for their 
implementation. On the other, there is a lack of environmental awareness among officials and 
experts in the State institutions regarding sustainable development and its modern 
mechanisms and what they offer from solutions to achieve economic savings along with 
protecting the environment. All of these factors produced a culture in the society in general 
and for the dealers within the planning process framework for IZs in particular, that 
environmental protection is a heavy burden ignored by everyone. In the best cases, it is 
                                                          
38
 The Fund for Supporting the Establishment, Extending public utilities and Development of IZs (FSEEDIZ), 
See Appendix (VI) for full details. 
39
 The name and capacity (ability) are withheld to avoid harm to the expert. 
Chapter 7 
256 
 
placed last on the list of priorities. This culture has led to the disregard of environmental 
considerations in the development projects, causing serious damage to the natural 
environment. 
7.5.2. Environmental NGOs: individual initiatives and ignorance by the State 
This section reviews the role played by environmental NGOs in Egypt, the limits and 
dimensions of this role and the various factors that influenced its composition. In light of the 
culture of lack of concern for the environmental protection and with the political 
marginalization of the will and role of the civil society, this culture has helped in deepening 
this marginalization towards the environmental NGOs, whether from the community or from 
the institutional framework of the State. It is even from the environmental agencies 
themselves. Therefore, it is found that the role of the environmental NGOs was limited to 
increasing the environmental awareness of the community or in simple civil works which are 
in their entirety outside the scope of participation in decision-making or participating in the 
environmental assessment of projects. There are many factors that may have affected this 
role. They can be summarized in the ignorance by the authority to the civil society via 
multiple ways. The legislation imbalance, shackling the judiciary, corruption, bureaucracy of 
the institutional framework, stopping the governmental financial support and curtailing the 
civil one, were all the previous authority’s means to extend its control over the civil society. 
7.5.2.1. Individual initiatives away from decision making 
Despite the factors mentioned previously that worked on marginalizing the role of the civil 
society and ignoring the environment and its protection, the voluntary work in the Egyptian 
society has grown recently. However, the individual nature predominated as well as the lack 
of proper organization and adequate study of the dimensions required by this work (Al-Wali, 
2009). The vast majority of the environmental NGOs have targeted increasing citizen 
environmental awareness and preservation of the environment activities. A group of NGOs 
have led good initiatives in addressing a number of issues concerning the preservation of the 
environment (Kandil, 2005). NGO-30 agreed with this last argument. She illustrated a 
number of models, saying: 
The NGOs concerned with the environment have a strong and effective role in 
preventing many of the projects adversely affecting the environment. There are 
many cases such as that of Adel Abu Zahra in Alexandria and preventing the 
drainage into the sea. Also, there is the subject of Agrium and changing the 
location of the factory after the intervention of the environmental civil authorities 
forcing the State to present the project again [after the approval of the EEAA on 
the project] on academic research institutions [mainly the Institute of 
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Environmental Studies where she works]. Then the Institute rejected it. So, the 
project was moved to another location. (NGO-30) 
As understood from the previous statement, the situation of preventing the drainage is for an 
already running project. In addition, the local community did not know about the Agrium 
plant until the time of the announcement of its implementation after the completion of the 
planning stage and appropriations. This is what sought the State, after community objections, 
to the re-evaluation of the EIAs again. Therefore, these projects and others addressed by 
NGOs through their leadership of the community to press for non-implementation of these 
projects, are all attempts that took place at the time of launching the projects or, at best, at the 
time of their implementation announcement. Thus, NGOs do not have the opportunity to 
participate neither in the planning process in general nor in the stages of the environmental 
assessment process as it is supposed (Badr and Alsunbati, 2008). NGO-34, the chairman of an 
NGO operating in the environmental issue, also confirmed, through his experience and 
inadvertent contact with the EEAA and local administrations, on that the principle of 
participation of civil society is treated with ignorance by the Government. According to him, 
the reality of what's happening is that the community is surprised by the projects 
implemented in front of them. Therefore, it was not accessible for the vast majority of NGOs 
except to directing their activities to raise awareness of the environment or in the landscaping 
and similar field work which does not fall within the decision-making process. While other 
NGOs, like ours, were specialized, in addition to the previous works, in resolving the 
relationship between the factories owners and the EEAA regarding the adjustment of the 
positions of the producing factories according to the environmental laws (NGO-34). 
We conclude from the foregoing that the role of environmental NGOs is predominantly of 
individual nature. It is limited to environmental education and environmental civil work. 
Also, this role is completely outside the framework of the planning process in general or the 
environmental assessment process more specifically40. The Government tended to ignore the 
civil society and environmental NGOs in decision-making. There are several factors that 
produced and facilitated this to happen. They could be addressed in the next part. 
7.5.2.2. Ignoring the environmental NGOs’ role: the governing factors 
Behind this ignorance towards the civil society in general and environmental protection 
NGOs in particular, were a set of factors. These factors with their different genres originate 
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from the State: restriction using the legislative legal framework, limiting private funding, 
preventing governmental funding and finally bureaucracy and corruption. 
First: ignorance and restriction using the legislative/legal framework of the State: 
Many people in Egypt, including Ac-55, see that the civil society is "a fanfare without real 
production" because it is forbidden to exercise its job and role. Despite their attempts, but the 
result on the ground almost does not exist (Ac-55). On the hand closer to the environment, 
NGO-34, Head of one of the Environmental NGOs, confirmed on the government neglect of 
their involvement in the hearings to express their opinion on projects, drafting laws or things 
like that. In his response to a question about if the Ministry of Environment has called for 
environmental NGOs to listen to their opinions with regard to the amendment of the 
environment law for the year 2009. He generally denied this and said: "Unfortunately not... 
The Ministry in general does not send to anyone... This is despite I'm there all the time in the 
Ministry and we are one of the most contacted NGOs to them (NGO-34). Ac-55 added on the 
outcome of the view reached by NGO-34 that the government is taking the means and dodges 
to achieve hearing and community participation as a procedure not as a real function. This is 
based to dump the legislation from a binding detailed framework (Ac-55). Then he added:  
The problem is that the legislative framework did not state how to make these 
hearing sessions. You state that the civil society is able to do so and so, but 
actually you are strangling and chaining it. Thus it will not be able to act 
In an interpretation of the restraint exercised against civil society, Ac-55 saw that the two 
sides, through which the civil society can express their opinion and participate actively in the 
resolution, are the legislative and the judicial authorities, while they are popularly disabled. 
The legislative authority is corrupted and does not reflect the community. Its loyalty is to 
those who gave them power. Therefore, it will express them and not the community. The 
judicial power is restricted by the executive authority as well as the imbalance of the 
legislations failing its strength  41 (Ac-55). Projecting more on the legislation governing the 
work of the NGOs and confirming what Ac-55 said, Dr. Essam Obeid sees that with regard to 
the NGOs specifically, they are subject to numerous legislations, whether such legislation 
include or concern the NGOs or what is related to the work of the NGOs themselves. This 
leads to stylistic and functional fragmentation in many cases. That is in addition to the large 
number of amendments and changes in such legislations (Eibeed, 2009) governed by corrupt 
legislative power. In front of disabling the judiciary and the legislature, the only solution to 
the civil society available is civil disobedience. Here, the heavy security stick of the authority 
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interferes and scatters by force. With such obstacles, the civil society has missed its role in 
the formulation of the desired situation and in the participation in decision-making. For this, 
the civil society as a whole preferred to withdraw from the equation. This is confirmed by the 
low overall voter turnout in the elections that used not to exceed 3 to 4%. This is in addition 
to the lack of its role in popular monitoring and follow-up of reform, because in order to play 
this role it must be provided with information allowing them to do so while that is not 
available. There is no law for the circulation of information and transparency is not 
available42. Actually what is applied is the confidentiality of information under the laws 
criminalizing materials disclosure. (Ac-55)  
Second: Limiting funding under the prevention of governmental financial support 
On another complementary hand, preventing funding is of the means of restriction, practiced 
against the civil society. Perhaps it is one of the most important problems facing the social 
service and hampering the work of NGOs and institutions working in this field. Based on that 
funding depends on the NGOs own resources or governmental support (Eibeed, 2009); the 
government has ignored all the NGOs, including the environmental ones and left them 
begging from abroad (Arafa, 2009). NGO-34 was suffering like many of the environmental 
NGOs from lack of funding from the governmental entities and from the environmental 
bodies. He considered this as the most important constraint preventing them from performing 
their role as it is supposed to be (NGO-34). He condemned and showed surprise from the 
EEAA action where instead of supporting them financially, it benefits financially from their 
work, saying: 
When making a conference or anything … We ask for fund from the Ministry of 
Environment to make the conference. Instead of that they rent us the hall holding 
the conference! (NGO-34)  
In addition to the benefit of the government from the NGOs work instead of supporting them, 
the legislation to ensure the regime's control over the civil society is almost preventing the 
donation for the NGOs. The rich who want to donate are trapped by censorship tools and laws 
that criminalize donations to the NGOs without prior official permission (Al-Wali, 2009). 
Third: Bureaucracy, corruption and hindering the efforts of civil society: 
In addition to the above factors influencing the marginalization of the civil society will and 
role; factors like nepotism, corruption and bureaucracy are factors that helped weaken and 
marginalize the role of the NGOs in general and the environmental ones in particular (NGO-
30). There are many cases in this regard and are circulated in the newspapers in Egypt, even 
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before the revolution. We can start with an example combining between the marginalization 
of the role of the community and involving environmental destruction where the corruption of 
the Ministry of the Environment itself contributed in it, where it is supposed to be the keenest 
body on protecting the environment. Several newspapers reported in the year 2010 (Yassin, 
2010a, Lahona, 2010, SaveEgypt, 2010b) that the head of the EEAA, Dr. Mawaheb Abul 
Azm had consented on the establishment of a power station at the north of Giza city. This is 
despite her visa on the final report of the EIA study for the project which objected the project 
and described it as devastating. In spite of that and her full knowledge of its dangers, the head 
of the EEAA - close to the ousted president's wife - has demanded the minister to approve the 
establishment of the station. He in turn approved the project. It is worth mentioning here that 
the objection of the municipalities and the people of the region had been ignored completely 
by the government despite the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company’s requests, the owner 
of the project, to conduct further consultation and hearing sessions to solicit the people’s 
opinion.  However, the unexpected environmental approval had settled it at the expense of the 
health of more than 70 thousand citizens (SaveEgypt, 2010b). In front of such a flagrant case 
of environmental and citizens’ health destruction by the hands of those supposed to protect 
them, and even ignoring the request of the project owner for consultation with the public, the 
question that arises is; what was the action of the local community towards it? Ac-55 
answered this question dropping on a similar case which is the case of Agrium plant and how 
the State dealt with the civil society. He said: 
They imposed it regardless of the people. Why? Because the Canadian 
Ambassador said we have paid $ 25 million bribes and the one who took the 
bribes have to deliver. So at the end he delivered. They hit the civil society into 
the wall [did not care about the civil society] and it was implemented. This is the 
shape of corruption. If you have a legislative framework followed by a clear 
institutional framework specifying the role of the civil society, nothing of this 
would have happened. (Ac-55) 
Therefore, the State’s ignorance of the civil society, and in cases of its objection forcing it on 
what people hate using various means, was prevalent in the former regime. It is explained in 
earlier sections of this chapter that in the cases where the civil society has prosecuted the 
polluting projects - as in the case of Agrium plant - and because of the legislative imbalance, 
the judiciary was handcuffed and could not redress it. Moreover, if the civil society 
demonstrated or protested in a stepping up, the turn of the security stick comes to intervene 
(Ac-55). 
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NGO-34, Head of one of the Environmental NGOs, had plenty of experience with the 
municipalities, the EEAA and other ministries in similar projects taken over by corruption 
and bureaucracy completely disrupting their efforts that continued for consecutive months in 
various attempts. In one of the attempts, after painstaking effort with the various departments, 
that lasted for months, and after obtaining all necessary visas, including the governor’s visa 
personally to extend the NGO with a 1000 trees to beautify a neighbourhood, he was 
surprised during the delivery with seedlings that are not suitable for planting on public roads.     
NGO-34 denounced the corruption and bureaucracy in the State apparatus and said: 
We put the 1.000 seedlings in the incubator. I appointed someone to be 
responsible for them. After that we found that the whole implant has spoiled. 
Some died and some became yellow. I said I will not do anymore work again... 
Unfortunately there are people pushing you forward and others pushing 
backward. There are people who encourage and others who cause terrible 
frustration (NGO-34). 
Therefore, the State was not only restricted to ignoring the civil society, but even the 
individual attempts by some NGOs some of which have been disabled by bureaucracy and 
corruption, and those behind these attempts were frustrated. 
It could be concluded that in light of a culture of indifference towards the environment along 
with political marginalization exercised by the authority against the civil society, the role of 
NGOs interested in environmental issues has been weakened and marginalized. So, an 
individual unorganized character dominated the role of NGOs and it was limited in increasing 
environmental awareness of the community or in the inexpensive civil works. This role 
appeared as well in civil society leadership in the face of some projects that harm the 
environment which surprise them by their implementation or by announcing their 
implementation without the civil society knowledge. The environmental NGOs have been 
excluded from the mechanisms of participation in decision-making or even the participation 
in the environmental assessment of projects. There were many factors that may have shaped 
this role where they all return to the ignorance / limitation by the previous authority to the 
civil society by multiple means. They can be summed up in the following: ignoring the 
environmental NGOs in the hearing sessions, the legislation disruption and not obliging the 
government on participation with others, shackling the judiciary, corruption, bureaucracy, 
lack of transparency in the institutional framework, and stopping governmental financial 
support and limiting the civil one. All of these factors were used by the previous authority to 
extend its control over the civil society and restrict it. 
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7.6. Corruption and Lack of transparency43 
Corruption became extremely rampant in the era of former president and he succeeded in his 
approach making it a prominent feature of his time. This regime encompassed the largest 
gang in the human history where there has never been stealing of land, people, money and 
wealth in such a miserable way before, not even in the eras of occupation (SaveEgypt, 
2010a). It was not strange that people revolted against this regime and placed its symbols in 
prisons on trial on charges of corruption where some of them have been sentenced and some 
of them waiting in jail led by the ousted president (EPP, 2010b, EPP, 2010a). There were 
many manifestations and forms of corruption, but the most serious is the direction of 
decision-making to serve the political and utilitarian goals of those in charge of power and 
their followers (Ju-48). The rampant corruption is due to several factors, starting with poor 
transparency and lack of disclosure of information of the State and its work (EIU, 2010). 
Lacking transparency enabled government officials and senior staff to break the law and 
breach career obligations in order to achieve functional graft without having to disclose the 
information against them (Elmasry, 2010, Yassin, 2010b, Mansour, 2010). The corruption 
was also increased by lacking effective societal accountability (Ac-55, Ahram-Digital, 2011). 
Furthermore, low income level of State staff employees that do not guarantee a dignified life 
for them, has facilitated the success of the authority in achieving its goal to choose officials 
according to the loyalty not for the efficiency. Last but not least, from the most important 
factors that also helped in the spread of corruption and to take an organized approach is; the 
former regime did not activate the anti-corruption laws as well as the international 
conventions and treaties signed by Egypt for the same purpose (Ahram-Digital, 2011). 
Furthermore, the State was not only just withholding information, but it has also legalized its 
confidentiality to protect the totalitarian regime and its interests (Ac-55). This made the 
executive authority not subject to oversight or real and effective accountability 
(AnsarPortsaid, 2010). 
In this context and as part of this whole, this section discusses corruption in the State 
apparatus and its impact on decision-guidance with respect to the environmental issue, and 
especially to disable the only tool to control the planning process for IZs environmentally 
which is the EIAs of the projects. Then it addresses the lack of transparency within the 
planning system as one of the most important factors that facilitated the spread of corruption. 
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7.6.1. Corruption disrupting the EIAs 
The previous introduction indicates the large spread of corruption with multiple images in the 
State apparatus. In a projection on the environment regard; it is found that the Egyptian 
environment is not spared from corruption. In fact, the most prominent picture was in the 
corruption of influential people marginalizing the environmental bodies in their limited role 
stated by the laws. Several attempts of wasting and polluting the environment and bypassing 
the role of environmental agencies such as creating dozens of major projects without any 
EIAs or their contravention, all of this was triggered by superior orders of the previous 
regime that violated the environmental laws and the EEAA decisions (Hafez, 2011). It does 
not stop at violating the environmental agencies decisions but more importantly, as examples 
already indicated previously, the environmental agencies who worked to harm the 
environment. There are examples of major projects approved by the Ministry of Environment 
itself despite rejecting their EIAs (SaveEgypt, 2010b), see Section (7.5.2.2). That was in 
compliance with and loyalty of the leaders of the environmental agencies to the higher 
authority which appointed them without efficiency and left them in their posts despite 
exceeding the legal age (Adel, 2011) leaving a state of anger and discontent within these 
agencies (Ali, 2011). Perhaps the example of Agrium factory was the best evidence of the 
above where, after the rejection of the EEAA to the EIA, the refusal has been changed to an 
approval at the second time. Then it has been presented again, after popular pressure, to the 
Institute of Environmental Studies at the University of Ain Shams and it was rejected. 
However, the government has implemented it in another location. This is confirmed by En-G-
32, NGO-30, and Ac-55. Moreover, Ac-55 returned the approval of the environmental bodies 
in the second time to the corruption, where he said: "This is what happened.  The Ministry of 
Environment accepted the project after its refusal at first, but why? Because it was far from 
bribes. Then when they received their share, they agreed." (Ac-55).  
From within the EEAA; En-G-16, the Director of Legal Department, spoke about not taking 
legal action from the Department of Environmental Inspection against the owners of big 
factories of influence, and stressing that such cases quickly gets the environmental approval 
unlike the normal ones. In the normal cases, the Inspection Department works hard to prove 
irregularities. En-G-16 said in this regard: 
Such heavy factories owned by important people do not come to me at all for 
committing any violations. They apply on a Saturday and get an approval on a 
Thursday. In contrary, when a restaurant applies, the Inspection [Department] ask 
for completion and keep saying: the chimney is crooked or not complying with 
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the specifications, the form was not clear or you have sent it to the district instead 
of the Secretary General, etc. (En-G-16) 
Such way of dealing confirms the spread of corruption in the management of environment 
and the lack of justice among the projects as we discussed earlier. This led Ju-48, through his 
judicial experience, to launch a generic expression describing the difficulty of applying the 
law on the people of influence and power in such an environment that is governed by 
corruption. He said: 
Environmental crimes are not seized, if seized the punishment will not be signed, 
and if signed the punishment will not be implemented. There are defects in the 
environmental law and defects in the devices implementing and following up 
environmental affairs. (Ju-48) 
Therefore, and based on the above and what is discussed in previous chapters; though the 
legal and institutional arrangements44 that Egypt had made to protect the environment 
(declaration of environmental law, the announcement of many natural reserves and the 
formation of a ministry of environment and so on etc.) all of this could be considered 
procedures without real function not reflecting a reality to preserve the environment in Egypt 
(Barakat, 2011). The process of environmental assessment as the only tool for the 
environmental agencies to ensure that the planning process for IZs is on the way for 
environmental sustainability is of no value. This is because the process is controlled by 
corruption and cronyism, not only of the people in power, but even of the State apparatus 
itself and with the assistance and the implementation of the environmental bodies mandated 
by law to protect the environment. All of this puts us in front of the reality of unsustainable 
environmental decision confirming the un-sustainability of the process of IZs planning, which 
means lack of sustainability of the product. 
7.6.2. Lacking transparency is to hinder the application of IE 
Lack of transparency is one of the most important factors, as indicated previously, that have 
helped creating the appropriate atmosphere for the growth of corruption in the institutional 
framework of the State. The planning process of IZs is part of this framework. It is reasonable 
that the characteristics of the entire framework reflect to all its constituents and parts as long 
as the same context exists under the auspices of the totalitarian regime lacking systematic 
study in decision-making process making it chaotic, see Section (7-4). In light of this, lack of 
transparency did not only help protect the corruption, but also prevented planning for the 
future leading to the disappearance of good investment and development context. The 
planning process of IZs is one of these contexts, because of lacking transparency, it lost 
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contact with sustainability and its mechanisms, on top of which; the IE. This section 
discusses the impact of lacking transparency on disabling the application of SD and IE. 
Dr. Ahmed Al-Ghandour, the Egyptian economic expert and Dean of the deans of the Faculty 
of Economics and Political Science, confirmed on the relationship between the totalitarian 
regime and lack of transparency, and its effect on impeding planning for the future, where he 
said: 
"The system in which we live is a totalitarian regime. Power is concentrated in 
the hands of one person. He decides everything and anything. I do not know what 
will happen tomorrow?! It is a fuzzy situation. How can I scientifically predict 
something and plan for it?" (Adem, 2010) 
Engineer Mohie Edeen Zaki, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Iron Alloys 
Company, agreed on that lack of transparency surrounding decision taking, the sudden way it 
takes place with, and being not based on prior planning; encapsulates the development 
process with chaos. This leads to a state of confusion and anxiety hitting those affected and 
they lose confidence in the investment atmosphere, which disrupts the production process 
(Khidr, 2010). In this context, Ac-G-11 - Senior lecturer of environmental planning, 
consultant of the GOPP Head and the President of the General Secretariat of New Cities in 
the GOPP - explained the importance of transparency in participation and dialogue adopted 
by the strategic assessments studies in introducing decisions, the way of their production and 
participating in them, to the citizens. This is completely absent from the planning process in 
Egypt. He said: 
Participation and dialogue are of the most important tools of Strategic Assessment 
through public participation and public hearing... The goal is to keep people 
knowing what will happen... The Strategic Assessment when quoting 
transparency means that you know why the decision is taken. It may be for a 
political, economic or urban goal. However, it is necessary that the goal is clear to 
all parties, for all parties to meet and look at their interests.... We have nothing of 
this. People moving to a place could be surprised after two months later by a 
factory built beside them suddenly. The whole process is failing. (Ac-G-11)  
Therefore, and in light of chaotic decision-making because of the absence of transparency; 
interests conflict and efficiency disappears from the development process. Focusing on the 
environmental affair, En-65, sustainable development expert, argues that the most important 
factors behind the chaos of the planning system are the lack of transparency and sudden 
decision-taking which is not based on study, leading to the inability to extrapolate the future. 
These are the two things that do not agree with IE or enable it. He then added detailing the 
above by saying: 
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Anything in Egypt can be made by anyone and it is right [which means accepted 
as being correct]. Meanwhile, someone else can do it and it is wrong [rejected for 
being wrong].... We are living in fog. Can you tell me about a definite way of 
doing or not doing anything in Egypt?!  The food industries were working. Why 
are they not working now? The cloudiness [lacking transparency and taking 
decisions suddenly] is the cause. Here in Egypt there is a kind of vibration. It is 
hard for you to expect or plan anything for the future.... Therefore, we have a 
problem in planning for something like IE in such a cloudy framework. You do 
not know how it looks like today or how it will look like tomorrow. This is a big 
problem.... If you did not enter the IE at the time of planning, will it succeed 
later? Its probabilities for success are very weak. Planning is the stage where right 
decisions should be taken. I must study what I will reach, and if I did not reach it 
I must know what I will do. Finally what will allow me to gather all the people 
who are feeding on each other, and cooperating with each other [he intended here 
the planning for industrial symbiosis]? I need to have a plan and transparency. If I 
do not have a plan I must forget about achieving anything sustainable or like IE. 
(En-65) 
It is understood from En-65’s statement that the cloudiness, he meant, surrounding the 
decision-making with the sudden application of these decisions, do not coincide with the 
careful systematic planning capable of predicting the future that creates the conditions and 
appropriate context for the application of IE. In an environment experiencing sudden 
uncharted change in the activity such as in the Egyptian context, it is very hard to invite a 
group of industries to be allocated in an IZ in a way qualifying them to take advantage of the 
wastes of each other, see Chapter (3). 
To conclude, lack of transparency and abrupt that dominated the decision-making in the 
institutional framework of the State under the totalitarian regime in order to protect its 
corruption, has established for chaos in the planning system. It has prevented the systematic 
prediction and planning for the future. This context is not sustainable and is disabling for the 
application of IE. 
7.7. Conflicts and lacking coordination 
Under the autocratic governance, a culture of conflict between the State bodies and 
authorities penetrated to gain the satisfaction of the Head of the regime to ensure continuity in 
position and personal gains. Ac-55 emphasized and expressed this briefly and strongly: "The 
institutional framework has conflict of powers between different parties. This conflict was 
motivated by corruption.” (Ac-55). With this conflict each body or sector has monopolized 
decision-making and planning for implementation. Cooperation and coordination between 
bodies and different sectors disappeared and thus the State work system was weakened. In 
light of this, this section reviews the nature of conflict between bodies involved in the 
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production of IZs and the impact of land possession as one of the most important factors 
leading to this conflict. Away from corruption45, as the main factor behind this conflict, 
hampering the State attempts to improve the planning framework and the allocation of State 
land, there is also the impact of the legislative framework on weakening the system of 
coordination between different bodies, in particular within the environmental bodies (En-65). 
This section works on illustrating the impact of the institutional fragmentation mainly in 
powers and their distribution in the institutional framework what has deepened the conflict 
(Ac-G-03, De-G-57). It then discusses the absence of team spirit and cooperation because of 
the sovereignty of individual interest and the impact on disabling the application of 
mechanisms such as IE. 
7.7.1. Jurisdiction over lands and interest conflict 
The mandates on the State territory have varied with different visions of each side and the 
objectives of this mandate (Alalam-Alyoum, 2011). This diversity has witnessed different 
limits and scope of influence for each body and lack of a clear definition of the territory under 
their jurisdiction (El-Wasat, 2010). With the absence of definition and dealing with the 
mandate from an individual perspective not from the perspective of the public interest, the 
interests conflicted and struggle occurred (Ahram, 2010). It led to sharp disagreements 
between the heads of the mandate parties. This disagreement controlled the atmosphere of the 
meetings determining the competent authority to supervise the territory of the State in the 
proposed Uniform Code of the State land (Rabie and Raafat, 2010). Ac-G-03 – consultant of 
the IDA Head, with extensive experience and contact with planning decision-making circles46 
- argues that this conflict is a logical inherited consequence from the nature and the general 
system form of the State that is packed with corruption. This system has created a culture that 
parties’ strength is measured by the amount of land they possess and can dispose of. This 
culture is what has made the actors acquire land without a clear goal or plan for its 
development. He then added on the mouthpiece of the IDA in its opposition to the 
cancellation of the military order that have allocated them a number of land pieces as IZs, 
saying: 
“How can the military order be cancelled? No, we need them”. However, they do 
not have a plan already stating that they need these land plots or anything.... They 
took them, then what? Nothing happened. Only God knows how they will be 
developed. The land has only become under the jurisdiction of the IDA. This is 
considered as power in itself. Now, there is territory under the jurisdiction of the 
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armed forces, the police, the tourism development, the communities, the 
agricultural development and the industrial development authorities. Now all 
these sides are spreading the country apart ... The target is mandate. This is the 
important thing on which they are fighting?! (Ac-G-03) 
Therefore it could be understood from Ac-G-03’s statement that the IDA is like the other 
bodies in this respect. It works on the acquisition of land without being part of its plans. This 
confirms that the goal is not as a result of development objectives or public interest as much 
as it is a desire to extend influence driven by individual interests. Individual interest could be 
through the allocation of land to influential people in the country to speculate it what achieves 
benefits for both sides (Ac-55, Ac-G-03). Ac-G-11 - Consultant of the GOPP President and 
the Head of the Secretariat General for planning new cities in the GOPP – agreed on the 
existence of the conflict and its nature. He stressed on that the problem lays in that 
governmental bodies monopolised decision-making and management of the land they posses 
or projects on these lands. They doing so without coordination with other stakeholders and 
authorities concerned with the proposed projects or the possibilities or capabilities available 
in the land and how to exploit them. He then added another dimension to the problem that is 
exacerbated due to the difference of jurisdictions types between the mandate of 
administration and the mandate of possession. This is becoming increasingly complex in light 
of the desire of each party to monopolize power. He called it the "clash of mandates" and he 
cited the following example: 
There were areas in the Red Sea Governorate declared as natural reserves. Their 
mandate is as property of the Tourism Development Authority and being 
announced as a reserve they became administratively in the mandate of the 
EEAA. Now if someone wants to build a kiosk, where shall he/she go? When 
he/she goes to the Tourism officials, they accept it. Then when he/she goes to the 
EEAA they refuse. Another person wants to build a camp to build an ecolodge. 
The EEAA approves. As he/she starts building the Tourism officials tell him: 
“you did not take a license from us. We are the owners of the land. So, you are 
not allowed to build”. This is what takes place in all the authorities. This is 
because there are no plans, no meetings or coordination. So we are working in 
lines that do not intersect. (Ac-G-11) 
So instead of sectoral planning and coordination in joint projects, there is conflict between the 
parties for controlling the land. It even reached the extent of the hostility of each body to the 
works of others and disabling them. 
It could be concluded here that; the multiplicity of mandate parties on the land without an 
appropriate framework, which separates the ranges of powers of each body, side by side with 
the corruption and individual interests have led to conflict of interests and emerging of a spirit 
of struggle.  Therefore, cooperation disappeared and the bodies within the institutional 
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framework turned out into isolated islands without cooperation relationships, and if there 
were any, they are for dispute and disruption. The next section shows how the legislative 
framework strengthens this state of fragmentation and conflict. 
7.7.2. Fragmentation as a problem strengthened by the legislative/institutional 
framework 
There have been some attempts by the former regime to improve coordination mechanisms 
within the legislative institutional framework governing the planning of the State land uses. 
The aim was to resolve disputes that arise regarding the mandate of this land where the 
National Centre for Planning the State Land Use (NCPSLU) has been established47. 
Moreover, another attempt was by issuing a unified law for the allocation of the State land 
placing the supervision of this matter to one of the authorities (Rabie and Raafat, 2010). 
However, these attempts until the Egyptian revolution in the 25th of January 2011 have failed. 
This was because; first the nature of the prevailing conflict within this framework is governed 
by individual interests not the public one, as discussed in the previous section. This involved 
the head of the NCPSLU - the new entity - in the conflict rather than investing the centre 
function in resolving the existing conflicts and disputes (Ahram, 2010). Second, the 
legislative framework because of its large number of legislations and conflicts of 
responsibilities and roles48 has helped increase the conflict instead of coordination and 
cooperation between different bodies. This happened first, by failing to put the mechanisms 
committing the bodies to coordinate with each other. In addition, it did not place practical 
mechanisms that prevent growing role of one body over the others’ roles as what happened in 
weakening the role of the environmental agencies. Secondly, it took place through 
dismantling and distributing the powers between the bodies in a way deepening the conflict. 
Ac-55 agreed with this understanding dropping on the situation of the IZs, both in existing 
cities or new cities, in their different subordination than that of the residential areas, where he 
said: 
The legislative framework does not relate the residential area to the IZ ... The IZs 
follow the IDA, while the residential areas follow the NUCA49 or the GOPP. 
They do not sit together to coordinate. From where can I get the affordability? 
The mortgage authority has no relationship with both of them. It exists in a 
separate island alone. They all live in separate islands without any coordination 
mechanism between them. (Ac-55) 
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Therefore, despite the presence of both industrial and residential areas within the same city 
and within the same administrative borders, but the administrative mandate of the IZs is for 
the IDA, while the residential administrative jurisdiction is for the NUCA in the new cities or 
the GOPP within the existing cities. Thus, this represents fragmentation of powers leading to 
a conflict which grows in the state of struggle and lack of coordination mechanisms. Ac-G-03 
stressed as well on the fragmentation of powers projecting also on the industry describing it 
as "you can say that the industry blood is sporadic" (Ac-G-03). The IDA does not have, 
within the scope of its powers, except the land, while the rest of the ingredients, and 
especially the utilities, scatter each in a different direction and authority (Ac-G-03). 
Therefore, Ac-G-03 argured that in the context of fragmentation of authority characterizing 
the institutional framework, the IDA would not be able to implement anything unless all its 
ingredients lay within the scope of its powers. He considered that the situation was better for 
the IZs before the establishment of the IDA withdrawing land development powers50 from the 
new cities devices of the NUCA where he said: "the basic problem is that you are only able to 
do what is under your hands. It means the case was better when the IZs belonged to the 
NUCA, at least you guaranteed the utilities." (Ac-G-03). Moreover, regarding the new cities; 
(De-G-57) agreed with Ac-G-03, because the NUCA enjoyed the full power which qualified 
it to studying, planning, and implementing in accordance with the plans timelines. At the 
same time, she considered that the current situation of the city councils, administrating new 
cities, hold fragmented responsibilities that do not guarantee the implementation of plans, 
which negatively affects the development in new cities. She referred her opinion to that poor 
coordination between different bodies is a fact making it difficult to share or integrate, 
powers or roles. Accordingly, having full powers for an authority is better to ensure the 
implementation of planned development (De-G-57). 
7.7.3.  Impact of the absence of team spirit on the application of industrial ecology 
As described in the previous sections, there are powers fragmentation and conflict culture 
dominating the relationships between different bodies instead of coordination and 
cooperation. This state of fragmentation provides a disabling context for SD and IE. 
According to Ac-G-03, the absence of team spirit driven by ego and desires of each party to 
refer success to itself, is an important factor helping in disabling IE. This is also confirmed by  
En-65, a sustainable development expert. He added that it is due to the complexity of 
operations like IE and being related to many parties. This requires awareness, a 
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comprehensive understanding of the importance of coordination and cooperation between 
different parties which is not available in the Egyptian case because of the absence of team 
spirit. He said in this regard: 
If you are talking about IE, then you are talking about several parties. The 
situation is complicated and difficult in Egypt. Why? We are the world 
champions in squash but we are very week in football. You can achieve so much 
individually. However, it is very difficult to coordinate between many people here 
in Egypt, and to have all of them convinced that they will achieve one goal. (En-
65) 
To conclude, the nature of autocracy in Egypt before the revolution had created a culture of 
conflict between the authorities and various bodies driven by individual interests and 
corruption. Each agency has worked on the acquisition of land and monopolised decision 
making process regarding them in light of the absence of cooperation and coordination with 
the other agencies. The factors helping the lack of coordination have varied. They start with 
corruption that thwarted the few State attempts to resolve the dispute over the mandate of 
land. The legislative framework also had an impact on weakening the system of coordination 
between different bodies. It also helped in creating powers fragmentation within the 
institutional framework what deepened the conflict. In this situation of lack of public interest 
under the dominance of the spirit of conflict instead of team spirit and cooperation, the 
potential application of sustainable development and in particular the mechanisms to achieve 
IE diminish in the Egyptian society. That is because it depends in the first place on 
cooperation between various parties inside and in the vicinity of an IZ. 
7.8. Conclusion 
If Egypt has been formally active for years in protecting the environment by many means, 
discussed in details in Chapter (2), Sections (2.3.3.2 and 2.3.4), all of this has been no more 
than mere ink on paper not reflecting a reality to preserve the environment in Egypt. Actually, 
the IZs were established regardless the environmental considerations causing serious damage 
to the natural environment. By analyzing the process by which these IZs were planned it is 
found, as proved in this chapter and the previous two chapters, that the process has been 
chaotic and unsustainable. There have been several and interrelated factors governing this 
process in a complex and interactive circle. Though determining the first point to start with in 
this interactive circle of factors deciding on the most influencing factor was complicated, the 
apparent tyranny of the ‘authoritarian regime’ supported by weak societal will, is to be 
plausibly considered as a key factor in the formulation of the others. 
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This chapter justifies these factors and how they relate to and affect each other in details 
through the previous six sections. This section, therefore, concludes how and why the 
different factors have interacted with each in weakening and marginalising the environmental 
role and its tools. Therefore, it justifies how the context shaping the planning process of the 
Egyptian IZs is disabling for the implementation of IE.    
I. Indifference with the environment: how and why 
The autocratic regime as experienced by Egypt for long years has relied on its security arm 
that worked to insure the interests of the ruling class along with the interests of its followers. 
This regime has depended on legislating and establishing for organized chaos that affected all 
frames of the State and all walks of life in order to be able to continue achieving its 
objectives. This chaos has weakened the entire State work system. It has replaced the system 
of values of work, construction and moral values with other falling values such as seizing the 
opportunities, corruption, nepotism and flattery. This has led to weakening the decision-
making levels, where the decision for its makers was associated with the satisfaction of their 
superiors. Thus, efficiency has been absent and hence Egypt has largely suffered from 
downturn in all fields of life where the economic downturn has become on top. Therefore, 
economic problems were put on the top in the culture and perception of all sects of the 
Egyptian society especially those in charge. In addition, corruption and abuses of the 
authority in general and towards the environmental laws particularly have spoiled the nature 
of the community. The Egyptian society, therefore, despite its ancient civilization and culture 
loving and protecting the environment, treated the environment with a state of indifference 
and considered its protection as heavy burden. The effect of such emerging state was 
maximised by the lack of environmental awareness among officials and experts regarding 
sustainable development and its modern mechanisms that offer solutions to achieve economic 
savings along with the environmental protection. This indifference state along with the 
implications of the authoritarian regime generated many other factors, as shown in the next 
points, that have weakened the environmental bodies’ role and their tools. This therefore 
made these bodies unable to protect the environment in general or intervene to insure the 
sustainability of the planning process of the IZs in specific. 
II. Marginalizing the environmental role 
With the central autocracy governing system, the corrupt executive authority dominated over 
the legislative and judiciary authorities. From the legislative side, this domination produced 
chaotic and imbalanced legislative framework. It was a result of the monopoly of legislation 
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by corrupt legislators who directed the process to serve their own interests and the interests of 
those who appointed them in such positions. They took the process away from the universally 
recognized democratic mechanisms and systematic study. This process produced legislations 
that affected negatively the respect of the environment. Limiting the role of the 
environmental bodies, producing imbalanced sanctions for environmental violations and 
setting up unscientific regulatory framework to govern the planning process were all products 
of this process. These products worked as important factors that shaped the planning process 
of the Egyptian IZs away from sustainability as follows:  
• Marginalizing the EEAA role: 
The focus of the EEAA role was to monitor the impacts of production and punish the 
offenders. There was no real act in order to limit these effects initially from preparation and 
planning. In this concern, the law only mentioned that the EEAA provides specialised 
technical support and advice when needed. The EEAA can also develop policies and general 
environmental programs that are legally non-binding to other sectors. The law, regarding this, 
lacks committing various bodies with coordination and cooperation with the EEAA regarding 
the full steps of the planning process. On the other hand, it obligates the EEAA to coordinate 
with all other bodies. This, as a whole, refers to obvious weakness of the EEAA making it 
difficult for the EEAA to achieve the supposed role in a correct way. This has been 
negatively reflected on the planning process in general causing lack of sustainability.   
• Unscientific regulatory framework governing the planning process:  
The nature of the former regime lacking the political will to achieve progress, along with the 
economic downturn, have caused the ignorance of science and its expenditure. The education 
system therefore has been weakened and a culture of disrespect of science and those in charge 
of it has spread. In light of these factors, planning education has been weakened where the 
framework of the planning process has become infected by chaos missing the respect of the 
professional and scientific knowledge. Scientifically, the framework of the planning process 
has become chaotic lacking methodologies, integrated planning, and standards based on a 
knowledgeable base. Moreover, under the pressure of economic life, the planning teams have 
dealt passively and without professionalism with projects and with the technical justification 
for the non-scientific wishes of the decision-makers. In total, the planning framework is 
found to be away from principles of sustainable development and recent mechanisms for its 
application where comes on top of which is IE. It is found that traditional planning thoughts 
adopting separate land use planning have controlled the planning process in a way disabling 
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for IE for which mixed land use planning is crucial for its application. Furthermore, a thought 
very related to economic and industrial market demands, and driven also by corruption, has 
dominated the competent industrial authorities in allocating industrial activities in IZs. 
Accordingly, accredited schemes that adopt a separate land use planning have been 
dramatically changed in a chaotic way of industrial activities distribution not only disabling 
for the application of IE but also the basic environmental ideas like central treatment 
networks. Organizationally, the planning process lacked an appropriate system for 
accountability and evaluating the work teams. This helped not only in lacking seriousness and 
professionalism, but also in choosing work teams on the bases of loyalty and obedience. In 
this context, the environmental awareness disappeared from studying and analyzing 
environmental problems in a scientific manner. Thus, solutions that respect the environment 
disappeared and environmental disruption increased. Consequently, the gap between the 
planning process and its products and sustainability, increased. 
• Weakening the environmental legal tool; the EIAs:  
The sanctions system stipulated for the most common environmental crimes are not 
consistent with the culture and nature of the Egyptian society and, therefore, with the 
appropriate standards of public and private legal deterrence. Environmental laws, in this 
frame, did not realize that punishment and reward should be in the context of having the 
environmental problem related to a moral nature. It is to be related to the citizen’s culture and 
their sense of responsibility towards the environment. For the most common environmental 
violations, the punishment exceeds the limit. As justice requires from judges not to be a deaf 
tool in the application of laws, judges spare no effort, in light of what is legally available, to 
acquit the violators of this unfair penalties. On an opposite side, as for the crimes with severe 
impacts on the environment, sentences in its maximum level are less than the offense 
committed or the cost of its treatment where some of these crimes cannot be compensated 
with money. Here, the injustice occurs and the right and beauty values fall in front of the 
citizen’s eyes. Accordingly, the value of justice was lacked. Therefore, sanctions were faced 
by a type of indifference from the society what largely weakened the legal deterrence 
regarding the environmental violations and crimes. This, in total, explains dealing carelessly 
with the EIAs what have effectively weakened the only tool by which the environmental 
bodies can intervene to ensure putting the planning process of the IZs on the path towards 
respecting the environment. Furthermore, corruption and cronyism were preventing the block 
of some of the serious polluting projects. It was not only by the influential people, but by the 
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State apparatus itself and even with the assistance and the implementation of the 
environmental bodies mandated by law to protect the environment. All of this shows the 
reality of the environmental decision what confirms the un-sustainability of the planning 
process of the IZs as well as the products of such process.  
• Limiting the environmental NGOs’ role: 
We conclude from the foregoing that in the light of a culture of indifference towards the 
environment and its protection generated in the community and its institutions, along with 
political marginalization exercised by the authority against the civil society, the role of NGOs 
interested in the environmental issue has been weakened and marginalized. So, an individual 
unorganized character dominated the role of NGOs and it was limited in increasing the 
environmental awareness of the community or in the inexpensive civil works. This role was 
also in civil society leadership in the face of some projects that harm the environment which 
they are surprised by their implementation or by announcing their implementation without the 
civil society knowledge. The environmental NGOs have been excluded from the mechanisms 
of participation in decision-making or even the participation in the environmental assessment 
of projects. There were many factors that have affected this role mainly where the State was 
involved by variant means to limit the role of the civil society. These means, if abstracted, are 
as follows: ignoring the environmental NGOs in the hearing sessions, the legislation 
disruption and not obliging the government for participation, shackling the judiciary, 
corruption, bureaucracy, lack of transparency in the institutional framework, and stopping 
governmental financial support and limiting the civil one. All of these factors were used by 
the governing authority to extend its control over the civil society and restrict it. Therefore, a 
context that lacks public participation is highly disabling for sustainable development and 
industrial ecology. 
III. The current framework accommodates neither the environmental considerations 
nor the IE: 
From the judiciary side, the executive authority intervened in judiciary affairs with several 
means: keeping the judicial inspection under the mandate of the executive authority to insure 
directing judges to what benefits the regime, choosing specific judges for certain cases, 
assignment of judges to work in governmental bodies, controlling the bulk of the judges’ 
salaries, and finally intervening in the implementation of sentences. The people therefore felt 
that law is hanging over their heads not protecting them what led strongly to shaking the 
prestige of the law. Therefore, they antagonized the law and circumvented it what helped in 
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spreading corruption. This generality was applied in detail on the environmental regard, as 
despite the abundance of environmental laws, the corruption disrupted them in several ways 
such as: 
o Applying sentences on weak people while strong and people in power were pardoned. 
o Blocking the application of the law in many environmental cases by judges, knowing 
that the irregularities were edited against the weak people not because they were 
violators as much as they did not respond to the records editors requesting bribes not 
to edit these records. 
o It was common to circumvent the judiciary interference against polluting sources by 
exploiting the administrative corruption to legalize these sources situations. 
All of this has resulted in the absence of prompt justice what led to a mistrust of the citizens 
in the ruling authority first and secondly in each other. As a result, and to avoid problems lead 
to litigation, the cooperative relations disappeared between dealers financially in general and 
between partners of the IZs particularly. Therefore, the attempts to apply mechanisms of IE 
such as IS disappeared because of the lack of the necessary environment for cooperation. 
From another complementary side, cooperation was excluded from the framework by the 
nature of the autocracy in Egypt. Before the revolution the previous regime had created a 
culture of conflict between authorities driven by individual interests and corruption. The 
legislative framework also had an impact on weakening coordination between different 
bodies and in particular between environmental agencies, as stated earlier. It has also 
fragmented the powers among these bodies in a way that deepened the conflict. In this 
situation of lack of public interest under the dominance of the spirit of conflict instead of the 
team work spirit and cooperation, the potential application of IE diminishes in the Egyptian 
society. That is because IE depends in the first place on full cooperation between various 
involved parties inside and in the vicinity of an IZ. 
Furthermore, the legislative framework governing the planning process ignores the systematic 
thinking. It is limited to procedures with no details or environmental standards that are 
scientifically correct and updated. This framework, therefore, has restricted the judiciary from 
supporting the environment on one hand. On the other, it did not only help deepen the 
economic perception over the environmental one, but also hindered the application of 
environmental thoughts and modern mechanisms such as IE. The planning process governed 
by such a defective legislative framework resulted in unsustainable planning. 
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Additionally, to protect the totalitarian regime and its interests, lack of transparency with a 
sudden application/change of decisions became a key feature of the institutional framework 
of the State. This context is incompatible with the careful systematic planning capable of 
predicting for the future, which creates the appropriate context for the application of IE. In 
such a cloudy context, planning for IS, by allowing co-location relationships taking 
advantages of using wastes of each other is completely unlikely. 
Finally, with the exclusion of efficiency and expertise of the work teams after unloading the 
governing framework from the professional and scientific content, the planning process 
lacked the proper planning where chaos has been in control. The framework therefore has 
become unable to accommodate SEA and SD that depend on the proper planning in its 
application. Moreover, the absence of an overall national/regional vision of the industrial 
localization has helped, with political pressures, in delaying the role of the environmental 
bodies to a stage where it is difficult to prevent the implementation of polluting projects. 
After all, this chapter formulates, in six sections, the factors influencing the planning process 
of Egyptian industrial zones. This chapter gives explanation for why this process has taken its 
current shape. It justifies how the influencing factors interacted with each other in 
formulating un-sustainable process confirming on the findings of the previous two chapters. It 
concludes with justification of how and why the environmental role has been weakened and 
the context shaping the planning process is disabling for the implementation of SD and IE. 
This chapter by doing so answers the second research question and contributes to the 
knowledge by helping in filling the gap regarding understanding the factors shaping the 
process through which the Egyptian IZs are planned and barriers to the implementation of SD 
and IE in the Egyptian context. The next chapter, therefore, synthesizes together the answers 
for the research questions in an integrated form to facilitate reflecting on the international 
debate in light of the local understanding. It then gives recommendations that could help 
develop the current process and ends with potential paths of future research. 
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8. CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.1. Introduction 
It is widely argued that existing industrial development in Egypt is not sustainable. It was 
also found that theorising on the current process of founding industrial zones (IZs) in Egypt, 
is lacking. Environmental conditions are expected to get worse, if new IZs are going to follow 
the footsteps of the existing ones. Yet, the government has recently announced taking steps in 
favour of sustainability. Understanding the current process and the factors influencing it is the 
first step to modify the path of industrial development in Egypt towards sustainability. This 
research therefore attempts to understand the process through which Egyptian IZs are 
planned, identifying therein, its governing factors. This research, hence, poses the following 
questions: 
1. Does the Egyptian government have an operational framework that could lead to 
sustainable industrial zones? 
a. What is the official framework of the process, under which industrial zones could 
be planned? 
b. What is the actual process through which industrial zones are planned? 
c. Consequently, to what extent is the current prevailing process sustainable and 
applying industrial ecology? 
2. What are the factors that influence/shape the current prevailing process through which 
industrial zones are planned? 
This chapter briefly synthesizes together the answers for these research questions extensively 
discussed in the previous three chapters. It provides a simplified construct of the current 
actual framework of the process through which Egyptian IZs are planned, and, more 
importantly, highlights its governing factors. In doing so, the chapter follows the outlines of 
the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter (3). In other words, the answers for the 
research questions are integrated herein into the same structure of the conceptual framework. 
Accordingly, the answers are presented under three sections: Overarching understandings, 
setting the context, and planning process for the Egyptian industrial parks. This allows 
presenting the answers in such a way that facilitates challenging the conceptual framework 
ideas/concepts against the theorization of the actual process of planning IZs in the Egyptian 
context. Reflecting on the international discourse in light of this local theorization, in addition 
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to shedding light on the current actual local process, stands as the contribution of this 
research to knowledge. 
Furthermore, the potential comparison between the ideas presented by the conceptual 
framework and the investigated realities of the Egyptian process could enrich local scholarly 
as well as societal debates on how to develop the current process towards IE. As a first step 
on this breathtaking challenge, the chapter ends with recommendations that could potentially 
help develop the current process, and potential avenues for future research. 
8.2. The Actual Framework of the Planning Process of the Egyptian 
industrial zones 
The actual framework that this section synthesises is delineated in three parts. The first 
presents the overarching understandings that govern the formation of the context which gives 
shape to the planning process of the Egyptian IZs. The second discusses the context settings 
that make the process unsustainable, disabling, therefore, the implementation of IE. The third 
introduces the current actual process through which the Egyptian IZs are planned. 
8.2.1. Overarching understandings  
Figure (8-1) presents the understandings that govern the formation of the context and the 
process through which the Egyptian IZs are planned. It has been found in this research that 
the process is chaotic and unsustainable. In details, there have been several and interrelated 
factors/understandings that govern the formation of this process. Although it is difficult to 
determine a starting point for this interactive circle or the main influencing factor, the 
apparent control of the ‘authoritarian regime’, supported by the absence of a societal will 
(before the revolution), are to be put as key factors in the formulation of the others. 
Relationships among these factors, extensively discussed in Chapter (7), are briefly addressed 
in this section that shows factors which influence the planning process. 
Egypt has been controlled for many years by an autocratic governing system. This system 
has anchored on its security arm, insuring its interests and the interests of its followers. The 
system has established an organized chaos, weakening, therefore, the coordination system 
and the entire work setup of the State. The main player therein has been a corrupt executive 
authority dominating over the legislative and judiciary authorities. This domination has 
produced an unbalanced system of political powers and a group of chaotic/defective 
legislative and institutional frameworks. In addition, it has also belittled the value of prompt 
justice, and weakened the legal deterrence. This construct of autocracy strongly influenced 
the formulation of other factors as follows:    
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• The education system has been weakened and a culture of disrespect of science has 
spread due to the nature of the former regime lacking a political will to achieve progress. 
This has been associated with control of the political decision, oriented by security 
reasons the aim of which is to maintain the regime, over the planning process making it 
chaotic and away from sustainability. 
Figure 8-1: Overarching understandings governing the actual process of the IPs 
 
• The values system of work, production and good morals has been replaced with other 
falling values such as seizing opportunities, corruption, nepotism and flattery. This has 
led to weakening the decision-making levels, where the decision for its makers was 
associated with the satisfaction of their superiors. Thus, efficiency has become absent 
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and hence Egypt has largely suffered from downturn in all fields of life where the 
economic downturn was on top. 
• The totalitarian regime in order to protect its corruption has dealt with cloudiness (lack of 
transparency) and abrupt in decision-making in the institutional framework of the State. 
This caused a chaos in the planning system. It has prevented scientific prediction of the 
future. This context is neither sustainable nor enabling for the application of IE. 
• The nature of autocracy had created a culture of conflict between the authorities and 
governmental bodies involved in the planning process driven by individual interests. 
Accordingly, different bodies worked on monopolizing decision-making. Such context is 
not an enabling context for IE depending mainly on cooperation between involved 
stakeholders.  
• Because of the chaos of the legislative framework, the Egyptian community has lacked 
trust between citizens and hence cooperative relations have been lost in the business 
field. IE therefore has lacked an important factor that could help in its application. 
• Due to the absence of a scientific/legal system for accountability, loyalty and obedience 
has become the base on which consultants and work teams have been chosen. Absence of 
efficiency as a criterion has contributed to the presence of an unsustainable planning 
process. 
• The Egyptian society has dealt indifferently with the environment and its protection. 
This was due to several factors. Corruption and neglect of environmental laws have 
spoiled the nature of the community in contradiction to its cultural and civilization 
heritage towards the environment. The deterioration of the general situation of the 
country, economic in specific, and its reflection on the basic needs of the people have 
limited their attention to improving their living conditions and ignoring anything else. 
This especially happened as a response to a prevailing concept that environmental 
protection is a disabling and financially exhausting matter. The effect of such a culture 
was maximized by the lack of environmental awareness among officials and experts 
regarding modern mechanisms of sustainable development (SD)/industrial ecology (IE) 
and solutions they can offer to achieve economic savings along with protection of the 
environment. This culture, along with the implications of the authoritarian regime, has 
weakened the environmental bodies’ role and the tools they use. This therefore made 
these bodies unable to protect the environment in general and intervene to ensure the 
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sustainability of the planning process of the IZs in specific. Hence, this resulted in the 
disregard of environmental considerations in industrial development projects, causing 
serious damage to the natural environment. 
• The subsequent governments of the former regime have tended to ignore the civil society 
and environmental NGOs in decision-making. Furthermore, NGOs have been weakened 
and marginalized by the former regime to keep control over people. 
8.2.2. Setting the context 
According to the understandings shown above, the Egyptian context could not be considered 
as an “enabling context” (Boons et al., 2011) for applying IE. In light of this, this section 
presents the settings of the Egyptian context influencing the planning process of IPs. It shows 
in detail how the context is not ready to actually incorporate and implement SD/IE. It shows 
how the societal will has been marginalized and kept weakened by the authoritarian regime. 
Then it highlights the weakened education system including the poor planning education. In 
addition, it shows defects of the institutional setup, the chaotic regulatory framework, lack of 
coordination and culture of conflict, and the deterioration of the economic situation and its 
effects on lacking sustainability.   
8.2.2.1. Marginalised societal Will 
The potential role of environmental NGOs is limited to the environmental education of the 
community and field projects. Environmental NGOs do not participate in decision-making or 
environmental assessment of projects. This has happened as the civil society’s role has been 
ignored and limited by the subsequent governments before the revolution of the 25th of 
January 2011 by multiple means including, see Figure (8-2): 
 Elections fraud at all levels and in particular parliamentary elections. 
 Suppressing the society attempt to protest and express opinions. 
 Excluding NGOs from decision making and assessment mechanisms  
 Legislation disruption that restricts the role of NGOs, and does not actually oblige the 
government to involve them in the decision-making process. 
 Shackling the judiciary. 
 Institutional defects like; corruption, bureaucracy, lack of transparency in the institutional 
framework. 
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Figure 8-2: Societal will settings 
 
8.2.2.2. Weak education system and research 
The deterioration of the general situation of the country, economic in specific, has reflected 
negatively on lowering the budgets allocated to scientific research and education. This was a 
result of the absence of a political will to achieve real progress. Further, showing disrespect to 
science has been expressed by the government and media means as well as by the elites. 
Therefore, the education level has significantly deteriorated, and graduates have become 
ineligible to enter the work market. Planning education is a part of this system. It has become 
imbalanced lacking definitions, methodologies, standards, identifying problems, and research 
on sound scientific basis, and it has lacked creativity and innovation. As a result, in 
association with the control of the political decision, the framework of the planning process 
has become chaotic, and traditional thought has dominated the planning experts’ way of 
thinking. Hence, the planning process has been kept away from sustainability. See Figure (8-
3). 
Figure 8-3: Education system and research settings 
 
8.2.2.3. Shortcomings of institutional performance and capacity building 
There are many forces which have negatively influenced the abilities of institutions and work 
teams therein to properly conduct their work. This has prevented Egypt from achieving 
measurable and sustainable results in its way to sustainable development. They could be 
summarized as follows, see Figure (8-4): 
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Figure 8-4: Institutional performance and capacity building settings 
 
 The nature of the former autocratic regime had strongly influenced the administration 
levels making them unable to make sound decisions built on scientific basis despite their 
legal position.  
 Governmental bodies have been deprived of an effective institutional system that has been 
replaced by individuals who work for their interests. 
 In light of lacking a legal system for accountability and evaluation, those individuals, the 
same way as they have been assigned, choose work teams and consultants on the basis of 
loyalty and obedience, not on scientific expertise and efficiency. Thus, they work to satisfy 
their superiors in a series of hierarchical levels on top of which is the Head of State. 
 Lacking a proper actual accountability and performance assessment system causes lack of 
seriousness and professionalism. Accordingly, products of such context become weak. 
 Supported by the regime, a culture of conflict among authorities and various bodies, 
driven by individual interests, has been created. In light of the absence of cooperation and 
coordination with others, governmental bodies have monopolized the decision making 
process driven by corruption that thwarted the few attempts to resolve the dispute between 
these bodies. With lacking attention to public interest under the dominance of a spirit of 
conflict instead of team spirit and cooperation, the potential application of IE mechanisms, 
mainly industrial symbiosis (IS), has diminished. That is because it depends in the first 
place on full cooperation between the various parties involved in founding IZs. 
 Under the pressure of a harsh economy, planning teams and experts have dealt passively 
and without a scientific thinking with the work presented to them only to technically 
justify the non-scientific wishes of decision-makers. 
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 In addition to the low level of graduates, the State has lacked proper programs for labour 
training because of the absence of a human resources development plan, all of which have 
lead to ill-trained workers. Further, separation between the educational system outcome 
and the labour market demand has prevented making real benefit from training programs if 
there were any.  
8.2.2.4. Science and new technologies 
Egypt is far away from being a ‘techno-scientific State’ and accordingly from sustainability 
and IE application. Governments, specifically before the 25th of January 2011 Revolution, 
have followed wrong and chaotic policies in decision-making in isolation from the scientific 
approach. This is due to the absence of governmental planning which is based on scientific 
approach, as well as the absence of a proper management of crises and urgent problems. This 
in its entirety is a result of the disrespect of science by subsequent governments. Reflections 
of this culture on the planning process are as follows, see Figure (8-5): 
 Significantly insufficient budget allocated to scientific research. 
 Lack of interest in scientific views/opinions or technical studies of qualified specialized 
consultants exists at all levels of the planning decision-making process. 
 Decision makers used to look for consultants who accept their opinions, rearticulate them 
in a scientific manner and process them into the required technical product. Here comes 
the function and importance of the consultant to officials. They do not participate in 
decision-making but they formulate techniques that serve this decision. From the 
consultants’ side, under the economic deterioration faced by the country, a major category 
of those consultants, employed by governmental bodies, have been inclined to participate 
in ignoring science. They have accepted to be a mere tool in the hands of decision-makers. 
They used them to justify their decisions which are not based on scientific research.  
Non-scientific approach has, as indicated earlier, formulated a chaotic unsustainable planning 
process. With respect to this process, some points could be briefly indicated as follows, see 
Figure (8-5): 
 SD and environmental concepts have been kept away from studying planning and 
environmental problems. The planning process, therefore, lacked solutions that observe 
the environment leading to an increase in environmental disruption. 
 Absence of a full vision of industrial settlements has delayed - with other factors such as 
political pressures and interests - the role of environmental agencies to a stage where it is 
Chapter 8 
286 
 
difficult to take an effective environmental decision. They could not prevent the 
implementation of contaminating projects and, hence, the environment has been negatively 
affected. 
 A detrimental thought has dominated competent administrative bodies which is basically 
tying up the allocation of industrial projects to supply and demand. Applying this thought 
has dramatically changed the adopted planning. It has produced serious negative 
ecological relationships between land uses and has blocked attempts made to apply SD/IE 
concepts. 
Figure 8-5: Science and new technologies settings 
 
8.2.2.5. Institutional Setup 
The autocratic governing system has significantly influenced the institutional framework of 
the State. This regime has not produced society-centric or even state-centric governance. 
Rather, it has produced a system that is centred around one single individual. It has lead to 
centralization of power in the hands of the ruler, and the absence of an effective independent 
role of the State apparatus. This regime has resulted in a chaotic and weak institutional setup 
that has disabled the application of SD/IE as follows, see Figure (8-6): 
 Government has monopolized decision making processes away from other stakeholders 
especially society.  
 With the absence of a proper planning, the institutional framework has become weak and 
unable to accommodate the application of strategic environmental impact assessment 
studies.  
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 Institutional fragmentation has lead to a state of conflict strengthened by lack of 
coordination mechanisms. This context has hampered the implementation of several 
industrial projects due to problems in utilities that are out of the industrial institution 
mandate. 
 Although the State has established mechanisms for overcoming bureaucracy, resolving 
fragmentation and facilitating policy integration and coordination between bodies involved 
in the planning process, self interest and conflict spirit have kept them ineffective and the 
decision has remained centralized.  
 The work system as well as the values system have been weakened and replaced with 
corrupted values in each workplace. This has happened through excluding competent 
professionals from senior management positions, and replacing them by those who are 
weak, both professionally and ethically. Over the years, the work system has turned into a 
sick environment dominated by the ethics of opportunism, adulation, nepotism, and 
corruption. 
 In support, the EIA process, as the only current tool for environmental agencies to ensure 
that the planning process for IZs is friendly to the environment, is of no value. Corruption 
and cronyism have controlled the process and emptied it from its function making it 
ineffective. Corruption has not been only related to those in power, but, more importantly, 
to the State apparatus itself and with the assistance of environmental bodies ironically 
mandated by law to protect the environment! This shows the extent to which the 
institutional setup is defective and disabling sustainability of the planning process of IZs. 
Figure 8-6: Institutional setup settings 
 
8.2.2.6. Regulatory setup 
For long years, Egypt has suffered from an autocratic regime that has set legislations and 
laws to achieve its own benefits. Its tool in doing so has been a corrupt legislative authority, 
chosen non-reflective of the Egyptian people’s conscience and will. This authority controlled 
the legislation process.  Resulted from this process is a chaotic legislative setup, containing a 
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large number of conflicting legislations with multiple and imbalanced penalties. 
Characteristics of such a setup are as follows, see Figure (8-7): 
 The regulatory setup has not been founded on scientific basis: 
o It lacks comprehensive vision that guarantees balanced distribution of 
responsibilities/powers among partners of the development process which could 
achieve real progress in the process. In this regard, laws only mention that 
environmental agencies in the planning process are authorized to provide specialized 
technical support and advice when needed, and develop policies and general 
environmental programs that are legally non-binding to other sectors. The focus of the 
role of these agencies is practically to only monitor the impacts of the production 
process and punish the offenders. It means that the role as stated by the law does not 
act in order to limit the harmful effects starting from preparation and planning. This, 
as a whole, points out to the obvious weakness in the strength and powers of these 
agencies, making it difficult for them to play the supposed role in a correct and 
complete way. 
o Further, the system of political powers between authorities is unbalanced. The 
regulatory setup lacks practical mechanisms to prevent growing of the role of one 
body over the others, as what happened in weakening the role of environmental 
agencies to the advantage of industrial and urban bodies.  
o It also lacks effective mechanisms obliging different bodies to coordinate with each 
other especially with environmental bodies. 
Overall, lack of power given to environmental agencies and mal-coordination with other 
concerned bodies, have been negatively reflected on the planning process in general, 
causing lack of sustainability. 
 This defective regulatory setup has governed the planning process limiting it in procedural 
terms. The setup is not detailed and does not contain Egyptian standards that are 
scientifically correct and updated. Therefore, this flawed setup has restricted the judiciary 
in supporting the environment and resulted in planning schemes that disrespect the 
environment. It also has helped deepen the economic perception over the environmental 
one making the application of environmental thoughts and SD/IE concepts unobtainable. 
 With autocracy, the corrupt executive authority has dominated legislative and judiciary 
authorities. This has led to weakening the judiciary's ability to protect rights, where 
financial and political influence has intervened in the implementation of laws and 
Chapter 8 
289 
 
provisions resulting in the absence of prompt justice and the weakening of legal 
deterrence. This has led to shacking the status of the law allowing people to antagonize 
and circumvent it; what spread corruption more. The environmental issue clearly 
represents this context where imbalance has occurred and the community has dealt with 
the environmental regard with indifference. Furthermore, marginalizing the judiciary’s 
role has led to a loss of trust between citizens, causing the absence of cooperative relations 
between dealers in general, and the involved parties in IZs in particular to avoid any 
problems leading to legal accountability. Therefore, the attempts to apply the IE/IS 
concepts have failed due to lacking the enabling context of cooperation. 
Figure 8-7: Regulatory setup settings 
 
8.2.2.7. Networking and information systems 
The initial founding phase of the current IPs program witnessed a good case of networking 
and relationships between the ex-Minister of industry and investors. This networking has 
significantly helped in the initiation of the idea of the program. Yet, this case is very rare and 
could be considered as an exception that proves the entire situation of the institutional setup, 
as well as the involved stakeholders in the development process, lacking coordination and 
cooperation between its institutions. The chaos of the institutional and legislative frameworks 
of the State has significantly weakened the coordination system. Yet, there have been a 
number of attempts to improve coordination mechanisms within the planning framework in 
general and regarding planning the State’s land use in specific. These attempts targeted 
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resolving disputes that have arisen regarding mandate over the State’s land. Most important 
of such attempts could be summarized as follows, see Figure (8-8): 
o Establishing the National Centre for Planning the State Lands Uses. 
o Establishing the Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development. 
o Taking steps towards issuing a unified law for the allocation of the State land 
assigning the supervision of this matter to one of the authorities. 
However, these attempts until the Egyptian revolution in the 25th of January 2011 have failed. 
Under the autocratic governing system, coordination and cooperation networking have been 
replaced by a culture of conflict, driven by corruption, between the State bodies and 
authorities targeting the satisfaction of the Head of State to ensure continuity in position and 
personal gain. Each body or sector has worked on the acquisition of land and monopolized 
the decision making process away from other partners and stakeholders. 
Instead of securing opening accesses to information to hold the government accountable to 
people and empower networking and participatory decision making, a cloudiness and abrupt 
atmosphere has dominated over the institutional framework in order to protect the corrupted 
regime. Out of this atmosphere was a chaos in the planning system that has prevented the 
prediction of the future scientifically and maximized corruption.  
Such context of cloudiness, chaotic planning, corruption and dominance of conflict spirit 
instead of team spirit and cooperation behaviour is not an enabling context for IE which 
depends mainly on scientific planning for the future and cooperation between involved 
stakeholders.  
 
Figure 8-8: Networking and information systems settings 
 
8.2.2.8. Funding 
Egypt under the chaotic planning of the corrupted regime, controlling the country for almost 
thirty years, has deteriorated in all walks of life specifically economically. Hence, the State 
has not paid attention to integrating sustainable development initiatives of environmental 
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bodies into the national budget. Therefore, funding for incorporating sustainable development 
has been limited and mainly coming from international and regional organizations according 
to their agendas and the commitment of Egypt to international agreements. See Figure (8-9).   
Figure 8-9: Funding settings 
 
8.2.3. Planning Process of the Egyptian industrial parks 
Figure (8-10) briefly presents the steps followed on national, regional, and local levels for the 
planning of current industrial parks in accordance with the context shown previously. 
Details of the steps compared to what officially should be are as follows: 
8.2.3.1. National level  
The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) has developed an industrial strategy based on 
partnership between public and private sectors. 
 Depending on the relationships of the former Industry Minister with businessmen, by 
virtue of being one of them, he communicated and made a dialogue with businessmen 
generating the idea of integrating private industrial developers in the development 
process of the IZs. 
 The Government then had a political will, if questionable in its purposes, to set a 
protocol to reform the legal and institutional setup to initiate the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA). This was to accommodate the implementation of the 
idea. It was mainly the work of the MTI (without coordination with, or study of, all 
relevant parties) to amend the legal and institutional setup governing the development of 
the IZs. It then prepared a proposal which the Minister submitted to the Cabinet for final 
approval before accreditation by the Presidency.  
 The IDA Head conducted a number of exploratory field visits to global models for the 
transfer of experience as well as marketing for the Egyptian economy. 
 The IDA involved a number of international developers and financial institutions in a 
network including a series of workshops that contributed to the formulation of an 
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operational framework for the Industrial Developer Program (IDP). Contrary to the 
law, other concerned governmental bodies, including utilities and environmental ones, as 
well as other stakeholders were not involved. 
Figure 8-10: Actual planning process of the IPs 
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 The IDA, without coordination with the concerned parties1 in violation of the law, has 
monopolized choosing the IPs locations in new cities. Because of the nature of land 
ownership owned by the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), it has coordinated 
with NUCA regarding the selection of sites within each city.  
 The IDA has monopolized marketing and land pricing, away from the investment 
bodies of the State - in violation of the law - and other concerned parties. 
 The IDA has prepared alone the regulatory setup of the program (TOR) and offered the 
program to developers. 
 The IDA was fully accounted for setting up regulations and governing rules2 of the IPs 
development without coordination with other concerned governmental agencies stated by 
the law; in particular the EEAA and utilities’ authorities.   
 For regulations and standards of urban planning, contrary to the law3, the IDA has 
chosen a few general regulations (did not include all areas of planning) from the Unified 
Building Law. The IDA then modified these regulations for the benefit of developers in 
addition to advising them on how to overcome some of these regulations. 
 With regard to environmental regulations legally supposed to be set by the EEAA, the 
IDA has only put the responsibility for any possible environmental damage on the 
developer and referred them to the general standards and regulations in the 
environmental law. There were no case-specific regulations4. 
 Developers apply and register to the program and then IDA qualifies, contracts and 
allots land in coordination with developers through dialogues, a coordination procedure 
that is not mentioned in the law. This was to ensure compatibility with developers and 
flexibility in implementation of the contract. 
8.2.3.2. Regional level 
 Contrary to legal documents, developers have played the supposed role of the IDA in 
managing with the concerned utilities’ authorities, both regionally and locally, to extend 
utilities to their sites’ boundaries. The IDA role has just been like a secretary that 
                                                          
1
 On top of them is the NCSLP: the basic role of it is to ensure coordination with the concerned State bodies to 
guarantee choosing best sites 
2
 Related to investment and land pricing, extending utilities, and selection of industrial activities 
3
 The official framework committed the IDA to coordinate with the General Organization for Physical Planning 
(GOPP) for the preparation of the regulations and then reviewing them. Then they are to be adopted by the 
Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development (SCPUD). 
4
 The environmental standards, stated by law, were formulated in an atmosphere that was not aware of the IDP. 
This carries an implicit expectation of lacking relevance and not taking into account the specificity of the IPs of 
the IDP. 
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receives applications from developers, sends them to the utilities’ authorities and 
receives them back to hand over to developers. 
8.2.3.3. Local level 
 Contrary to the law, as an intermediary, the IDA seeks city councils (the authority over 
the land) to deliver lands to developers (the landowners).  
 In light of the absence of a national, regional or local vision and in violation to the law, 
the IDA transferred its responsibility in choosing industrial activities of IPs to the 
developer alone, to do it based on his/her marketing and economic studies. Then the 
selection was approved by the IDA without any coordination with others including the 
EEAA on top of the list. 
 Urban planning for each IP has been prepared by the developer through his/her 
specialized consultancy offices5. The extent to which the developer and the planning 
team has followed a scientific method and dialogue to reach the best planning that meets 
the developer’s requirements and wishes has merely depended on the level of the 
consultancy office.  
 In accordance with the law, developers through their consultancy offices set up zoning 
regulations inside their IPs in accordance with those regulations already set by the 
NUCA.  
 In light of the absence of a special code for the IPs planning, the approval of urban 
planning and the adoption of the IPs master plans have been the responsibility of the 
IDA alone without the partnership of others as stated by law. The consultant of the IDA 
reviews and approves the IPs master plans in accordance with a number of regulations 
taken from the Unified Building law without covering various planning and 
environmental areas. 
 The Egyptian Environmental Affairs Association (EEAA), the State’s apparatus 
entrusted with achieving the integration of the environmental dimensions in planning, is 
limited to reviewing the IP master plan and detailed design of utilities in accordance 
with regulations. 
 Based on a master plan that is subject to change according to marketing and actual sales 
and only shows a distribution of the industrial activities types without real allocation of 
factories, each developer prepares an environmental impact assessment (EIA) via 
                                                          
5
 Without identifying restrictions by the IDA for level of the consultancy offices 
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consultancy offices. Then the EIA is presented to the city council (the administrative 
concerned body) to be checked, mainly carelessly and without transparency when 
providing information, if fulfilled in the first place. Then it is sent to the EEAA, 
ironically after the implementation of the project in many cases, for taking a decision 
thereon6. The EEAA has the right, in some cases, to request the city council to complete, 
update or correct information regarding the study. The EEAA then issues the approval 
decision that is sent to the city council, which is in turn sent to the developer to be able to 
start the implementation of the project, if not already started. The EEAA doesn’t obligate 
developers to submit an environmental carrying capacity report as stated by law.  
 Developers apply for licensing their IPs to the One-Stop window established by the IDA. 
Then the IDA only gives them a preliminary approval. Developers afterwards go through 
many bureaucratic procedures to get final approvals from many concerned bodies, 
although the IDA is legally bound to help developers in licensing. The dominant issuer 
on the ground for both: buildings’ and utilities’ permits, has been cities’ councils.  
In brief, the overall process is a top down process. It significantly suffers from centrality and 
monopoly in decision-making of most of the steps by the IDA, the State entity responsible for 
industrial development. This could be noticed clearly from lacking coordination with all 
concerned parties and stakeholders not just the private sector, contrary to the law. This is also 
observed at the regional level when considering its diminished role as a level that is supposed 
to connect the national level to the local one back and forth. Diminished roles of the regional 
level that potentially help empower the participatory approach, strengthens the top down 
process where decisions are made on the national level and sent afterwards to the local level 
for implementation. This is the case of the planning of the IPs despite the existence of the 
private sector sharing the IDA in some steps and responsibilities. They both are mainly 
isolated from other governmental bodies and stakeholders, causing therefore many problems.  
8.3. The Egyptian case:  reflections on and contribution to knowledge 
First, from an international perspective, it was concluded in Chapter (2) that IE lacks a 
comprehensive theoretical framework. Without such a framework, IE is subjected to the same 
risk of ambiguity as for SD (Boons et al., 2011, Agarwal and Strachan, 2006). Second, 
Chapter (2) has also spotted a gap in the contribution of the Arab countries in general and 
                                                          
6
 In cases of amendment of the IP master plan, it was sufficient to renew the IDA approval without the need to 
renew the environmental approval from the EEAA. 
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Egypt in specific (Shalaby, 2003b) to the international discourse on environmental 
sustainability processes (Esty et al., 2003). Third, it was also concluded in Chapter (2) that 
the step beyond grand theories and typologies of governance, towards undertaking detailed 
empirical testing to measure the shift from government to governance, is needed. A focus on 
governance in a more dynamic and interactive manner is called for to know what forms of 
governing lead to what sorts of outcomes (Jordan, 2008). Furthermore, Gibbs and Deutz 
(2007) and Vermeulen (2007) mentioned that many authors, like Welford (2004), have called 
for more input from planning, as one of the social sciences fields, in guiding the 
implementation of IE.  Fourth, from the local view, Egypt lacks the needed theorization on 
the process through which IZs are planned. Fifth, the implications of the recent arrangements 
made by Egypt regarding the institutional and regulatory setup to improve the governance 
system towards SD have not yet been examined.   
This research has covered these spotted gaps. Covering the first gap, Chapter (3) develops a 
comprehensive theoretical conceptual framework of the planning process of EIPs, 
representing a first phase of contribution to the knowledge locally and internationally. 
Further, this research is an empirical test that measured the extent to which the industrial 
system in Egypt is moving towards governance for SD, and how and why the process has 
produced unsustainable IZs. It theorizes upon the current process of planning IZs in Egypt 
and its governing factors. It examines, empirically and in details, the influence of the 
Egyptian governing system and the institutional and regulatory setup therein on this process. 
This research by doing so (as discussed in details in Chapters (5, 6 and 7) then synthesized in 
this chapter) has already covered the other gaps representing the second phase of contribution 
to the knowledge not only locally but also internationally by filling the gap from the 
developing/Arab countries’ side. 
From another side, McManus and Gibbs (2008) see that there is a need to research how 
decisions regarding industrial development, like industrial locations, are being made; and 
investigate the level of knowledge and acceptance of industrial ecology, and the barriers to its 
implementation from the perspective of various decision-makers. This research in Chapter (7) 
discusses how the decisions on the planning of the Egyptian IZs have been taken and the 
extent to which IE is accepted therein. It also analyzes different barriers to the 
implementation of IE concepts and ideas in the Egyptian context governing the planning 
process of IZs. This section, therefore, discusses reflections of the investigated realities of the 
Egyptian process/context on the concepts and ideas of the conceptual framework, concluded 
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in Chapter (3). This stands as a further contribution of this research to knowledge that could 
potentially help the international discourse on developing more advanced theories on the 
implementation of IE. 
Now, this section re-reads the conclusions of the empirical study indicated previously, in this 
chapter as well as Chapters (5, 6 and 7) and synthesizes from them what could lead to: 
o A new set of  barriers to the  implementation of IE as empirically investigated,  
o An evaluation of IE concepts and ideas that, while mentioned by the conceptual 
framework, have been proven to be important/marginal issues as emerged from the 
Egyptian case/context.   
IE and barriers to its implementation 
Briefly, each of the following points initially addresses each of the IE concepts included in 
the conceptual framework (concluded in Chapter (3)). Following is a discussion on 
reflections of the Egyptian case on these concepts: 
 The ambiguity of the IE term (Gibbs and Deutz, 2007, McManus and Gibbs, 2008, 
Agarwal and Strachan, 2006) needs intensive scholarly and societal debates to 
contextually define IE (Jordan, 2008, McManus and Gibbs, 2008). Furthermore, IE is an 
interdisciplinary and integrated field of studying industrial systems in concert with nature 
and society (Geng and Yi, 2005).  
Despite the importance of defining IE locally and following an interdisciplinary approach 
to study it that could guide the implementation of IE in a proper and contextual way, 
Egypt has not presented a real progress in this regard. This happened due to the absence of 
the political will to achieve progress, the economic downturn, and the neglect of science 
all of which have led to weakening the education system and spreading a culture of 
disrespect for science. There has also been a control of the political decision over the 
planning framework, making it chaotic and keeping it away from adopting a scientific 
approach. It lacks not only the local definition of SD/IE but also the planning definitions, 
concepts, methodologies and integrated planning visions. 
 Society has to have the will, the collective will of all societal groups, (Gibbs and Deutz, 
2007) to bring about SD and IE. Therefore, setting the system of governance to be society-
centric is crucial. To have the context enabling for IS, adopt and support decentralisation 
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(Geng and Yi, 2005), and participatory7 decision making processes at all levels (Boons et 
al., 2011, ESCWA, 2003).  
Yet, Egypt until the revolution of 25th of January 2011 was controlled by an autocratic 
regime with a very centralized State work system and has not effectively gotten rid of 
since then. Civil society has almost been marginalized by many means and ignored from 
decision-making process at almost all levels, sectors and authorities. The tyranny of the 
regime supported by the absence of the societal will have significantly caused regulatory 
and institutional chaos that kept the country undeveloped. This context is disabling for the 
implementation of IE, and, therefore, the Egyptian case is significantly highlighting the 
importance of society-centric governance. With the growing societal will that has revolted 
against the former regime triggering its fall, Egypt is supposed to be moving towards 
involving society in governing the country. Hence, possibilities of applying IE concepts 
are expected to increase. 
 SD and IE require a system of governance that resolves conflicts (between the three pillars 
of SD: society, economy and the environment) and hence reach coordinated policies 
(Jordan, 2008) and cause the adoption of  a coordinated planning approach to apply IE  
(Geng and Yi, 2005, Gibbs and Deutz, 2005, Roberts, 2004).  
In Egypt, instead of seeking such a system and a planning approach, a culture of conflict 
between the authorities and various institutions driven by corruption has been nurtured. In 
light of this culture, governmental institutions have monopolized the decision making 
process neglecting coordination, cooperation and teamwork spirit; and have thwarted the 
few attempts to resolve the dispute between those bodies. 
 IE is supposed to be not only a system that is merely applicable inside EIP (Geng and Yi, 
2005), but also a culture that the community has to adopt.  
The Egyptian community lacks the environmental awareness that makes it ready to adopt 
IE. Weak education system and media, as well as marginalized NGOs, have not helped 
increase the awareness towards such an important issue. 
 To apply IE, a long-term and incremental planning approach has to be adopted (Geng and 
Yi, 2005, Gibbs and Deutz, 2005, Roberts, 2004). The need for considering this approach 
is significant for cases that the gap between its realities and IE concepts is huge, like the 
case of Egypt. Hence, the international discourse on IE is required not to be “evangelical 
                                                          
7
 Especially through forming stronger connections with all civil society sectors, including NGOs, and academic 
and scientific institutions on sustainability issues (ESCWA, 2003). 
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in its optimism for what could be achieved” (Gibbs and Deutz, 2005).The international 
discourse is required to highlight such an issue and develop conceptual frameworks for IE 
with incremental phases that could help in building gradually on evolving  cases like 
Egypt towards full implementation of IE.  
 Regulatory setup has to be not only context-specific, but also case-specific.  Moreover, a 
shift from a regulation-based to incentive-based approach is a necessity (Roberts, 2004, 
Shalaby, 2010a).  
Egypt suffers from a chaotic regulatory setup containing a large number of conflicting 
legislations with multiple and imbalanced penalties that do not consider the Egyptian 
community characteristics. It also lacks a case-specific planning and environmental codes 
for different industrial programs/types like the IDP program. The IDP program has been 
regulated according to general regulations taken from planning and environmental laws. 
Accordingly, possible damage to the environment is significantly expected. Therefore, 
while the Egyptian case can highlight the importance and possibility of the regulatory 
setup to be context-specific and case-specific, applying a shift from a regulation-based to 
incentive-based approach seems to be very optimistic for the Egyptian case, if adopted for 
new programs on a gradual basis.  
 The primary concern of IE is industrial symbiosis (IS) (Boons et al., 2011). IS works best 
where there is a strong agglomeration of co-located and integrated establishments that 
have the capacity to utilise waste as a resource in production. The more intense the 
agglomeration, the greater are the prospects for innovation and synergies (Roberts, 2004, 
Tudor et al., 2007, Erkman, 1997, Elabras Veiga and Magrini, 2009). This intensity 
implies not only variety, but also redundancy of the agglomerated establishments where 
the regional level is argued by some to be more viable than  a purely park-based level 
(Gibbs and Deutz, 2005, Sterr, 2005). According to Korhonen and Snäkin (2005), the 
regional level “enhances connectance and opens up new possibilities for cooperation” 
(Boons et al., 2011, p.906) . Yet, IS depends mainly on coordination and cooperation 
between different partners of the process. 
 Absence of coordination and cooperation is exactly the most important problem and 
obstacle of the Egyptian context disabling the implementation of IS. As indicated earlier, 
on the government side, coordination and cooperation have been replaced by a culture of 
conflict dominating  the institutional framework of the State. On citizens’ side in general 
and that of businessmen in specific, cooperation, in the first place, requires trust between 
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different dealing partners, and a strong judiciary to protect rights if a problem occurs 
between partners. Yet, marginalizing the judiciary role in Egypt has led to a loss of trust 
between citizens trying to avoid any problems leading to litigation. This has caused the 
absence of cooperative relationships between involved partners in the IZs founding 
process, and hence the disablement of the implementation of IS. In this regard, there are 
other two barriers8:  
o In Egypt, planning IZs in general depends mainly on traditional thoughts. Adopting 
traditionally separate industries is a concept that is still deeply considered. Applying 
IS within such a distribution is not expected in an EIP that encourages mixed land 
uses (Roberts, 2004).  
o Further, endorsed an IZ planning is significantly subjected to change according to the 
respect, given by the administrative bodies in charge of industrial lands allotment, to 
market requirements and the economic concept of demand and supply. Distribution of 
industries on the ground becomes chaotic. It does not only disable the implementation 
of IS but also basic environmental considerations like having separate industrial 
wastewater infrastructure. 
8.4. Recommendations 
If not for the Egyptian revolution in January 2011 to recover the societal will in governing the 
country by getting rid of dictatorship, then getting rid of this regime and securing effective 
open access to community participation in decision-making would have been on top of the 
recommendations given by this research. This is for its paramount importance because its 
absence has had the greatest impact on the deterioration of the country in general and its 
environment-related products and processes in specific.  
Based on the analytical study conducted for the actual process through which the Egyptian 
IZs are planned, and its governing factors, and the problems/barriers addressed therein to the 
implementation of IE, the following contextual recommendations could be useful in terms of 
putting Egypt on the correct path towards IE:  
 Secure a society-centric governance and establish the needed legislative and executive 
institutions therein to show respect to institutionalism, decentralization and participatory 
decision making. Securing support and national fund for NGOs is significant in this regard 
                                                          
8
 Same barriers apply for the implementation of the IE concept stating: a shift from activity-based to 
performance-based appraisal is crucial in the co-allocation process of firms (Roberts, 2004). 
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to allow them to help in introducing the culture of participation and acceptance of 
environmental protection, SD and IE to the community. 
 Develop a contextual incremental conceptual framework for IE implementation 
accompanied by local definitions of SD and IE. 
 Adopt a long-term multidisciplinary integrated coordinated planning approach for IE. 
Setting up a comprehensive industrial map for the country is a necessity.  With securing 
the political will to adopt IE and make real progress, it could be more appropriate for the 
current institutional setup, already centralized, to apply a centralized planning process at 
different levels, but only as a first phase. This is to encourage community to adopt IE and 
overcome potential market/coordination failures regarding IS synergies.  
 Resolve fragmentation between governmental institutions and apply practical coordination 
mechanisms.  
 Environmental bodies must have a balanced political power as that given to industrial and 
planning bodies, if not more, to be able to enforce the implementation of their plans and 
programs targeting the incorporation of SD and IE into the national plan. Reforming the 
regulatory and institutional setup is accordingly needed. 
 Achieve full independence for the judiciary and legislative authorities away from the 
executive authority. 
 Reform the regulatory setup  taking the following points into account: 
o Following the scientific approach in reformation. 
o Balanced distribution of responsibilities between institutions. 
o Resolving contradictions and redundancy of laws and regulations.  
o A contextual penalties system. 
o Case-specific regulations. 
o An effective system of accountability which depends on openness and transparency to 
eliminate corruption. 
o Support the NGOs’ work.  
 Establish an information system that helps plan for/manage optimal reduction, reuse and 
recycling of resources and wastes. 
 Adopt participatory and learning approaches, and policies that target: 
o Respect for science by the State’s work system and the community. 
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o Securing appropriate fund for scientific research and for the reformation of the 
education system including planning education. 
o Reformation of the current defective values’ system of conflict, corruption, nepotism, 
flattery and seizing opportunities. Recovery of values of respect of the environment, 
honesty and hard work, is crucial. 
8.5. Future Research 
However, to verify the validity of these recommendations, more research is needed. As a 
pioneering study that deals with industrial zones in Egypt as a process not a product, this 
research addresses variant phases of the planning process to give a comprehensive image of 
the process and the factors governing its formulation. Investigating the process includes 
phases of setting up policies, pre-planning, planning, approvals and licensing, and regulation 
and legislation. Yet, further investigation is needed to empirically examine each of these 
phases. This is important as developing scenarios for putting industrial development on the 
way to SD and IE would not be applicable without in-depth investigation on what, how and 
why each phase in details is constructed. 
In addition, developing possible long-term, incremental and context-specific conceptual 
framework towards the application of the IE/EIPs in Egypt needs more empirical 
investigation. The research has constructed a conceptual framework of a normative planning 
process for IE/EIPs. Being a collection of ideas and concepts from different literature, this 
framework is not applicable to any context. However, the ideas presented by this framework 
could enrich local scholarly as well as societal debates on how to develop the current process 
towards IE. Contextualizing this conceptual framework for the Egyptian case (or any other 
context) is an interesting task to perform. This could be done by conducting an empirical 
study, using the Delphi method in which a panel of experts are asked to answer a 
questionnaire in rounds till a consensus is reached. The questionnaire is designed in light of 
the conceptual framework contextualised in tune with the findings of this research. 
Further, In relation to the 25th of January Revolution that puts Egypt on the way towards 
democracy, an interesting investigation would be about the extent to which a potentially 
democratic government in Egypt could create a more sustainable pattern of industrial 
development within a context that still suffers from implications of autocracy. 
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I. EGYPTIAN INDUSTRIAL ZONES DEFINITIONS AND TYPES  
I.1. Industrial zones definitions: 
Industrial zones (IZs) types, given names and definitions vary from country to country. These 
differences go back to the characteristics/conditions that each of these countries has, the 
experiences that each developed in the establishment of IZs, and the objectives, each aimed at 
in the establishment of IZs (Shalaby, 2003). This section adopts the official definition of 
Egypt, well expressed in variant related laws/decrees, and by different officials1 whose 
work/experiences are directly related to the IZs management and development. 
Starting from laws, the Unified Building Law No. 119 for the year 2008 defines IZs as: 
Areas of land located inside or outside the governorates reins with their external 
coordinates described on cadastral maps. These areas are allocated to industrial 
projects and their related service activities in accordance with the provisions of 
the governing laws of industry and investment in the scope of the strategic plan. 
(Mubarak, 2008b,p.7) 
The definition of the Presidential Decree No. 350/2005 on the establishment of the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA) does not differ from the one stated above, but it adds the 
inclusion of "both existing and new IZs as well as the unused licensed lands owned by 
companies or individuals that are being transferred to IZs" (Mubarak, 2008b, article 3). The 
Presidential Decree also excludes "the general industrial free zones, economic zones, craft 
zones and maintenance workshops which do not fall under the jurisdiction/control of the 
IDA” (Mubarak, 2008b, article 3). Both previous definitions apply, after the exclusion of the 
above stated kinds, to five types, according to the governmental view.  
I.2. IZs types: 
I.2.1. IZs of Governorates: 
I.2.1.1. Industrial areas inside the existing cities: 
These are the old industrial areas that were developed on the outskirts of existing cities or at a 
distance which is not far from the urban boundaries. However, with the unplanned urban 
growth, cities contained these areas which now exist as industrial slums. These areas have no 
managing bodies to represent them and they depend on the containing cities in their needs for 
infrastructure and facilities. They are grouped under their governorates, and given names 
after their containing district or the main company/factory which operates therein (see table 
                                                          
1
 Head of the central administration of industrial zones of IDA, manager of the administration of industrial 
zones development of EEAA IDA’s head’s advisory. 
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A-1). The determination of this type  returns to Ac-G-112 and En-G-32, but the latter would 
prefer not to launch the term IZs on these industries and rather  calls it industrial clusters. 
According to him, the reason is that: "an industrial zone is a large area far from the city and 
has separate infrastructure/services, a separate administration and a manager, which is not the 
case for these city-contained sites " (En-G-32). Recently, to find a solution for these cities 
polluting sources, the State has interfered, first, by prohibiting the establishment of any new 
industries within cities boundaries and, second, by transferring existing polluting industries 
within cities to approved newly-established IZs. The Prime Minister's decree, regarding this 
matter, has been issued on 2005. Since that time, many steps have been made including the 
required studies and procedures to set this decree into action3.  
Due to the current polluting status and the expected immanent disappearance of such type 
with the full implementation of the previously mentioned decree, this type was excluded from 
the chosen sample. 
I.2.1.2. IZs outside existing cities:  
The IZs of this type are outside the urban mass of cities, administratively subordinated and 
owned by governorates and are established independently by governors’ decrees (see table A-
1). Authority was given to governorates to establish IZs under the Local Government Act. 
The Act also stipulated that the Industry Committee of the governorate is competent to 
manage such zones. Then, as amended by the Investment Law, IZs’ management has become 
the responsibility of the industrial zone board of directors of the concerned governorate (Ac-
G-03). The number of existing industrial areas of this type is 64 IZs (En-G-32 and Assal, 
2010). They exist on the periphery of some cities distributed mainly on Nile Valley and Suez 
Canal, see Figure (A-1). Recently, work is going on in some IZs of this kind but owned by 
GOIMP4, while being under the mandate of The IDA5 by virtue of the authority given to it by 
the decree no 350 for the year 2005 (In-G-06).  
                                                          
2
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
3
 Example on starting this strategy: Cement factories in Helwan are being prepared to be leaving the region 
which hosted them more than 75 years where the factories lived side by side with the people who suffered 
greatly from the pollution caused by cement, iron and steel and coke plants. This decree came in context with 
the strategic plan of Helwan governorate and the Ministerial Committee decision for the replacement of 
production lines and the transfer of environment polluting industries outside the governorate. A committee 
headed by Rachid Mohamed Rachid ex-minister of Trade and Industry was formed to develop a plan for 
transferring the cement plants outside Helwan governorate and resettle them in other areas away from 
population density. (Ashark-Alawsat, 2011) 
4
 The General Organization for Industrial and Mining Projects 
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5
 Handling here is for the IDA and it means putting down the conditions, contracts, allocations, planning and 
operating permits which will be mentioned later in details when speaking about authorities and their powers.  
Figure A-1: IZs of the governorates 
Reference: (IDA, 2011d) 
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Table A-1: Industrial zones of governorates 
Zone Title Governorate 
Torah and Shaq Al Tho’ban industrial zone 
Helwan 
South Helwan industrial zone  
Katamia industrial zone  
Shaq Al Tho’ban industrial zone (taken hold of 
Al Robeiky industrial zone 
Al Maasara Industrial Zone 
Division Maadi Company for Development and Reconstruction 
Egypt-Alex. Road - Al Nozha District 
Cairo El Salam City Industrial Zone  El Marg District Industrial Zones 
El Sharabya District Industrial Zones 
New Manshia industrial zone 
Alexandria 
Al Nasseria industrial zone  
Upper and Lower Mergham industrial zone  
The industrial zone in K 31, Desert Road 
Seibco Industrial Zone  
Ajami industrial zone  
Al Nahda industrial zone and its expansions 
Ohm Zagheou Industrial Zone 
The industrial zone C 1 
Port.Said 
The industrial zone C 6  
The industrial zone C 11 
The Northwest Bortex industrial zone 
The industrial zone south of Port Said (Al _ Reswah 
The industrial zone for light industries  Suez 
Southwest Gamasa industrial zone  Dakahlia Asafra industrial zone  
Belbeis - 10th of Ramadan road industrial zone  Sharkia 
Al Shorouk industrial zone  
Qaliubia Al Safa industrial zone 
Al Aqrasha Industrial Zone  
Balteem industrial zone  
Kafr El Sheikh Metobas industrial zone  
Industrial Zone in mlaha of Moneisi  
Mubarak Industrial Zone and its expansion Menoufia Industrial Zones In kafr Dawod 
Natron Valley industrial zone  Beheira Boseili Desert industrial zone  
Al Qantara Shark industrial zone 
Ismailia 
The 1st industrial zone 
Technology Valley 
The 2nd industrial zone 
Abu Khalifa Industrial Zone 
Abu Khalifa ( Sugar Factory  
Abu Rawash industrial zone and its expansions  th Of October6 
Kom Abu Radi industrial zone  
Beni Sueif 
Baiad Al Arab industrial zone  
The industrial zone 1/31  
The industrial zone 2/31 
The industrial zone 3/31 
The industrial zone 4/31  
Kom Oshim industrial zone  
Fayoum New Kom Oshim 
kouta industrial zone  
Al Matahra industrial zone, east of the Nile Minya 
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Al Awamer Abnoub industrial zone  
Assiut 
Al Zarabi industrial zone in Abu Tig  
Al Safa industrial zone (Beni Ghaleb) 
Sahel Selim industrial zone  
Dairout industrial zone  
Badari industrial zone  
Al Kawthar District industrial zone  
Sohag Al Ahaiwa industrial zone in  Beit Dawood industrial zone, west of Gerga 
West Of Tahta Industrial Zone 
Kalaheen industrial zone  Qena Hu industrial zone  
El Boghdadi Industrial Zone Luxor 
Al Alaki Valley industrial zone Aswan 
Al Kharga industrial zone  The New Valley El Dakhla industrial zone 
The industrial zone in K 26 Matrouh 
Bir Al Abd industrial zone  
North Sinai Al Masa’eed Artisans’ Industrial Zone  
The industrial zone for building materials, south of El Arish  
Reference: (IDA, 2011c) 
I.2.2. IZs in new cities: 
The IZs of this type are established by presidential decrees on the periphery of new planned 
cities. They are owned by the NUCA that is affiliated to the Ministry of housing, utilities and 
new urban communities. They are also under the mandate of the IDA (Ac-G-03, In-G-06)6. 
There are 21 IZs (IDA, 2011b), shown in table (A-2) and Figure (A-2). 
Table A-2: IZs in the new cities 
Zone Title Governorate 
Badr City industrial zone  
Helwan 15th of May industrial zone  New Cairo industrial zone  
Al Shrouk industrial zone   
Borg Al Arab industrial zone  Alexandria 
Ataka industrial zone and its expansions  Suez Petrochemicals - south of the Sumed 
New Damietta industrial zone  Demeitta 
New Salhia industrial zone  Sharkia 10th of Ramadan industrial zone  
East Port Said industrial zone  Port Said 
Al Obour industrial zone Kaliubia 
El Sadat industrial zone  Menoufia 
Nubaria industrial zone  Beheira 
6th of October industrial zone  6th of October 
New Beni Sueif industrial zone  Beni sueif 
New Fayoum Fayoum 
New Minya industrial zone  Minya 
New Assiut industrial zone  Assiut 
New Sohag Sohag 
New Tiba Loxour 
Reference: (IDA, 2011b) 
                                                          
6
 The relationship between the two authorities, the NUCA and the IDA, is discussed in details in Chapter 5.  
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Figure A-2: IZs in the new cities 
(IDP, 2011e) 
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I.2.3. IZs of the Industrial Developer Program7: 
Creating strong relationship with the private sector has recently become the prevailing 
strategy of the Egyptian Government (IDP, 2011d). To apply this strategy, the government 
has made some institutional/legal arrangements. The government established the IDA and 
gave it the authority to develop IZs in collaboration with the private sector. Accordingly, the 
decree no 350/2005 establishing the IDA allowed industrial developers to take part of IZs’ 
development. This is understood from the responsibilities given to the IDA. the establishing 
decree reads: 
Setting the conditions and rules that permit private companies to establish, 
provide infrastructure to, create administration bodies of, and manage industrial 
zones; and offer investors tracts of lands needed. (Mubarak, 2005, article 2) 
Hence, the government created a new program for industrial parks’ generation in cooperation 
with the private, local and international sector, entitled “the Industrial Developer Program”. It 
aims at creating the suitable environment for work, accelerating the development process and 
easing  the burden on the State budget (IDP, 2011d). To do so, the program sets developers 
responsible for the expenses of the zone internal development, including facilities, 
infrastructure, services and so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  addition, the program takes advantage of the developer's experiences in managing and 
marketing the zone, hence, speeding up the marketing process both internally and externally 
and, thus, speeding up the implementation  process (In-G-06). All the current IDP sites are 
                                                          
7
 This program is discussed in details in chapter 6 
Figure A-3: The IDP sites 
(IDP, 2011e) 
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allocated in the planned extensions of a number of new cities, such as those of 6th of October 
City, 10th of Ramadan and Borg El Arab City, where the constituents are available for 
industry, including infrastructure, transportation means, energy, labour and so on (see Figure 
A-3). This applies to the already planned three phases of the programme (Ac-G-03). 
I.2.4. Heavy IZs: 
The previous IZs are not, by location, permitted to encompass heavy industries what led to 
the idea of establishing IZs for such type of heavy and polluting industries away from urban 
areas. Heavy industrial zones are established by the decree No. 358/2008 which put them 
under the mandate/jurisdiction of the IDA. The surface area of each of them is around 300-
400 km2 of the desert land owned by the state. Therefore, their idea relies on establishing an 
integrated zones of industries, residential, services and logistics (In-G-06). The first attempt 
to establish these zones returns to the former Prime Minister Kamal El-Ganzouri who issued 
a Military Governor's command to establish 27 IZs of heavy industries. However, after 
appointing the following government, headed by Dr. Ahmed Nazif, the government cancelled 
the previous command. Through the recent pursuit by IDA, claiming the need for such IZs 
according to the industrial development plan, IDA began to revitalize the heavy IZs project 
(Ac-G-03). According to Assal (2009), the proposed number of zones that need to be 
revitalized is 24 out of 27 previously- issued IZs. A presidential decree was issued to relocate 
a number of 11 IZs while work is in progress by the NCPSLU to explore the rest of the sites 
(Arab-Finance, 2011), (see Figure A-4). After that, the IDA is authorized to select the 
projects and complete the planning and operational steps. 
Therefore, the IZs of such type are still in a very early step of the planning process. As 
investigating the planning process is the focus of this research, this type is excluded from the 
sampling process. 
After excluding the governorate IZs inside cities and the heavy industries zones the sampling 
process is performed on the other three types: a) the governorate IZs outside cities, b) the IZs 
in the new cities, and c) the IPs of the IDP. It is also important to mention that (a) and (b) 
types are both owned and managed completely by the government although they vary in 
location and mandate. Both types, therefore, represent the traditional way of founding the IZs. 
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Figure A-4: IZs for heavy industries 
Reference: (IDA, 2011a) 
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II. EXAMPLE OF CORRESPONDENCES WITH THE INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPERS 
Re: Towards Planning Eco-Industrial Parks in Egypt: a request to induct an interview  
Hide Details  
FROM:mohie shalaby  
TO:Dr. yafi mohamed  
CC:yosra abdelmoneim  
Message flagged  
Friday, 13 November 2009, 8:16 
 
Dear Dr. Yafi, 
The pleasure is mine to meet you and thanks for your interest, kind and quick 
reply. I will be waiting for Miss Yosra to contact. 
Kind regards 
Mohie  
  
Mohie Edeen Shalaby 
PhD Researcher  
School of City and Regional Planning  
Cardiff University  
King Edward VII Avenue  
Cardiff, Wales  
CF10 3WA 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/cplan/contactsandpeople/researchstudents/p-z/shalaby-
mohie-overview.html 
Assistant Lecturer 
Faculty of Urban & Regional Planning  
Cairo University (on leave) 
Tel: Mobile (+2)0190015450 
Office (+2002)33038438  
 
 
 
From: yafi mohamed <yafi_mohamed@cpcegypt.org> 
To: mohie shalaby <shalabymohie@yahoo.co.uk> 
Cc: yosra abdelmoneim <yosra_abdelmoneim@cpcegypt.org>; info <info@cpcegypt.org> 
Sent: Tue, 10 November, 2009 17:39:54 
Subject: RE: Towards Planning Eco-Industrial Parks in Egypt: a request to induct an interview 
Dear mr mohie shalaby  
I will meet you with pleasure   
My assistant miss yosra abdelmoneim  will constct you to define a meeting    
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Yosra 
Pls check my planning and define a meeting to mr mohie  as usual after 1 pm   
Best regards 
Dr yafi  
  
From: mohie shalaby [mailto:shalabymohie@yahoo.co.uk]  
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2009 04:48 م 
To: yafi@link.net; a.rabie@cpc-egypt.org 
Subject: Towards Planning Eco-Industrial Parks in Egypt: a request to induct an interview 
  
Appendix II 
A 12 
 
  
Mohie Edeen Shalaby 
PhD Researcher  
School of City and Regional Planning  
Cardiff University  
King Edward VII Avenue  
Cardiff, Wales  
CF10 3WA 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/cplan/contactsandpeople/researchstudents/p-z/shalaby-
mohie-overview.html 
Assistant Lecturer 
Faculty of Urban & Regional Planning  
Cairo University (on leave) 
Tel: Mobile (+2)0190015450 
Office (+2002)33038438 
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III. DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLE 
III.1. AL Tajamouat IP: 
On the origin of the company and how it has developed, In-28, the Executive Director of Al 
Tagamouat IP, said that Al Tajamouat Company is originally a company for real estate 
development which succeeded in developing an industrial zone in Jordan that was one of the 
first industrial zones owned and managed by private sector.  The objective of the company 
was the development of the first project of an industrial city in Jordan. The idea at that time 
was not to be an industrial city as it would be a unit of workshops and crafts as there was no 
strong industry in Jordan to necessitate the foundation of an industrial city. Then she added:  
We acquired 500,000 m2 and we made the development, planning and 
infrastructure. We extended our work where we were building crafts, commercial, 
services and workshops units and offering them for sale or rent. We were trying 
to facilitate and speed up the person's decision to invest by having something that 
is ready ... The investor can take 500, 1000 or 1500 m2 depending on his/her 
need. Of course the big move came after Jordan signed the “quiz” convention and 
foreign plants started coming from different States to benefit from the advantage 
of exporting to USA “UTI free” ... We started building larger factories 5000, 
10000 and 20000 m2 and marketing these lands to people who want to open 
factories in Jordan. Within 6 years we were able to be the largest industrial park 
owned and managed by the private sector in Jordan. We started to expand our 
work; through marketing the project abroad not only waiting for people to come 
from outside Jordan but also going there and marketing the project. The idea 
behind our project in Egypt was that Jordan has no more capacity for the 
development of industrial zones than Egypt. It was necessary to have a look at the 
development of industrial zones in the surrounding region and Egypt had one of 
the best investment climates in the region. (In-28) 
After the success of developing AL Tajamouat Industrial City in Jordan and at the Egyptian 
Government’s invitation, a joint stock company has been established under the name of AL 
Tajamouat Investment Company- Egypt, in November 2007 . AL Tajamouat signed an 
agreement with IDA, in the first stage of the program, to acquire 1.1 million square meters of 
land in a unique location in 10th of Ramadan city to develop AL Tajamouat Industrial Park 
(AL Tajamouat IP), see Figure (A-5). The full network of infrastructure of AL Tajamouat IP 
is planned to be implemented in three phases over seven years while the construction of the 
ready and tailor-made industrial facilities will be over ten years. AL Tajamouat has 
developed its service-oriented module which provides many types of industrial facilities with 
a turnkey solution for foreign and local investors. AL Tajamouat manages a range of 
integrated investor solutions by an experienced team, which will further facilitate the process 
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of starting up and operating businesses for manufacturers, in addition to offering auxiliary 
services1 (Altajamouat-Egypt, 2011). 
  
                                                          
1 They include labour and managerial dormitories, industrial food catering facilities, commercial units, storage 
and warehousing areas, and office spaces allied with general maintenance, housekeeping, and security services. 
Figure A-5: Al Tagamouat IP location 
Reference: collected by the researcher from (IDP, 2011c) 
 
Al 
Tagamouat 
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III.2. CPC Egypt IP: 
According to the CPC website, CPC stands for ‘Construction Products holding Company’. 
CPC is a Saudi company, one of a supply chain of Bin Laden Group, where its subsidiaries 
are dynamic, developed, and reputable organizations committed to the highest work and 
safety standards in the field of building materials and construction products. CPC, with its 
highly experienced group of companies and staff members is dedicated with its well-trained 
work force and is in a strong position to offer complete turnkey projects including 
engineering and eonstruction products. Its involvement in projects varies from a turnkey 
contractor to a joint venture partner to a main subcontractor (CPC-Egypt, 2011a). In-43, the 
Executive Manager of CPC, adds more details defining the company and the start of the 
project saying:   
As Bin Laden group takes large building contracting, they resorted to 
manufacture high quality building materials in order to maintain  a commitment  
to its due time, . We are running more than 30 factories located in various 
industrial zones.  we want to convey our experience outside Saudi Arabia and 
engage in the industrial developer scheme in more countries including Egypt 
while establishing our own industry at the same time, that’s working industrially 
as well as an industrial developer. Also in Syria we entered industrially and as an 
industrial developer and we established an industrial complex. We are opening a 
project in Abu Dhabi, also an industrial complex including uneven areas. As a 
company we have our constructions company and we do not have other partners,. 
(In-43) 
From the CPC website it could be added that CPC Egypt signed a contract with IDA to 
acquire 1.5 million m2 of land in sixth of October city in the first stage of the IDP, see Figure 
(A-6). This project is considered to be one of the first Industrial parks in Egypt owned and 
managed by a private sector company. CPC Egypt is divided into four areas as follow: 
construction material area, food industry area, textile industry area and the park central 
services2 area. CPC Egypt will acquire for its own use, two lots of land to build its own 
building material factories (CPC-Egypt, 2011b). 
  
                                                          
2 They include structure facilities: water, electricity, sewage, etc, labour housing, technical school, mosque, 
clinics, food court, laundry, cafeteria, and other recreation facilities. 
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Second Stage 
First Stage 
Figure A-6: CPC IP location 
Reference: collected by the researcher from (IDP, 2011c) 
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III.3. The Third Company: IP3 
IP3, a company from the second phase of the program, signed a contract with the IDA to 
acquire around 1 million m2 (IDP, 2011a). The IP3 industrial activities are chosen to be 
mainly in the engineering industries and complementary in various industries like; 
construction materials, textiles and food industries.   
When comparing the three cases, it is possible to argue that Al Tajamouat Company is more 
experienced in the industrial development field. This is due to its previous involvement, as an 
industrial developer in establishing, and operating an industrial park in Jordan. This is not the 
case for CPC which is working only in the area of manufacturing building materials in such a 
way far from the idea of industrial developer. The third company differs from Al Tajamouat 
Company  despite the fact that its executive manager had been involved in the preparation for 
a first phase company. As all companies of the first and second phase have not been 
implemented and hence lack the experience of operating and production. This advantage 
particular to Al Tajamouat Company has uniquely influenced the process of initiating the 
IDP, as discussed in details in chapter 6. 
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IV. GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE INTERVIEWS QUESTIONS 
Table A-3: General framework of the interview questions 
  Main idea   Subject of the question 
1 The project 
story 
1 Asking about the project story  
2 Asking the respondent to abstract the project story in a specific steps from the idea, reasons, steps,… 
2 Involved partners roles 
3 Another way to ask about the story with focusing on the roles of partners and the relationships between them? 
4 
In case of the respondent forget a specific important partner or not 
aware of all partners: I will ask to help him/her to focus on a specific 
named partner: the governorate, planning team, FESDIZ, firms, 
champions, …. 
5 The Government role. 
6 More focusing on the role of the respondent's body in the project? 
7 The way of choosing the IZ location and activity 
3 Relationships 
among partners 
8 Focusing on the relationships between partners and the extent to 
which they were supporting the success of the project? 
9 Tools/instruments used to build these relationships? 
4 
Legal, 
institutional 
and planning 
obstacles 
10 Legal and institutional obstacles and how they been overcome. 
11 Planning regulations obstacles and how they been overcome. 
12 Partners’ environmental awareness? Used ways to develop. 
5 Ideas 13 The way of gaining new ideas, adopting the ideas, and convincing 
other partners. 
6 Planning teams 14 The choosing of the planning team. 
7 
Networking 
and 
participation by 
the planning 
team 
15 Evaluating of the planning team way of networking with other partners. 
16 Evaluating of the planning team way of building ideas, participating 
with others, and the used tools for that. 
8 Community participation 
17 The respondent vision about how the other partners accepted the ideas and dealing with others. 
18 The value system adopted in each partner. Is this was obstacle or incentive? And then? 
19 Was there a community participatory environment? (Surrounding inhabitants, champions, NGOs and the environmental groups). 
9 
Supporting 
tools and 
incentives 
20 
Demanding fund and administrative support from other 
partners/international donors. And how they respond to your 
demands? 
21 Regulation based approach or substantial incentive program? Which 
way used to push investors to accept the idea? 
10 Recommendations, future plans for spreading the idea and how? 
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V. LIST OF INTERVIEW/EE(S) AND ROLE 
 
Table A-4: List of interview/ee(s) and role 
Code Role 
Interviewee's 
Orientation 
Profession & 
Job Nature 
Case 
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Ac-01 
Lecturer, Department of Regional Development - Faculty of 
Urban and Regional Planning, Cairo University (FURP) 
Senior Planer and the project Manager of the planning of a 
number of Industrial Parks through private consultants. 
A member of an NGO (refused to dismiss) 
                          32 
Ac-08 
Assistant Professor, Department of Urban Planning - FURP. 
Head of Urban Research Consulting Centre (URCC), FURP 
Senior Planer and the project Manager of the planning of a 
number of Industrial Parks through private consultants. 
                          80 
Ac-12 
Professor in Department of Architecture, Faculty of 
Engineering, Aim Shams University. 
Chairman of Engineering Office for Architecture & Planning 
(Archplan). 
                          70 
Ac-15 
Assistant Lecturer, Department of Regional Development - 
Faculty of Urban and Regional Planning, Cairo University 
(FURP) 
Founding Partner of the Consultant Office for Planning. 
Environmental Expert at GOPP, URCC. 
                          70 
Ac-44 
Lecturer, Department of Urban Planning - Faculty of Urban 
and Regional Planning, Cairo University (FURP). 
Project Manager of the Strategic Planning of a number of 
villages in the Egyptian Countryside for GOPP.  
Senior Planner and the project Manager of the planning of an 
Industrial Park. 
                          64 
Ac-55 
Professor, Head of the Department of Basic Sciences, Faculty 
of Urban and Regional Planning, Cairo University (FURP) 
Consultant for many Ministries and Institutes such as: 
• Ministry of Housing, Utilities & Urban Development, Egypt 
(MHUUD) 
• General Organization for physical planning (GOPP). 
                          83 
Ac-66 
Assesstant Professor in Department of Urban Design, Faculty 
of Urban and Regional Planning.  
Chairman of Planning and Architecture Office (PAO). 
                          45 
Ac-G-03 
Planning Consultant to the Head of the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA) - Consultant to a number of 
governorates and bodies including the General Organization 
for Physical Planning (GOPP) - Professor, Department of 
Architecture and Planning, Faculty of Engineering, Suez 
Canal University (FESCU) 
                          137 
Ac-G-11 
Consultant to the Chairman of the General Organization of 
Physical Planning (GOPP). 
Head of the Technical Secretariat for planning new cities, 
GOPP. 
Lecture, Department of Urban Design, Faculty of Urban and 
Regional Planning (FURP) - Cairo University (on leave) 
                           90 
Ac-G-38 Consultant to the Chairman of the General Organization of Physical Planning (GOPP).                           11 
De-04 
Deputy of Architecture & Consultations Eng. Div. Head, El-
Araby Group of Companies & Factories, Industrial Sector - 
Quesna 
                          28 
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Code Description 
Interviewee's 
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De-28 
Project Manager of Al Tajamouat Industrial Park in Egypt, Al 
Tajamouat Investment Compony for Industrial Parks and 
Real Estate Development. 
                          73 
De-43 General Director of CBC Egypt for Developing Industrial Zones (Six of October City)                           70 
De-64 Project Manager of IP3 industrial Park                            60 
De-G-02 Technical Director (Chief of Technical Engineers) - New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA)                           28 
De-G-17 Head of Technical Affairs Sector, GOPP                           6 
De-G-19 General Director of Technical Affairs Sector, GOPP                           27 
De-G-22 Head of Technical Affairs Sector, NUCA                           8 
De-G-37 Director of the Administration of Urban Planning - Quesna City - Menufiya Governorate.                           50 
De-G-50 General Director of water and sanitation Planning - in the GOPP                           11 
De-G-57 Director of the Office of Investment -  the Development Council of Six of October City                           22 
De-G-61 Engineer, Technical Affairs Sector, New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA).                           20 
En-25 Project Manager of Strategic Urban Planning for Small Cities Project, UN HABITAT and GOPP                           37 
En-65 
General Manager of Environics Environmental Systems on 
the path to sustainability. 
Ex-Director of the Environmental Assessment Administration 
- the EEAA 
                          50 
En-G-13 Environmental Consultant to the EEAA                           13 
En-g-16 General Manager of the Legal Affairs, EEAA                           22 
En-G-32 
General Director of Industrial Zones development 
administration, the EEAA 
Member at the charity for Enviroment and development. 
                          22 
En-G-35 Director of Projects Administration - EEAA                           22 
En-G-36 Director of Environmental Assessment Administration in the EEAA                           33 
En-G-39 Director of the General Administration of Industrial Improvement & Controlling - in the EEAA                           5 
En-G-45 
Manager of the Legal Affairs Administration in the  EEAA 
Director of Technical Office of the Assistant Minister of 
Environmental Affairs for Legal Affairs. 
                          70 
En-G-52 Vice Director of the Department of Environment - the Development Council of Six of October City                           22 
En-G-54 Senior Engneer at the department of Environment - Quesna City Council - Menufiya Governorate.                           17 
En-G-60 
Professor, Department of Urban Planning - FURP. 
Member of the Board of Directors of the FSEEDIZ. 
Member of the Board of Directors of The High Council for 
Planning. 
Founding Partner of a private consulting Office 
                          40 
In-47 
Professor - Agricultural Research Center - Cairo University. 
Investor and Owner of an Industrial company in Anshas 
Industrial Zone 
                          15 
In-G-06 Head of the Central Administration for General industrial Zones in the IDA                           26 
In-G-23 Vice President of the IDA for Technical Affairs.                           15 
In-G-29 Advisor to the Head of the Industrial Development Authority (IDA)                           10 
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In-G-31 Head of the Central Administration of Industrial Developers in the IDA                           6 
In-G-41 Manager of Quesna Industrial Zone - Menufiya Governorate                           40 
In-G-42 Executive Manager of  the FSEEDIZ                           15 
In-G-58 Vice Executive Manager of  the FSEEDIZ                           27 
Ju-14 Chairman Judge at Cairo Economic Court                            20 
Ju-48 Chairman Judge at Giza Court of first instance                           90 
NGO-30 
Professor, Department of Environmental Engineering 
Sciences, and Vice Dean of the Institute of Environmental 
studies and research - Ain Shams University 
                          25 
NGO-34 Head of the charity for Environment and development                           122 
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VI. IZS PLANNING PROCESS: AUTHORITIES AND COMPETENCES 
OF THE GOVERNAMNTAL BODIES INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS 
VI.1. Introduction: 
This appendix discusses various concerned bodies within the State that are involved in the 
planning process for IZs. Authorities and roles of each body will be addressed from what is 
granted by law to each of these bodies and also from what is imposed by law including 
mechanisms, coordination tools and institutional arrangements aimed at tightening the 
relationship between these bodies in order to adjust the production process of IZs in Egypt. 
VI.2. Industrial Development Authority (IDA): 
VI.2.1. Reasons behind the IDA establishment: 
IDA was established by the presidential decree No. 350 for the year 2005 that transfers the 
entity and the competences of the General Authority for Industrialization to the IDA. The 
decree also added to the IDA competences related to industrial lands development, 
encouraging investment in the industrial sector and facilitating the acquirement of the 
industrial permits (Mubarak, 2005)  what will be detailed later. There are multiple reasons 
behind this conversion, but the main reason as far as what was clarified by Ac-G-031 is the 
policy that was followed by the State on the establishment of IZs in the governorates. 
Therefore, Governors sought to establish IZs without a general plan of the State governing 
this work. This resulted in the governorates exaggeration of the State’s overdraft budget2 for 
the implementation of the infrastructure. But that had not been completed in most zones what 
affected badly these zones and prevented them from contributing to the Egyptian industry. 
This happened in light of lack of powers of the General Authority for Industrialization to 
intervene in the competences of the governorates with regard to IZs. Therefore, the 
Government took its decision to re-drafting the General Authority for Industrialization to give 
it more powers and roles to be able to adjust the system of industrial development in Egypt 
what produced the IDA with its current competences (Ac-G-03).  
  
                                                          
1
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee. 
2
 Represented in the National Investment Bank. 
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VI.2.2. IDA’s competences and responsibilities: 
(Mubarak, 2008b), as well as its implementing regulations, has singled the IDA as the entity 
responsible for IZs. This is specified in the matters of planning and building organization in 
pursuance of the purpose of the law and this is what is understood from the following text: 
In the application of the provisions of the attached law..... It is meant by the 
administrative entity responsible for the planning and organization: for the new 
urban communities; the NUCA, for the touristic areas; the GATD, and for the 
industrial zones; the IDA. Article No. 4, (Mubarak, 2008b) 
By returning to the presidential decree No. 350 for the year 2005, it is found that the IDA is 
responsible for the implementation of industrial policies of the State, the industrial lands 
development and facilitating the licensing process as well as encouraging the investment in 
the industrial sector. Article No. 2 reads: 
IDA shall be the entity responsible for implementing the industrial policies to be 
set by the ministry concerned with foreign trade and industry and its affiliated 
entities. It shall also be in charge of motivating and encouraging investment in the 
industrial sector, setting and implementing the policies of lands development for 
industrial purposes and making these lands available to investors, along with 
facilitating the acquirement of the industrial permits for them. (Mubarak, 2005) 
Then, the decree detailed the different competences, roles and missions that allow the IDA to 
implement the formulation of the responsibility stated above. They could be classified as 
follows: 
VI.2.2.1. Setting Policies and deciding on establishing IZs: 
The decree has singled out the IDA for setting the general policies and plans necessary for 
developing the IZs, in coordination with the governorates and other concerned entities. IDA 
shall exclusively have the power to adjudicate the requests for establishing the IZs or 
expanding those already existing along with setting the conditions and rules connected 
therewith, whether the IZs are established or run by the governorates or other entities 
affiliated to the State or the private sector (Mubarak, 2005). In-G-06, Head of the Central 
Administration of IZs of the IDA, confirmed this matter by saying: 
Regarding the entities that control the establishing of IZs: The IDA is the only 
body that is authorized to adjudicate the establishing of IZs. Okay? And this is 
according to the presidential decree establishing it, and which granted the IDA 
this authority. 
In addition to the above; the IDA is authorized in setting the general policies and plans 
necessary for training the labour in the field of industry and supervising the projects financed 
by foreign grants or loans and affiliated to MTI3. It is also authorized in setting the necessary 
                                                          
3
 Ministry of Trade and Industry 
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policies and mechanisms for connecting the industrial sectors development requirements with 
the scientific research activities and their related technology (Mubarak, 2005). 
VI.2.2.2. Drawing up industrial development studies and plans: 
Concerning planning, the IDA is responsible for drawing up the industrial development 
studies and plans sectorally and geographically, following up and encouraging their 
implementation. This is plus determining the lands to be appropriated for industrial purposes 
in coordination with the NCPSLU. Also, it is responsible of determining the industrial 
activities and products and the related service activities in coordination with the EEAA4, the 
governorates and the other entities of the State and the private sector (Mubarak, 2005). What 
confirms the competence of the IDA in this regard, De-G-575 assured in her response to a 
question about the IDA competences compared to those of the City Council, where she 
works, with respect to the planning process of an IZ located in the same city belonging to the 
industrial developer program, she said: 
Before the issuance of the plan and before approving it, there is not any role for 
the Council or the Projects Administration in the planning process. Only the IDA 
was in charge of the whole work and also they approved the plan and then 
informed us about it.  
It is clear from the above that the preparation of planning for the industrial development sites 
is a pure responsibility of the IDA. Due to the recent establishment of the IDA and also to a 
prior knowledge of the researcher that the planning of many of the IZs has been done away 
from the IDA, this made him wonder about an explanation for the dissimilarity between the 
legal text and its application. The following are some answers from the concerned experts: 
First: in existing IZs, the one responsible for planning is the owner whether governorates or 
NUCA through their own consultants whether private or governmental bodies. In-G-06 gives 
that meaning by saying: 
Concerning all current IZs in Egypt nowadays, governorates were in charge of 
planning them through their consultants then we continue after them. 
Also in the same regard, Ac-G-03, IDA Head's Consultant, declared that: 
NUCA has given the industrial sites already planned to the IDA then the IDA just 
allocated investors on the land lots…. like what the NUCA has already done in 
the North extension of Six of October City. 
As a completion of the above, En-G-60, a member of the Board of Directors of the Supreme 
Council for Urban Planning and Development6, said: 
                                                          
4
 Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency 
5
 Director of the Projects Administration of one of the new cities councils following NUCA. 
6
 Details of this council role will be shown later in this appendix. 
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The NUCA has established the new cities and allocated October, Ramadan and 
El-Sadat cities as industrial cities. And then the planning schemes began through 
the GOPP7 … or through the GOPP in cooperation with international consultancy 
offices.  
Secondly: In-G-06 explained that regarding the new IZs currently proposed, the planning will 
be the responsibility of the IDA by one of two ways: either by the planning and technical 
team of the IDA or by offering the IZs to the consultancy offices to do the planning task. In 
detail he said: 
Regarding the planning, we, as the IDA, are responsible of it ... I mean, for 
example," we were just talking on the subject of IZs for heavy industries, because 
of their importance we will do its planning ... First there is coordination with the 
entity competent of raw material for industry such as the authority responsible for 
mineral resources/wealth to set the materials kinds, quantities and so on. Then the 
technical team of the IDA sets the proposal for industrial activities and products. 
Now we have determinants of industrial projects that could possibly be 
established in this zone. After that  the subject is to be sent to the planning team 
to go through the physical planning according to these determinants ... Or for the 
already completed IZs (meaning the new zones within the provinces or new cities, 
non-heavy zones), I will put them up to the consultancy offices.... The entire new 
IZs will be offered to the specialized consultancy offices. The next step is to make 
a short list and evaluating the offers then the chosen offices will be given the 
zones.  
And by asking Ac-G-03 for his role as a planning consultant for the IDA Head, he said about 
the IDA’s request from him to prepare the planning for the IZs in the governorates:  
… and also if there is a governor who has an IZ that he could not or failed to plan 
it, the IDA tells me to take it and plan it in-house just to speed up the process. 
(Ac-G-03) 
Thirdly: As for IZs for industrial developers, the developer is responsible for preparing the IZ 
planning. In this regard, In-G-06 talked about how to set the planning by developers saying: 
…after selecting companies which succeeded as developers, each of the chosen 
will be given around one million square meters in October or Ramadan cities to 
establish an industrial park. The developer sets the planning concept to be 
reviewed by the IDA. After the approval, the developer goes into the details and 
presents a master plan. All the planning determinants of this master plan are 
already accredited. So, our planning consultant, [Ac-G-03], reviews the master 
plan, according to these determinants, preparing for the accreditation by the IDA. 
After that, the developer continues with the master plans of sewage, water, 
electricity and so on…. On this way, the developer carries the responsibility and 
the load of IZs planning on behalf of the State.  
That is what has been confirmed also by Ac-G-03 by saying: 
                                                          
7
 On the base that GOPP is the urban planning consultant for the State according to the law and this will be 
detailed latter in this appendix. 
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The developer when preparing the planning for his IP, he is the one who brings 
the planner… So, the developer makes his own arrangements and chooses any 
specialized consultancy office to do the work. 
VI.2.2.3. Industrial lands development: 
Regarding tools and mechanisms of industrial lands development, (Mubarak, 2005) states that 
the IDA is competent in setting the conditions and rules regulating the exploitation and 
development of IZs’ lands and pricing them for investors. In this regard, In-G-06 confirmed 
that the projects terms of references (TOR) as well as the lands allocation are completely 
made by the IDA without interference from any other entity, by saying: "The Regulations, 
planning and lands allocation are all made by the IDA" (In-G-06). About this, he gave an 
example on the industrial developer program, explaining the remaining lands development 
steps and mechanisms such as:  putting up of lands, receiving companies and evaluating them 
and selection of qualified companies. In a response to a question on whether the IDA is 
competent to prepare such steps and tasks he replied: 
Yes yes yes, go for example for the TOR which has been prepared for the 
Industrial Developer Program, it is from the IDA without the participation of any 
other parties. Completely from the IDA…. Then it has been put up for the 
companies wishing to enter the program. They then entered, took the TOR, and 
presented their documents. The evaluation followed by the selection of the chosen 
companies has been done. All is done by the IDA. (In-G-06) 
IDA also sets the conditions and rules enabling the private sector companies to establish, 
extend public utilities to, and manage the IZs (Mubarak, 2005). In-G-06 explained regarding 
this point that the IDA works in this concern as a regulator and facilitator for the private 
sector companies aiming at accelerating the lands development and easing the matter on the 
State regarding this program. He gave an example to explain the role as a regulator in details, 
as being about the settling of the developer program in the governorate, saying:  
One of the Governorates wanted to enter the Developer Program, where the 
Governor said that I've IZs which are not yet developed, he asked: can I work 
with you? I said you are welcomed. The Governor will provide the land which is 
600 acres and we will apply the same procedures. The land is owned by the 
governorate so it will be allocated on the X, Y, Z bases…. I contracted with the 
Industrial Developer then I send him to contract with the governorate, the original 
owner of the land, but according to the contract between me and him: There are 4 
years to put industries into operational phase, extend all the infrastructure, present 
a bank letter of guarantee in favour of the governorate and finally having the 
capability of financial and technical marketing. All the details of both contracts 
are documented. The governorate, as the owner, with me (the IDA) as a regulator 
and we both follow up the developer and so on. Ok? Now, how can the developer 
contract the end-customer? He has a contract model to follow attached to the 
original TOR. After finishing with the end-customer I then review according to 
the regulating rules between me and the developer. (In-G-06) 
Appendix VI 
A 27 
 
He also explained the IDA's role as a facilitator, saying: 
I have allocated a piece of land to a developer, I contact, as an example, the 
ministry concerned with electricity saying: I have a developer who has this land 
and his electricity requirements are 70 mega and so and so … What is your plan 
to provide this electrical capacity? Their response is that tasks 1, 2 and 3 will be 
done in time plan of so and so … If everything is ok and there is compatibility 
between the ministries' time plan and the developer's one, I then link/join/engage 
both parties to each other and so on … OK?  (In-G-06) 
Regarding land pricing as an important step in lands development policies, In-G-06 explained 
that the IDA after evaluating sites and choosing one of them as an IZ, it sets up a committee 
to determine the price. As an example mentioned by him concerning the Endowments lands, 
saying: 
We established, by a decree of the Prime Minister, a committee concerned with 
evaluating the lands prices. It includes three banks proposed by us. We set up a 
stir committee to examine the endowment lands that have been nominated and 
succeeded as IZs, and then place the price. Now another process starts once the 
initial assessment of the price is determined. It will be sent to the Minister of 
Endowments as a land owner. If agreed on the price, it will be submitted to the 
Prime Minister for the final approval. Now we can buy the land and start working 
on it.  
VI.2.2.4. Improving the investment atmosphere: 
IDA is authorized in setting the general rules for motivating the investors within the IZs, 
binding them to definite criteria for production, operation and exportation, or other 
development targets, and working on providing the proper atmosphere for investment in the 
IZs in cooperation with the GAFI. These rules are to be submitted to the Cabinet for 
approval. IDA is also competent to the marketing and advertising of the IZs by Issuing books, 
magazines, publications  and advertising materials to promote the IZs and projects in 
cooperation with GAFI (Mubarak, 2005).   
Perhaps one of the most important tools that provide improvements of the investment climate 
is the reformation of the legislative framework and simplification of the procedures. 
Accordingly, Decree No 350/2005 has entrusted the IDA with the task of studying the 
legislations related to industry and suggesting what is proper regarding them (Mubarak, 
2005).   In relation to this, Eng. Amr Assal, Head of the IDA, explained the matter in a TV 
interview through a program entitled "Happening in Egypt" on 16/5/2010, saying: 
Our role at the MTI8 and the IDA is to review the existing laws and to simplify 
the procedures.... People suffer from multiplicity of agencies and taking licenses 
from several entities. We have to unify them and reduce procedures.... Eng. 
                                                          
8
  Ministry of Trade and Industry 
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Rasheed9 issued 420 ministerial decrees cancelling old ones that hinder the 
investment. The remaining part is to amend the current law, The Unifying 
Industrial Law, what is taking place now. (Assal, 2010)  
In an affirmation of what has been  done regarding the issuance of the Unifying Law of 
Industry, the IDA has conducted a comprehensive inventory of legislations, laws and decrees  
related to the industrial activity in Egypt (A-Ahram, 2009). In a statement to Al-Ahram 
newspaper in its issue dated 11.8.2009, Amr Assal said adding to the above: 
This move comes within the framework of the MTI's Plan to issue a uniform law 
for the industry aimed at unifying legislations, laws and decrees organizing the 
industrial activity and updating them. Additionally, it also aimed at cancelling the 
decrees that do not comply with encouraging and accelerating establishing the 
industrial investment. Once issuing the targeted law; 34 laws, most of them issued 
for more than 50 years will be cancelled. (A-Ahram, 2009) 
VI.2.2.5. Approvals and licenses: 
IDA in this concern is authorized to set the conditions and rules regulating the approvals and 
licenses required for the industrial projects and their issuance, and for issuing the certificates 
of entry in the industrial register (Mubarak, 2005).  The Building Law also states in its article 
No. 23 what confirms that the competent administrative entity, which is the IDA in the case 
of industrial lands, is in charge of accreditation of the planning schemes. The text proofing 
reads:  
The competent administrative body10 approves/accredits the detailed planning of 
IZs and craft zones in accordance with the regulations issued by SCPUD11. The 
same provisions and procedures for the lands division apply to the projects 
division in both the IZs and craft zones taking into account the regulations, the 
terms and conditions set in the executive regulations of this law. (Mubarak, 
2008b, Article 23)  
This is what has been confirmed and explained by Ac-G-03 saying about his role in the IDA 
in reviewing and then approving projects: 
When a scheme comes to the IDA, I technically review it … So, my role through 
the IDA is reviewing/examining all IZs planning schemes whoever the planner is 
including those done by the GOPP and those related to the Industrial Developer 
… I only review the planning according to the regulations stated in the contract 
between the IDA and the other party and there is nothing else in my role 
regarding this issue. (Ac-G-03) 
In addition, De-G-31, Head of the Central Administration of Industrial Developer, also 
mentioned that the IDA is the entity that reviews/examines the IZs schemes and approves 
                                                          
9
  Ex-Minister of MTI 
10
 Refer to article 4 of the same law also mentioned at the start when speaking about the specializations of the 
IDA in this appendix, to understand that the building law has defined the concerned administrative authority for 
IZs to be the IDA. 
11
  Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development. 
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them. In the same context, In-G-06 gave the details in this respect giving an example on the 
Industrial Developer program, saying : 
When an IZ land is being allocated to a developer [After allocating a developer to 
an IZ land], I, as the IDA, work with the developer on the details. First: he 
presents a master plan. All the planning determinants of this master plan are 
already accredited. So, our planning consultant, [AC-G-03], reviews the master 
plan, according to these determinants, preparing for the accreditation by the IDA. 
After that, the developer continues with the master plans of sewage, water, 
electricity and so on. (In-G-06) 
Moreover, the IDA may mandate any of the concerned State entities for issuing approvals and 
licenses (Mubarak, 2005). In an interpretation of this issue, De-G-57, Director of the Projects 
Administration of one of the city councils that follow the NUCA, explained that the IDA 
authorizes them already in issuing the building licenses for industrial projects within the city, 
whether before or after the enactment of the new Building Code No. 119/2008. This is 
because of the lack of the proper/qualified team to perform this task in the IDA. 
It is concluded from the above items (from a to c) that the State through the decree No 
350/2005 gives the IDA many powers that were within the scope of other State bodies and 
also were not available at the General Organization for Industrialization. In particular these 
ate; the powers of planning, organization and land development, and setting up the 
development conditions and rules for dealing with them. In this regard, and in an answer by 
De-G-57 on whether there are any differences between pre-and post-establishment of the 
IDA, she replied: 
Yes of course, it [she means the IDA] became in full charge of the industrial 
lands. We were in full responsibility for Lands: marketing, putting out and 
allocating the lands were tasks that were controlled by us. It was completely our 
responsibility as NUCA from A to Z. The only thing that the investors were in 
need to bring from the IDA12 is just the certificate of entry in the industrial 
register. Now, the IDA became in full control while we only issue the building 
license and collect the land price; that is it. (De-G-57) 
VI.2.2.6. Coordination with infrastructure authorities: 
In regard with infrastructure, IDA's role is to coordinate with the governorates or the other 
State or private sector entities that take charge of extending the public utilities to and 
managing the IZs to make them available to investors, through the Industrial Lands 
Subsidization Fund (FSEEDIZ) (Mubarak, 2005). That what has been confirmed by Ac-G-03 
saying:  
Regarding the new cities, I gave you the brain which is the centre of businesses 
which is the IDA while I did not give you the arteries which is the NUCA, How 
                                                          
12
  She means the General Organization of Industrialization 
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come!? They handed IZs to the IDA, but the whole infrastructure is subordinated 
to the NUCA. In the first stage, the NUCA extended the needed infrastructure to 
the IZs. When the industrial extensions happened, the NUCA asked the IDA to 
pay for the infrastructure saying that we have no budget for these extensions and 
they are not in our plan. IDA said: Pay! Pay what?! I am not in charge of paying 
for the infrastructure. That is it. I mean, you gave me a body without vessels, how 
could the blood feed the body? (Ac-G-03) 
It is clear from the foregoing that the law did not give the IDA the authority to extend utilities 
and even entrusted the task of coordination with the concerned authorities to the FSEEDIZ. In 
this regard, the text of the law is weak especially when compared to similar provisions of 
other laws and in particular Law No. 59/1979 concerning the establishment of the NUCA 
(Assadat, 1979). This law dictates in a clear way and gives authority to the NUCA to 
establish, extend and operate the utilities13. Hence, an important question emerged here which 
is: Through this framework, what is the role played by the FSEEDIZ - as one of the tools of 
the IDA - in the coordination with relevant agencies in establishing and extending utilities? 
This is what will be answered in detail during the talk later on the FSEEDIZ as one of the 
bodies involved in IZs' planning process. 
VI.2.2.7. Coordination with other parties: 
As regard to coordination with other parties concerned in IZs and following up the 
implementation of the business, (Mubarak, 2005) obliged the IDA in coordination explicitly, 
first: with the NCPSLU in regard to site selection and identification of lands. Secondly: with 
the EEAA with respect to the identification of the industrial projects activities and related 
services. On follow-up, the decree gives the IDA the power to follow up and evaluate the 
industrial projects in coordination with the concerned authorities to ensure that there is no 
violation regarding the use of IZs (Mubarak, 2005, Article 4)   . On the other hand regarding 
the extent that the law makes the State bodies concerned with IZs obliged to coordinate and 
cooperate with the IDA, the decree text is obligatory to these bodies in the coordination and 
cooperation with the IDA but only with regard to its competences prescribed by law not with 
respect to establishing and development of IZs generally and to the utilities and infrastructure 
in particular. Article No 14 of the Decree stipulates: 
                                                          
13
 Article No 13 of the Law No. 59 of 1979 stipulates that: ".... The Authority [NUCA] is competent to 
approving and issuing licensing necessary for the establishment, the management and the operation of all 
activities, projects, buildings, utilities and services that are under its mandate. All of this is in accordance with 
the laws, regulations and decrees in force." As stated also in Article No. 28 of the same Law that the NUCA is 
competent to: ''… studying and implementation of regional facilities and services utilities for new urban 
communities projects….. exploring the best ways to implement the regional facilities in the new urban 
communities’ sites to ensure the economic relevance of the projects involved, land distribution/division and 
establishment of internal facilities either directly through the authority/agency or through concerned 
development bodies or via any other way that deems suitable for the authority. 
Appendix VI 
A 31 
 
The State competent authorities, concerned with the IZs, shall coordinate and 
cooperate with the IDA to enable it to perform its duties prescribed in this decree. 
(Mubarak, 2005) 
In this regard, Ac-G-03 confirmed on that the system of coordination between government 
agencies is defective/faulty and that the IDA in this context will not be able to implement 
something that is not within its power. His words are as follows: 
The coordination system is full of problems, and therefore what is within your 
hands is the only thing that you can do. I mean, what is in the IDA’s authority, on 
the ground, is only the land. There is no water, electricity, roads, gas or oil, and 
even the drugs industry technology belongs to the Ministry of Health. Everything 
is scattered. It was better when IZs were under the control of the NUCA, I mean, 
at least the utilities were ensured. But with the IDA, I give you something that 
you cannot utilize. (Ac-G-03) 
The question now that arises is: what mechanisms and institutional arrangements that the IDA 
uses to coordinate with those concerned with IZs? Regarding this matter, In-G-06, Head of 
the Central Administration of IZs of the IDA, replied that the IDA uses the tool of 
committees whether permanent or temporary to coordinate with any authority according to 
the importance and time granted to a matter to have it done. In details he said: 
This means, there is a permanent committee between the IDA and the NCPSLU. 
As for the Ministry of Mineral Wealth, there is a permanent working committee 
to identify the heavy industries zones. Furthermore, there is a committee between 
me and the governorates according to the IZ type and its land owner. For 
example, if the land belongs to Endowments, there is a committee between me 
and them. Hence, it is a multiple specializations working group dealing with each 
other because there is a legal procedure, a technical one and so on. Therefore, 
both sides work with each other through a team work in which each of them has 
its role done according to the establishment decrees of both sides. (In-G-06) 
Regarding the coordination with the EEAA, In-G-06 illustrated that there is permanent work 
committee with it for examining the industrial projects schemes and in particular, what is 
related to the proposed activities, saying : 
When I reach as the IDA the step of an IZ with a master plan, at this point I 
involve the EEAA…. There is a permanent committee with it to get the schemes 
accredited. It does some amendments, actually they are very minor ones, but at 
least it does not deny an investor when he/she presents a master plan and say "No, 
I do not know anything about you". So, the EEAA has an important role in 
accrediting an existing master plan with proposed industrial activities. (In-G-06) 
From another side, De-G-57 confirmed the existence of sessions and regular/periodic 
meetings that gather them with the IDA while some of these meetings are only between the 
heads of both sides. She said:   
Yes, there are many meeting between the NUCA and the IDA…. and of course 
there are also meetings between the heads of both sides for approving projects…. 
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So, there is exchange in the opinions between the IDA and the NUCA through 
periodic meetings between both bodies. (De-G-57)  
VI.3. Fund for supporting the establishment, extending public utilities and development 
of IZs (FSEEDIZ): 
The establishment of FSEEDIZ returns to the State's desire to overcome the administrative 
and financial obstacles/constraints facing the development and operation of IZs in Egypt and 
to make them eligible for attracting investments (In-G-42, In-G-58). Therefore, (Mubarak, 
2005) that established the IDA, stipulates in its article 10 the establishment of FSEEDIZ and 
specifies its purpose and scope of work as follows: 
A fund shall be established for supporting the establishment, extending public 
utilities and development of the industrial zones in Egypt. This will subsidize 
land prices as well as the industrial and service activities related to them in these 
zones, in such a manner that leads to achieving the IDA's targets with regard to 
the industrial development as prescribed in Article 2 of this decree, and in a 
manner that leads to bolstering the industrial zones ability to attract investments 
and encourage investment competition. (Mubarak, 2005)  
In addition to the previous talk about the aim of FSEEDIZ and its work, Ac-G-03 explained 
that  the expenditure on extending the IZs utilities was made in a random way that made 
many zones unable to operate in spite of the huge budgets spent. Hence, FSEEDIZ came to 
correct this by supporting the establishment of what is missing for each zone to be able to run 
and not to support new IZs in establishing their utilities. His words were as follows: 
The purpose is because utilities have been extended but in an incomplete way. 
Each zone needs just a small thing to be put in operation like a generator, 
maintenance or any tiny work. FSEEDIZ is in charge to do this work and put the 
IZ on operation…. I mean, not establishing utilities from scratch. For example of 
what happened on the time of the [ex-]Minister Ibrahim Suleiman, the 
construction work for a sewage station has been given to contractors who spent 
the budget on concrete works. Finally the building has been built but without the 
mechanical works. Where are the mechanical works? They replied that they are 
going to import them but they will cost money and so on. He cheated the State 
and worked on too many stations that most of them do not operate because of the 
lack of mechanical and electrical works...... So, FSEEDIZ entered the process to 
complete the station that needs small work to be operated not to support the new 
IZs or those that are completely vacant from utilities. (Ac-G-03) 
On the other hand, In-G-06, Head of the Central Administration of IZs of the IDA, disagrees 
with what is explained by Ac-G-03 explaining that FSEEDIZ serves the existing zones that 
have not completed their utilities and also supports the new IZs in their internal utilities, 
where he said: 
When I determine the industry type of an IZ, I can approximately say that…. 
these are my needs from infrastructure, from where can I get them? I have to pay 
to get them. There is a fund that supports both existing and new IZs. This is in 
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coordination with the Ministry of finance that I take a budget from according to a 
plan listing the existing IZs that have shortage in their utilities for the budget to 
compensate this shortage.  OK, for new IZs, I will send to the Ministry of Finance 
that I've got a new zone which completed so many steps and it is now under our 
mandate, so I need a budget to extend its infrastructure. I mean, pay for the 
internal infrastructure: water networks, sewage networks, roads networks, and so 
on. The external works are very important, for them I will coordinate with the 
concerned State authorities to provide them. (In-G-06) 
And perhaps the strategy that FSEEDIZ currently adopts is that; In-G-58, Assistant Executive 
Director of FSEEDIZ, explained it could be interpreted that there is no difference between the 
former and latter statements but the latter completes the first. Therefore, FSEEDIZ is initially 
pressing its work, since its establishment, on inventory and assessing the existing IZs with 
incomplete utilities. As a hierarchical thinking to suit the State budget, FSEEDIZ has chosen 
one IZ from each governorate to support the establishment of the incomplete utilities and 
putting the IZ into operation. Then it will continue the work on the existing IZs till putting 
them all on run while new ones will be supported in the FSEEDIZ future plans (In-G-58). 
Furthermore, Eng. Amr Assal, Head of the IDA and the FSEEDIZ’s Board of Directors, 
added in a TV interview through a program called "Happening in Egypt" on 16/5/2010, a new 
dimension of FSEEDIZ’s strategy and its role in the development of regions that are not 
attractive for investments aiming at achieving a balanced industrial growth over the national 
level, saying: 
The role of FSEEDIZ is specifically to assist IZs development and put all the 
required incentives which help industry success in these ones ... The objective of 
FSEEDIZ was to provide utilities for the needy IZs … To complete the existing 
utilities and as we said it was concerned with  Upper Egypt, Delta, the New 
Valley and Sinai. Therefore, through FSEEDIZ, we were able to provide the 
utilities necessary to attract industry there…. When we talked about the industrial 
developer, what did we do?: FSEEDIZ budget is directed to support development 
in the governorates while the industrial developer shares us and funds the 
attractive areas for investment like Cairo and Alexandria … and we directed our 
investments to  Upper Egypt and Delta. (Assal, 2010)  
FSEEDIZ is a separate entity of MTI. It has a board of directors that is formed by a decree 
from the Minister of MTI. The board chairman of the IDA shall be the head of the 
FSEEDIZ's board of directors (Mubarak, 2005, Article 10). Eng. In-G-42, the Executive 
Director of FSEEDIZ, justified the separation of FSEEDIZ as an entity from the IDA to the 
desire to give it the needed freedom of movement away from routine complications that may 
arise if it is a part of a massive entity like the IDA. Furthermore, this was for it to be granted 
the needed competence in communicating and dealing with various ministries and bodies 
which qualify it to play its role quickly and easily (In-G-42). 
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FSEEDIZ's resources shall be formed of the appropriations and money to be allocated for it 
by the State (Mubarak, 2005, Article 10). It succeeded after just two years from its formation 
and through the budget of about a billion Egyptian pounds to attract investments of around 5 
billion pounds and run 492 factories (In-G-58). In the same window and in other updated 
words, Eng. Assal stated that: 
The total fund that has been given to the FSEEDIZ till today is one billion and 
450 million pounds ... It supported, by using this amount,  33 IZs in 24 
governorates. (Assal, 2010)  
VI.4. Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) and its executive body: 
EEAA14: 
According to the official website of MSEA, the mandate of the first full-time minister of 
environmental affairs at the Cabinet was by the Presidential Decree No. 275/1997 under the 
title of Minister of State for Environmental Affairs (EEAA, 2011). Wikipedia defines the 
term "Minister of State" as: 
A minister without a portfolio, is a member of the Cabinet, has the right to vote 
and is directly linked to the Prime Minister. (Wikipedia, 2011) 
This definition is similar to the case of the Minister of Environment in Egypt, as MSEA does 
not have an organizational entity or an administrative body and depends on the presence of 
EEAA as the executive organ of the MSEA. EEAA's board of directors is chaired by the 
Minister of MSEA while the Executive Chair of the EEAA is assigned as the Vice Chairman 
of the board (EEAA, 2006). EEAA has been established by the Law No. 4 of 199415, which 
stipulates that: 
An agency for the protection and development of the environment shall be 
established within the cabinet under the name "Environmental Affairs Agency". 
The Agency shall have a public juridical personality and shall be affiliated to the 
competent Minister for Environmental Affairs. It shall have an independent 
budget and its head office shall be located in Cairo. Branches for the Agency in 
the governorates may be established by a ministerial decree and priority is to be 
given to industrial zones. (Mubarak, 1994, Article 2)    
VI.4.1. EEAA's competences: 
By returning to Law No. 4 of 1994 and the amended version No. 9 for the year 2009, it is 
found that EEAA's competences are basically limited to setting the policies and plans 
necessary to preserve the environment while it is not responsible for their implementation. 
However, it is in charge of following up the implementation of those plans in coordination 
                                                          
14
  Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency. 
15
 This body has replaced the one established by the Presidential Decree No. 631 of 1982 in all of its rights and 
obligations in accordance with the provisions of Article No. 4 of Chapter II of the Law No. 4 of 1994 
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with the concerned administrative authorities (Mubarak, 1994, Mubarak, 2009). That is 
illustrated by the following text: 
The Agency shall formulate the general policy and lay down the necessary plans 
for the protection and promotion of the environment and follow up the 
implementation of such plans in coordination with the competent administrative 
authorities. The Agency shall have the authority to implement some pilot 
projects. The Agency shall be the national authority responsible for strengthening 
environmental relations between Egypt and other countries and regional and 
international organizations. The Agency shall recommend taking the necessary 
legal procedures to adhere to regional and international conventions related to the 
environment and prepare the necessary draft laws and decrees required for the 
implementation of such conventions. (Mubarak, 1994, Article 4, Mubarak, 2009). 
Within the frame of these competences, the Environmental Law details all the 
responsibilities, roles and missions through which the EEAA can achieve the purpose from its 
establishment. Those missions include different stages of the development process starting 
from submitting the technical opinion to the decision taker/maker. Then there is setting plans 
and strategies necessary for environmental protection then organizing planning and 
development reaching to the coordination with the concerned authorities and their follow-up 
in the implementation of those plans. Finally, there is the mission of taking the legal 
procedures against offenders. With multitasking and diversity of EEAA's competences, it is 
worth mentioning here that this section will only study the tasks that are related to the 
planning process which are in the focus of the research. Those tasks can be listed as follows: 
VI.4.1.1. Processing of environmental information and expressing the technical opinion 
to decision-makers: 
Regarding expressing the technical opinion to decision makers that require collecting related 
data, EEAA is competent to collect national and international information on the 
environmental situation and the changes affecting it on a periodical basis in cooperation with 
the information centres of other agencies. Additionally, it participates in the preparation and 
implementation of the national programme for environmental monitoring and thereby makes 
use of the data provided in management and environmental planning. Furthermore, it is 
competent in compiling and publishing periodic reports on the main environmental indicators 
and outlining them in an annual report on the environmental situation to be submitted to the 
President of the Republic and the Cabinet, a copy of which shall be deposited at the People's 
Assembly. It also prepares draft laws and decrees related to the fulfilment of its objects and it 
expresses its opinion on proposed legislation related to the protection of the environment 
(Mubarak, 2009, Article 5). EEAA also gives its opinion regarding the scheduling of 
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hazardous wastes and possibility and conditions of disposal (Mubarak, 2009, Articles 30 and 
31). 
VI.4.1.2. Preparation of studies and setting environmental program plans: 
EEAA in this regard is competent to set the various environmental plans of the State. This 
includes the preparation of studies on the environmental situation, formulating the national 
plan for the protection of the environment as well as the environmental maps of urban areas 
and areas to be developed, preparation of an environmental contingency plan, participating in 
the preparation of programs to face environmental disasters, laying down a plan for 
environmental training and supervising its implementation, and participating in the 
preparation of the national strategy for the integrated environmental management of coastal 
areas. Furthermore, this involves preparing the programs for the environmental education of 
the public and assisting in their implementation as well as the training programs for the basic 
education stage in coordination with the Ministry of Education. Lastly, it is in charge of 
preparing the draft budgets required for the protection and development of the environment 
and proposing economic mechanisms to encourage different activities and procedures for the 
prevention of pollution (Mubarak, 2009, Article 5). 
VI.4.1.3. Formulation of the regulatory environmental framework for development and 
planning: 
In this concern, EEAA lays down the criteria to be followed when planning and developing 
urban area. It also sets the principles and procedures for assessing the environmental effects 
of projects as well as the criteria and conditions which owners of projects must observe 
before the start of construction and during the operation of these projects. Additionally, 
EEAA lays down and follows up the rates and percentages necessary to ensure that 
permissible levels of pollutants are not exceeded (Mubarak, 2009, Article 5). Furthermore, it 
shall, in cooperation with MOF, set a system of incentives for agencies, establishments, 
individuals and others for their environmental protection activities or projects (Mubarak, 
2009, Article 17). 
Based on the foregoing and as pointed out earlier, it can be seen that the EEAA could be 
considered as the environmental advisor of the State. Since the competences of the EEAA are 
confined/limited to expressing the technical opinion when needed, setting strategies and 
plans, laying down standards and requirements governing the process of planning and 
development. In addition, the Environmental Law does not obligate the EEAA to implement 
those plans as well as not giving it legal force necessary to ensure the achieving of such 
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environmental standards and criteria in the planning process. The only instrument that the law 
has given to the EEAA to intervene in the development process is to assess the environmental 
impacts of projects. In confirmation of this meaning, in a question to one of the prominent 
officials16 of EEAA on the authority granted by law to the EEAA to interference by rejection 
or modification in the planning process, his answer was: 
You know the Egyptian system and how approvals could be gained, from the 
important entities like GOPP and the IDA. Everything is submitted to the Cabinet 
after approvals from those bodies. Then, what is our role? If they consulted us, we 
give them the environmental dimensions that we need for application. Then the 
decision is to be issued by the Cabinet, when this happens, you cannot do 
anything despite the work is possible to be defective17. However, we do our best 
to activate the role of the EEAA in site selection and ranking, monitoring and 
inspection on factories, and studying the EIA..... Therefore, all what we do is 
ONLY studying the EIA report individually: distance from residential areas, 
distance from the environmental areas and so on.... Anything else is non/away of 
our business. (En-G-32)  
Within the same meaning and in an answer to a similar question to the previous one but about 
the EEAA's role in the development sites selection, one of the EEAA's advisors18 confirmed 
the previous answer, saying: 
There are stipulations that we put, but the EEAA does not intervene in the site 
selection process as it a higher policy. This is the role of the Government, 
ministries and the prominent players who do this task. However, some conditions  
exist, and this is the only thing we do. (En-G-13)  
Away from the EEAA's officials, in a short brief response over a question on the extent to 
which the EEAA intervenes in the planning process of IZs, Ac-G-60, member of SCPUD's 
board of directors and member of FSEEDIZ's board of directors, answered: "No, they do not 
intervene and even most of the current IZs have not been basically evaluated by an EIA”. In-
G-06 also confirmed during his speech on the planning process steps that the EEAA does not 
intervene in the process except in the step of reviewing the planning schemes after its 
completion, he said: 
Once I announce an area as an IZ and it is done with a master plan for it after 
calculating my requirements, I send the master plan to the EEAA, and coordinate 
with it: I have this IZ that I gained the mandate on it by the decree no X. The 
proposed vision of the IDA it to allocate the industrial activity Y according to this 
master plan. Could you please approve it? Then the EEAA approves it according 
                                                          
16
 In order not to inflict any harm to this official, the researcher will refer to him as being a senior official of the 
EEAA who is by virtue of his position aware of the planning process.  
17
 Starting from here it is noticed that the official speaks with a low voice when mentioning negative things 
about important people according to him and raises his voice again when talking about positive things from his 
point of view. 
18
 In order not to inflict any damage to this consultant, the researcher will just point to his location as a 
consultant of the EEAA without exposure to other details. 
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to the environmental determinants. ... When I finish the work on an IZ and have a 
master plan for it, I then insert the EEAA into the process. I mean, as an example, 
in the Industrial Developer Program, we worked and then worked till we reached 
an existing master plan with distributed activities that in principle is approved 
form the IDA according to the contract, I ask the EEAA: what is your opinion 
now? So, the EEAA intervenes in this point … " (In-G-06) 
VI.4.1.4. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study 
Thus, The EIA studies value has been maximized based on that EIA is the only instrument 
that has been given by law to the EEAA to intervene in the planning process of IZs by 
assessing environmental projects prior to their implementation. This is understood from the 
above and as confirmed by Ac-G-11, Head of GOPP Consultant, saying: "We have nothing in 
the Environmental Law except the EIA". In another way but in more details, En-G-36, 
Manager of the EIA administration of the EEAA, confirmed the same meaning as above in a 
response to a question on the tools given by law to the EEAA to ensure that the planning 
process complies with the environment, where he said:  
The Environmental Law is a national legislation concerned with organizing 
foundations for environmental protection in Egypt. It put two instruments to 
avoid the negative effects of projects.... A substance called Article No. 34 law 
4/94 saying that any proposed activity has to comply with the zoning and its 
nature. This is the first one19 ... The second stated by Article Nos. 19 and 23 
talking about a required study that is called: Environmental Impact Assessment of 
projects. Any project has to present a study that shows the environmental 
feasibility from this project. This study shows the environmental impacts 
resulting from the project and how as well as the procedures to reduce them and 
the follow-up of implementing such procedures through an environmental 
management plan for the project. So, these are the articles of the law that ensure 
avoiding any adverse effects from any project. (En-G-36)  
Hence, after proving the importance of the EIA from the foregoing, it is imperative now to 
have enough knowledge on this tool and analyse it to identify the role of the EEAA in its 
application and also its usefulness. Law No. 4/1994 and its amended version No. 9/2009 
define the EIA as:  
                                                          
19
 The Law attributed to the Regulations to specify the competent authority of approvals for the suitability of the 
site and the rest of the details. This is what could be understood from the following text: "It is necessary that the 
site to be held by the project is appropriate for the activity of the establishment to ensure not exceeding the 
permissible limits of air pollutants. Also, the total pollution from all establishments in one area has to be within 
the authorized limits. The executive regulations of this law shall determine the enterprises subject to its 
provisions and the competent authority for approvals on the suitability of the site and the permissible limits of 
air pollutants and noise in the area held by the enterprise." (Article No. 34 - Law No. 4 of 1994 that has been 
amended by the Law No. 9 of 2009). As the old executive regulations are contrary to the text of the provisions 
of the amended law and that the new executive regulations have not been issued until the time of writing these 
lines,  therefore proceedings to deal with this article which include identification of the hand responsible for the 
approval for the suitability of the site is still not known. Hence, this tool will be considered from the tools 
through which the EEAA can intervene in the planning process until a new declaration. 
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Studying and analyzing the environmental feasibility of proposed projects, whose 
construction or activities might affect the safety of the environment in order to 
protect it. (Mubarak, 1994, Mubarak, 2009) 
In terms of obligation, the same law is outspoken when stating this issue by saying:  
Any natural or legal person, general or private, is obligated to present an EIA 
study of the establishment of the project to the competent administrative authority 
or the licensing authority before starting the implementation of the project. 
Conducting the study is to be according to the elements, designs, specifications, 
criteria, and the environmental loads of each activity type that are issued by the 
EEAA in coordination with the competent administrative authorities. The 
competent administrative authorities are obligated to present the IZs' maps that 
declare the permitted industrial types according to the environmental loads of 
each type. (Mubarak, 2009, Article 19) 
It is understood also from the text that the Law obligates those in charge of conducting the 
study to do it according to the EEAA's criteria. In this concern, En-G-36 stated that the 
EEAA has issued a guide explaining what Article No. 19 states, saying: 
First thing that article 19 stated that the submission of the EIA study has to be 
according to the specifications and criteria issued by the EEAA. Hence, it is must 
to have guidelines or a guide for any study to organize it whether for the 
procedures of the study or for the specifications of how to do it. Actually, this 
guide was issued and released in 1996. Regarding the EIA it includes articles and 
actions required starting from doing the study and ending with issuing the 
decision by the EEAA on the study. 
As for the role of the EEAA, as well as the competent administrative authorities on this study, 
we find that the law obligates the licensing authority to send such a satisfying study to the 
EEAA. The EEAA has the authority to ask for further needed data required to give a decision 
on the study. Law (Mubarak, 2009) stipulates the details of this matter as follows: 
The competent administrative authorities or the licensing authority shall send the 
EIA study satisfying, mentioned in the preceding Article, the EEAA need, to 
express its opinion thereon and propose measures required to be taken in the field 
of preparations and systems in order to treat the negative environmental effects. 
The EEAA is authorized to ask the study presenter for further data, designs or 
explanation necessary to express its opinion thereon. The EEAA is obligated to 
send its opinion issued in this assessment to the competent administrative 
authority or the licensing authority within a maximum of thirty days from the date 
of receiving the study or from completing the study or implementing the EEAA's 
suggestions regarding the study. Otherwise, the assessment shall be deemed 
accepted by the EEAA. The project has to start its activity through the licensing 
period given to it, otherwise the environmental approval shall be deemed not 
existing. (Article No. 20) 
By analyzing the above articles Nos. 19 and 20 of the law, it is concluded that the law does 
not commit the entrepreneur by a specific timing for the submission of the study. The words 
"before implementing the project", stated in Article 19, open the way in front the owner: from 
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the time of land allocation and passing through conducting financial and economic feasibility 
studies then planning and design of the project and at last, licensing the project. After all of 
the previous steps, and to start the implementation/construction works he/she must present an 
EIA to gain the environmental approval. The Act also does not specify a time that the 
competent authority must complete the study in or send it to the EEAA, while the Law 
obligates the EEAA by a maximum of a month to give its decision. Therefore, the balance is 
missing here: the speed that the EEAA is obligated to give its decision in does not harmonize 
with allowing time to the owner and the competent administrative authority to conduct, 
complete and then send the study to the EEAA. This claims that the priority is given to 
investment and those doing it at the expense of the environment and those responsible for 
protecting it. What confirm this claim is that the building Act No. 119 of 2008, in articles 
from 39 to 42 upon stating the procedures and documents required to give a building license 
for a project, does not mention any document/approval which must be obtained from the 
MSEA or its executive body, the EEAA, including the EIA itself to obtain the license to start 
the construction works. This means that the owner is permitted by law to start the 
construction works of his/her project without the need to obtain an approval from the 
environmental authorities or even visit its building (Mubarak, 2008b, Articles from 39 to 42). 
In another confirmation on this concern, in a response from De-G-57 to a question on the 
timing of obtaining the environmental approval for a project she replied: 
This subject took a long time and many meetings by the IDA discussing many 
decisions on it and after submitting a final one, people have complained against it. 
Recently, I have heard that the final agreed decision has been changed again. The 
last decision was due to the incident where there was a problem in Sadat City, 
that the investor has built his factory without obtaining the environmental 
approval. When he tried to run the factory, a problem occurred as a food factory 
was adhering to this pollutant factory that we talk about. When submitting this 
case to the EEAA, it refused it and said that the new factory cannot be in the same 
area with the other one. … To avoid putting the investor in this situation again, as 
it is not logic to let him/her go and pay a lot of money in his/her land and building 
then we tell him/her that your factory has been refused. So, we agreed; the NUCA 
and the IDA, that any investor must obtain the environmental approval before 
obtaining the building license for his/her factory. Just a few days ago, I was in the 
IDA, they said that it is now done that the environmental approval will be 
obtained after the building license as people complaint against the time wasting.   
For me, I still disagree their decision, because letting the investor pay for land, 
drawings and a building then the project is to be refused! What to do with the 
factory then? This situation and similar ones direct/enforce the EEAA to approve 
the factory as it is already implemented whatever its nature! Again, they told me 
that it is now confirmed that the environmental approval is after the building 
license!   
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Hence this matter here may raise an enquiry on the feasibility of the EIA study in the case 
just shown above. It also may give an indication; that needs further investigation when 
analyzing the case studies in chapter 6, on the weakness or the desire to weaken the 
environmental decision in the development process aiming at reducing obstacles in front of 
investors. The MSEA and its executive body, the EEAA, have no authority by law to 
intervene in the planning decision as explained before. Furthermore, the only tool by which 
they can intervene which is the EIA study, its decision is marginalized to the extent forcing 
the environmental authorities to accept and approve the existing status whatever its nature as 
confirmed by a number of officials and experts as it will be explained in the case studies 
analysis. 
VI.5. General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP): 
Based on what has been stated by GOPP's website, the GOPP was established by the 
Presidential decree No. 1093/1973 to be affiliated to the Minister of Housing and 
Construction20. GOPP shall set the rules of the general policy of urban planning and prepare 
the plans and programs of urban development (GOPP, 2011). With the release of the Building 
Law No. 119/2008, the term of sustainable urban development has emerged as follows: 
GOPP is the State's entity in charge of laying down the general policy for 
planning and sustainable urban development, preparing the plans and programs 
for this development at national, regional and urban levels, and reviewing and 
approving the urban schemes at the local level in the framework of national, 
regional and local goals and policies for planning and sustainable urban 
development. GOPP is authorized to verify the application of such schemes and 
programs in accordance with the previous mentioned goals and policies, and 
raises its reports thereon to the competent minister for submission to the SCPUD. 
(Mubarak, 2008b, Article 5)  
Law 119/2008 gives details of the variant responsibilities, roles and missions that allow the 
GOPP to apply the competences stated above. They could be classified as follows:   
VI.5.1. Laying down general policy for planning and preparing the strategic schemes: 
GOPP sets up and implements the National Program for the Preparation of the Strategic Plans 
for Urban Development at various national, regional, and governorates levels, as well as the 
strategic plans of cities and villages (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 6). This is according to what 
GOPP conducts, in coordination with the competent authorities, of researches, sectoral and 
planning studies, and taking into account the military vision and requirements and of the 
defence of the safety of the State. (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 10). GOPP is also competent to 
review, approve and follow-up the implementation of the strategic plans of towns, villages 
                                                          
20
 The Ministry is now called: Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development. 
Appendix VI 
A 42 
 
and their urban boundaries (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 6) through specialized consultancy 
offices via regional centres of the GOPP (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 11) as described in the 
following text: 
The regional centres for planning and urban development prepare the project of 
the strategic master plan for the city or the village through experts, consultants, 
agencies, and the specialized engineering and consultancy offices that are 
registered with the GOPP. (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 11) 
Within the previous outline, Ac-G-11 confirmed that the GOPP is currently working on the 
national planning for the Republic, saying: "the national scheme is currently under 
preparation by the GOPP", in addition to the preparation of the strategic schemes for cities, 
saying: 
Of course, in accordance with the new law No. 119, the strategic scheme became 
the basis of preparing variant schemes…. State is in the frame of the preparation 
of strategic plans for all cities, villages and hamlets as you know. Therefore, cities 
like Zagazig and Ismailia are existing cities and that is why the GOPP is working 
on them.... We are also now preparing schemes for Badr, Al-Sadat, Tenth of 
Ramadan, Alobour, and New Cairo. (Ac-G-11)  
Hence, it follows from the previous text that GOPP has the full authority granted by law in 
planning existing cities that follow the governorates. But, with the fact that the other cities 
mentioned at the end of the previous text are new cities that belong to the NUCA21, the 
researcher wondered about the specific role of the GOPP in these cities and the relationship 
between the two bodies in this regard. Ac-G-11 explained that the GOPP serves as a technical 
consultant for these projects and he detailed the nature of this role saying: 
New cities are cities that belong to the NUCA. Therefore, a decree to redo the 
strategic schemes for the year 2027 has been established for these cities to give 
them updated plans.... We as GOPP are not the owners of such project but the 
NUCA is the owner. All the new cities are put up through the NUCA but we as 
GOPP are the technical consultant of this project. We are the technical working 
group to deal with the consultant22: we prepare the TOR, we take it to the 
consultancy offices, and then receive the work presentations as well as the 
technical reports  presented to both the GOPP and NUCA. But, we as GOPP take 
the technical side of the work. In brief: we have the lead in the technical side. 
(Ac-G-11)  
About the reason behind the GOPP being responsible for such role, Ac-G-11 answered: 
GOPP, as it does the city planning as well as the strategic schemes of the 
Egyptian cities, so it has the experiences that allow it to support the NUCA in 
planning such schemes especially as there are 12 new cities. Therefore, the GOPP 
carries the technical role in helping the NUCA, but in the natural frame, the 
NUCA is the base. 
                                                          
21
 Details of this authority role will be shown later in this appendix.  
22
 He means the consultancy office that contracted the NUCA to do the work. 
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VI.5.2. Regulating the exercise of planning and urban development: 
Regulating the practice of planning and urban development through: (a) developing capacities 
of urban planning departments of the Local Units (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 10), (b) 
developing mechanisms for the implementation of the schemas at different levels and for 
detailed master plans, (c) assessing and updating information and physical indicators in 
coordination with the information centres at various levels, (d) to propose and express 
opinions on laws, regulations and decrees regulating urban planning and development 
(Mubarak, 2008b, Article 6), and finally, (e) preparing works guidelines of urban schemas 
(Mubarak, 2008b, Articles 2 and 6) including the identification of methods, rates, and criteria 
for preparing and pursuing the application of such schemes (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 10). As 
a confirmation of GOPP’s role in preparing the works guidelines specifically regarding the 
IZs as the research focus, Ac-G-38, Consultant of the GOPP’s Head and is responsible for 
reviewing the works guidelines for the planning of IZs,  answered a question on this regard, 
saying:  
Currently, the preparation of these guidelines is being finalized.  The origin of the 
initiative is the cooperation between the IDA and the GOPP to implement the 
Law, which states that the GOPP is obligated to prepare the guidelines of the 
planning for different uses.  
On detailing the role and steps followed in this regard, he continued saying:  
Ac-G-0323 has prepared, individually, the draft of the guidelines which has been 
presented to the GOPP as the entity responsible of reviewing and accrediting the 
guidelines technically. The GOPP through its urban planning consultants 
reviewed the guidelines and requested some amendments thereby…. The 
revisions have been done also through workshops where the drafts have been 
checked by all the competent authorities: EEAA, Fire Fight Forces, Ministry of 
Interior, Ministry of Defence, and so on….. Through workshops that Ac-G-03 
attended in addition to representatives from the concerned authorities as well as 
the consultants group I mentioned before. (Ac-G-38)  
As regarding the role of the GOPP in the accreditation, he answered: 
The competent authorities approve the final formulation that has been accredited 
by the GOPP after conducting the amendments expressed by the consultants and 
representatives from various authorities. The final formulation then, is to be 
submitted to the SCPUD for the final accredit. The SCPUD then circulates the 
accredited guidebook to the Republic and through this step it is given the power 
as a law. (Ac-G-38) 
Ac-G-03, the preparer of the guidelines, confirmed what has been told by Ac-G-38. His 
answer on a question in this regard was:  
                                                          
23
 He works as a Consultant for the GOPP and as an Advisory for the Head of the IDA.  
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GOPP appointed and contracted me to prepare the IZs’ Guidelines, for the 
planning of IZs … The Law says that it is a must to have guidelines/guidebook, 
the GOPP prepares guidelines for the expense of other entities … As it is the 
entity responsible for planning, so they told me that the first guidebook to start 
with is for industry … They received the guidebook and they, in the GOPP, are 
now reviewing it … It is supposed that the IDA is reviewing with them…. The 
planning consultants and those from the EEAA and from other authorities have 
also attended the discussion meetings.  
GOPP is authorized to do some additional roles related to the cooperation with the 
administrative bodies competent of uses of different lands and of the industrial lands on top 
of them as the research focus. GOPP as the entity in charge of urban planning in Egypt and 
with its team-works specialized in planning as stated and explained above, supports the IDA 
in some planning matters that are not explicitly mentioned not only in the Law 119/2008, 
which organizes the role and powers of GOPP, but also in the decree establishing the IDA 
No. 350/2005, which regulates in turn the role and powers of the IDA. Some of these tasks 
are related to the assessment of the validity of proposed sites to allocate IZs on them. In-G-
06, Head of the Central Administration of IZs of the IDA, explained GOPP’s role in the last 
mentioned task when he was talking about the process’s steps of planning IZs, saying: 
…The second step is to evaluate these lands to decide whether they will work or 
not? Keep it clear in your mind that I am talking about the lands’ nature, as 
evaluating the need of such lands to be presented to the governorate requires 
another study. But this area of land with particular planning determinants is 
qualified or not, is the issue I am talking about. So, we work with the GOPP, Ac-
G-03 and another consultant with him called Dr. Ayman Elhefnawy, GOPP’s vice 
president, do you know him? … We sat together in many meetings working on 
putting the related evaluating criteria as well as thier different relative 
weights24….  
In addition to GOPP’s role regarding the technical side of the preparation of strategic 
planning for the new cities as stated and explained earlier, the GOPP also, based on the 
previous text, technically supports the IDA in some aspects of planning, as in the previous 
example: the evaluation and selection of the qualified sites as IZs, without the 
obligatory/necessary legal provision to do so. 
VI.6. Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development (SCPUD): 
It is issued by the meeting of the Ex-Prime Minister with Ministers of MED25 and 
MHUUD26, Chairman of GOPP and the Secretary General of the Cabinet on 07/08/2008 to 
discuss functions and organizational structure of SCPUD where the council is: the entity 
                                                          
24
 Then the expert went on mentioning the evaluation details which are outside the framework of the research 
focus in this point. 
25
  Ministry of Economic Development. 
26
  Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development. 
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tasked with achieving the objectives of urban development and coordination among the 
authorities concerned with the process of planning and urban development. It is also tasked  
with achieving the link between the economic development plan of the State and the urban 
development plans (Almasry-Alyoum, 2008). SCPUD was established according to 
(Mubarak, 2008b), which stipulates: 
A supreme council for planning and urban development shall be established and 
having the legal status, and will be based in the city of Cairo. It is to be formed 
under the leadership of the Prime Minister, the membership of the competent 
ministers, heads of the authorities concerned with urban development and uses of 
state lands, and ten  experts who are specialized in related issues nominated by 
the competent minister, at least half of them are not from the Government nor the 
local administrative units.  A presidential decree shall be issued to constitute the 
council and its basic system. (Article 3) 
The Presidential Decree No. 298 has been issued on 9/10/2008 on the formation of the 
SCPUD according to the previous provision (Mubarak, 2008a). In the light of what is 
stipulated by (Mubarak, 2008b), Building Law, as the SCPUD is minutely competent to the 
following:   
VI.6.1. Accreditation of policies and Planning: 
SCPUD shall adopt the goals and policies for planning and urban development and urban 
harmony at the national level (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 4), which its proposals are put by the 
related competent authorities27. They are to be sent to the Technical Secretariat of SCPUD to 
prepare the necessary studies thereby and to report its findings to SCPUD for adoption 
(Mubarak, 2008a, Article 1). It is also competent to the accreditation of strategic plans for 
urban development at the national, regional and governorates levels upon the presentation of 
the competent minister (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 10). 
VI.6.2. Adoption of the determination of the areas that need re-planning and those 
non-planned,  and the projects outside the urban area boundaries:  
SCPUD is also authorized, upon the competent governor’s presentation, to adopt the 
identification of re-planning areas and those  not planned according to the output of the 
strategic master plan or the detailed plan of the city or village (Mubarak, 2008a, Article 7), as 
well as the adoption of its plans, programs, priorities and mechanisms of  implementation and 
funding sources. It is also authorized to adopt  the new urban development projects that are 
established outside the urban area’s accredited boundaries (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 4), 
which is detailed by (Mubarak, 2008a) as follows: 
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 GOPP comes on top of these authorities. 
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In case of a request to establish a new urban development  project outside the 
accredited boundaries of the urban area  of the city or village within the strategic 
plans that are prepared at the governorate level, the requesting party shall prepare 
the necessary studies on the project ... The project and studies that have been 
prepared thereby are displayed to the Technical Secretariat of the Council for 
consideration in coordination with NCPSLU and the Operations Committee of the 
Ministry of Defence. It then prepares a report thereon for submission to the 
Council. In case of SCPUD approval on the project; it will then be raised to the 
President of the Republic to issue the necessary decrees. The Technical 
Secretariat of the Council shall conduct the necessary specialized qualitative 
studies. The SCPUD is authorized to set up quality specialized committees to 
express their opinion in the submitted issues. (Article 8)  
VI.6.3. Coordination and following up: 
SCPUD is competent to coordinate between ministries and entities concerned with urban 
development and uses of the State lands for the preparation and application of the national 
strategic planning scheme and to enable development partners to implement their roles and 
responsibilities towards the achievement of national goals. In this regard, Ac-G-11 confirmed 
in his answer to a question on the problems of coordination between agencies involved in 
planning, explaining the SCPUD’s role in addressing these problems as well as  involving all 
parties in the planning process, saying: 
...but now, there is a glimmer of hope ... The new law established an entity and 
called it the Supreme Council for Planning. It has very great power in conducting 
the planning processes in Egypt. It really gathers different disciplines with 
different quality committees. This means it tries to join relevant parties to each 
other and coordinate between them in different subjects. Therefore, when taking a 
decision, it will be taken based on the multiplicity of perspectives and taking into 
consideration the different interests. It has full authority in the planning processes 
in Egypt. For example: city like Sadat, imagine if it has been connected to Cairo 
by a metro line, there will be a huge amount of accessibility. Or if it is linked to 
the Nile Delta through a high way as it is now attracting labour from the Nile 
Delta much more than from Cairo. Imagine what will happen to the development 
right there? Then who will take such decisions? Is it the Roads and Bridges 
Authority or the IDA or the GOPP? Who? The strategic plan addresses such 
solutions, and this is the glimmer of hope. Because the SCPUD decides what will 
be done even outside its authorities and that the coordination must be done 
between x and z to have y done…. Now, such actions are now taking place, so 
there is a glimmer of hope as well as promising work … (Ac-G-11)  
Regarding  follow up of the application of the schemes, SCPUD is also competent to 
evaluating the overall results/outcomes of the application of the national strategic scheme and 
regional strategic schemes (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 4). This shall be based on the annual 
report prepared by GOPP, which includes what have been executed from the programs and 
projects included in the Five-Year Plans of the State. Additionally, it is competent to 
evaluating the role of the different authorities concerned with management and 
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implementation and identifying the most important achievements and obstacles facing the 
implementation process. In this regard, SCPUD commissioned the concerned ministries and 
agencies to follow up the implementation (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 6). 
VI.6.4. Organizing the Legal framework of urban development: 
Building Law gives the SCPUD the power to propose and express its opinion regarding drafts 
of laws related to urban development (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 4). It is also singled out to 
review legislations and propose amendments in light of the emerging matters (Mubarak, 
2008b, Article 5). Regarding necessary regulations for the licensing approvals, the SCPUD is 
competent to collect all the regulations stated/prescribed in the related laws and decrees. Then 
it shall issue a decree including them to be within the regulations necessary to issue a 
statement of validity of the site for building and licensing (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 4). 
Details of this role are as follows: 
SCPUD shall address all the State authorities to determine the regulations for the 
issuance of licenses for each entity. These authorities shall send the regulations 
they have to the Technical Secretariat of SCPUD to prepare a report thereon and 
submit them to the SCPUD. In case of approving such regulations, they will be 
included to the ones necessary for the issuance of licenses. SCPUD shall issue a 
book including all those regulations to be distributed to ministries, governorates 
and concerned authorities to obligate them with it without having to get approvals 
from the competent authorities when issuing a license. The SCPUD is also 
competent to accredit the planning and building regulations of each of the NUCA, 
the General Authority for Tourism Development and the IDA within the scope of 
its competence and after the coordination with the competent minister.” 
(Mubarak, 2008b, Article 2). 
To confirm on this from the field side, on a question that was directed to Ac-G-38, Consultant 
of the GOPP’s Head and the official responsible for reviewing the guidebook of planning IZs, 
concerning the accreditation procedures of the guidebook, he answered confirming the 
SCPUD’s role in the final accreditation, saying:   
The concerned authorities approve the final formulation … Then, it is to be 
submitted to the SCPUD for the final accredit. It then circulates the accredited 
guidebook to the Republic and through this step the guidebook is given the power 
as a law.  
VI.7. The National Centre for Planning the State Lands Uses (NCPSLU): 
The NCPSLU has been established by the Presidential Decree No 153/2001 (Mubarak, 2001). 
According to what has been mentioned on the NCPSLU’s website, it is aiming to assure the 
complete coordination between the State’s entities to: achieve the best possible use of the 
State lands, follow up the development of such lands and tighten the monitoring over these 
lands aiming at the full protection against possible assaults. The NCPSLU is also competent 
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to studying the national key projects to guarantee the maximization of the national revenue 
(NCPSLU, 2011e). This is also confirmed by Dr. Nazif, the Ex-Prime Minister, after opening 
the Centre that follows him directly, saying:   
The NCPSLU has an important role in the light of the development movement 
that Egypt witnesses in all fields whether agriculturally, industrially, and on the 
touristic and urbanism levels. The Centre’s role is to achieve the needed 
coordination between all sectors to reach the best uses of the State lands 
according to the development goals of Egypt and according to the resources 
Egypt has whether for agriculture or for the residential areas. (Abdelkreem and 
Gamaledeen, 2007)    
Dr. Nazif also explained that the NCPSLU, which follows the Cabinet, will be having a 
comprehensive perspective for the development. It will break up the clashes to gain access to 
the largest return for one major resource which is the land (Abdelkreem and Gamaledeen, 
2007). Article No. 2 of (Mubarak, 2001) prescribes the competences of the NCPSLU in 
coordination with the concerned parties. These competences could be classified as follows:   
VI.7.1. Coordination and breaking up the clashes regarding the mandate over the 
State’s lands 
Coordination between different ministries on the uses of the State lands outside the 
agriculture rein, and also in relation to the pricing rules of the land, its selling system, 
collecting its value and organizing its protection. This includes a possible coordination with 
the Ministry of Defence on the uses of such lands what does not contradict with the defence 
plans for the State (Mubarak, 2001, Article 2). 
A set of annual recommendations books have been issued by the NCPSLU and the researcher 
studied three of them that have been published (NCPSLU, 2011a, NCPSLU, 2011b, 
NCPSLU, 2011c). They work on clarifying and detailing the centre roles as prescribed by its 
establishing decree and they have been circulated to the State agencies. For example, the third 
book is about a request from the NCPSLU to the governorates to follow a set of procedures 
that allow it to activate its role as a member of the committee responsible for deciding on the 
use of the governorates lands. In this book, the NCPSLU asks for the accredited schemes, 
sites areas  proposed to be used, the nature of projects  proposed to be established on these 
lands according to the development plan and the cadastral maps necessary for these sites. The 
NCPSLU asks also for that the required data are to be sent to it well in advance before the 
convening of any meetings. So that the Centre can set up its studies in coordination with other 
stakeholders and to reach the desired results that achieve the desired consistency between the 
governmental developmental schemes and the general economic plan of the State. 
Consequently, those results  will then be at the disposal of the governorates  and will 
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generally help them in their developmental orientations (NCPSLU, 2011a). When reaching 
this point, the NCPSLU would be on its way to achieve the aim of its establishing. 
In addition to the preceding competences, regarding the State lands allocation, the NCPSLU 
is competent to express its opinion on requests from State bodies to modify previously 
allocated land uses or allocate and add new land. It also expresses its opinion on the clashes 
between these bodies and each other or between such entities and individuals on determining 
who is competent to manage, use and dispose of any lands reserved for them outside the 
agriculture reins (Mubarak, 2001, Article 2). Therefore and to explain the use of the words 
"express the opinion" previously mentioned and which might be understood as weakening the 
Centre's role, the researcher questioned a number of the governmental officials, such as (In-
G-06, Ac-G-11, Ac-G-03, En-G-32, and In-G-29), about their visions on the role of the 
NCPSLU and the extent to which it is powerful. Those officials confirmed that the Centre is 
the key to receiving requests from different bodies, studying them, coordinating between the 
various State bodies, then expressing its decision and finally issuing the Prime Minister's 
decree regarding this decision. Since the decision-making within the NCPSLU is the 
authority of its board of directors that directly follows the Prime minister, so deciding on any 
matter by this board is the foundation that is followed by routine procedures that will not 
change anything, up to issuing the Prime Minister's decree. In-G-06 confirmed this meaning 
by saying: 
The owner of a land is to be determined by the NCPSLU…. It has been 
established since 200428 … It counts the lands that are already allocated and those 
required to be allocated currently and in the future for a specific body, and puts 
all these data on the general map of Egypt. It then breaks the clashes between 
these bodies after coordinating with the Army and other concerned bodies. It will 
finally announce the owner. As an example, we requested it to allocate some 
lands to establish a number of heavy industry projects. It studied this subject and 
then announced a number of sites as IZs after coordinating with all authorities. 
The final step was issuing the establishing decree for such IZs: these sites with 
coordinates x,y,z for each are allocated and under the mandate of the IDA to 
establishing industrial projects and so on….       
  
                                                          
28
 In spite of that this statement about the year of the establishment of the National Centre is incorrect, but it is 
very close to the reality. Despite the decree that established the Centre was on 2001, the Board of Directors of 
this Centre has not been formed until late 2004 and early 2005 (refer to the Ex-Prime Minister's decrees Nos. 
46/2004, 242/2004, 731/2004 and 467/2005). In addition, the opening of the headquarters of the Centre, as 
stated before, was in 2007. Thus, this explains the matter is that the work of the National Centre has not been 
sensed by the organs of the State till 2004 or 2005. So, it is worth mentioning that this will be taken into 
consideration when talking about the implication from this Centre on the planning process of IZs. 
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VI.7.2. Studies, counting and planning: 
The NCPSLU is competent to prepare the necessary studies and environmental and technical 
researches related to the State lands outside the reins. Additionally, it prepares the inventory 
and evaluation of these lands and then laying down the master plan of their development and 
uses according to State policy, hence, the mapping of land uses for all purposes, as well as 
detailed maps drawn from the general planning. It then delivers to each ministry the map 
showing the allocated land uses for this ministry’s activities. Each ministry will alone have 
full authority to dispose, oversee and development of such uses. The Presidential Decree also 
authorized the NCPSLU to share the concerned bodies in selecting and identifying sites for 
new key projects of the State (road-rail-sea ports and airports - economic areas ... and so on). 
Furthermore, it is competent to documenting the urban areas boundaries for cities and 
villages and preparing studies on extensions or modifications of these boundaries. It is also 
the entity responsible for the inventory of the annual programs for the development and use 
of the lands of each ministry- with the retention of all data on the State lands outside the 
reins, which is allocated to each ministry-, the annual uses of these lands, and what is 
left unused (Mubarak, 2001, Article 2). 
Meanwhile, through studying the previous competences specially those related to planning, it 
might seem that there is overlapping between the SCPUD and the NCPSLU. To clarify the 
distinction in competences between the two, the researcher directed a question on this 
meaning to In-G-06. He explained that the role of the NCPSLU is to study the State lands 
outside the reins of the governorates, break up the conflict between various State bodies in 
jurisdiction over these lands, and issue the official decree that regulates this issue. On the 
other hand, the SCPUD is competent to manage the planning matters within/inside the 
reins/control of the governorates. His answer was exactly as follows: 
29
… So the National Centre the (NCPSLU) has a role. Ok, there are IZs that are 
established inside the governorates? No, this centre is responsible for the lands 
outside the reins called the State ownership but those inside the reins of the 
governorates, governorates are responsible for its planning. According to the new 
law, the Unified Building Law, a body has been established called the Supreme 
Council for Urban Planning (SCPUD), The governor prepares the strategic 
planning for his/her land uses and accredits it from this council. (In-G-06) 
VI.7.3. The relationship between the NCPSLU and the bodies that have mandate over 
the State lands:   
The relationship between the NCPSLU and the bodies that have mandate over the State lands 
is formulated from two things: the first is the Board of Directors which contains one 
                                                          
29
 This text is a direct continuation of the previous text of this expert. 
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representative from each body and the second is the general framework, which is set up by 
the centre due to the nature of this relationship. Regarding the Board of Directors, it is headed 
by the Deputy Premier who is also the Minister of agriculture. Many Decrees which form the 
board of directors have been issued by the Prime Minister (Nazeif, 2004a, Nazeif, 2004b, 
Nazeif, 2004c, Nazeif, 2005). By studying the evolution of these decrees, it was noted; the 
absence of the MSEA from the first formation (Nazeif, 2004a) and it appeared directly in the 
second formation with both the Minister of Water resources and the Military survey 
Authority (MSA). In the same formation, GAFI has confirmed that MSA is the only body 
responsible for lands data base (Nazeif, 2004a). The third formation has confirmed also that 
MOD is still the only body responsible for keeping the database for all activities (Nazeif, 
2004b). As for the fourth formation, Ministry of petroleum has been added and each 
representative from the NUCA30, GATD31 and GALR32 has been exchanged by another one 
from each related ministry. This made the formation completely from ministries 
representatives plus the Director of MSA. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) stays 
not represented in the NCPSLU board of Directors and even in any of its bodies in all the 
four formations. This arises an important question on the reason behind the exclusion of the 
MTI  and not any other mandate authority (Nazeif, 2005) and therefore emergence of the 
wonder on how the coordination is being done regarding the lands allocated for industrial 
activities. 
With regard to the relationship framework created by the NCPSLU, as indicated in 
(NCPSLU, 2011d), the NCPSLU is engaged by equal relationships to Ministries of Housing, 
Agriculture and Tourism, all governorates, the NUCA and the MTI. Despite of the absence of 
the industrial authorities in the board of directors as mentioned before, but NCPSLU sets it 
right and puts the MTI as a mandate authority connected to it by a relationship that is equal to 
the other authorities stated before. Deviated from this pattern; first, the presence of the MOD 
in a special place due to its strategic importance and to response to the duties that the 
Establishing Decree imposed upon the NCPSLU regarding the coordination with the MOD. 
Second, the GAFI and the investors have been separated from other bodies. Probably, that is 
because of the attention paid by the Centre to investment as one of its aims priorities. 
NCPSLU’s website states encouraging investment as the second of seven goals, (NCPSLU, 
2011e) reads: 
                                                          
30
 New Urban Communities Authority 
31
 General Authority for Tourism Development. 
32
 General Authority for Land Reclamation. 
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2. Attracting and directing the foreign and local capitals to invest in funding and 
establishing the developmental projects to serve the State lands in all fields. 
It is also found that each of the Ministries of Environment, Oil and Culture is connected to 
the NCPSLU through what so called a “special relationship (Atypical)” as stated in NCPSLU 
(2011d). Therefore, this relationship could be understood as weakening not as strengthening. 
What confirms this understanding is that the important ministries such as Industry, Housing, 
Agriculture, Tourism and the Governorates, which are all mandate authorities, have 
ordinary/typical relationships with the NCPSLU. It is thought that what could be understood 
here is that the coordination and follow-up with the latter authorities is regular/typical while it 
is not with ministries like Environment, Culture and Petroleum or only when it is needed on 
intermittent cases. What confirms this meaning is what In-G-06 said about that the IDA being 
linked by a standing coordination committee to the NCPSLU, saying:  "Means, there is a 
standing committee between the IDA and the NCPSLU to present the topics….". 
VI.8. Local Administration – Governorates 
VI.8.1. Competences of the Governorate’s Executive Council (ECG) and the Governor: 
The Governorate’s Executive Council (GEC) composed from the governor as a chairman and 
membership of both assistants of the governor, heads of towns, cities and districts, heads of 
departments, agencies and public bodies within the scope of the governorate, and general 
secretary of the governorate as the council’s secretary (SIS, 2011). GEC shall set up, in 
conjunction with GOPP through its regional centres, local physical goals and policies at the 
governorate level in accordance with the needs identified by the Governorate’s Local People's 
Assembly (GLPA) within the framework of the national goals and policies (Mubarak, 2008b, 
Article 9). The Governor after approval by the GLPA is competent to accredit the detailed 
schemes for zones whatever its uses are. (Mubarak, 2008b) describes this in details as 
follows: 
A decree by the competent governor is issued after the approval of local people's 
assembly of the governorate for the accreditation of detailed plans for downtown 
areas, areas that need re-planning, unplanned areas, industrial zones, craft zones, 
areas allocated as urban extensions and areas of distinguished value, in 
accordance with the principles and standards for those areas contained in this law. 
(Article 16) 
This is in addition to projects for land division as stated in the same law as follows: 
The competent governor issues, upon the presentation of the general 
administration of planning and urban development, a decree to accredit the land 
division projects and its list of conditions, including the obligation to implement 
internal utilities, or modify these projects or those  existing within the urban area 
boundaries of the city of village, in accordance with the planning and building 
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regulations approved in the strategic master-plan and the detailed plan ... (Article 
20) 
VI.8.2. Competences of the General Administrations of Planning and Urban 
Development (GAPUD): 
A general administration of planning and urban development (GAPUD)  exists in each 
governorate based on the Article No. 8, (Mubarak, 2008b). Within its administrative scope, 
GAPUD is responsible for urban planning matters prescribed by law. At the level of local 
planning for the governorate, it is involved in the formulation of the development needs and 
priorities and this is what (Mubarak, 2008b) explained as follows:  
The general administrations of planning and urban development formulates, 
according to the works guidebook of the urban planning schemes  prepared by the 
General Administration of Urban Planning with the participation of the competent 
local unit, local people's assemblies, the competent executive bodies, and 
representatives of civil and private society, the urban development needs and 
priorities at the local level within the framework of the objectives and regional 
and local policies and proposes the necessary projects and action plan for 
achieving them. (Article 11) 
It is also competent at the level of local planning for cities and villages to prepare the detailed 
plans of cities and villages based on the regulations of planning and building of the strategic 
master plan approved for the city or village (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 14). Furthermore, 
GAPUD prepares the detailed plans for different uses as well as programs and priorities of 
the integrated development projects of the approved master strategic scheme (Mubarak, 
2008b, Article 8). It does the previous tasks through experts, consultants and agencies and 
specialized engineering consultancy offices registered with GOPP (Mubarak, 2008b, Articles 
8 and 14). All are under the supervision of the regional centre of the GOPP of each 
governorate (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 8). 
In addition to the above, GAPUDs shall determine the areas of re-planning and prepare its 
plans and programs, priorities, and mechanisms for its implementation as well as the funding 
sources. This is based on that the governors will submit these issues to the SCPUD for 
accreditation (Mubarak, 2008b, Article 4). 
In a summarizing and confirmation of the foregoing and in particular on IZs in governorates, 
In-G-06 explained that governorates are responsible for the planning of IZs within their reins 
after the accreditation of the strategic plans by the SCPUD, saying: 
… Ok, there are IZs that are established inside the governorates? No, this centre 
(he means the NCPSLU) is responsible for the lands outside the reins which are 
called the State ownership but those inside the reins of the governorates, 
governorates are responsible for their planning. According to the new law, the 
Unified Building Law, a body has been established called the Supreme Council 
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for Urban Planning (SCPUD), The governor prepares the strategic planning for 
his/her land uses and accredits it from this council. 
VI.9. New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA): 
The NUCA has been established by (Assadat, 1979), the Law No. 59 of 1979, in order to curb 
the urban infringement upon agricultural areas, and redistribute the inhabitants far from the 
narrow strip of the Nile valley with the creation of new civilized centres for achieving 
community stability and economic prosperity through the establishment of new attracting 
areas outside the scope of the existing cities and villages (NUCA, 2011). The NUCA is the 
only entity responsible for the establishment of new urban communities and is the mandate-
holder thereby by virtue of Articles 2 and 9 of the same law mentioned recently (Assadat, 
1979). This is stated clearly in Article NO. 2 of this law as follows:  
An authority shall be established called New Urban Communities Authority ... Is 
to be - without the others - the State entity responsible for the establishment of 
these urban communities. (Assadat, 1979, Article No. 2) 
While the ninth Article reads: 
A decree of the Prime Minister after approval by the Cabinet to allocate the State-
owned lands, which are chosen to establish new urban communities.... Any 
natural or legal person is prohibited after the issuance of this decree to possess, 
put hand or assault any part of the lands allocated for the purposes of this Law. It 
is also prohibited to conduct any business or construct any establishments, 
facilities or purposes in any way except by permission of this body [NUCA]. 
(Assadat, 1979, Article No. 9) 
Within the frame of the above, the Law singled out the NUCA with a range of competences 
and authorities to achieve the goal of its creation. Assadat (1979) stipulates: 
The Authority is competent to study, propose, implement and follow-up plans, 
policies and programs of the establishment of new urban communities, according 
to the economic and social development plan and within the general policy of the 
State. (Article 28) 
In light of this general competence, NUCA’s competences as stated in details by the Law 
could be classified as follows: 
VI.9.1. Laying down the policies of establishing new urban communities and 
organizing and following up their implementation:   
The NUCA lays down the policy and prepares the plans and programs of the urban 
development to establish new urban communities and coordinates between them and plans 
and puts programs for production and services. And in so doing, the NUCA is also competent 
to organize, coordinate and exchange advice with ministries and agencies involved in 
urbanism activities and related fields. Regarding lands and organizing their development, the 
NUCA is authorized to divide the new urban community to cities, villages, zones, and 
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districts and set the regulations and building specifications in each of them. It also 
promotes/markets for the sale, lease or exploitation of their lands (Assadat, 1979, Articles No. 
28). The NUCA is also competent to the approval and licensing necessary for the 
establishment, administration and operation of all what falls within its competences whether 
they are activities, projects, realizations, buildings, utilities or services (Assadat, 1979, Article 
No. 13). To facilitate and govern the organization of the new urban communities’ 
development, the NUCA is authorized to establish a council to develop the new urban 
community and manage the utilities and projects therein (Assadat, 1979, Article No. 44). 
Concerning the following-up, the NUCA must follow-up the implementation of urbanism 
plans of new urban communities and overcome what may object the implementation from 
physical or technical obstacles, as well as assess the achievements (Assadat, 1979, Article 
No. 28). 
VI.9.2. Sites' selection and planning: 
The NUCA is competent to conduct studies necessary to choose the most appropriate 
locations for new urban communities and for their planning (Assadat, 1979, Article No. 28). 
It is explained by Article 7 of the same Law, reading: 
The Authority (NUCA) shall select sites necessary for the establishment of new 
urban communities and prepare general and detailed planning for them, in 
accordance with the general plan of the State. Sites' selection and planning are 
tasks that are to be done by the NUCA, by its organs or by contracting with 
persons, companies, consulting firms and local and foreign bodies, in accordance 
with the provisions contained in this law in this regard. (Assadat, 1979, Article 7). 
VI.9.3. Studying and implementation of projects and infrastructure: 
The NUCA is authorized to work on the implementation of businesses and projects in the 
new urban communities including services' projects. With regard to utilities, the NUCA is 
competent to studying and implementation of the regional utilities as well as implementation 
of interior utilities whether through the NUCA directly, through concerned development 
councils or in any other way it deems appropriate. It is also competent to oversee the 
implementation of these projects either alone or through its development councils in every 
new community (Assadat, 1979, Article 11). In this regard and to explain what powers and 
control have been given by law to the NUCA over new urban communities, Assadat, 1979 
briefly but strongly states that: 
The Authority (NUCA) in order to achieve its objectives is authorized to conduct 
all the actions and works that will implement the determined programs and 
priorities and it may contract directly with persons, companies, banks and local 
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and foreign bodies, in accordance to the rules prescribed by the Authority's 
interior regulation. (Article 11) 
To clarify and confirm the previous legal article, Ac-G-11, GOPP Head's Advisory and 
Chairman of the technical secretariat of planning new cities, in dealing with the differences 
between GOPP and NUCA confirmed on the authorities and powers given to the latter as the 
owner on its mandate over the new cities.  Also, he confirmed on GOPP's role as a planning 
consultant to the NUCA, saying: 
Both two authorities are subordinated to the Ministry of housing. The NUCA has 
many many many other tasks in the frame of lands allocating and work within 
cities themselves.... We in GOPP play a technical role helping NUCA but in the 
normal case, it is in full charge. It is in charge of contracting and dealing with 
investors as well as doing the internal coordination with them while we play an 
advisory role.... This combination happened because the NUCA is the owner of 
all the new cities … Cities like Zagazig, Ismailia are existing cities and that is 
why GOPP is in charge of their planning while new cities are subordinated to the 
NUCA. (Ac-G-11)  
Regarding IZs within the new cities, In-G-06 interpreted the nature of NUCA's competences 
of land ownership and preparing and accrediting the planning schemes, saying:  
... Industrial zones within the new cities were and are still owned by the NUCA, 
we [the IDA] regulate these zones: we set up industrial regulations, how to 
allocate lands and to whom, how to ensure a serious action from investors and so 
on. But industrial zones within October City and its extensions are controlled by 
the NUCA. On 79 when some new cities have been established like El-Sadat and 
Tenth of Ramadan, they were integrated cities including urban, residential areas 
and touristic areas. Since 2006, we have the mandate over industrial zones in the 
new cities but they are still owned by the NUCA. … There are 8 million m2 
within October City, they are planned and accredited by the NUCA as an 
industrial extension and we just added them to the industrial developer program...  
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VII. NATURE, IMPORTANCE AND KEY REASONS BEHIND THE IDP 
The current strategy for industrial development of the Egyptian Government aims at pursuing 
policies of economic diversity in investment and establishing closer relationships with the 
private sector through flexible regulations and legislations. In addition, focusing on the 
competitive advantage in Egypt represented in availability of distinct opportunities for 
investors and achieving maximum benefit in all areas of industry. Egypt is thus to enter a new 
era of cooperation between the Government and the private sector through the creation of a 
new generation of industrial zones with cooperation of the private sector both locally and 
globally, to help create the necessary work environment to grant the rights to develop, 
manage and operate lands - on the long-term - to private entities under the association 
agreements between the Government and the private sector (IDP, 2011d). About the nature of 
the IDP and its purpose as it is in its initiators’ understanding, In-G-061, Director of the 
Central Administration of the IZs in the IDA, said:  
The industrial developer is part of the State plan according to the IDA 
establishment decision where it stated that the industrial zones are to be 
developed through the way of the industrial developer, what does this mean? It 
means that the private sector contributes with the State in the development. 
Meaning that other than having the State working on its own in 2 millions square 
metres of land providing utilities networks and other things, no, I want the private 
sector to contribute in all of this within the approved industrial zones.... This is a 
parallel development method with the State.... By this way, I speed up the 
development and I take spending money off the State disbursement. I give the 
developer the responsibility of the promotion and marketing because it is a 
regulation to have promotion and marketing qualities to be able to marketing 
internally and externally. Through this way, I help him and he helps himself too 
... (In-G-06)2    
It could be said from this statement that the importance of the program and its benefit is due 
to achieving strong industrial development without burdening the State through the 
partnership between both the public and the private sectors. This is confirmed by ME, the 
Executive Director of CPC3, saying: 
The primary benefit of the way of the industrial developer as an example of the 
private public partnership, is that it will guarantee a horizontal expansion and 
large powerful growth of the industrial base, which the State will not be able to 
                                                          
1
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
2
 Amr Assal, The Ex-Head of the IDA, confirmed on the same meaning (Assal, 2010).  
3
 CPC is one of the companies joined the IPs Program as an industrial developer. It is one of the case studies this 
chapter is analyzing.  
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achieve, why? Because, there will be investments within the zone which will be 
provided by the developer. (De-43) 
In-G-06, Director of the Central Administration of the IZs in the IDA, adds to what is 
mentioned above that the importance of the developer is due not only to the contribution in 
the establishment and marketing but also to the contribution in the management of the IP 
maintaining its quality and level of service provided. In this regard, he said: 
The developer goal is not to make the infrastructure and that’s it, not the goal is 
the management after operation which is most important as he is not a contractor 
he is a park manager and operator so his process involves the establishment while 
the management and maintaining the quality is the important part according to the 
contract between him and me ... (In-G-06)  
There are many reasons for establishing such program where De-43, the Executive Director 
of CPC, pointed out that the program is a normal result of the ambitious plans made by Egypt 
for the advancement of the country, saying: 
Why did Egypt want to make private industrial zones? Because in the last 5 or 6 
years very ambitious plans have been put and it is really the first time to have 
such plans which are realistic seeking the development of the country, 
accommodating  workers and raising the living standard of people. For this to 
happen, the agriculture does not guarantee it. The services sector has started to 
guarantee it, although they are somewhat slow and the State carries a large part of 
operating. Therefore, the industry is the base for this with the partnership with the 
private sector. (De-43) 
He adds a further reason to what is mentioned before that the failure to deal seriously by 
investors who were allotted small plots of lands that provided by utilities, which they did not 
develop, led the State to changing the thought through partnership with the private sector and 
with giving part of the responsibility to it along with tightening the conditions for 
development, saying 
There is a daunting amount of industrial zones in many countries in the world that 
has led these countries to be industrial without the State having to pay a lot of 
money. In Egypt, we did not have such vision ... They decided from 3 years after 
discovering that investors in the new cities took lands without working in them, 
they decided to somewhat change their minds. The first thing is to take the lands 
from those investors then to put some conditions upon the ones who will take 
lands and at the same time to create new zones where the developers will share in. 
(De-43) 
Others including Ac-G-03, the Consultant of IDA Head, have a different point of view 
referring to the weakness of the State budget and its incapability to extend utilities which led 
the State to have a partner, saying: 
... You gave the best areas you have which are in the new urban communities to 
the industrial developer because you do not have a budget to extend the main 
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infrastructure ... So they brought the developers and asked them to extend the 
infrastructure. (Ac-G-03)  
Amr Assal, Ex-Head of the IDA, confirmed on the limited budget of the Government and this 
is the reason behind involving the private sector in the existing IZs development aiming at 
directing this limited budget to develop other IZs in Upper Egypt to achieve good balance in 
development, saying: 
Our resources are limited. Today, we are able with our resources to provide 
utilities for 2 million meters every year. We still have land in some small towns, 
for 4 years we are still providing utilities and the investor is waiting to build the 
factory. We do not want to enter this cycle; taking land without utilities and the 
investor waits for us, does not build the factory and the employment does not 
work, and we keep watching each other and say we are fine this way. No, to 
provide 10 million meters, we had an important goal in the Ministry that 
development has to be balanced at the level of all of Egypt. Not to concentrate on 
6th of October and 10th of Ramadan and therefore all funding coming to us from 
the Ministry of Finance has not pumped one pound in Cairo or Alexandria. All 
funding went to Upper Egypt, to the Delta, to Sinai and to the New Valley and 
resulted in 830 new project as a result of pumping a billion and 450 million 
pounds in 33 industrial zones in 24 governorates which we spoke about 
yesterday. (Assal, 2010)  
Therefore and as a summary for what is mentioned before, it could be said that the reasons 
behind this program are due to the weakness of the State budget that pushed the State to enter 
a partner. What helped the State doing so are the plans put aiming at solving industrial 
development problems and on top of which not dealing seriously by the investors with the 
lands they posses. This led to changing the thought and the involvement of the private sector 
in the management and giving it part of the responsibility. 
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VIII. QUALIFYING PROCESS OF THE IDP 
After offering the program and announcing for one of the IDP phases, the IDA starts the 
qualifying step, Figure (A-7), and then carries out the final evaluation and choice of 
companies followed by preparing for contracting procedures. IPs developers confirmed and 
praised the dialogue formula and style of participation adopted by the IDA through 
workshops in the qualifying step. It was in an attempt to reach the best possible models for 
IPs as well as to prepare a preliminary consensual draft of the contract (De-28, De-43)1. De-
43, the Executive Director of CPC, adds that the IDA rejected some companies which had 
real estate perspective to insure real industrial development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a clarification of the nature of the proceedings, De-28, the Executive Director of Al 
Tagamouat IP, confirmed2 and praised the dialogue formula and style of participation are a 
preliminary consensual draft of the contract, where he said: 
The IDA had an integrated team. They distributed the TOR including 
prequalification documents. They asked for our previous work, the CV of our 
administrators as well as our marketing plans that we have used, the way we 
communicate with our customers, how we follow up with clients, how we build 
and what will we build. This means that there were preparatory workshops for 
more than one time. Also there was a workshop convened by the IDA with all 
industrial developers after we all have presented the prequalification documents. 
They held a workshop, where all developers were there and everyone presented 
his/her best ideas for developing the best model for IPs. Of course, they took all 
the ideas from all people and then, made the contract which was distributed on all 
of us. We discussed this contract as they put conditions and obligations of the 
                                                          
1
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
2
 De-43, the Executive Director of CPC IP, shares De-28 in the same understanding but used different words.   
Figure A-7: Qualifying step in details 
Reference: (IDP, 2011b) 
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Egyptian Government. Then they chose 5 companies from the proposing 
developers of the first-generation. We were one of the chosen companies. (De-28) 
De-43, the Executive Director of CPC, agreed consistently with the overall steps, adding the 
IDA rejection  of some companies which had real estate perspective, not an industrial 
development perspective, saying: 
The project was globally launched. When we entered the project, we made a pre-
study. We presented the pre-study of the project. We made it internally and 
presented the idea to the IDA. They chose us among people who presented good 
projects ... They attracted some local developers. A Turkish group came as a 
developer running in development in Turkey and another Egyptian group. Some 
other groups applied but had a real estate perspective, meaning land speculation. 
So, they were rejected. (De-43) 
With the presence of management experience in dealing with the program and also with the 
many companies wishing to obtain more lands; the IDA, starting from the second phase, 
chose evaluating the companies using total points standard. In this way, competitive criteria 
are determined for the presented offers. That is with the relative weight of each criterion 
reflecting the viewpoint of the IDA and reflecting its priorities at the time of TOR 
preparation. Competitive criteria are divided into four main groups: development activity, 
level of service, technical competence and financial efficiency (IDA, 2008b). De-64, the 
Executive Director of IP3, confirmed on the application of this on the second phase of the 
program saying: 
Second phase differs from the first phase of the program in that in the second the 
selection of developers is based on an assessment using the total points standard 
(experience - reputation - the financial capacity - ..), and when there is equality 
between companies, the project feasibility study as well as the master plan are 
used to differentiate between the applying companies. (De-64) 
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IX. ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING APPROVALS (EIA STUDIES) OF 
THE IDP 
This appendix discusses the EIA studies as an important step of approvals and licensing that 
the developer should legally complete. This is examined by analyzing what has been done in 
this regard in the case studies of the IDP. This appendix deals with the nature and type of the 
EIA and how is it prepared, approved, what are the parties involved and the role of each 
partner. Then it addresses problems of application of the procedures and their impact on the 
actual feasibility of the study and if it achieves its purposes or not. It ends by a conclusion 
that, from the procedural form, the developer is the one who prepares the study through his 
choice of consultancy offices to be presented to the city council for reviewing its readiness 
and send it to the EEAA for taking the appropriate decision. This is done in shape, but the 
mentioned procedures are affected by many influences, which make the study lack its actual 
feasibility. These effects were based on the strength of the legal and institutional position of 
the IDA and the developer when compared to the EEAA which is marginalized with the EIA 
by which it can intervene to adjust the planning path and make the planning of the IPs 
compatible with the environment. 
IX.1. Nature of the study: 
Starting from the contract applied between the IDA and the industrial developer and in 
particular in the development plan and sales that stipulates requiring the developer “to divide 
the total area to specific industrial areas according to types of targeted industry and after 
approval by the EEAA to neighbouring industries places” (IDA, 2008a, p. 33). According to 
En-G-361, Director of the environmental assessment Department in the EEAA, that this is 
done through preparation of the developer to the master plan and then submitting for approval 
by the IDA followed by the developer sending it with EIA study for reviewing and audit 
opinion (En-G-36). The developer prepares the EIA study through specialized technical 
offices and submits it to the competent administrative authority which is the city council; 
where the IP lies, for reviewing the fulfilment of its items before sending it to the EEAA for 
review and decision, what was confirmed by several specialists as well as all developers 
interviewed by the researcher. In this context De-43, the Executive Director of CPC said: 
We made the environmental study for the entire region by a consultant who will 
also present the study to the council ... We made something called the 
                                                          
1
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
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environmental impact of the IP but the distribution of plants (factories) did not 
happen2. (De-43) 
De-G-31, Head of the Central Administration of the industrial developer in the IDA, also 
confirmed on the above and added clarifying the role of the EEAA in the study of the plan 
and reassurance of considering the environmental regulations by saying: 
For the master plan, we put a condition after its adoption that the developer brings 
an approval on activities. He goes to the EEAA they tell him: No; change this 
activity, put it here and this activity here and so on. The same activities could stay 
by the way but they redistribute them and change their locations. Also it is 
possible after some time while he is adopting for example textile activities that 
need boilers: these boilers have problems because they need certain treatment 
stations and he did not prepare the zone for it. Therefore, he has to choose 
between two things; change the activity or put a treatment station and thus he 
adds to the master plan and has to amend it again with me. (De-G-31) 
About the nature of the study; En-G-36, Director of the environmental assessment 
Department in the EEAA, which is responsible of reviewing and thus deciding on these 
studies, explained the nature of the study and its divisions. He added that the developer is 
asked to make the study for the IP as a whole and then each plant therein has to present 
another study for itself, detailing this by saying: 
The EIA study is divided into 3 sections: basic data brought from library studies; 
references or literature or through field studies for specific measurements. The 
second section is a description of the project thoroughly and the third section is 
the environmental management plan and environmental monitoring plan. The 
investor within the scope of industrial developers program presents a study for the 
EIA of the IP as a whole. As this is what happened in the integrated tourism 
centres; for example one who takes Marsa Alam area and makes development of 
the whole region and says I will make hotels, rests, business and shopping 
centres, roads and so on, for this he makes an EIA study for the centre as a whole. 
Therefore, what applies to tourism centres normally applies to industrial 
developers. As long as we have a base we follow; it is to be applied to the centre 
as a whole and to the activity/factory after that. But here there is something is to 
be considered: the study as I said has 3 sections. The base line already exists, 
where the factory does the second study will not put the base line as I already 
have it and will only make the other two sections. (En-G-36) 
En-G-52, Deputy Director of the Environmental Administration of Sixth of October City 
council, which is the department that receives the study from the developer and review its 
completeness before sending it to the EEAA, confirms on the foregoing saying: 
For those developers, each zone individually prepares a complete study. I mean 
for example I have a zone called Polorice and there are CPC and Sami Saad: All 
of them are developers ... Each large zone of these made an EIA alone but not 
                                                          
2
 This means that what is done is the EIA based on the adopted plan, which presents the distribution of industrial 
sectors without plants (factories) allocation. 
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from level (B) which is the small one. No it made on the highest level which is 
level (C)3 . (En-G-52) 
Thus we notice the reduction of the level of study from (C) to (B) although the probability 
that the factory is one of the activities stipulated in the EIA guidelines to make a study of 
level (C). About the reason behind this, En-65, one of the former senior officials in the EEAA 
and current Chairman of the Board of Directors of one of the major specialized consultancy 
offices in environment and sustainability in Egypt, replied that this is their vision they put in 
the modification of the EIA guidelines reasoning that by the following: 
When we made the guidelines, concerning the EIA, which we made here for the 
EEAA, we say, you people if the category (C) is inside an industrial zone with a 
strategic EIA it is lowered one grade and grade (B) is lowered one grade. Do you 
understand what I mean? On the basis that a large part of the issue is solved, as 
long as it follows the regulations and environmental management systems of the 
industrial zone as a whole, the industrial zone puts a cover as long as it is inside I 
lower it one grade. (En-65) 
But the potential impact of the factory on the pollution carrying capacity of the region is the 
same in both cases which means this amendment is incorrect. Because the reduction in the 
level of the study means that the plant is not required to submit a study on the pollution 
carrying capacity of the region containing it what represents more stress on the environment. 
This was confirmed when asking En-65 about this issue and, he answered with no logic and 
his answer included contradiction. This brings us to the purpose of that amendment to the 
EIA guidelines and the degree of environmental awareness for both who make it or adopt it 
specially that it contravenes the environment law which included the carrying capacity study 
to the EIA studies. 
En-65 added another dimension of the nature of these studies and considered that what the 
IPs do can be put as a start on the way to the strategic EIA. He clarified the main reason for 
resorting this kind of studies is the entry of the private developers and that the EEAA created 
pressure, even if that was undisclosed, on the IPs exploiting their eagerness to speed 
marketing their land plots and attracting investors to impose making a study for the industrial 
zone as a whole :saying 
Before that, they used to ask factories to make an EIA, now it is raised to a higher 
level because the IZ now makes a strategic EIA. Not all existing IZs make, only 
new ones [He means the IPs], and this is a good development. They become 
doing a strategic EIA, to which level? Now at least the process exists and the 
                                                          
3
 The assumed level of the study that the investor provides is linked to the level of his own project and its 
classification according to its negative impact on the environment according to the declared lists and enacted in 
this regard ranging from the white, gray and black lists offset respectively by the level of study to be done, 
starting from level A, then B and then C. 
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EEAA started, to my knowledge, and this is an undeclared policy but if you are 
inside an IP, they will not agree for you as a factory until the whole region has a 
strategic EIA. Thus they use the factories to press on the IP.  Before that, it did 
not matter for anyone because the IZs followed the governorate. They now know 
how to do such story because there are private developers who take the IPs and it 
makes a difference to them as they sell their land plots. Their money is on the 
scale now as if it is known that EIA’s here is not accepted investors will go to 
another zone. So, now he exerts pressure on the IPs. (En-65) 
It is understood from the above that the undeclared policy concerning forcing the developer 
to do an EIA for the IP as a whole is not based on legal obligation, or at least there are legal 
loopholes to prevent its application otherwise the EEAA would not have made a deal with the 
NUCA to ensure its application. This is affirmed by En-G-36, Director of Legal 
Administration in the EEAA, by saying: 
We made a deal with the NUCA concerned with the industrial cities that 
regarding the zones they gave to developers; the developer in order to get an 
approval of establishing a factory that he required to submit an EIA for the whole 
area including the inner divisions. (En-G-16) 
From the above we can draw that with respect to the IDP, the agreement between the NUCA 
and the IDA requires that each IP, as a whole, do an EIA of level (C).  So that, each factory or 
activity within the IP prepares a separate study of level (B) for its project. The study on level 
(C) for the IPs is considered by some as an introduction or a beginning of the application of 
the strategic EIA.  
IX.2. Problems of the EIA Studies: 
There are numerous problems for the EIA studies ranging between administrative and legal 
problems as well as application problems. As previously explained in chapter 5, the answers 
from a number of governmental officials4 were about the intervene of the EEAA is only 
through review and approval of the EIA. That section of chapter 5 had ended with a question 
about the actual feasibility of implementation of this study as compared to its problems. 
These cons vary from the intended weakening of the study in order to reduce the obstacles 
facing investors, or putting the EEAA in front of an existing situation by allowing the 
implementation of projects on the ground and then ask for the approval on the environmental 
study. Through the identification of problems of application in the IDP cases, we can confirm 
or deny the problems mentioned in the previous chapter what this part addresses. 
The start of application problems is because the contract, as we mentioned when talking 
about environmental studies, is not obligatory to the developer more than to present a master 
                                                          
4 Refer to Appendix VI, the section entitled “Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study.  
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plan showing the main divisions of industrial types targeted in the IP. This must be done in a 
maximum period of three months of signing the contract. Therefore, this is often done 
without completing marketing and therefore without actual implementation for what is 
already settled based on actual sale of the land plots. Moreover, the general distribution 
provided by the developer is always subject to, as previously mentioned, to the industrial 
demand. This in total means that the EEAA approves a general distribution subject to often 
change. Thus, how is this reconciled with the guarantee of achieving the objective of the 
environmental study? Directing this question to In-G-06, Director of the Central 
Administration of the IZs in the IDA, he stressed on that the revision regarding the 
amendments arising from marketing is made in parallel by the EEAA with the IDA, saying: 
Some developers have joined the program and after taking the land and working 
they found that marketing for themselves has a majority for an industrial activity 
that was minor. He can send me asking to change. I study it and I say ok, adjust 
the master plan, redistribute the activities, and redo the environmental approval in 
parallel with me. The EEAA approves the   developer’s master plan in parallel 
with me so that when the end customer submits his studies things go right. So, 
yes I can amend for the developer according to the regulations I have. (In-G-06) 
En-G-36, Director of the environmental assessment Department in the EEAA, confirmed the 
above, adding that the developer is asked to submit distribution of the industries activities 
shown in the master plan. And in case of changing, the developer has to provide a 
complementary study or just notification in cases of compatibility of activities. Thus the 
developer must coordinate with the EEAA in each step taken in which there is a change from 
what has been approved, and exactly he said:  
No, there is something called sectoral division: what is the sector? Is this sector 
nutritional or building materials’ or what? The developer says I will make 
nutritional with building materials’, another one says plastic with mineral 
materials’, and a third one says I will make it all assembling cars. OK, if he said 
in the study I will make plastic and no one comes for plastic so, he makes a 
complementary study; he must tell me. It is not according to the demand as this 
takes place in old zones depending on clients’ needs. How come this happens 
here as well? Why is it called developer then? He presents a master plan and 
adopts it from the IDA ... He can only change it after returning back to the IDA 
and to be able to change it, the IDA will request an approval from the EEAA 
again. But there is something: for example, if it is plastic industries zone and a 
paper factory comes, there is something called compatible activities. Actually, the 
paper is consistent with plastic. In this case, he can send us and we can say we 
don't mind … Thus every step he takes he must coordinate with me if there is a 
change from what we agreed upon ... But if the change is within the same activity 
he does not come back to us. (En-G-36) 
Moreover, to complete the picture, En-G-36 was asked about their action in case of the 
developer’s change is within the same activity in response to the industrial demand and if the 
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developer is obliged to refer to the EEAA before selling, he replied: No, as the factory itself 
will make a separate study.  
From the foregoing it can be concluded that; first: with the mere notification in case of 
changing the activity within what En-G-36 called compatible activities, the developer, 
additionally, can change the industrial types as he wishes responding to industrial demand as 
long as it is within the same chosen industrial sector without reference to the EEAA. It is 
known that many industrial sectors include a wide range of industrial activities types that 
could be consistent with each other among themselves or with neighbours, while this 
consistency does not occur in case of other types. This wide range of types, for example in 
engineering industries and in miscellaneous industries, is considered as an advantage by some 
developers aiming to benefit from it in marketing5 based on what En-G-36 stated. This leads 
to difference in the image approved by the EEAA than what can be imagined to happen, and 
on the actual feasibility of making an EIA under these rules. Second: In light of En-G-36’s 
statements, that there is no restriction to land surface areas as long as the developer did not 
alter the industrial activity. This raises a question on the impact of that on the IP carrying 
capacity associated with surface areas and number of industries not just their types. It is 
known, according to the updated regulations for the Environment Law in 2005, that the term 
carrying capacity has been added to the elements are to be measured, by the environmental 
study provider for a project of level (C) within an area already having sources of pollution. 
This is to check the degree of the IP acceptance or environmental capacity to accommodate 
new activities. Such as making an industrial extension of an industrial zone or adding a group 
of factories to an existing industrial zone (En-G-36). By knowing that the IPs are examples of 
the projects identified by En-G-36 under non-compliance with the change of surface areas of 
the inner land plots, will the industrial developers be obliged to present a carrying capacity 
study? En-G-36 answered as follows: 
Actually it is supposed to be so, but with the developers working in remote areas 
with little or no high industrial density, so they do not make it. But if the 
developer works in an existing industrial zone or making an extension for it; in 
this case I request a carrying capacity study from him. (En-G-36) 
Since all industrial developer sites are merely extensions of already existing industrial zones, 
see Appendix III for maps, and that 6th of October city and 10th of Ramadan city are 
considered from the most intensive industrial sites, these are the two cities that include the 
three case studies of industrial developers program. The size of contradiction in En-G-36’s 
                                                          
5
 Referee to chapter 6 in the section entitled “Choosing IPs activities”, for the quotation of De-64.  
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talk can be noted and his trial to justify the non-obligation of the developers with this study. 
We conclude from this that the EEAA does not oblige the industrial developer to present a 
carrying capacity study as well as it does not consider the possible impact of non-compliance 
with industrial land surface areas within the industrial activity. 
In addition to what is previously mentioned, this part identifies what the developers 
themselves do as well as their views on the problems have been addressed before. In a 
question about the amendments that occur on the plan linked to the industrial demand and 
marketing and if it requires a re-approval from the EEAA?, De-43, the Executive Director of 
CPC, answered no. in details he said: 
No, no, we have a view on the projects ... and each factory presents an EIA of the 
project. The factory that we find, from the start, messy and will not work properly 
with us we refuse it. If a factory needs an opinion we ask the IDA and it states 
this is within the activity A, B, C. (De-43) 
Therefore, it is understood from this statement other than that stated by En-G-36, the director 
of the environmental assessment administration, concerning that the developer coordinates 
with the EEAA step-by-step in case of the change. This is also confirmed by De-64, the 
Executive Director of IP3, more clearly and powerfully than what told by De-43, saying: 
The role of the EEAA is limited only to the approval of the EIA on the master 
plan, which shows the land plots without the actual allocation of industries. This 
means it shows one type of activity such as engineering industries which includes 
many industrial types. Thus, they are just filling papers and it is just a routine 
work because this master plan completely changes linked to selling. (De-64) 
As a completion to the application problems and by asking En-G-36, Director of the 
Environmental Assessment Administration in the EEAA, about the obstacles they face, he 
answered in a way confirming what was mentioned in the previous statement that the study in 
its entirety is just filling papers and routine work. As the IDA does not give any 
weight/interest where the project is implemented without the EEAA approval. Then they, the 
EEAA, are surprised by sending the study at the time of implementation.  He explained the 
reasons for his rejection of this by saying: 
The project is being implemented and we are surprised by receiving its EIA! ... 
We give opinion on two things: the location and the impact of the project on the 
site. The location could be inappropriate and the project is already implemented, 
how can I give a decision! (En-G-36) 
En-G-16, Director of Legal Administration in the EEAA, confirmed on the same problem 
mentioned by En-G-36 and saying that it is a common problem. He also supported the 
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researcher by many variant official letters6 as examples of a lot of letters directed to him from 
many local administrations (Sixth of October and other cities councils and local 
administrations) reporting cases on operating factories that did not gain the environmental 
approval (Variant-Local-Administrations, 2009, En-G-16). Asking En-G-36 about how this 
happens while contradicting the law, he replied: 
As I told you, there is no coordination between the authorities. The IDA is 
supposed to send to me, as soon as it allots the land to the investor, his model and 
it does not do that. It allots by itself and tells the investor to go and build. After he 
takes the building license and implements, and he wants the operating license 
they tell him go to get approval from the EEAA. Now the law obliges him and it 
used to before that as well. Generally, the legislation is obligatory but the problem 
is in the penalty, as the violation has no penalty as law No. 4 did not include a 
penalty concerning the EIA but the new law No. 9 now exerts a penalty.  It also 
specified that the study is to be submitted before the project implementation. (En-
G-36) 
The viewpoint of the competent administrative authorities in the industrial cities, represented 
by the Deputy Director of the environmental administration of sixth of October city following 
the NUCA, came confirming on that the problem of projects implementation without the 
approval of the environment comes on top of the problems they face7. She added that this 
problem is common but it is in the way for solution because the law No. 9 has put financial 
penalties of up to one million Egyptian Pounds for implementation without having the 
environmental approval. 
En-G-36, The director of the environmental assessment administration, adds another problem 
which, is the lack of seriousness from administrative authorities in reviewing the studies and 
to assured their compliance and accuracy before being sent to the EEAA, clarifying the 
repercussions of that by saying: 
The second thing is that some authorities do not revise the studies and do not 
make sure they meet all the elements. They just send them as they are. I ask for 
completing the uncompleted elements and this is the role of administrative 
authorities. Of course, this increases time for the project owner and thus he is 
negatively affected. (En-G-36) 
En-G-16, Director of Legal Administration in the EEAA, confirmed on the foregoing, adding 
the administrative authorities’ lack of transparency in providing information, explaining the 
following: 
The lack of transparency of the authorities sending the EIA in the point regarding 
the detailed maps, where it is supposed that the authorities make a form or a map 
                                                          
6
 See Appendix X for a copy of some of these letters. 
7
 The researcher conducted some interviews with other environmental specialists and governmental 
environmental administrative that all of them confirm the same problem such as: (Ac-G-11, Ac-09, Ac-15).  
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or an estimated drawing for the proposed location for the establishment of 
industry noting that the drawing area for the proposed industry site does not 
decrease than 6 km2. They have to tell me the different uses in the vicinity of the 
6 km2 surrounding the location as most industries have a safety level of 6 km 
such as fertilizers, cement, iron, and steel industries. They are supposed to have a 
map and the map showing the existing industries, not to write that they don't 
exist. This land is designated for this industry and this for that industry and so on. 
What do they do? they say this is an unoccupied plot, unoccupied, and so on ... 
Those doing the EIA are blind; they just see through paper. They just judge 
through paper.  They do not go to the site ... He has a fertilizer factory surrounded 
by unoccupied plot No. 60 and 70. I do not know what 60 is to be designated for 
nor what 70 is designated for nor 80 for what. The information for me is 
anonymous (vague) and you send them a letter but they don’t reply. Did you get 
me? This is what happens on the ground. (En-G-16)  
IX.3. Conclusion 
Based on the above we can conclude the following: 
Concerning the legal obligation; we find that the contract between the IDA and the developer 
obliges the developer to obtain an approval from the EEAA on the master plan presented 
through the EIA prepared by the developer through specialized technical offices. This master 
plan is to be submitted to the competent administrative authority, which is in our case the city 
council that ensures the fulfilment of the study before being sent to the EEAA for revision 
and then taking the decision. 
About the nature of the study; the EIA is divided into 3 sections: basic data, description of the 
project and its details, and the environmental management and monitoring plans. The 
industrial developer is required to make an EIA for the IP as a whole with its three divisions 
what is called level (C). Then each manufacturer wishes to settle in the IP makes a further 
study for his factory containing the second and third sections what is called level (B) without 
the need for the first section, as it had already been submitted in the IP one. The main reason 
behind demanding the IPs to present a complete study is the shift from IZs owned by the 
Government to involving the private developers as partners in the process. As the EEAA 
performed pressures on the developers taking benefit, of their eagerness for speeding up their 
lands marketing and attracting investors, in imposing making the study for the IP as a whole. 
This was applied through an agreement made between the EEAA and the NUCA. It is worth 
noting that this is an undeclared policy and not based on legal obligation. Or at least there are 
legal loopholes to prevent its application otherwise the EEAA would not have resorted to a 
separate contract to guarantee its application. Therefore the competent administrative 
authorities, including the IDA and the NUCA, do not deal very seriously with this study and 
perhaps the absence of legal obligation, together with the perception that the environment is 
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luxury (something complementary) are behind the lack of respect for the EIA study as well as 
the attempts of neglection that conducted by those authorities. 
With regard to the problems facing the study in practice, we find that they start by the 
adoption in the revision only (according to the contract) of a master plan, which does not 
display more than sectoral division of the industrial activities without actual allocation of 
factories. This leads to expansion of the range in front of the developer to choose types which 
some might correspond with each other or with neighbours while this consensus does not 
occur in the case of other types.  This is linked to the industrial demand and thus the image 
varies from that approved by the EEAA. Thus, this means that such study is just a form that 
lacks a real feasibility. What confirmed this more is the non-legal obligation (according to the 
contract) for the developers to take consent of the EEAA in the case of any amendment or 
change. Any change to the plan means practical change in carrying capacity measurements of 
the IP contrary to what had been approved by the EEAA. In addition, we find the EEAA 
contradictory permit which leads to the understanding that developers are not bound basically 
to doing carrying capacity measurements.  
The administrative legal problems are presented in weakening this study to reduce the 
obstacles in front of the developers. We find that while the project is implemented without 
obtaining the approval of the EEAA, the EEAA is surprised by receiving the project EIA 
study at its time of implementation. This means putting the EEAA in front of de facto and 
therefore it becomes impossible to change the location if it is inappropriate or avoiding its 
impact either internally or on its surroundings. This happened due to the disappearance of 
fines from the law but it continued to happen despite adding fines to the amended law8, owing 
to the lack of the seriousness of the Government in operationalizing these penalties especially 
on big/important investors. Adding to the above confirming on marginalizing the role of 
EEAA and its only tool, the EIA, is what stated by the EEAA from complaints from the 
competent administrative authorities in non-transparent dealing and not providing correct 
                                                          
8 A fine has been developed for offenders in the amendment of the Environment Law, which was in 2009, but 
has not been activated to the time of the research interviews, and still seriousness is lacking in the transfer of 
offenders to court. This is affirmed by the Director of Legal Department of the EEAA in his answer to a 
question from the researcher on the move of the environmental legal records after amending the law, he said: 
I did not make legal records yet and I refuse doing them ... Because what do they send me? Pulp toaster- plastic 
crusher — I will show you the models [see Appendix X for some of these models] they sent to me and you will 
laugh. I mean they (Department of environmental assessment) sent me things I'm sorry will bother you 
psychologically.... Heavy factory do not be sent, these kinds enter on Saturday and take the approval on 
Thursday. On the other side they send me to complete for a restaurant; the chimney is retort or non-conforming, 
or the model was not clear, oh he sent to the district council not to the General Secretary and so on while they 
don’t send the heavy and important factories.   
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information about the projects to push the EEAA to approve the projects. Also the lack of 
seriousness of administrative authorities in reviewing the studies assuring their completeness 
and correctness before being sent to the EEAA. This leads to the EEAA request of 
completing which means prolonging the duration of the process on the project owner. 
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X. OFFICIAL CORROSPONDENCES REPORTING ON OPERATING 
PROJECTS THAT DID NOT GAIN THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
APPROVAL 
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XI. EXAMPLES OF TRANSPARENCY PROBLEM OF THE CITY 
COUNCILS 
This Example of problems that De-281 reported is in giving surrounding roads levels so that 
the engineering team can complete the utilities detailed plans and begin implementation. 
Obtaining this information delayed nearly nine months because of a piece of paper that is 
already available at the city council. In addition, the council pushed them for executing 
incorrectly or by changing the inputs in a conflicting way and demanding an amendment, 
which caused them both financially and time harm. In details De-28 explained this, saying: 
There is information conflict, we received took the land in an official record on 
24/2/2008; a record signed in 10th of Ramadan council for the whole land plan. 
For me to be able to do any planning for any project, I make a topographical 
survey and after that when making a comparison of my work, my level with roads 
level; for about 9 months we were not able to take the roads level from them … 
You are talking about a level, for me to carry out my main roads and make the 
fence I need to know the levels. I've got a major road which is Ismaelia desert 
road and here I have Robiki, thus I have two main roads not a bystreet. We took 
the land on 2/2008. They gave us road schemes (plans) on 3/2009; the road level, 
swedge connection and everything. We stayed with our plan ready and all our 
work ready but unable to implement because we have a difference of 1.5 m in 
some places and 70 cm in others. They keep on telling us to implement and they 
will consider our level. We told them this will not work out as we have general 
main roads that you took off and you left the extension. If I became higher than 
the extension by 1.70 m or you became lower than me by 1.70 m; are you going 
to lower the street to become two levels! This can’t be …Also we did not know 
about the sewage network, which means I started not to know how you will join 
me to it. Once they say here, once they say there and another time they say we 
will put 4 points here so that you and the neighbour are shared. We work this, and 
then they say; No I will supply you from here. The difference is that if I follow 
this I will put a pump station and if I was supplied there I will depend on gravity 
so I won’t need the station.  We adjusted the plans about 4 times which means 
that if my consultancy contract worth amount (x), I paid 40% more for redesign 
differences. Redesign, redesign, every while and it takes time. Our consultancy 
office take it, studies it, gives it to us to revise with the council, and then we 
return it back to him again and so on.  This takes a month or a month and a half  
delay each time. (De-28) 
 
                                                          
1
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
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XII. UNLAWFUL PARLIAMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE IMBALANCE 
Normatively, the legislative authority is a sincere expression of the community conscience.  
Meanwhile, the role of the judiciary is the protection of what the community expressed and 
demonstrated of conscience. The role of the executive authority comes as the hand by which 
the judge disguises those who violate the rule, or protects those who their rights have been 
violated. Here, the importance of legislation comes because if it became corrupt, everything 
follows in the system crashes (Ju-48)1. Is the Egyptian legislature an honest (a sincere) 
expression of the conscience of the Egyptian community? Voluminous studies, articles and 
investigations both locally and globally that talk about elections fraud in Egypt at all levels 
and in particular the parliamentary elections, put us in front of the fact that the legislative 
authority in Egypt, especially in Mubarak’s ruling period are unreflective of the conscience of 
the Egyptian community. The last two councils (People and Advisory ‘Shura’) were 
dissolved after the 25th of January Revolution. The crude forgeries that took place in them 
were considered by many as one of the main reasons that led to the outbreak of the revolution 
(Gharieb, 2011, Abdesalam, 2010, El-Ebrashi, 2010, Khamas-Hawas, 2011, Abo-Bakr, 
2011b). In this context, Ac-55 emphasized on the corruption of the legislative authority 
creating flawed legislative framework which took into account only the interests of its 
authors, saying: 
The legislative framework is flawed and thus it adversely affects the judiciary, 
restricting it as if it does not exist. Why is it flawed? If we come to the MPs ..., 
we will find 10 appointed members and 200 of 444 members the Court of 
Cassation ruled them as invalid membership. Thus, to whom does their loyalty 
go? To those who brought them in. Thus, they will not listen to nor consider the 
interests of someone else other than those who brought them. (Ac-55) 
Therefore and as Ac-55 mentioned, the defective legislative framework has negatively 
affected the judicial authority and almost eliminated its existence. This is consistent with 
what a number of those belonging to the judiciary believe, like (Ju-14) and (Ju-67). In 
addition to those judges, Ju-48, who emphasized on the corruption of the legislative authority 
and its results which is the biggest problem experienced by the judiciary in Egypt. He added: 
The basic point that struck the entire process by flaw is that the Egyptian 
legislative authority is unreflective and is an unreal expression, of the Egyptian 
society ... Therefore what is the result? The result is a legal legislative defect 
                                                          
1
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
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weakening the judicial authority and disabling the law because ‘each pot exudes 
its including’ [Arabic proverb]. (Ju-48) 
Hence, what judicial authority representatives meant along with the experts, and specifically 
which could be understood from the previous text of (Ju-48) about the corruption of the 
legislative authority being like a container (pot) containing rotten things and thus will only 
exudes rottenness. The legislative flaw was a result of the corruption of the legislative 
authority, which accounted for legislation and led it to serve their own interests and the 
interests of those who brought them to legislation sites. From here we can say that the 
beginning of the negative impact of the corrupt legislative authority was by guiding the 
legislations production away from the universally recognized democratic mechanisms. This 
produced conflicting laws and cumbersome to justice, in particular regarding the respect of 
the environment. The next section works out on explaining this as one of the most important 
factors affecting the planning process of the IZs through weakening the role of environmental 
laws in ensuring respect of this process to the environment. 
• Corrupt legislature: monopolizing the legislations production: 
This section discusses the legislation production in Egypt that caused legislature imbalance 
and weakened the legal deterrence towards environmental issues leading to weakening the 
role of environmental agencies and in particular their only tool to ensure the planning process 
of the industrial zones (IZs), EIAs2, respect environment. This appendix answers: how is the 
legislation production performed? How could it be related to democratic ways producing 
legislations? 
Legislations production in all democratic countries has the same bases that do not change. 
Their path is clear where the parliament, elected by the people, does not dispense the people 
themselves. This path does not accept introducing laws projects to MPs before they mature in 
an expanded community dialogue including those in power, experts, the opposition, and 
stakeholders. This is supposed to involve the naysayers before the supporters3 (Hammad, 
2011). Is this what is happening in Egypt? 
                                                          
2
 Environmental Impact Assessment studies 
3
 In Britain, for example, the new legislations, even the legislative amendments, are not forwarded to the House 
of Commons before passing by stages ensuring achieving general consensus, regardless of who proposes laws. 
These stages begin with consultation. This is a task entrusted to the Ministry or Body which the legislation is in 
the sphere of its competence. They explore the opinion of the experts and civil organizations in conjunction with 
governmental agencies. The most importantly is to open a transparent community dialogue and consultation 
with the public through different communication means. The most important of these means are the media and 
direct meetings to find out the opinion of the people, actors in the society, and people of interest. Then the 
legislation is referred to the House of Commons to take another stage again before the vote, called the reading 
stage. This is followed by drafting before being presented to members for discussion and vote. If the law is 
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In answer to this question and to find out how legislations have been made in Egypt, Dr. 
Emad Alhusseini, Professor and academic researcher, explained that the legislations do not 
depend on the scientific method. They are made without reference to the experts and those 
who will be affected by them.  
On the other side, they are issued by the MPs without discussion and always with a 
mechanical approval without reference to the people (LCHR, 2009). Ac-55 agreed with this 
argument, explaining the disruption of that procedure and the reason behind this imbalance, 
by saying: 
The legislative framework is in a mess because it is not based on professional and 
scientific knowledge. The legislative framework outlines should be established by 
professional specialists. The legal specialists then formulate the drafts of the 
legislations to be presented to the parliament to express opinion. In Egypt where 
do drafts come from? They come from the National Democratic Party (NDP) and 
from the parliament that is under the control of the NDP!! That is why the law 
states that every technical authority in the government puts what it requires as 
general outlines. It is then forwarded to the State Council to be presented to the 
Opinion and Legislation Committee for adoption and legally formulated in the 
general legal framework of the State. Then it is presented to the parliament for 
approval and thus implementation. Here in this case, it is not presented to the 
relevant technical authority neither to the State Council. Thus this is a 
considerable disruption. But why is this happening? This is because of the 
monopoly of power within a certain elite. (Ac-55) 
Therefore, from the two former statements it is generally understood that the disorder and 
chaos in the legislations are due to that the parliament accounted for the development of 
legislations away from the scientific method without the involvement of any other party. It 
even excluded the official technical authorities, the body proposing the legislation or that the 
legislation lies in its competence. 
Focusing more on the environmental issue in question and under study in this research, Ju-48 
agreed with the former conclusions about the nature of the defect governing the legislation in 
Egypt. That is as a result of the takeover of the legislature by the task without the 
involvement of experts and community. He also denounced ignoring the democratic 
mechanisms and community participation, which had been applied in Egypt before. Where, 
the opinion, of judges and the people of expertise, was considered regarding penalties and 
their likes under the monarchy. But this and surprisingly disappeared as the reliance became 
only on the specialized committees of the parliament. However, he, (Ju-48), saw that these 
committees and despite the annexation of law professors, advisers, vice cassation court and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
passed by the House of Commons there is a similar course of work carried out by the House of Lords (Hammad, 
2011). 
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assistant ministers, each of them in his field, but they are not the owners of the technical 
opinion freely. Otherwise, they follow the political decision makers. Therefore they are no 
more than a drafting committee not an advisory and study committee. From here comes the 
flaw that has infected the legislation. He projected on the disorder incident in the 
Environment Law No. 9 of 2009 reasoning the imbalance and lack of relevance to the nature 
of Egyptian society and especially with regard to the penalties, due to the issuance of the law 
for presidential desires. These desires are according to Egypt's commitment to international 
agreements which were not approved by the people or even did they explore the people’s 
opinion about them (Ju-48). In this context, he said: 
As example, in the amendments to the sanctions of the environment law - put by 
the legislative authority for showing off, as a claim that we have strong EEAA4, 
strong law of environment. Why did this happen? The State is committed to 
international agreements such as Johannesburg and Rio de Janeiro. The State 
signed these agreements due to a decision of the President without the consent of 
the people or even the parliament with its defects. (Ju-48) 
On another complementary side and getting much closer to the body that the law of the 
environment is in its jurisdiction, En-G-16, Director of Legal Affairs in the EEAA5, denied 
the occurrence of any of the previous mentioned democratic steps. He shared the former 
experts their conclusions, referring to the latest environmental case which is the Environment 
law No. 9 of 2009 for amending the Environment Law No. 4 of 1994. His department did not 
participate in studying the law nor putting it in nor even expressing opinion about it before 
the approval, where he said:  
This amendment is very stupid ... We did not share in it as an environmental legal 
department.... Do you know how this law was amended? Like any research study 
you have. The Dean brings anyone to make it to earn some money. If you tell the 
Dean the subject is concerning concrete and the person you brought is specialized 
in hydraulics, he answers that this person understands concrete as he had studied 
concrete in the second year in his faculty! .... This is the thought ruling here and 
this is what happened at the time of amending the law. (En-G-16) 
From this statement it is understood that there is a committee appointed by the senior 
management including a number of consultants that prepared the law draft or participated in 
its study before being forwarded to parliaments. This might seem different to what is stated in 
the preceding paragraphs of the Parliament monopoly of legislation. However we see that the 
difference, assuming this is existing, is in the method not the outcome. This is what En-G-16 
                                                          
4
 Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency 
5
 The administration concerned with the study of the environment law and its amendments. This is supposed to 
be based on a study involving the opinion of experts and civil bodies in conjunction with relevant governmental 
bodies. The most important is to open a community dialogue about the law and reaching agreement on it before 
referred to the People's Council. 
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referred to in the former statement about the committee consultants as beneficiaries and non-
professionals. Thus monopoly is an agreed result even if the authority in Egypt followed a 
road giving them a legal democratic form which is bare from the actual truth on the ground. 
This can be inferred from the above and also be confirmed by Hammad on how some 
countries, including Egypt, apply the shape of the mechanisms referred to at the beginning of 
this part and not their essence, saying: 
Theoretically, many of the States say that they apply the same mechanisms. Even 
any one of the "remnants" [the term given to the followers of the ousted regime] 
can emphasize that the disbanded NDP performed similar work before submitting 
laws drafts to the parliament. But in the end the promulgation of laws would be 
for the benefit of the same corrupt governing class controlling power, wealth and 
now present in Torah6. (Hammad, 2011) 
The nature of defect in legislation is diverse and multifaceted. The laws include multi-crimes 
for the same act and penalties vary according to different laws (Ju-67). Ju-48 also found that 
it is hard to find like the volume of criminal legislations in Egypt in any other State due its 
large size. It means that since the revolution of July 1952 until today, there is an internal 
sense for the Egyptian citizen that the law is not a means to adjust the society as much as it is 
a tool in the hands of the ruling power to reach a particular goal or interest. Thus with the 
nature of the current provision there is no discipline in the laws. Conflicting provisions and 
conflicting legislation are common because of the speed of issuing them. Then he added: 
Now, legislations are being issued without knowing why. It is possible for me to 
judge in an issue, then I get surprised that there is legal provision valid from a 
month and I did not know about it. Is there in the universe a parliament issuing in 
one parliamentary session from 10 to 15 laws other than treaties?! ... I can judge 
today in a misdemeanour or a contravention, while it has an issued law to 
criminalize it or considering it as a felony and I do not know. This is because of 
the opened barrel of laws throwing laws around the time ... You can find strange 
things that are not important at all involved. These are not for public interest as 
much as they are to serve the personal interests of some people ... Therefore the 
size of the laws judged unconstitutional last year and the year before is quite a 
sum. The last of these laws was the Real Estates tax law. (Ju-48) 
The implications of using expressions such as "an opened barrel throwing laws" and 
"personal interests" with the unconstitutionality of a sum of laws are confirming on all the 
haste and lack of precision and discipline in the way they are put with. Most importantly, it 
strengthens the logic mentioned before, that such legislation is driven by the interests of its 
creators. 
                                                          
6
 One of the prisons of Egypt, where symbols of the ousted regime are imprisoned between some guilty 
spending a period of incarceration and others trapped under pending investigation. 
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We conclude from the foregoing that; the monopoly of legislation by the corrupt legislative 
authority to serve their interests and the interests of the corrupt ruling class, caused a 
legislative imbalance. This imbalance was represented in the chaos of a large number of 
legislations. These legislations are conflicting with multiple and imbalanced penalties (Ju-
48). Thus, this had its impacts on weakening the legal deterrence in general, and regarding 
environmental issues under consideration in particular. This therefore, weakened the role of 
environmental agencies and their legal tools for environmental protection, especially, EIA, 
their only tool to ensure respect of the environment and its considerations by the planning 
process of the IZs7.  
                                                          
7
 Section 7.3.1.2 covers this issue in detail. 
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XIII. ABSENCE OF THE PROMPT JUSTICE 
In his speech on the ninth of January 2011, the day of celebration of the Egyptian judiciary, 
just two weeks before the revolution of the twenty-fifth of January, which brought down his 
regime, the ousted president Mubarak told a selected group (Abo-Bakr, 2011a) of Egyptian 
judges: "We seek prompt justice and convinced that slow justice inherits sense of bitterness 
among citizens." Then in his speech, Mubarak called on Egyptian judges to exert more efforts 
and accelerate the ruling in cases for everyone with a right to gain his right without long 
waiting for litigants or prolonged suffering (Damatsoft, 2011). This refined traditional 
discourse did not bring anything new for almost 30 years which is the duration of Mubarak's 
rule. But rather, He called for the achievement of something he and his regime were the first 
to stand up against it. This is the content of what a number of senior judges in Egypt believe 
in (Abo-Bakr, 2011a). Among them is the Chancellor Judge Zakaria Abdul-Aziz, the former 
head of Egypt’s judges club, where he said: 
Who is standing against the prompt justice? Is it the regime who seeks achieving 
it as the president says?! The regime is the one who is hindering the achievement 
of justice either with unconstitutional laws, or the State by its unstudied decisions 
leading the citizen to resort to justice, or through non-implementation of the 
provisions. There are many provisions issued and the State and its agencies refuse 
their implementation? Is this lead to achieve justice? If we search, we will find 
that the largest proportion of cases in front of the State Council Courts is caused 
by the State and the regime. Who caused the presence of more than 3000 appeals 
to the Administrative Court during the last forged elections? Is not it the 
Government by its flawed proceedings? (Abo-Bakr, 2011a) 
The authority policies throughout the past three decades have established for the absence of 
justice as a value and concept in the Egyptian society. Justice means the presence of a set of 
agreed human values reflected all in a law that people are all equal in front of it.  All the 
people turn to this law to achieve their usurped rights without injustice or delay in the 
recovery of the right. This concept no longer exists in Egypt (Al-Asswany, 2011). 
In light of this introduction this appendix will address the factors causing the absence of 
justice, notably the lack of judiciary independence and the administrative corruption. Also, 
the impact of these two factors on the planning process and in particular the environmental 
regard. Then, it will demonstrate the impact of the absence of justice on the lack of 
confidence, and its relationship to disabling the application of sustainable development 
mechanisms. 
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XIII.1. Executive authority with administrative corruption hinder the independence of the 
judiciary 
There are a number of factors behind the lack of justice in Egypt, but the most prominent of 
which is due to the intrusion of the executive authority over the legislative and judicial 
authorities with the spread of administrative corruption. When the law becomes a tool for the 
expression of the ruler will rather than the people’s will, the imbalance leaks out to 
everything including the ruling regime itself. The judiciary in each state complying with the 
law is the safety and justice valve. Even if one of the other two authorities is corrupted, the 
judicial decisions and ensuring their implementation are enough for the repair (Al-Refaai, 
2011). In Egypt, the executive authority intruded heavily over the legislative and judicial 
authorities. It reached up to the legislative authority setting at the desires of the executive 
authority (as previously explained). Accordingly, extravagant legislation dominated in Egypt 
via a badly elected authority over the past half a century. In this period, legislations were 
issued unnecessarily except to reflect keenness of the executive authority to impose its 
hegemony on the other two authorities whether in their composition or in their performance 
of the daily work. This is to the extent that some judicial decisions are still so far, under the 
Emergency Law, subject to the system of certification from the head of State (Al-Refaai, 
2011)1. The executive authority intervened in judiciary affairs with several means including 
the pressure on the judges through judicial inspection following the Minister of Justice, the 
distribution of certain cases in the courts on certain judges, assignment of judges to work in 
governmental bodies, and the executive authority controlling the bulk of the salaries of 
judges. However, these methods have not succeeded in influencing except only a small 
number of judges (Hassan, 2011, Ju-48). But they restricted much of the judiciary movement 
and ability. They were capable of stripping the judiciary of its usefulness to become a mere 
tool in the hands of the executive authority (Al-Refaai, 2011). 
With the lack of the judiciary independence and the weak of its ability to protect the rights, 
forms of corruption have spread like political and administrative corruption. The sovereignty 
of law was not respected greatly. That, in addition to the enactment of laws that serve the 
favor of powerful groups at the expense of the public interest, as previously noted, the 
implementation of the law and judicial decisions were governed in many cases by political 
and financial influence. Verdicts were implemented against the weak in society, while 
procrastinating implementation or repealing them if they were against those with financial or 
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 This is also mentioned by a large number of the senior judiciary although the text is from (Al-Refaai, 2011) 
and confirmation of the same meaning from (Abo-Bakr, 2011a) and (Ju-48). 
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political clout. These practices led to the weak of the prestige of law in the eyes of people. 
They started seeing it as sword hanging over their necks rather than a means to protect them. 
They dealt with the law in an opposite way. They became not hesitating to break it, and 
circumventing it in various ways (Hassan, 2011). On top of these are the bribes that increased 
and deepened corruption at all State levels. As a natural result corruption has affected 
(reached) the implementation of provisions or editing records and irregularities.  
Environmentally, Dr. Salah Arafa2 agreed with the impact of corruption. He argued that 
despite the abundance of environmental laws but they are without effect as they are not 
implemented due to administrative corruption. Then he added in detail that environmental 
violations are being overlooked following the same pattern of bailiffs in courts who are used 
to say that the address was not evidenced to stop activating the case against those who paid 
them a bribe. He stressed that environmental laws are not binding to those with powerful 
political and financial influence. The MSEA cannot confront them in this regard (Arafa, 
2009). In terms of the judiciary, Ju-48 confirmed that administrative corruption is one of the 
main reasons that force them to disrupt law by halting the execution of the punishment. He 
then showed how, where he said: 
I was trying during the deliberation in environmental violations to stop the 
execution of the sentence in its two parts; that restrictive of freedom and the fine. 
This is because in my point of view the fine will not be paid as the contrary will 
happen. The mechanisms of implementation and environmental crime arrest 
involve corruption. This is due to that he [the environmental arrest officer] did not 
record the simple administrative environmental violation because there is an 
actual violation, but because he has not been paid the 20, 50 or 100 pounds from 
the assumed violator not to record the case. This is the real situation: the 
administrative corruption is the tragedy of the Egyptian environment. (Ju-48)  3  
Then  Ju-48 demonstrated on the impact of corruption by the spread of pollution, appearing to 
the public before professionals, throughout Egypt. Also, that a large proportion of the sources 
of this pollution are working apparently in a legal way by the running permits they illegally 
obtained from the competent administrative authorities. On another hand in addition to the 
above, this "virtual" legal form restricts the judicial. Although it is of the powers of the 
prosecution to intervene to ensure the legality of the permit or request an environmental 
review from academic scientific bodies to ensure the compatibility of a sources of pollution, 
but there are a number of reasons that practically prevent them from doing so. On top of these 
reasons is that a prosecutor is part of the Egyptian people with his bound culture due to the 
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 one of the most important Egyptian environment flags who gained prominence in the international arena 
3
 Ju-14 agreed with this, knowing that the text is for (Ju-48). 
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nature of the general Egyptian case; both economically and socially that sets the 
environmental issue in a low level of his priorities4. That is especially in light of the 
congestion of cases - as previously noted – which does not leave room/time for the 
prosecutor/judge to consider other ones. Second, there is the way of dealing which the 
prosecutor could be subjected to in case he takes such step. He will not find support from his 
superiors. He might even be blamed from the judicial inspection. Ju-48 summarized this 
situation by saying: 
He is to be asked: Why are you going to a factory? There are environmental 
observers and specialized staff already. You have to finish the cases you have 
first then consider this issue. Therefore, he would not repeat it again.... The story 
is: there is administrative corruption in general that the prosecution cannot 
respond to (stand against) due to poor environmental culture and weakness in his 
superiors. This is due to many criteria and circumstances surrounding him if he 
takes such a decision. It might be said that he went to take a bribe or fabricate a 
problem with this factory for one reason or another. Thus who wishes to do his 
work properly will find no one to support him. In addition, the follow up 
mechanisms of the administrative body in charge of the implementation of 
environmental affairs follow up mechanisms are all corrupt and unfit. (Ju-48) 
This statement brings us back again to the first factor affecting the absence of justice which is 
the lack of judicial independence. The situation summed up by Ju-48 confirms what we have 
previously mentioned that the subordination of the inspection to the executive authority 
greatly affected the independence of the jurist in his decisions. Thus it restricts the role of the 
judiciary and directs it to what serves the interests of the executive authority or at least does 
not conflict with them. To clarify the meaning of this result and also in line with the impact of 
corruption fortified with executive authority control, on the breakdown of law and stopping 
the implementation of provisions on people in power and even worse - the words are to  Ju-48 
- challenging the implementation of judicial decisions in the contrary to their operative part. 
The reverse is also true, where what is implemented from the judicial decisions is only 
concerning weak people who do not have acquaintance to protect them to prevent the 
implementation of the sentence against them (Ju-48). The judge then gave a blatant 
environmental example, saying: 
Supreme Administrative Court ruling issued to prevent clubs and hotels of the 
teachers unions, police and armed forces on the shore of Rushdi in Alexandria. 
An environmental NGO has learnt in one way or another that clubs will be set up 
on the campus of the sea and the campus of the sea will be filled for a surface 
area of more than 20 or 30 acres... A case was raised to the Supreme 
Administrative Court. The judiciary has ruled by stopping the decree, what 
happened then? The hotel belonging to the police was built and handed over to a 
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 This is discussed in details in section 7.5.1. 
Appendix XIII 
A 87 
 
private party called "Azur" responsible of it. It is now managing the hotel and it 
generates income for the ministry of interior. Also, the implementation of the 
armed forces hotel and club was done and of course the teachers’ were not 
implemented! (Ju-48) 
Thus it is not only the non-implementation of sentences, but also in Egypt it reaches up to the 
violation of judicial decisions of the top administrative judiciary in Egypt, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, which is equivalent to Court of Cassation in the normal judiciary. So 
the rule of the Supreme Administrative Court has been implemented regarding the teachers' 
union, while the same rule has been waived with respect to police and army clubs which are 
two bodies possessing influence that is not available to the first. Beside the authority given to 
these two sides, which qualified them for violating the provisions of the highest 
administrative judicial body in Egypt, it is also possible that these authorities were using their 
powers in the service of their members, even if it is at the expense of judicial rulings and 
damaging the environment. However, it was not just for this cause, but the main motive 
behind it was corruption in the first place. The company referred to by Ju-48 is a company 
owned by Zuhair Garana, Minister of Tourism in the ousted authority5, where the Minister 
Habib Al-Adli6 – Minister of Interior also in the ousted power – granted the company of the 
former one the right to use the police club hotel in Alexandria for large amounts of money 
(Essisy, 2011). 
XIII.2. Absence of trust and hindering the application of industrial symbiosis 
Environmentally and within the frame of the above, it did not only stop on the extent of 
disabling environmental laws and violating judicial decisions causing severe harm to natural 
environment, but it also extended to creating a general atmosphere of mistrust affecting the 
reciprocal relationships between partners of the development process. Thus, this has hindered 
the application of sustainable development mechanisms such as IS.  
With the judiciary losing its independence and the spread of corruption in the administrative 
system along with this, a large part of achieving justice was lost. The Egyptian society 
therefore, lost the feeling of justice that releases energies and urges them to diligence. The 
Egyptian citizen lost confidence, whether in the authority or in the others around him/her. As 
the last defense wall for the citizen which is the judiciary cannot restore full rights and with 
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 He was sentenced in cases of corruption (BBC-Arabic, 2011). 
6
 He was sentenced to 12 years in cases of corruption (Ahram, 2011). 
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the speed which does not detract from these rights7(Sedky, 2010). It is possible for any citizen 
to find himself going in a vicious circle of cases - despite the clarity of his right - due to the 
absence of prompt justice. Because some has violated one of his rights and it takes years to 
prove this right legally. He might be forced to waive his right or part of it to avoid 
engagement in these stressful procedures which are time and money consuming (Qusya.com, 
2010). This situation of the lack of justice and its impact on the spread of a culture of mistrust 
restricted transactions within the community except only within those where confidence is 
available among them, on their rareness. This is because dealers do not rely mostly on 
contracts for the recovery of rights, but to maintain confidence among them. They know the 
difficulty to engage in judicial proceedings if this confidence has been weakened/shaken or if 
one of them infringe upon the other. En-65 tended to confirm this culture and illustrated it in 
detail, saying: 
Among the things encouraging people to still have trust is that if this trust has 
been shaken, I still have another line of defense which is the contracts and the 
judiciary. For us, this second line of defense does not exist at all. If we have a 
contract, between me and you, we sign the contract to register our confidence. 
But the truth is that if you violated the contract I cannot think about going to the 
judiciary. The process does not deserve with the size of our contracts. (En-65) 
Getting from general to specific, in a toppling on the planning process for IZs and specifically 
on the impact of the absence of prompt justice and lack of confidence on the nature of 
relations between partners of the industrial process, it can be said that this culture has heavily 
influenced the limitation of these cooperative relations between partners and each other. 
Lacking these relations contradicts one of the most important principles of IE in order to 
achieve IS (Boons et al., 2011). In a clear translation of this matter from the perspective of 
reality, En-65 explained one of the experiments where he failed to achieve cooperation 
between two companies - in the town of Ain Sokhna, where there is difficult access to water. 
This was in order to benefit one of them from the treated wastewater of the other instead of 
buying water or desalination of sea water as both techniques are high cost. En-65 explained 
the reason behind this, saying: 
I have an industry line having a problem to get rid of the used cooling water. I 
have also a tourism line having a problem of getting water. I tried to compromise 
between the two as it is nonsense that you are here throwing water and do not 
know how to use it, while, the guy on the other side needs water and cannot find 
it. I tried to coordinate between them and found out that I am wasting my time.... 
The problem is that the tourism guy is not confident that the cooling water, the 
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 According to the researcher at the American University, Safaa Youssof Sedky, in her own doctoral dissertation 
in the Sadat Academy for Administrative Sciences that 81% of the Egyptians affirm the slow pace of litigation 
and that they are marred by routine killing hope in the arrival of the proceedings to an end. 
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other one will give him, will be suitable for irrigation. He is not sure that it will 
contain something contaminated ... The problem is “when you don't have the 
trust” nothing can be done... The main issue is that he does not trust the other side 
... He tells you: suppose we signed a contract and the monitoring system appeared 
to be damaged, what shall we do? To whom shall we go? There is neither 
judiciary nor law to protect this and quickly. Unfortunately there are numerous 
options in Egypt if we trust each other to sort it out. The actual case is that 
everyone keeps away from the other. They say the door that brings the wind, 
close it and keep yourself rested. (En-65) 
Therefore, due to loss of confidence and because of the impact of the absence of prompt 
justice, this experiment failed along with many others. The relationships, that may lead to 
success of the implementation of the mechanisms for achieving sustainable development, 
represented in IS, have disappeared.  
We conclude from the foregoing that with the central autocracy, the executive authority 
dominated over the legislative and judiciary authorities. This led to weakening the judiciary's 
ability to protect rights. Where, the financial and political influence intervened in the 
implementation of the law and provisions. They were applied on the weak and the strong was 
pardoned. This led to shacking the prestige of the law. The people felt that it is a sword 
hanging over their heads not protecting them. Thus, they antagonized the law and 
circumvented it. So, corruption spread. The environmental issue did not violate that rule 
where, despite the abundance of environmental laws, the corruption disrupted them in several 
ways. First, this was through disabling the implementation of the provisions on the people of 
influence, and their application on the weak people. Second, by the judges themselves, where 
they blocked the application of the law, knowing that the irregularities were edited against the 
weak people not because they are violators as much as they did not respond to the records 
editors requesting bribes not to edit these records. Thirdly, it was through the exploitation of 
the administrative corruption to legalize the situation of pollution sources. Thus, blocking the 
judiciary interference, even if individually, as it will be blamed by the judicial inspection 
following the executive authority. It did not stop at the limit of environmental destruction as a 
result of the encroachment of the executive authority, the spread of administrative corruption 
and the lack of implementation of verdicts, but all of this resulted in the absence of prompt 
justice. That was through slow litigation and its weakness in the restitution of rights to their 
respective owners. It led to a loss of confidence of citizens in the ruling authority first and 
secondly in each other. As a result, to avoid problems, the cooperative relations disappeared 
between dealers in money in general, and between the parties within the system of IZs in 
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particular. Therefore, the attempts to apply mechanisms of sustainable development such as 
IS disappeared, because of the lack of the necessary context for cooperation. 
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XIV. AC-G-03’S EXAMPLES ON CORRUPTION 
According to Ac-G-031, corruption has the biggest influence in guiding the decision-making. 
He gave a number of examples, they are as follows: 
Gamal Mubarak’s father in law built a neighborhood called New Giza. The GOPP 
gave him an illegal letter just for being Gamal Mubarak’s father in law. He came 
with the letter requesting things from 6th of October governorate. I am the 
governor’s consultant. When the governor presented it to me, I told him that is 
wrong. He asked: What about it Doctor? The letter is from the GOPP. I said but 
this is still wrong, as the law stated so and so. He wanted to flatter him anyway. I 
took the letter to the Head of the GOPP and asked him how could such a letter be 
issued? He acted as if he is surprised. He called his deputy and asked how was 
such letter issued from here? He started pretending and acting. He said: can you 
believe I remained for two weeks not knowing what to do with this letter as I was 
worried of it. Then he called the one responsible of infrastructure in the GOPP, 
and they both continued pretending and acting. You can understand what I mean. 
Everything can be illegally accessed just for being someone powerful. 
Ac-G-03 also mentioned a recent example in this regard. It is concerning the irregularities, 
the agricultural administration in the governorates deals with to protect the agricultural area 
from building on it. He said: 
Whose law is it? The important point is that there is an existing law but who acts 
regarding this law? Who is to apply this law? Sorry but you are saying there is a 
law forbidding building on agricultural land. Well someone working in 6th of 
October governorate told me that Shehab Mazhar (a politically and financially 
influential person) is building on agricultural land. As  he demolished the 
building as stated in the law, he was surprised by the Minister of Agriculture 
blaming him saying: Can’t you distinguish between people you “donkey” he 
meant idiot!! 
Therefore, it is assumed that, who puts laws, adjusts the irregularities and moves the lawsuits 
against them, which is the executive authority, is the first to sponsor the violation pursuant to 
the interests of powerful financial and political people. Thus absence of legal deterrence helps 
the personification of the legal and political decision and its direction to serve the interests of 
influential people along with neglecting scientific logic and studies ensuring efficient 
planning leading to randomness of the planning process and randomness of the product. 
                                                          
1
 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
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XV. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETUP LACKING TRANSPARENCY 
This appendix discusses the lack of transparency as one of the most important factors that 
have created the appropriate atmosphere for the growth of corruption. It addresses the state of 
lack of transparency controlling the institutional framework of the State and the planning 
process of IZs as part of this framework.  
Many writers and experts of different specialties have monitored the lack of transparency of 
the State apparatus and how it affects the spread of corruption (Elmasry, 2010, Yassin, 2010, 
Mansour, 2010). The economic expert, Ahmed Al-Sayed Al-Naggar, had attributed the 
spread of corruption to the lack of transparency and the absence of disclosure of the State 
information, its economic works and its financial affairs, enabling governmental and senior 
State officials to break the law and breach the career obligations in order to achieve graft 
without having to disclose the information against them (Ahram-Digital, 2011). Ac-551 
agreed with this argument and asserted that the community can not exercise its oversight role 
because of the lack of information, where he said: 
For the community to perform its supervisory role, it should at least have the 
necessary information to revise and monitor. Here there is no transparency and if 
you request information and data: It is not allowed. There is no law to allow 
circulation of information. The opposite is true. We have confidentiality of data. 
If you take an employee’s statement to a newspaper you will be punished by 
imprisonment from 3 to 7 years... Thus this is opposite to the transparency; you 
are applying confidentiality of information. (Ac-55) 
So, the State was not only just withholding information, but it has also legalized its 
confidentiality to protect the totalitarian regime and its interests. Thus, this state of cloudiness 
experienced by the State in Egypt is what has allowed and prepared for corruption to spread 
and to become a key feature of the institutional framework of the State. Therefore, it was 
natural that the characteristics of this framework were reflected to all its constituents as long 
as the same environments exist under the auspices of the totalitarian regime, as well as the 
absence of scientific method in decision-making and the spread of randomness and chaos. 
Lack of transparency did not only help protect the corruption, but it also prevented planning 
for the future leading to the disappearance of good atmosphere for investment and 
development. The planning process of IZs was one of the most important of these 
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 An indication for an interview/ee, the code may contain some of the following abbreviations that mean: En = 
Environmental, In = Industrial, Ac = Academic, De = Industrial Developer or Development Officer in local 
administration units, Ju = Judge, G = Governmental position (it will appear if applicable), NGO = A member of 
environmental NGOs boards of directors, Numbers = Serial Number of the interview/ee 
Appendix XV 
A 93 
 
atmospheres, which inherited the lack of transparency. It lost contact with sustainability and 
its mechanisms, on top of which; the IE, this is discussed in chapter 7, section (7.6.2). 
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